T
950
V.1+2

German activities and German Arab relations in the Fertile Crescent countries, with emphasis on the current century

Anita M. Gilleo

1968

ProQuest Number: 27550216

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

ProQuest 27550216

Published by ProQuest LLC (2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

T
950
v.1

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

German Activities and German-Arab Relations in the Fertile Crescent Countries, with Emphasis on the Current Century

by

Anita M. Gilleo

Approved:

Dr. Joseph J. Malone, Adviser

Dr. Zeine N. Zeine, Member of Committee

Dr. Nicola A. Ziadeh, Member of Committee

Date of Thesis Presentation: April 5, 1968

GERMAN ACTIVITIES AND GERMAN-ARAB RELATIONS IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES, with Emphasis on the Current Century

by

ANITA M. GILLEO

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts in the
Middle East Area Program of the
American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Lebanon
1968

ERRATA AND CORRIGENDA

Page 48, note 119, l. 7: Change "as" to "was".

Page 114, l. 20 from bottom: Change "1939" to "1932".

Page 114, last line: After "Company" insert "(1943)".

Page 115, l. 3 above quoted material: Change "Naji" to "Sami".

Page 115, l. 2 above quoted material: Change "Director" to "Director-General".

Page 126, l. 6 from bottom: Correct to "thoroughly".

Page 138, l. 9: Delete "von" and substitute "Oscar".

Page 159, l. 1: Change "about 9" to "7.30".

Page 159, note 98, second to last line of text of directive: Correct to "definitely".

T
950
v.1

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

German Activities and German-Arab Relations in the Fertile Crescent Countries, with Emphasis on the Current Century

by

Anita M. Gilleo

Approved:

Dr. Joseph J. Malone, Adviser

Dr. Zeine N. Zeine, Member of Committee

Dr. Nicola A. Ziadeh, Member of Committee

Date of Thesis Presentation: April 5, 1968

ABSTRACT

The Fertile Crescent is an area to which Germany has for a hundred years been attracted by raw materials and markets, by opportunities for economic development, by its appeals to scholarly curiosity of the highest order, by a geography and climate utterly different from its own--by every motivation from the noble desire to live a more truly Christian life in the holiest of lands to simple search for a refuge in adversity. Periods of German ascendance in the Fertile Crescent have been brief and those of intense official German interest of but slightly longer duration. German influence never reached the stage of governmental control and had always to be won in competition with other, nearly always stronger, European Powers. Although this competition never evolved into a military contest concentrated in the Fertile Crescent, military contests did follow upon each period of ascendance, culminating in major setbacks for Germans with Middle Eastern ambitions, of whatever type. The sharing of the consequent trials, through which Germany and the Fertile Crescent have passed as fellow sufferers rather than as opponents, helped create and strengthen the unique relationship called "the traditional German-Arab friendship".

Extract from interview by West German weekly news-magazine with Jordanian General Sherif Nasir, uncle of King Husein, shortly after the June war--

Gen. Nasir: We have always been the friends of the free world. . . . We have fought two world wars on the side of this free world. If it treats us so badly, we ought to re-examine our position.

Interviewer: With respect to the Germans also?

Gen. Nasir: The Germans could have helped us a great deal. We have to pay for your errors. Since Hitler's time we have admired the German people. I have been in Germany and I know the feelings of the people. We love that country and it is not the people who have disappointed us. We hope that one day the true Germans will come to power.

--Der Spiegel, XXI, No. 28 (July 3, 1967), p. 61.

Perhaps without realizing it many of us are still reading from a yellowed, outdated page the history of the Orient that was, while the Near East of today is calling to us...

. . . . . .

But the time of comfortable distances is long past, just as the tales from the Thousand and One Nights are no more than tales. . . . In truth, the Crescent has almost never dispensed a mild, romantic light!

. . . . . .

The Near East is calling to us, as we have experienced again and again.

--Reinhard Hüber, Allahu Akbar--Nahost ruft uns (Heidelberg; 1954), pp. 12-13.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I. GERMAN-ARAB RELATIONS THROUGH THE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I 3

The German Presence in Palestine
Growth of Other German Interests in the Near East
The Peaceful Crusade
The Hejaz Railway
Bagdad Railway Construction Begun
Other Aspects of the German Presence in Iraq
Germany in Syria and Lebanon
The Eve of World War I
The War Years
The Danger Past

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I 38

CHAPTER II. THE FATA MORGANA FRIENDSHIP 56

The German View
The Arab View
Lebanese Opinion
Syrian Opinion
Iraqi Opinion
Jordanian Opinion
Epilogue

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II 79

CHAPTER III. THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939) 90

German Contacts with the Near East during the Decade Following World War I
German-Fertile Crescent Trade in the Twenties and Thirties
Other Relations between Germany and the Fertile Crescent during the Thirties

Page

Official Policy
Arab Reaction to Nazi Blandishments and Accomplishments
Palestine
Transjordan
Syria and Lebanon
Iraq
The "True World War"

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III 119

CHAPTER IV. WORLD WAR II IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 133

Third Reich Relations with Arab Nationalists
September 1939 to Mid-1942
Transjordan
Syria-Lebanon
Iraq
Mid-1942 to Mid-1945

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 151

CHAPTER V. THE FIRST POSTWAR DECADE (1945-1955) 161

Trade, 1945-1955
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
Iraq

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V 175

CHAPTER VI. THE SECOND POSTWAR DECADE (1956-1965) 182

A Last Word on Adolf Hitler
Orientalistik (Practical and Academic) as the Sixties Began
Trade Triumphant
Investment and Aid
Other Contacts
The Problem of the "Two Germanies" and the Fertile Crescent Countries
West German Relations with Israel
The Controversy over West Germany's Relations with Israel
The Diplomatic Break
The End of an Era
Lebanon and East Germany
Lebanon and West Germany
Jordan
Iraq and East Germany
Iraq and West Germany

Page

Syria and East Germany
Syria and West Germany

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI 260

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 292

The Special Problem of Technical Assistance
Vying Viewpoints and the Search for a Viable Policy

FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 304

APPENDIXES

A. Terminology for Near and Middle East
B. German Commentary on the Arabs
C. Content of Nazi Propaganda Directed at Arab Countries
D. Organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany Charged with Aid to Developing Countries
E. Chronology of Euphrates Dam Negotiations

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE

Germany's late acquisition, in 1884, of colonies in Africa and their loss scarcely thirty-five years later with defeat in World War I has left her with a colonial past which is little more than an historical curiosity.[1] Other attempts to extend her sphere of influence have been even less enduring. As a result, her colonial career was too brief, and her colonial ambitions too far from realization, to make a lasting imprint on world opinion. Ironically, the frustration to its expansionism suffered by the Second Reich, and the thwarting of the Third Reich's efforts to redress those wrongs, are yielding benefits now to the Reichs' non-expansionist successor states. Partly because of this lack of a significant colonial past, West Germany has been able to extend trade and aid to formerly mandated lands of the Near East to a degree that has called forth embittered accusations of neo-imperialism from some quarters.[2]

Has there at any time been a true German sphere of influence in the countries of the Fertile Crescent? What are the background, actualities, and prospects for the German presence in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria? How do German relations with these Near Eastern nations in the twenty years following World War II compare with the no less eventful two decades which followed World War I?

In the gathering of facts and opinions to answer these questions, limits have been set to render the topic more manageable: the Ottoman Empire, Palestine, and the Israel question (including the Zionist movement) will be dealt with only where their bearing on events and situations in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, or Syria make their inclusion advisable. Wartime policy and operations will be discussed only as deemed significant to the main topic of relations between Germany and the Fertile Crescent countries. Religious or charitable foundations and enterprises of

all sorts, splendid as their work has been, will be touched on only as they seem pertinent.[3]

Searching of lists of publications and conversation with German specialists in Near Eastern affairs have revealed a post-World War II scarcity of books in German on current Near Eastern problems, and particularly of those on Germany's relations with the Near East. The trend appears to be to broad-sweep histories of the area and to grand surveys including the Far East, the Crusades not having been neglected, however. Now and again, a volume devoted to the "Orient" as traditionally understood in German (see Appendix A) has appeared. Even so, mentions of Germany's relations with the Near and Middle East are rarely to be found therein--quite a contrast with the turn-of-the century polemics called up by innumerable schemes for restoration of the ancient productivity of the Fertile Crescent as an outlet for German enterprise. Travel and religiously-oriented books on the area nonetheless continued to enjoy their traditional popularity.[4] All in all, the rate of publication since the early 1950s, when reconstruction in Germany was finally well under way, does not compare with the spate of tomes on the Near and Middle East immediately preceding and during the war years. Sales figures from the 1938-1945 era would be of interest as an indication of the justification for some three dozen books on essentially the same subject during those years.[5]

The modest postwar rate of publication--which is now supplemented by television reporting[6]--may be more realistic in view of the German public's current lack of serious interest in Near Eastern problems as attested to by German journalists interviewed. Typical is a diminuitive volume of 168 pages, published in 1955, which seems to have been designed to encourage but not to tax that limited interest:

> The Near East, where in our time the civilizations of the West and East meet, was for thousands of years quite simply the civilized world. . . . Since its economic, political, and strategic significance has been appreciated anew, discussions of this area receive special consideration. Nevertheless, knowledge of the past of the Near East, which has such an important place in the history of the human race, has remained remarkably limited.[7]

As for official German interest in the Near and Middle East, this has been directed far more intensively and more continuously to the lands surrounding the Fertile Crescent--Turkey, Iran, Egypt--than to the Fertile Crescent countries themselves. The events which are recorded in this account of a hundred years of German presence in the Fertile Crescent were therefore rarely at the focus of interest of even those officials charged with the making and execution of policy for the Orient.

---

[1] Adolf Hitler's exploitation thereof notwithstanding.

[2] See below, pages 78 and 96, for examples.

[3] The hospital of the Catholic Sisters of St. Charles Borromaeus (Heiliger Karl Borromäus) in Beirut will serve as an excellent example. They also established a school and a hospice.

[4] P. Bamm, Frühe Stätten der Christenheit (Munich: 1955, with 13 additional printings, the latest of which was dated 1963) and P. Schütz, Zwischen Nil und Kaukasen (3rd ed. rev.; Kassel: 1953) are good examples of books which are both.

[5] Some of them were very extensive: I. E. Kirchner's Der Nahe Osten (Munich: 1943) runs to nearly 1,000 pages and covers a much vaster area than its title indicates.

It is not unanimously agreed that this flood of books was officially encouraged. "Money was available for such things then," one of my informants pointed out, but the retired diplomat who was the Third Reich's minister in Iraq denied that any motivation other than a desire to be read inspired these writers.

[6] Frequency of articles on Near and Middle Eastern questions in serious political periodicals is also not high. Aussenpolitik, with a greater number than most others examined, has averaged about two a year during the past fifteen years.

[7] H. L. Kaster, Kleine Geschichte des Orients (Frankfurt am Main: 1955). Numerous passages in this work were found to be nearly identical with portions of G. E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, the sixth revised edition of which appeared in 1960.

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Imports into Fertile Crescent Countries from Germany as Percentages of Each Country's Total Imports, 1925-1946	93
2.	Exports to Germany from Fertile Crescent Countries as Percentages of Each Country's Total Exports, 1925-1946	94
3.	Exports from Germany to the Orient as Percentages of Total German Exports, 1929-1938	95
4.	Imports into Fertile Crescent Countries from West and East Germany as Percentages of Each Country's Total Imports, 1956-1965	193
5.	Exports to West and East Germany from Fertile Crescent Countries as Percentages of Each Country's Total Exports, 1956-1965	194
6a.	Imports into West and East Germany from the Near and Middle East as Percentages of Total West and East German Imports, 1956-1965	195
6b.	West German Imports from Fertile Crescent Countries, 1963-1965	195
7a.	Exports from West and East Germany to the Near and Middle East as Percentages of Total West and East German Exports, 1956-1965	196
7b.	West German Exports to Fertile Crescent Countries, 1963-1965	196
8.	Annual and Total Private West German Investment in the Nations of the Fertile Crescent, 1952-1965	198

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Imports into Fertile Crescent Countries from Germany as Percentages of Each Country's Total Imports, 1925-1946	93
2.	Exports to Germany from Fertile Crescent Countries as Percentages of Each Country's Total Exports, 1925-1946	94
3.	Exports from Germany to the Orient as Percentages of Total German Exports, 1929-1938	95
4.	Imports into Fertile Crescent Countries from West and East Germany as Percentages of Each Country's Total Imports, 1956-1965	193
5.	Exports to West and East Germany from Fertile Crescent Countries as Percentages of Each Country's Total Exports, 1956-1965	194
6a.	Imports into West and East Germany from the Near and Middle East as Percentages of Total West and East German Imports, 1956-1965	195
6b.	West German Imports from Fertile Crescent Countries, 1963-1965	195
7a.	Exports from West and East Germany to the Near and Middle East as Percentages of Total West and East German Exports, 1956-1965	196
7b.	West German Exports to Fertile Crescent Countries, 1963-1965	196
8.	Annual and Total Private West German Investment in the Nations of the Fertile Crescent, 1952-1965	198

INTRODUCTION

An abstraction with an existence largely detached from the course of events, without a discernible beginning and persisting despite vigorous official condemnation: thus is an impartial observer led to conceive of the phenomenon of the "traditional German-Arab friendship". West German Near East specialists disavow any clear knowledge of its origin or supposed roots. The ancient beginnings to which it has been attributed have surely been adduced after the fact, attractive though the resulting legend is. An account of these beginnings, one which reaches back the farthest into history of any encountered in research for this thesis, appeared in 1960 in The Egyptian Economic and Political Review:

> Arab-German relations have always been cordial; they are also very long established. The first recorded relationship goes back to the year 800, when a German delegation visited the Caliph Haroun al-Raschid's governor of Kairoun Ebn Aghlab in Tunisia. The mission, political in its intentions, sought to enroll Arab assistance in matters connected with European politics.
>
> A few years later an Arab delegation from Bagdad visited the city of Aachen, . . . thereby establishing the first friendly political relations between Arabs and Germans. Some 300 years later the Emperor Fredric the IInd Hohenstaufen, an unwilling crusader, terminated the fifth crusade in an unexpected manner by treaty with the Arabs. On the 18th of February 1929 the first treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed by German and Arab, represented on this occasion by the Sultan al-Kamil of Egypt and the Emperor Fredric. The next German Emperor to visit the Arab world was Kaiser Wilhelm the IInd Hohenzollern, whose momentous visit to the Holy Land is still the subject of discussion and historical controversy.[1]

It is in fact likely that the legend of traditional friendship is essentially the lengthened shadow of one man--the discredited and largely forgotten last German emperor. The modern history of German-Arab contacts begins two decades before Wil-

helm's accession to the throne, however, and hence date back a full century. These contacts, with their antecedents, and the special nature of the relationship which has developed from them, are the subject of the chapters which follow.

---

[1] "The German Contribution to Arab Industry" in Supplement: "Germany and the UAR", The Egyptian Economic and Political Review VI (July-August 1960), IX-XI.

CHAPTER I

GERMAN-ARAB RELATIONS THROUGH THE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I

As the nineteenth century was drawing to a close, German activity in the Fertile Crescent area attracted the attention of the Great Powers of the day but caused them no notable concern. Calm assurance was the tone of a French survey of the situation published in 1900:

> It is clear, then, that Germany expends its efforts chiefly in Palestine, but if one compares the results obtained with those of other nations, one sees that, despite its very active propaganda, Germany still lags far behind England, the United States, and, above all, France.[1]

Fifteen years later the Fertile Crescent was to become a battleground in the struggle between the Allies (here chiefly the British) and the Central Powers.

The German Presence in Palestine

Because their influence has been carried into present-day Jordan by annexation and emigration, German institutions and settlements in Palestine require mention even though this area has in general been excluded from the scope of this study. Formal German presence is considered as dating from 1841, when an Anglo-Prussian agreement (which was ended in 1886) set up a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem. The first Prussian bishop arrived in 1846; in the meantime (1842), a Prussian consulate was opened. In the 1850s various German religious orders or missionary groups opened pilgrim hostels,[2] hospitals, and other institutions to aid the unfortunate. In the 1860s were founded the Talitha Kumi girls' school of the Kaiserswerther Sisters and the Schneller orphanage and vocational school.

Replacement of the Prussian consulate by a German one upon the formation of the Second Reich in 1871 was followed by intensified German activity: the creation of hospitals, establishment of numerous churches both Lutheran and Catholic, and multiplication of German-run schools. These latter included the Schmidt's Girls School of the Deutsche Verein vom Heiligen Land, a school for the blind at the Schneller "Syrian Orphanage", and, eventually, a total of five schools under the auspices of the Jerusalem Verein (headquarters in Berlin).[3]

The Deutsche Palästina-Verein for Palestine research was formed and began periodical publication of its members' papers in Leipzig in 1878. The initial issue of the organization's Zeitschrift stated its regret at the role of "silent onlooker or at most of one who works over materials brought to light by others" to which German scholars had to that date been confined in Palestine research.

In the late 1860s also appeared the first of the so-called Templar colonies, which eventually numbered nine (six of them agricultural) with about 2,000 members. Though never in any way a manifestation of official German policy, they were eventually--in the 1930s--exploited politically. Locally, they unquestionably played an informal role in forming the Arabs' image of Germany. A 1932 source explained their character and origins:

> The German Templar settlements (Templersiedlungen) in Palestine play no significant role in Palestinian agriculture as a whole. They are, however, significant through their origin and their successful agricultural work.
>
> Here also it was not material considerations and prospects of profit which moved the European colonists to settle in Palestine. As an antidote to the religious shortcomings of the time, a community of all those who wanted to live true Christian lives independent of church and state was to be formed. Christoph Hoffmann and G. D. Hardegg, the leaders of the movement, . . . saw in Palestine the land in which the Temple societies could realize their concept.[4, 5]

There were also settlements of German Jews. In fact, the large number of German-speaking Jews in the neighborhood of Jerusalem is said to have given the German language a supremacy there which was exceptional in the Near East. The German section of the

Alliance Israelite Universelle, known as the Hilfsverein der Deutscher Juden, established agricultural colonies in the vicinity of Jaffa and Haifa as well as of Jerusalem and formed, to all appearances, an "integral part of the German community in the Holy Land".[6] Its insistence on retaining German as the language of instruction in its schools, including the Technical Institute at Haifa which was operated in conjunction with the Zionist organization, led to a break with the latter.[7]

It is interesting to note that accusations of German ambivalence with regard to Zionism and Jewish emigration to Palestine date back more than half a century. Le Mois Colonial, anxious for French hegemony in Syria, complained in 1910:

> William II, always a clever politician, has been able to use a two-handed weapon. On the one hand, in favoring the exodus of the Jews towards the Holy Land he is able to rid Germany of a people who in general are extremely unpopular and are often badly treated; whilst on the other hand, as these Jews retain the status of Germans, a nationality of which they are proud, and are assured of the protection and help of their Emperor, they constitute a powerful agent in his policy of peaceful penetration.[8]

The British view, too, was that Zionism was promoting German interests, but these suspicions subsided with the strong anti-Zionist stand taken by the Turkish government in 1913.[9]

In 1899, a group of German financiers founded the Deutsche Palästina Bank. Branches were soon opened in Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, and Tripoli.[10]

Growth of Other German Interests in the Near East

Apart from these diverse undertakings in Palestine, until 1870 Germany's contacts with the Fertile Crescent were principally confined to missionary activities in Syria and a small amount of trade. This latter was hindered until 1889 by the necessity for shipping goods via Trieste and misunderstandings stemming from the unfamiliarity with commercial customs of the Levant. Industrialists of the Rhineland and Westphalia organized a Deutsche Handelsverein (trading association) in 1880 to encourage trade with the East in view of the Balkan countries' having become independent.

However,

> this association did not have a long life. For the Germans the Levant was still an almost completely unknown territory, and many a misunderstanding arose which cost the association dearly. Then it was attempted to bypass the experienced merchants and deal directly with the users, thereby taking too little into account the special character of the Levantine customer.[11]

Already in 1872 the Ottoman government had had recourse to a German engineer, Wilhelm von Pressel, as adviser for railway construction, foreshadowing a long and eventful German participation in the Empire's provision with railways. A line to Basra was already being considered. In the meantime,

> adorned with a pompous title, Pressel was commissioned . . . to undertake the necessary studies. In the years 1872/1873 five thousand kilometers [of route] were laid out under his supervision in Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Kurdistan, including the route Alexandretta--Aintab--Birečik--Urfa--Diyarbakir--Mardin--Mosul--Erbil--Kirkuk--Deli Abbas--Bagdad.[12]

It was von Pressel who built the line from Haidar Pasha to Ismid, authorized by royal irade in 1871. Beginning in 1888, German firms associated in a syndicate undertook the extension of the Anatolian railways, having been granted a concession for a line from the Bosporus to Ankara.

In 1889 the Deutsche Levant Linie began providing shipping service to the Near East once every three weeks, the "Levant" at that early date indicating only Turkish ports. (Seventy-five years later there are some twenty sailings a week from German North Sea ports to the Levant.) Cooperation among eighteen railway companies in existence in Germany at the time made possible direct shipping to the Levant from almost any German railway station on a single shipping document.[13] No German ships called regularly at Syrian and Palestinian ports until 1896, although in 1895, a peak year, four had called at Beirut, five had appeared in the Red Sea, and three had called at Basra.[14]

In 1890 a trade agreement was concluded by the Second Reich with the Ottoman Empire[15] and despite "accidents at sea, earthquakes, epidemics, storms, and bad harvests"--and absence of

any government subsidy--exchange of goods rapidly expanded, and "at long last the initial mistrust in commercial and industrial circles with regard to trade with the lands of the Levant was fully overcome."[16]

The resulting competition was annoying, though far from ruinous, to the British. The energy with which the German traders, with the help of their consuls, "pushed their wares" and even sought to adapt them to the needs of their Oriental customers was viewed with distaste. Furthermore, the German goods were of low quality, "but they were cheap."[17] (Even Mosul records showed imports from Germany in 1895 to a value of about Fr.40,000. Bagdad that year imported goods valued at Fr.1,237,500 from Germany.)

Meanwhile, Germany's victory over France in 1870, more than one historian insists, had favorably disposed the Turks, "always easily impressed by military success",[18] to cooperation with Germany. Need was in any case felt for a counterweight to British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882, and against Britain's moves to ensure to herself exclusive control of the Persian Gulf.[19]

Fifty years previously, in 1835, Captain Helmuth von Moltke, at the head of a handful of Prussian officers, had been engaged by the Ottoman Sultan to bring his army up to something resembling a modern standard. In this von Moltke claimed to have succeeded against indifference and ignorance, but he saw all his group's work undone at the 1839 battle with Ibrahim Pasha's forces at Nazib in Syria.[20]

In 1883 Sultan Abdul Hamid II turned again to the Prussians for help, inviting the German emperor to send him a military mission for a similar purpose. Some seventy German officers headed by General Colmar von der Goltz duly arrived to serve, in part, as instructors at the Staff College.[21] (Von der Goltz remained until 1895, returned from 1909 to 1911 and again during World War I.) Of special significance to the study of German-Arab relations in the Fertile Crescent area is the fact that numerous students of these German instructors were young Arabs from all parts of the Ottoman Empire who were later to attain great influence, even

power. Aziz Ali from Egypt--hence, "al Masri"--and Nuri al-Said from Iraq were two such.[22] Meanwhile, von der Goltz' reports were familiarizing his government with the "conditions and prospects of the Turkish realm".[23]

German interest in the Mesopotamian region was gradually mounting. Von Moltke, said to have first found his way to Asia Minor on special leave to make a study of military topography, provided "the earliest evidence of appreciable German interest in this part of the world".[24] During his long stay he strenuously explored and mapped part of Mesopotamia, which he saw as a natural route for overland communication by means of that still-infant invention, the railway.[25] Swelling German emigration to the Americas had disturbed von Moltke as it had increasing numbers of writers in German on social and economic questions--among them Friedrich List, Prince von Bülow, and Aloys Sprenger, the Orientalist.[26] Settlement of German emigrants in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and even in Syria and Mesopotamia was suggested as an alternative more beneficial to the Fatherland,[27] whose naval inferiority at that time did not permit an "oceanic" expansion. These individuals should not be conceived of as belonging to any movement, however,[28] and their schemes had no concrete consequences:

> During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, it is true, attempts had been made to stimulate German settlements in Syria and Mesopotamia. But later, when the problem of German oversea migration had become less acute, all proposals for German colonization in the Near East were abandoned.[29]

The major practical development in German relations with the land of the two rivers before the turn of the century was the appointment of a German resident of Bagdad as German consul. Until that time German interests there had been so slight that they had been entrusted to the British representative. In Beirut and Damascus, as in Jerusalem, German consulates had replaced the Prussian ones, already in existence at mid-century, upon the formation of the Second Reich in 1871. (The changeover in Bagdad took place in 1894.) By 1899 there were also vice-consuls at Aleppo, Haifa, Jaffa, Latakia, Saida, St. Jean d'Acre, and Tripoli.[30]

Public attention was further drawn to the area by the monumental work of German archaeologists there at the turn of the century. At the same time, excitement over Sultan Abdul Hamid's assent to German construction of a railway which would link Bagdad with Constantinople and hence with all of Europe was at its peak:

> Helgoland-Bagdad--this direct route has from time immemorial placed Germany and the Near East alike and mutually in the center of world traffic from northwest to southeast. To this geographical route of trade both Germany and the Near East, as the two bridges of the world economy of the Middle Ages, owe that prosperity and wealth which the natural overland road to India created and ensured.[31]

Oriental Studies and Archaeology

A review of the Great Power rivalries in the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire resulting from this German enthusiasm--rivalries which were only temporarily resolved with the peace settlement following World War I--will be delayed in favor of a glance at the more tranquil topic of scholarship and research. Two fields of Eastern studies to which Germany has made considerable contribution are archaeology and Orientalistik, the latter including, of course, Arabic studies.[32]

German Oriental studies can be said to have attained significance, historically, during the sixteenth century at Heidelberg.[33] As for Arabic:

> During the seventeenth century in Germany a good deal less work was done on Arabic than in Holland, Italy, France, or England. It was primarily theologians who took some interest in this language, but they had access to few aids to their study. Anyone who hoped to accomplish something in the field had to go abroad as did, for example, Johann Elichmann from Silesia, who settled in Leiden as a physician.[34]

In the late fifteenth century the Ottoman Empire had begun to permit European merchants to establish themselves in the Levant. An occasional traveler penetrated into the hinterland; in the sixteenth century a German physician named Rauwolf is known to have visited the sites of Nineveh and Babylon.[35] Published accounts by scholars, clergymen, merchants, government officials, and diplomats--most of whom seem to have been British--of their journeys in the Near East became frequent.[36]

Despite German pioneering in the field[37]--J. J. Winckelmann (1717-68) is called "the father of modern archaeology" and Heinrich Schliemann (1822-90) is probably so considered by the general public for his work at Troy--Germany entered late on its great archaeological work in the Fertile Crescent, particularly Mesopotamia:

> Toward the end of the nineteenth century, German and U.S. scholars joined the British and French in the field . . . . The Germans . . . developed their activities to include several sites, in both the North and the South, among them the famous sites of Ashur and Babylon. Indeed, early in the twentieth century, in the years preceding World War I, the Germans were in the fore of archaeological activities in Mesopotamia.[38]

The undertaking which, more than any other, gave the Germans that lead was the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft excavation at Babylon under R. Koldewey, who worked there from 1899 to 1917. He had acquired experience earlier in the Greek islands, Italy, and Syria. His two assistants were Bruno Meissner, the Assyrologist, and Walter Andrae, both distinguished names in Oriental studies.

Baalbek in Lebanon, already a tourist attraction when Wilhelm II visited it in the winter of 1898, was systematically excavated and studied at the Emperor's behest by a German team from 1899 to 1905. It was Koldewey and Andrae who made the preliminary studies for the excavation, having been commissioned to interrupt their journey to Babylon for the purpose. Similar work was initiated at Palmyra.[39]

That the unique knowledge of land and people acquired by German archaeologists and other explorers of the Near East led to their being called into government service is most dramatically attested by the energetic career of Max Freiherr von Oppenheim. Ranging from India to the Chad, he had travelled in Asia Minor, crossed North Africa, lived for a time in Cairo. By his own account, it was on an expedition into the Syrian desert in 1893 that he succumbed to a fascination with "the wild, unfettered life of the sons of the desert".[40] This attraction eventually led to the three-volume masterwork Die Beduinen. Friend of Sultan Abdul Hamid and of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, blood brother to the sheikh of the

Shammar tribe, he was taken into the service of the German Foreign Ministry and assigned to Cairo (later to Constantinople). To his other preoccupations he added, in 1911, archaeological work at Tell Halaf in northeast Syria, and a museum for his finds and further research was formed in Berlin.[41]

Meanwhile, German archaeologists were busy at Sham'al (1884-1902) and at Qal'at Sam'an (reconstruction of the St. Simeon Stylites church of pilgrims) in Syria. In Palestine German archaeological undertakings were relatively limited despite lively public interest. Excavations were carried out at Megiddo (Armageddon) in 1903 by the Deutsche Palästina Verein, at Jericho from 1907 to 1909 by the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft, at Sechem-Bolata (1913-14 and also 1926-28 and 1934).[42]

Although German archaeologists had become interested in Mesopotamia as early as 1873, the first expedition, to Telloh (site of ancient Lagash), did not take place until 1887.[43] Koldewey's work at Babylon followed, with excavations also at Borsippa nearby and at Fara (site of ancient Shuruppak) and Abu Hatab in Southern Iraq in 1902. Only two winters could be spent on the site of Ctesiphon, however, and plans to extend the project at Ashur to Al-Hadhr (site of ancient Hatra) had to be forsaken with the onset of war. Extensive work was done at Samarra from 1911 to 1913.[44]

Excavations in the twenties and thirties included those at Mt. Garizun in 1928, Mt. Hebron (1926-27), and Khirbet al-Minye (an early Islamic palace) and Tell al-Oreme on the Sea of Tiberias from 1937 to 1939.[45] Archaeological work in the Fertile Crescent by all the Western Powers is considered to have reached a peak in the early thirties, but Germany's contribution was "scientifically the most worthwhile", according to the German envoy to Iraq during that period.[46]

A comment on the human side of this return after the interruption of World War I is to be found in Lührs' book:

> When, long after the war [in the late 1920s], the scientists who had once worn the military tunic were able once more to return to the lands of the Bible in order to search for traces of lost cultures, our former servants, helpers,

> and laborers came in streams to them . . . in order to work once more for the "Alemanis", whose fame as scholars and fighters still lives in the vast spaces of Iran and Iraq, even though the burial places of many of them . . . have long since been brought to a traceless level with the ground.[47, 48]

Similarly, it was about eight years after World War II that German archaeological work in the Fertile Crescent resumed, with their return to Warka (ancient Uruk) in Iraq in 1953. Lenzen and Moortgat were the prominent names then, with the latter working also in the so-called Khabur triangle.[49] In 1955 a section of the German Archaeological Institute was established in Bagdad.[50]

German Orientalists, in part because of the nature of their work, were far less likely to be acquainted with the Orient first-hand than were the archaeologists:

> For the scholars who concerned themselves with the languages and cultures of the peoples of the Orient it was for a long time in no way taken for granted that they should visit the countries in which these peoples lived. The point of origin for all Oriental studies was the Bible, studies were traditionally directed to the past and were based almost entirely on written records, which could most conveniently and comfortably be examined at one's own worktable or in the libraries of the Occident.[51]

The great age of German Oriental studies corresponds roughly to the life span of Theodore Nöldeke (1836-1930), "the outstanding German Orientalist of his time".[52] Primarily a philologist, he seems never to have visited the lands to the study of whose languages he devoted his life. The same was true of Jakob Rieske (1716-74), "the first Arabist worthy of the name whom Germany brought forth."

In the early nineteenth century, the Romantic movement had awakened a desire for closer contact with things Oriental which greatly benefitted Arabic studies. King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia, thoroughly steeped in Romantic ideas, promoted Oriental studies, most notably by providing for purchase of manuscripts. J. G. Wetzstein, an Orientalist who served as consul in Damascus from 1848 to 1862, was able to assemble two collections for Berlin, one for Leipzig, and one for Tübingen. A government-sponsored trip in 1879-80 permitted Edward Sachau, later director of the

Seminar for Oriental Languages at Berlin, to acquaint himself with Syria and Mesopotamia first-hand.[53, 54]

Martin Hartmann, professor of Arabic at Berlin, and a pioneer in Islamic studies as a distinct discipline, had served as interpreter at the German consulate in Beirut from 1876 to 1877. He is credited with having articulated "the Arab question" for the first time in a book of that title (Die arabische Frage), published in Leipzig in 1909, which examined the concept of "Arabia for the Arabs" through history.

Gotthelf Bergsträsser (1886-1933), many-sided philologist and historian of literature and Islamic law, studied Arabic and Aramaic dialects of Syria during a visit in 1914-1915. Bruno Meissner (1868-1947) is to be remembered for gathering the first significant body of data on the southern Iraqi dialect, as well as for his archaeological activities.

The librarian of the Berlin Seminar, B. Moritz (1859-1939), "knew the Orient first-hand from Morocco to Iraq" but was concerned with paleography and geography of the Arabian peninsula primarily. Georg Jacob (1862-1937), "one of the most striking figures among German Orientalists at the beginning of this century," seems to have made only one trip East, to Istanbul in 1895. None of the students of Islamic philosophy and Arab science, who became relatively numerous after the turn of the century, are reported as having acquainted themselves with the Near East through travel.

After all, a present-day German Orientalist reminds us,

> German foreign policy provided relatively stimulus for interest in current problems of the Orient. The colonial era began very late for us and came rapidly to an end.[55]

A French review of Germany's "Islamic" policy considered the official encouragement during the colonial period somewhat more significant than the quotation above implies:

> The interest which German scholarship brings to Islam is already of venerable age. Wilhelm II, who took pleasure in Oriental fantasies, willingly took under his aegis scholars, institutes, societies which devoted themselves to the study of the Orient.[56]

Explorers and geographers played a part equal to or greater

than that of the Orientalists in bringing knowledge of the Near East to the German public. As a representative of this group Ewald Banse was apparently outstanding from the viewpoint of prolificacy and popularity as well as competence of his published works: three of them, appearing between 1910 and 1926, constitute half of the references on the Islamic Orient cited in the German encyclopedia Der grosse Brockhaus.[57] Germans had been among the European geoologists who undertook studies in Palestine and what is now Jordan, most notably of the northern portion of the Great Rift, in the early 1800s. Following von Moltke's pioneering work in the 1840s, German geographical and related studies of the Fertile Crescent area appeared regularly each decade through the end of the century.[58]

In the early 1900s a concerted effort began to be made to extend a general acquaintance with the Orient to a wider public:

> Since the German-Turkish alliance has ever more clearly indicated the Eastern trend of our foreign policy, there has been a zealous effort made to give more attention to Oriental matters. Everywhere in Germany and Austria-Hungary special newspapers and magazines (Deutsche Levante Zeitung, Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient, Asien, Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient), books, and collections are occupied with enlightening the public . . . . Language courses have been organized, Oriental institutes have been founded, and through suitable intensification and broadening of the courses of study in our colleges an effort is being made to provide a clearer comprehension of the physical environment and economy, history, and culture of the Orient and of the special mentality of its peoples.[59]

The political and economic developments which had accompanied and underlay these developments in scholarship dealing with the Orient will be surveyed below.

The Peaceful Crusade

"The last German emperor is the last European monarch to have undertaken a--albeit highly peaceful--Crusade."[60] Kaiser Wilhelm II's visit to the Levant must always be included in any record of German-Arab relations. Brief and melodramatic though it may have been, and all but lost to memory, it left a legacy in the

form of an afterglow of good will and an impression of German sympathy which has been peculiarly tenacious. By chance or design the capricious Kaiser contrived to orchestrate his visit to evoke an enduring resonance in Arab emotions.[61] He was to all evidence never discredited in the East as he has been in the West. At any event, the image of the strong "tribal" leader is so appealing to the East that it can surmount otherwise insuperable disadvantages.[62]

What were the motives behind Wilhelm's visit to Palestine and Syria, and what were its immediate results? Although, as seen above, German commercial, military, and scholarly interest in the Near East rapidly built up in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, official policy under Bismarck disclaimed it. The Iron Chancellor did seek to entertain good relations with the Ottoman Empire as a check on British influence there, "but Bismarck seems never to have understood Germany's possibilities and needs in the Orient; he left this area entirely to neighboring Austria."[63] He in fact was explicit in his misgivings that German investment there might force the government to adopt an imperialist policy in Asia as they had in Africa.[64] His only aims for the Near East were to prevent an Austro-Russian conflict there and avoid German involvement in commercial and colonial conflicts, as in all overseas areas.

The portentous-sounding Drang nach Osten began only when Wilhelm, then 29, ascended to the throne in 1888 and despite Bismarck arranged for and undertook his first visit to Istanbul (in 1889) as guest of Abdul Hamid II. Bismarck's consequent discomfiture was based not last on fear of arousing the hostility of Russia. Wilhelm relieved himself of this hindrance by dismissing Bismarck in 1890.[65]

It was once acceptable to attribute a policy to a single influential personality. A 1909 review of this era in Germany speaks of the Orient policy as originally the personal inspiration of Wilhelm II.[66] However, tracts of the period reveal a general preoccupation with Germany's rapidly expanding population, limits to expansion in food production, and need for markets for industrial output:

> Our geometrically-increasing population on the same limited area of land requires first of all transformation of raw materials into manufactured products, thus increasing their value, and export of these products of our work into newly-opened markets.[67]

That the Near East had been considered as an area which could accommodate all of these pressures has been noted above (page 8). Whatever Wilhelm's own motives in seeking Eastern involvement, he was surely swept along by these pressures once his policy provided them a vent. Lukasz Hirszowicz goes so far as to ignore any initiative on Wilhelm's part. Having first mentioned the growth of German holdings in the Ottoman Empire to a total value of 1 billion Reichsmarks by 1912 and the granting of a preliminary concession for the Bagdad railway, he continues:

> Because powerful German banks and the armaments industry became ever more interested in Turkey, it was impossible to maintain the Bismarckian policy of <u>désintéressement</u> towards Near Eastern affairs.[68]

The Bagdad railway scheme was in effect "adopted" as their own by the Foreign Ministry and the expansionists, quite against the will of its financial backers.[69, 70]

Much is often made of the fact that the Pan-German League (founded in 1890) had published a pamphlet entitled "Germany's Claims to the Turkish Inheritance" (Munich: 1896). It is said to have advocated economic and cultural action rather than annexation or political domination, however.[71] But much "avowedly expansionist" literature from other sources did appear in the following twenty years.[72]

Accusations of unscrupulous, cynical preparation and coordination of all aspects of the Drang nach Osten are to be encountered even today. An account published in the German Democratic Republic which was concerned primarily with World War II asserted:

> Already during the preparations for and carrying out of the first World War the ruling circles of Germany were able, by means of a penetration of the Ottoman Empire in virtually all fields and through the utilization of its territory, its governmental apparatus, and its economy to realize in large measure its plans for the Near East.[73]

A British author in 1956 referred to "the cynicism of this visit of a professed protector of Christendom to a despot reeking with the blood of Armenians"--phraseology reminiscent of 1916.[74]

However opportunist or scheming the Eastern policy may have been and no matter how diverse its roots, Wilhelm's conceptions and misconceptions were crucial to its ultimate form. Most fundamental, he failed to grasp the nature of the caliphate and the fact that Sultan Abdul Hamid was not all-powerful throughout his domains. Wilhelm conceived of the caliph (who was by long custom, if nothing else, identical with the Sultan[75]) as capable of proclaiming a holy war (jihad) with full and immediate response at any time.[76] "Remember what you and I agreed upon at Peterhof," he wrote the Russian Tsar from "Stamboul" on October 20, 1898, "never to forget that the Mahometans are a tremendous card in our game in case you and I are suddenly confronted by a war with the certain Meddlesome Power [Britain]."[77]

A source of motivation smacking less of power politics which is seldom included in today's accounts of the era was Wilhelm's preoccupation with promoting the unity of the Protestant churches. As an adherent of the principle of the divine right of kings,[78] and as a believer in their role, as a consequence, as guardians of religion, he felt an obligation to see that Protestants enjoyed a standing in the Holy Land equivalent to that of the Catholics (whose interests there had long been under French sponsorship) and to that of the Orthodox (whose interests were protected by Russia).[79] This concern is revealed in his Memoirs.[80] He was also concerned to establish the principle that only the German Emperor could protect German subjects, whether Catholic or Protestant.[81]

During the Kaiser's second trip to the Near East in 1898 he and the Kaiserin dedicated the Protestant Church of the Redeemer in Jerusalem, which had been constructed over the remains of the church which Charlemagne had had built. British accounts of the visit dating from the World War I era refer to this as merely the "ostensible object" of the trip. It would seem on balance, how-

ever, that the event was at least of equal importance to him personally and in his capacity as Emperor as was the subsequent stop in Damascus and his successful negotiations with Abdul Hamid in Constantinople.

To judge from the frequency of reference to it in accounts of Near East-European relations[82] the single most dramatic event of his second trip to the Near East was Wilhelm's declaration of friendship for all Muslims: "Let his Majesty the Sultan, as well as the 300 millions of Muslims who venerate him as their Caliph, be assured that the German Emperor will always remain their friend." Two circumstances in connection with this statement may merit consideration. Responsible informants have pointed out that Wilhelm in this declaration had merely echoed a similar one from a speech given prior to his own during the ceremonies in Damascus by a member of the ulema (he is identified as a certain Sheikh Abdullah, who delivered the welcoming address).[83] Wilhelm may also have been carried along on a wave of emotion which he reported in a letter to the Tsar on November 9, 1898 (he had arrived in Jerusalem on October 29). He confessed in this letter that the competition among Christian sects had disturbed his (manifestly sincere) emotions at being where the Christ himself had walked:

> My personal feeling in leaving the Holy City was that I felt profoundly ashamed before the Moslems and that if I had come there without any religion at all I certainly would have turned Mahometan! . . . I am afraid that Religion in Jerusalem is often used by the Clergies as a cover for political devices and designs and that is very wrong and does Christianity a very great harm as the Moslems have long ago perceived this and treat us accordingly. I return home full of great disillusion . . . . The most interesting and finest town from the oriental point of view is no doubt Damascus . . . . The Holy Land is simply terrible in its arid dryness and utter want of trees and water.[84]

Of the Damascus visit he wrote:

> Our reception here is simply astounding; never has a Christian Monarch been so feted and received with such unbounded enthusiasm. It is because I am a friend of the Sultan and Kaliph and because I always pursued an open and loyal policy toward him.[85]

The hatred for England and the contempt for France in the Levant were increasing, he remarked later in the same letter.[86]

Within Wilhelm's own frame of reference, then, his performance and public statements in Jerusalem and Damascus were undoubtedly a good deal less cynical than the opposing Powers have wished them to seem to be. The amazingly persistent and favorable image of the Germans which he left with the people of Greater Syria will be investigated in Chapter II.[87]

The immediate practical result of the trip was a promise from the Sultan that Germany--or, more exactly, the Anatolian Railway Company, which had taken over the original concessions of the Deutsche Bank--would receive the concession for the construction of the railway which he envisioned to connect lines already built with Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf.[88] This was followed in November 1899 by a preliminary agreement,[89] leaving details such as the financial aspects to be worked out later. So began the "bewilderingly complicated" story of the construction of the Bagdad Railway.

Actually, such a scheme had been proposed as early as the 1830s, with would-be entrepreneurs from every European Power eventually seeking to promote the idea; all of the Great Powers also bid for the concession against Germany.[90] There is some disagreement among accounts at this point on the grace with which the others accepted the choice of Germany, whose plans for the line are said to have best suited both the Ottoman Government and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. (A primary reason was the fact that the route avoided the coast, where the line would have been exposed to bombardment from the sea; it was to run Konya-Adana-Aleppo-Mosul-Bagdad, with branch lines in Iraq.)[91]

France, although concerned for her sphere of influence in Syria, abandoned opposition to the Ottoman-German plan and her own scheme for a railway to Bagdad in return for a 40% interest in the German line.[92] Britain in the last years of the nineteenth century still saw her main threat in France and Russia and as recently as 1892 had urged German commercial development in the up-

per Persian Gulf area as a counterweight to Russian influence.[93] Russia's objections were limited to the original choice of route via Sivas and Diyarbakir, which she considered as passing too close to her own frontier.[94]

The Kaiser, who took a proprietary interest in the project, provided an interesting sidelight on the British attitude in his account of a visit from Cecil Rhodes in March 1899:

> Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Baghdad Railway and open Mesopotamia after having simultaneously introduced irrigation there. I said that was Germany's task, just as his was the Cape-to-Cairo line.[95]

Four years were to pass before actual construction could begin. The Kaiser, becoming impatient, wrote the Tsar at the beginning of 1902 about:

> the Baghdad Railway, which I intend German capital to build. If that most excellent Sultan had not been dawdling for years with the question the Line might have been begun years ago and would now have offered you the opportunity of dispatching a few Regiments from Odessa straight down to Koweit . . . .[96]

Comments, as reported by Lührs, by a British officer who stopped at the Ashur excavations reveal the publicity given the project at this stage:

> You Germans are splendid fellows, but you just don't understand politics . . . . Think of the Baghdad Railway. We English have built longer and more important lines all over the world, without making a big fuss about it; now we're in the process of linking Cairo with Capetown. You haven't even begun the Baghdad Railway yet, and your politicians are already crying out to the world everything you plan to accomplish with it, how you will win Turkey and Persia for yourselves and attract the trade with India.[97]

The Hejaz Railway

Meanwhile, the Sultan was preoccupied with an equally impressive railway construction project, the only one in the Ottoman Empire for which no recourse was had to foreign capital: the so-called pilgrims' railway from Damascus to the holy cities.[98] Politically important because it facilitated movement of troops to a remote area of the Ottoman holdings, the Hejaz railway has

a place in a review of German activities in the Fertile Crescent since the supervising engineer was a German, Heinrich August Meissner.[99]

Ordered to commence in December 1900, the work came to an end in 1908 although tracks had not yet been laid as far as Mecca; even so the accomplishment was noteworthy: 1302.4 kilometers of main line had been completed (Damascus-Medina) and joined to the existing line to Aleppo, and a branch line for transport of construction supplies had been built to the Mediterranean coast from Deraa. "The construction work demanded a work force of engineers and laborers unprecedented for the time," according to the head of the German engineering firm engaged in 1961 to study rebuilding of the southern section. The greater part of this labor force consisted of Ottoman troops: 7,500 were being used on the project by 1907.[100]

What was the quality of the work in this difficult and isolated region? The International Resources Engineering & Exploration Group attested in 1957:

> In general, the engineering as carried out at that time, taking into account the methods of the day, was very good. The route was amazingly well chosen for the day despite the difficulties presented by the terrain. A careful study has led us to the conclusion that no improvement can be made without excessive costs.[101]

Bagdad Railway Construction Begun

In 1909 Meissner, by then known as Meissner Pasha, joined the Anatolian Railway Company. After issuance of a royal irade in early 1902 (revised March 1903), the newly-constituted Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company--10%-owned by the Anatolian Railway Company--had finally commenced construction of the line to Bagdad.

Meanwhile, in 1900, there had occurred the incident which galvanized British public and official opinion and gave further impetus to the forces leading to World War I.[102] A technical commission of the Anatolian Railway Company had reconnoitered the probable alignment of the railroad through Iraq to

Kuwait, where the sheikh's permission for the building of a terminus and harbor was unsuccessfully sought.[103] Britain, which had in 1899 concluded one of its standard Gulf sheikhdom agreements giving Britain control over Kuwait's foreign relations in return for protection, replied to the dispatching of Ottoman forces with a visit from units of the British fleet.[104]

Britain obviously felt threatened by the intrusion of a foreign power onto the land-bridge to India, a prospect upon which she had formerly looked benignly. One competent explanation of the about-face maintains that

> the Anatolian and Baghdad railways were almost the sole enterprises in the world where Germany could be said to have broken fresh ground without directly interfering with the set schemes of other nations . . . . It was only when it seemed about to monopolise what promised to be the only overland route to India through a country, also, in which rich oil deposits had been discovered that it was seen that success would enable Germany to threaten the Empire in a manner not to be borne.[105]

All possible means of hindering the building of the railway were thenceforth resorted to by Britain. By a German account, "the battle over the laying of the tracks . . . was conducted by the opponent with bribery and sabotage, shots from the dark, and sudden attacks on isolated work camps."[106, 107]

Active British opposition to the project was finally eliminated in 1907 by German acceptance of the British condition that construction and operation of the Basra-Bagdad portion be reserved to British interests, thus abandoning the dream of a railway "German to the Gulf". "It was not, however, until 1914 that Germany and Great Britain came to an agreement . . . which safeguarded British political and economic interests in the region to be served by the railway from Baghdad to Basra."[108] This agreement was initialed but never signed owing to the outbreak of the war.[109]

Other Aspects of the German Presence in Iraq

Other aspects of the German presence in Iraq were more significant than the embryo Bagdad railway during the first decade of this century. In 1909 a German school was founded in Bagdad;

it was still in existence during World War I, when it had 168 pupils in five grades and six German instructors on a staff of nine.[110] Regularly-appointed consuls had begun to be assigned to Bagdad about 1905 and vice-consuls to Basra. The latter town developed a German quarter after German steamers ("subsidized", Longrigg maintains) began calling there in 1899. The Hamburg-Amerika Line inaugurated regular sailings to Basra in 1906, "a luxury to which merchants doing business in the Near East had not heretofore been accustomed."[111] This development was accompanied by

> an influx of German commercial travelers and resident agents --notably the firm of Wönckhaus--and by the appearance of their goods in the shops. Iraq, in fact, seemed destined to afford a stage for full German penetration.[112]

The German share of Iraqi trade remained only a small fraction of that enjoyed by Britain but nonetheless made notable progress. The value of German goods received at Basra rose from about $500,000 to nearly $9 million between 1906 and 1913. This accounted in 1910-12 for 15% of Iraq's imports (as against 9% for 1909-11) and placed Germany as Iraq's third most important supplier. Iraqi exports to Germany lagged well behind, their value rising from about $500,000 in 1906 to slightly over $1 million in 1913. This represented 12.3% of Iraqi exports in 1913 (as against 7% in 1909-11) and brought Germany up to third place as a buyer of Iraqi goods from fourth place in 1912.[113] Similarly, the number of German steamers calling at Basra was small by comparison with the British total--20 in 1913 as against 163--but the rate of increase was impressive, only 12 having called in 1912.[114]

Meissner Pasha finally appeared in Bagdad in 1911 and opened offices (later to accommodate the British High Commissioner), selected the site for the railway station in Bagdad, and had the first sod for the line northward ceremoniously broken. Meanwhile,

> the immediate task of moving the Bagdad railway materials from Basra led to the formation in 1912 of an ad hoc company, the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient, with equal participation of the Lynch Co. and the Deutsche Bank; it acquired suitable small craft for its purpose and was controlled locally by the Euphrates and Tigris [Lynch] management.[115]

Inseparable from the story of the Bagdad railway is that

of Germany's brief flirtation with the oil industry in Iraq. German petroleum men had visited Mesopotamia to take samples from known seepages as early as 1871; other similarly interested German visitors appeared toward the end of the century. The Germans, in fact, seemed to have stolen a march:

> On the grant of the first concession given to the German-owned Ottoman Railway Co. of Anatolia in 1888 a vizirial letter promised the Deutsche Bank (thereafter effectively controller of German enterprise in Turkey) a priority of rights in mining development, including petroleum.[116]

The 1902 and 1903 conventions setting the terms under which the Bagdad railway was to be built allotted a 20-kilometer strip athwart the roadbed to the company's use, including the exploitation of minerals, and in July 1904 an option for oil exploration in the Mosul and Bagdad vilayets was given to the railway administration, which passed it on to the Deutsche Bank.[117] The option was not pursued, despite two renewals. Janurary 1911 found the Deutsche Bank associated with C. S. Gulbenkian, the newly-formed (British) National Bank of Turkey, and Shell interests in plans for a new company to which the Deutsche Bank agreed to transfer its option.[118] This new company, which officially came into existence in 1912, was the Turkish Petroleum Company. The long road to production was not yet at an end:

> By 1913 the desirability of reconciling the rival applicants and enabling field work to commence was clear to all. Anglo-German agreement on the diplomatic level was added to that of the companies. The Turkish Petroleum Co. was again reorganized. A quarter of its capital was allotted to the Deutsche Bank, a quarter to the Shell group, and a half to Anglo-Persian, with an interest of 5% to Gulbenkian.[119]

Ironically, the only exploitation of Near Eastern oil in which Germany--today, as represented by West Germany alone, the largest oil consumer in Western Europe and consequently the Middle East's main customer for oil--participated was some rather primitive operations just before and during World War I:

> In Iraq the seepages of Kirkuk and Tuz continued to be used as ever during the war [1914-18]. Those of Qaiyara were developed on a more ambitious scale by the Germans, who carried out shallow drilling, built galleries, removed "refined products" by tank-lorry--and were even heard to speak of a pipeline to the Mediterranean! They were scarcely less interested in the Zakho seepages, where drilling and tunneling were also carried out. The military use of the locally-distilled products of Qaiyara and Tuz was continued after the British occupation.[120]

Upon the outbreak of war, the Deutsche Bank interest was taken over by the British Custodian of Enemy Property. With the awarding of this German share of the Turkish Petroleum Co. (renamed the Iraq Petroleum Co.) to France in 1919 in return for the latter's undertaking to facilitate passage of future oil production from the Mosul area across the plains of Syria, there ended significant German connection with Near East oil development. (See also the section on Iraq in Chapter III and that on Syria in Chapter VI below.)[121]

Germany in Syria and Lebanon

On the whole, Germany's position in Syria (including Lebanon) was markedly different from that of the other Powers:

> This nation had no traditional connections with Syria, stood close to no community in it, had no Muslim subjects, and was a newcomer in the Eastern world. But . . . the early twentieth century brought the German flag to Syrian ports, followed by its commercial travellers, its banking and insurance companies, its hotels.[122]

A 1912 comment from the Levantine press summarizes the uniqueness of the German relationship with the Levant in other terms:

> Nearly all of the Great Powers of Europe, and along with them the United States, have competed in the field of school propaganda . . . . Germany concentrates its attention on trade.[123]

In the majority of the commercial centers of the Levant at the turn of the century imports from Germany greatly exceeded exports to her, German and Austrian imports combined averaging

4.3 million francs in value annually and exports Fr.560,000. Moreover, while the latter were dropping, imports of German goods were rising.[124] Approximately 100 German firms had joined forces in the Export-Verband deutscher Maschinenfabrik und Hüttenwerke of Berlin and established branches and depots in Piraeus, Salonika, Smyrna, Mersin, Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus, Haifa, Jaffa; "a fruitful business" ensued.[125] In addition, a large force of traveling salesmen was dispatched by German firms every year to the Levant:

> They are constantly showing the latest samples and take detailed notes with unflagging attention to the needs, tastes, prices, and economic conditions of the country . . . . These travelers, instead of having recourse to interpreters or to Anatolian or Syrian dealers in their traffic with the local people, take the trouble before leaving to learn the language of the country in which they are to work; for the most part they have attended practical courses in Oriental languages offered by various German universities. . . . The German engineers follow the same practice before leaving on their exploratory missions.[126]

Assisted also by low prices, dependability in delivery, and extremely liberal conditions of payment--and other practices even less favorably looked upon by the French, German business with the Levant increased substantially. In 1905 the Atlas line of Bremen established a regular service to Beirut, and others followed.[127] Even so, Germany was only the fifth largest supplier of Syro-Lebanese imports before 1914, ranking after Great Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, and Italy (but preceding Russia).[128]

A related area in which the Germans were prominent was the keeping of restaurants and hotels, predominantly in Palestine, however. There was even a Kurhaus at Carmel.[129]

German schools were not unknown in Syria: there were Oberrealschulen in Aleppo and Beirut until the end of World War I. Both Catholic and Protestant missions opened lower schools: there were seven such schools with 765 pupils (including a girls' orphanage) in the Vilayet of Beirut alone. The Bagdad Railway Company also sponsored schools (many of its German employees had their families with them). Nevertheless, it was felt that

German activity in this field was inadequate as to both quantity and quality in view of the nation's newly-acquired standing in the Near East.[130] With respect to its missionary work, however, Germany's position was a prominent one by the second decade of the twentieth century.[131]

The construction of the Bagdad railway had brought many Germans to northern Syria, and the French, who considered Syria its special area of interest, feared an increase of German influence and commercial penetration there once the railway became operational--and with some reason. Even today, there is strong pro-German feeling in Aleppo, which was the site of the Bagdad railway construction headquarters for a time (there were reportedly 400 German railway officials in the town just before World War I began[132]). The development of the port at Alexandretta, which was originally to have been carried out by French enterprise, was in the hands of the Germans between 1911 and 1914 as part of the Bagdad railway project (but reverted to the French after the war).[133]

Apart from these short-lived major projects, however, "it was France which had carried out almost the totality of physical works of development on Syrian soil."[134]

The Eve of World War I

In 1900, it has been said, no one could have foreseen that longstanding and profound differences among the Great Powers would soon be temporarily set aside, "simply because a new rival had shown himself in the Orient: Germany."[135] An indication of the penetration which German enterprise had achieved by 1914 is provided by the Deutsche Orientbank of Berlin and Hamburg, with its overseas branches in Constantinople, Dede Agach, Brusa, Aleppo, Minnik, Tanta, Mansura, Alexandria, Cairo, Tangier, Casablanca, and Teheran.[136] Further, the Imperial German Postal Service had its own post offices in Constantinople, Smyrna, Beirut, Jaffa, and Jerusalem.[137] However, "Germany's attempts at gaining hegemony over the Mediterranean and hinterland around it were to founder with

her defeat in 1918."[138]

Many Germans had, and many still have, misgivings about the nature of and justification for Germany's Asian adventure. Even while "the 'Drang nach Osten' had become a principal aspiration of German imperialists . . . , the Social-Democrats warned against the railway as the first great triumph of German capitalism-imperialism . . . ."[139] There are informed Germans working in the Near East today who simply deny the political or imperialist nature of German interest in the Fertile Crescent at the beginning of the century. There is in published material over the past fifty years a common theme of acknowledgment that the commercial and political cannot so easily be separated, however. "Commercial imperialism" is perhaps the best term for the policy which had evolved by the second decade of the twentieth century.[140]

In 1916 Germans could read:

> The frequently-put question "Colonial policy or overseas policy?" is badly phrased . . . . More than ever the present demonstrates to what extent our economic activities depend upon the constellation of political power.[141]

A quarter of a century later, in the midst of another World War, another German writer on Near East affairs was arguing that the move to the East was economically sound but bound up with a "romantic imperialism" the international political consequences of which had not been thought out.[142] A concise assessment dated 1960 incorporates all of these observations, and more:

> The building of the Baghdad railway, which began in 1903 and was completed [sic] in 1914, constituted a participation in the imperialistic competition of the European powers. And although this grand plan had as its basis a unique complex of political and commercial expansionism, imperial ambition, romantic dreaming of old-style monarchical splendor, and sober military calculation, it could not but be looked upon by other powers as the provocative expression of that "push toward the East" which was the leitmotiv of Wilhelm II's policy after Bismarck's withdrawal from the scene.[143, 144]

Construction of the Bagdad railway continued until the eleventh hour and past. Three years of coping with inadequate facilities and a difficult labor force are said to have turned Meissner Pasha's back hair to white, but he saw the eighty kilometers north to Samarra to completion a few weeks after war was declared.[145] The section of the line in Asia Minor had been taken

as far as the Euphrates by 1912, to Ras Al-Ain some 320 kilometers beyond Aleppo by 1914, and on to Nusaybin (228 kilometers from Mosul by the present route) during the war. The first full-gauge train from Nusaybin to Istanbul, on October 9, 1918, was also the evacuation train for the children and wives of the engineers who had worked in the most remote areas.[146]

In the spring of 1914 the Turkish and German governments had reached an agreement on joint use of the railroads in event of war. The Bagdad railway line was of limited utility during the greater part of World War I, however, since all troops and supplies had to be transferred to animal-drawn vehicles for the passage through the Taurus Mountains, where bridges and tunnels were still to be built. The British extended the line to the north and south of Meissner's Bagdad–Samarra section, but through connections Istanbul-Bagdad had to await the postwar period. (Through connections Istanbul-Ostend were not realized until 1940, fifty years after the Bagdad railway was first seriously proposed.)[147]

The War Years

Because of the intensified, dramatic character of wartime activity, its story is often told.[148] For that reason, and since it is the results and effects of wartime activity which are of interest in this review, the barest outline of events on the World War I battlefields of the Fertile Crescent will be attempted.

General Otto Liman von Sanders had arrived in 1913 at the head of a large German military mission to reorganize the Turkish army under the direction of Enver Pasha.[149] In this and other ways the stage had been set for the Ottoman Empire to join the Central Powers. The Turkish government was maneuvered into a declaration of war, and "with the formal entry of Turkey into the war German domination over Turkish actions and affairs became paramount."[150]

Statements, even conjectural, as to the shape of things which Germany envisaged for the Fertile Crescent in event of a Central Powers victory are rare indeed. Henderson purports to

know that Germany was discussing with her allies in 1913 a possible division of the Ottoman Empire in the event of its collapse and cites a statement in a 1927 history of Germany to the effect that "Germany meant to reserve to herself the central portion of Asia Minor, Aleppo and northern Mesopotamia, as well as the harbors of Alexandretta, Mersina and Adana [sic]."[151] No hint is given of the intended fate of the remainder of Iraq and of Greater Syria.

It is more than possible that the matter had not been carefully and realistically thought through. Present-day commentators emphasize the "discrepancy between the wishful thinking and reality" of German Near and Middle Eastern policy during the first World War.[152] For example, a recent West German history of World War I policy and its manipulators summarily states: "As in the conduct of the war in Europe, the Imperial government also seriously overestimated the capabilities of Germany and her allies [in the Islamic world]. . . ."[153]

As mentioned above (page 17), an important element in German planning was a Muslim holy war (jihad) to be declared by the Caliph-Sultan in support of Ottoman-German efforts against the French and British.[154] The groundwork had been twenty-five years in the laying:

> While the Kaiser was seeking to set himself up as the protector of Islam . . . German political strategists . . . were studying plans for a possible jihad, or Moslem holy war, this to be turned into a revolt against Britain and her allies by the world of Islam organized by German agents and conducted by leaders paid by Berlin or the Constantinople Caliphate.[155, 156]

The call to holy war, issued on November 14, 1914, was "without significant results".[157] Why had this carefully-nutured project failed? Partly, it is suggested, because the cynicism of a holy war in alliance with Christians was apparent to the humblest, most isolated Muslim communities.[158] There were also nationalist and political aspects to be considered:

> The Muslims in the hinterland discussed whether the future Arab nation should be joined by federal ties to the Turkish nation, whether one should agree to recognize the Caliph in Istanbul or whether the close collaboration of the Young Turk government with the German unbelievers justified a final

break with the Ottoman Empire.[159]
Others, like Aziz Ali al-Masri, weighed the chances for automony within the Ottoman Empire in cooperation with the Germans against cooperation with England to obtain full Arab independence; he chose the former and broke with Sharif Hussein after a brief essay at cooperation.[160, 161]

Despite this egregious miscalculation in the matter of the jihad, the myths and misjudgments of that day have had consequences perversely beneficial to German-Arab relations. The nature of these consequences and the triviality, to the Arab mind, of the ambiguities which they entail, will be considered further in Chapter II. The propaganda spread[162]--"Emperor Wilhelm II was represented by German agents as a friend of Islam and rumors were circulated about his conversion to Mohammedanism"[163]--left a favorable impression while making no commitment (a technique repeated with some success during World War II). As a result, Germany's alliance with the Turks does seem to have been taken as directed against Britain rather than the Arabs even when Germans fought side by side with Turkish troops against Arabs.

As for the Germans, many undoubtedly were convinced that "Germany interceded without hedging or reservation on behalf of the independence of Islamic peoples."[164] Presumably "independence from other European Powers" was the intended meaning since, as an ally of the Constantinople government, Germany did not have a free hand with regard to Arab independence from Turkish domination.[165]

As a demonstration of the tenuousness of Britain's alliance with certain Arab groups, evidence is repeatedly offered of overtures by those very groups to the Germans. For example, it is claimed that "an envoy of Emir Hussein of Mecca, who later allied himself with the English, appeared in Bagdad to negotiate with the Germans and Turks,"[166] and that "Sharif Feisal [after the Balfour Declaration became public] . . .considered reconciliation with Turkey and cooperation with the German-Turkish troops operating on the Sinai front under General Kress von Kressenstein."[167]

This very type of evidence, however, annuls the indigna-

tion at British and French double-dealing to which the anti-British claim a right:

> For Antonius this [the Sykes-Picot agreement] was a "shocking document . . . a startling piece of double-dealing"; as though during the same months Hussein and Feisal had not also been engaged in their double-dealing with the Turks. Indeed, they seem to have proposed a resumption of negotiations with them and their German allies as late as 1918.[168]

There was unquestionably opportunism on both sides, although that with the farthest-reaching pernicious effects is perhaps to be condemned with the greater right and reason.[169, 170]

To turn to military operations, two men prominent in formation of German Middle East policy through World War II--Franz von Papen, as Ambassador to Ankara, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, as Minister of Foreign Affairs--saw service in Palestine as officers attached to the Fourth Turkish Army under von Falkenhayn.[171] Lt. Fritz Grobba, later envoy to Iraq, served as aide-de-camp to Colonel von Stotzingen during the Sinai campaign.[172] General Helmuth Felmy, selected to command the military mission dispatched to Iraq in 1941 and later Sonderstab F for operations in the Arab area, was a flying officer in the same sector during World War I.

The German principals in the Near Eastern theater included General Liman von Sanders, as mentioned above. His military mission's members, who had come to number about 200, were serving as command, intelligence, propaganda, and supply officers.[173] Colonel, later General, Kress von Kressenstein is identified with operations in the Sinai peninsula, having served there from the beginning of 1915 through 1917 (and had made a thorough reconnaissance of the Sinai desert prior to that time). Field Marshal von der Goltz took over command of the Turkish army in Iraq in January 1916 but died of typhus in Bagdad three months later, "having exposed himself in the foremost trenches".[174] In mid-1917 General von Falkenhayn, former Prussian Minister of War, then Imperial Chief of Staff and commander of the German army in Rumania, assumed command of the new "Group of Armies F" (for Falke--"falcon") or Yilderim ("lightning"), as it was known to

the Turks, when it was formed (this operation combined German and Turk units under an almost entirely German staff). Recalled in a few months to the European front, von Falkenhayn transferred his command to Liman von Sanders in March 1918 at Nazareth.

German and Austrian units dispatched to the Near East included some infantry and cavalry but were predominantly "technical": machine-gun, artillery, mortar, mine, engineer, radio and telephone, aviation, anti-aircraft, medical, and motorized transportation units.[175]

Operations in the Levant began as a struggle for control of the Suez Canal but resolved themselves into a struggle for Syria (to include Palestine). Kress von Kressenstein earned himself British praise--"undoubtedly one of the greatest masters of desert warfare the war has produced"[176]--not least for the rapidity with which he was able to get his vehicles across the Sinai desert for a surprise attack on the Canal in February 1915 (which had no significant results). Although the Central Powers were on the defensive on that front from February 1916 on, German military buffs take satisfaction in his having withstood, as commander of the Turko-German forces there,[177] heavy fire from the British at Gaza and then driving them back to a line in Sinai in the spring of 1917.

Initial German-Turkish successes in preventing the capture of Bagdad by the British culminated in the latter's surrender at Kut al-Amara in April 1916. After von der Goltz' death ten days later, German advisers had little influence in this area. On a lower echelon, a small expedition sent to sabotage Anglo-Persian Oil Co. installations near the Iraqi border had ample experience of the Turks' failure to cooperate in German plans:

> Quite obviously, the Turks wanted no independent activity on the part of the Germans in Iraq, and particularly not in Persia. Their own far from firmly established authority could only be impaired thereby in the eyes of the fickle Arabs and the hostile-minded Persians.[178]

The British did take Bagdad in March 1917[179] and started north. It was then that the Yilderim operation was conceived in order to regain Bagdad, but when General von Falkenhayn perceived

the precariousness of the Central Powers' position in Palestine[180] he obtained permission to postpone the offensive in Mesopotamia and divert the bulk of the Yilderim forces to the Levant. The Sixth Army, in Mesopotamia, remained under his command.

In Syria, from 1916 onwards, the German and Turkish troops found themselves fighting in the midst of a population rendered increasingly hostile by the repressive measures taken against the Arabs by Jemal Pasha, who was also considered somewhat anti-German.[181] Food and all kinds of supplies were tragically inadequate for civilian and military alike; troops were weakened and demoralized. "A build-up of British forces under General Allenby brought disaster to von Falkenhayn," succinctly concludes an account of the Palestine campaign written from the Allied viewpoint.[182]

A German author preferred to see the situation in a more positive light:

> With great élan and overwhelming strength the [British] attack was carried into the Jordan Valley and up to the slopes of the Lebanon. There, however, it was brought to a halt by the thin line of Germans and Turks, who, badly fed, were poorly supplied, even to the extent of sometimes having no ammunition for their guns, having almost no planes, while the enemy was fitted out with every possible tool of modern war. Nonetheless, the British, who had crossed the Egyptian border at al-Arish on December 23, 1923, lay from March until November 1917 before Gaza, and only in December, after nearly a year in putting hardly 500 kilometers behind them, did they take Jerusalem.
>
> . . . It was only in September and October 1918, when the forces of the Central Powers were decimated by the treason which had infiltrated the ranks from behind the lines, . . . that they succeeded in breaking through the front in Palestine.[183, 184]

It was Liman von Sanders who inherited the "disaster",[185] in March 1918, and saw the Levant operations through the long retreat via the Bika and Aleppo to the evacuation of the German and Austrian troops in five ships from Haidar Pasha in January 1919. In Mesopotamia, the Sixth Army still held Mosul when the Armistice was declared, though the British were on the outskirts, and was able to offer some assistance to the armies converging in retreat on Aleppo.[186]

As if in justification of those who have seen the Drang nach Osten as a creation solely of Kaiser Wilhelm II's will to power, "the capture of Aleppo--ending once and for all the plan for a German-controlled Railway from Berlin to Baghdad--occurred just a few days before his abdication."[187]

The Danger Past

The immediate postwar reaction in Britain, as expressed in a 1919 work called The Long Road to Baghdad, was that it had been a close call:

> So far as our interests in the Gulf were concerned . . . the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1914 was a positive blessing . . . .
>
> Every month of delay before hostilities must have strengthened Germany's grip on Mesopotamia, which was to be the base of her flank attack on India.[188]

Of loss to the Fertile Crescent of the beneficial effects which German enterprise might have conferred, there is little hint in Allied post-mortems. Only an American account suggests the idea somewhat obliquely: "A development of Mesopotamia, even as modest as that achieved in Anatolia, would pay the cost of the Baghdad Railway many times over."[189]

Official German prewar documents making reference to enterprises directed to the economic development of the Fertile Crescent in conjunction with railway construction were published in English in 1931. In one of them, "mines, irrigation works, port facilities, etc. undertaken over a considerable number of years by German capital" in association with the Anatolian and Bagdad railroads were mentioned. Later the same year (1913) there was an explicit statement of policy in this regard:

> We have no interest in showing favor to the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, which will be more or less in competition with the Baghdad Railway and in which we shall receive a comparatively paltry share. We would far rather that the irrigation works in Mesopotamia should thoroughly open up the country and provide generous freights.[190]

Generally-available German publications had also given the ques-

tion a good deal of attention:

> The Bagdad Railway project means not only railroad construction but also agriculture. . . . The irrigation engineer presses forward with the railway engineer.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Who will carry this work through [in Iraq] is not certain: perhaps German and English technology together.[191]

An example offered of the kind of private enterprise which might very well have extended into the Fertile Crescent countries was the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft (German-Levantine Cotton Company), with headquarters in Dresden and branches in Smyrna and Adana. Its work was closely allied to that of the Bagdad railway:

> In [Syria's] northern portion, bordering on the Euphrates --with Aleppo as its center--the region is very similar to the Assyrian highlands. Remains of the old cotton culture have persisted here, and are on the threshhold of a new expansion. The Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft has taken a particular interest in this area; it is therefore of great significance to the Bagdad railway since the economic development, and thus the repopulation, of the Assyrian highlands depends on it.[192]

The Kulturinspektor, H. Auhagen, of the Bagdad Railway Company had already made a study of the agricultural peculiarities and potentialities of Syria in (presumably) its northern portion, and pronounced them very promising.[193] Some German agricultural equipment was even introduced into Syria by the company but the Syrians were not yet ready to use the machinery effectively.[194]

Willfully or not, most non-German sources omit this aspect of the spread of railways in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century. One, however, does point out the "agricultural revolution" which they sparked in central Turkey:

> In districts penetrated by these roads, new settlements were formed, produce marketed, and new lands cultivated. The companies initiated irrigation projects and agricultural training centers to stimulate traffic on their roads; in these details the Germans were most efficient and thorough.[195]

Another remarks: "The Berlin Bagdad Railway Company tried to encourage farmers to plant cotton during the construction of the

Samarra section of the line and made plans for extensive development of the crop."[196]

This evidence notwithstanding, it was implied that Germany would have made a poor benefactor for these lands at best. Germany's tentatives at colonialism were "uneven" and "scarcely effective".[197] The introduction to the collection of German documents referred to above pointed out:

> In a similar collection of British documents we should be sure to find the voluminous Consular reports on the condition and aspirations of the Armenians, Samoans and other races whose destinies are at stake. But such matters seem to have no importance for the German Foreign Office. "It is fairly indifferent to us under which misgovernment the Cretans suffer" is one of the Kaiser's minutes.[198]

Counters a German writer: "Before the [first] World War it would have occurred to no one to concern himself with the best interests of the Near Easterners themselves"--implying that the standards of the Second Reich in these matters were simply those of the era.[199]

The opinion has been expressed by West German specialists in the Near East that the two decades which culminated in World War I were of the highest importance to subsequent German-Arab relations. In addition to an occasional dramatic, and well-received, gesture such as the Kaiser's visit, during that period innumerable favorable local relationships and impressions laid a basis for future cooperation between Germany and the Fertile Crescent countries. Most significantly, World War I established Germany irrevocably in the minds of the masses as the opponent of Britain, the oppressive force of which was still felt to lie heavily on Arab aspirations when the time came for a second World War to be fought.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1] E. Verney & G. Dambmann, Les Puissances Étrangères dans la Levant en Syrie et en Palestine (Paris: 1900), p. 37.

[2] Most notably that of the Kaiserswerther Sisters in 1851.

[3] E. M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway (Reissue; New York: 1966, first published 1923), p. 135, states that there were eight by 1902, with 420 pupils. Information in the first two paragraphs of this section is taken from L. Bauer, Volksleben im Lande der Bibel (Leipzig: 1903), pp. 298-303.

[4] A. Bonne, Palästina--Land und Wirtschaft (Leipzig: 1932), p. 137. The German agricultural colonies did not face the same problem of profitability as did the Jewish, he explains on page 138, since they "used Arab day laborers, whose demands and wages were substantially lower than those of the Jewish workers."

[5] Some of the Templar colony members were very active in commerce, selling steadily increasing imports of German and Austrian goods on commission throughout the region. (Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., pp. 488 & 495.

[6] Earle, op. cit., p. 133.

[7] The Hilfsverein had the approval, if not the active support, of the German government, and German diplomats saw in this controversy Russian influences directed against German culture. (S. Weltmann, "Germany, Turkey and the Zionist Movement 1914-1918", The Review of Politics, XXIII, No. 2 (April 1961), p. 249.

[8] E. Lewin, The German Road to the East (London: 1916), pp. 113-14.

[9] Weltmann, op. cit., p. 250.

[10] Earle, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

[11] "Deutsche Schiffahrt in die Levante", Orient (Hamburg), V (September 1964), p. 129.

[12] H. Schmidt, Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Turkei (Berlin: 1913), p. 4. [13] "Deutsche Schiffahrt in die Levante", pp. 129-30.

[14] All of the German ships were steamers since they were of recent construction and much envied by the older maritime nations. Notable among these was the Gottorp, which the Deutsche Exportbank had sent with an exhibition of samples of German products across North Africa to Alexandria, thence to Beirut, Smyrna, and Constantinople. (Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., pp. 498-99 & 486.

[15] "From that time onwards," says G. E. Kirk in Short History, p. 90, "German consuls in the Ottoman Empire were assiduous in the help they gave to German commercial interests."

[16] "Deutsche Schiffahrt in die Levante", p. 130.

[17] W. O. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (London:

1962), pp. 77-78.

[18]Kaster, op. cit., p. 113. Verney & Dambamnn, op. cit., p. 44, comment on the popularity of German printed illustrations in this connection: "One of our most distinguished consuls points out in one of his works this profusion of prints, which are found in all the cafés of Turkey and invariably show a regiment of French cuirassiers fleeing in terror from two [German] uhlans."

[19]Kirk, Short History, p. 90.

[20]Lewin, op. cit., p. 25, says that von Moltke was not joined by his party of three officers (von Vincke, Fischer, and Keipert) until two years after his arrival. The Prussians resigned their functions as advisers before the battle at Nazib when Hafiz Pasha refused to follow their advice to draw back to a strong point three hours' march away. (Von Moltke later served as the chief of the Prussian general staff, from 1857 to 1888, effectively reorganizing the army along modern lines.)

[21]According to W. O. Henderson, op. cit., p. 78, this had been preceded by a military mission under Köhler in 1880. In line with his overall policy of désintéressement in the Orient, Bismarck insisted that all official ties be severed between the von der Goltz mission and the German government.

[22]Another ex-Ottoman officer in this group was Fawzi al-Kawukji, "who was to lead the Palestine Arab rebels in 1936 and served the Axis during the second World War." He was also among the leaders of the Jebel Druze rebellion against the French in 1925. (Kirk, Short History, p. 165.)

[23]Z. Saleh, Mesopotamia (Iraq) 1600-1914 (Bagdad: 1957), pp. 208-09. Von Moltke had published a series of reports as "letters".

[24]Ibid., p. 203. On the same page he quotes Viscount Morley, speaking before the House of Lords in 1911, to the effect that von Moltke "was fascinated with the idea of what could be done on the banks of the Euphrates. That circumstance and the fact that Moltke wrote as he did has exercised a curious effect on the German imagination ever since."

[25]He has been called the first military man to appreciate the importance of the role which railways could play in the deployment and supply of armies on a large scale.

[26]His Babylonien. das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonialisationsfeld für die Gegenwart (Heidelberg: 1886) developed ideas he had first presented in a pamphlet in 1884.

[27]Lewin, op. cit., pp. 25-31. E. Jäckh, Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg (Munich: 1913), p. 20, deplores the advocacy of German colonization as creating an atmosphere of distrust of German intentions it would take years to overcome, not to mention the many practical obstacles to its realization.

[28]Saleh, op. cit., pp. 210-11.

[29]Earle, op. cit., p. 123.

[30]Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., p. 37. There were German physicians in Aleppo, Beirut, Jaffa (one each), Haifa (three), and Jerusalem (five), with German pharmacies in Beirut, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, they add. Data on Iraq from Longrigg, Iraq, p. 5.

[31]Jäckh, op. cit., p. 11. Further, he says, the discovery of the sea route to India was responsible alike for the cultural decline of the Near East and the impoverishment of Germany.

[32]"No European nation has done more for Oriental studies than has the German," H. H. Schaeder, at that time professor of Iranian philology at the University of Berlin, asserted in a speech in late 1934. ("Der Neuere Orient", Der Orient und Wir (Berlin: 1935), p. 53.)

[33]With the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, the Heidelberg University's collection of manuscripts was sent to the Vatican, according to Prof. V. F. Galbraith in a talk at the British Council, Beirut, Feb. 19, 1967.

[34]J. Fück, Die arabischen Studien in Europa (Leipzig: 1955), pp. 90-91.

[35]A Bavarian captive of the Turks, one Hans Schiltberger, set down a not entirely convincing account of travels in the same area about 1400 which still appears on reference lists of major works on the Near East.

[36]"Archaeology", Encyclopedia Britannica, 1965 ed., Vol. II, pp. 243-44.

[37]The French consul at Mosul, P. E. Botta, is considered to have inaugurated the era of systematic archaeological excavations at Nineveh in 1842, although a really scientific approach did not evolve until the last quarter of the century, with German work at Olympia in Greece (1875-80) a leading example. (Ibid.)

[38]Ibid.

[39]B. Schulz & H. Winnefeld, Baalbek. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen in den Jahren 1898-1905, ed. Theodor Wiegand (Berlin: 1921), Vol. I, p. 9. The French, with their special interests in the area, were not wholly pleased:

> The Germans, who have done some excavating in these ruins, and the cost of which they have recovered many times over by a monopoly on the sale of photographs and other works, have carried off seventy-two cases containing the most precious objects found in the course of the excavations.

(N. Moutran, La Syrie de Demain (3rd ed.; Paris: 1916), p. 263.)

[40]M. von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen (Leipzig: 1939), Vol. I, p. 4.

[41]Although he was asked for advice on the Bagdad railway route by the director of the Deutsche Bank, von Oppenheim recounts, he could not as a Foreign Ministry employee comply with the request. On an 1899 trip from Aleppo to Mesopotamia, however,

> I could at least fulfill a further request from Herr von Siemens: give him my views as to the best route through the

particularly difficult stretch between Aleppo and Mosul. To my gratification, my suggestions were accepted. (Ibid., p. 8.)

[42]H. H. Schaeder (ed.), Der Orient in deutscher Forschung, Leipzig: 1944), pp. 231-36.

[43]Saleh, op. cit., p. 213. Members of the first expedition were B. Moritz, R. Koldewey, and L. Meyer.

[44]In the special field of Islamic archaeology, "perhaps the most important and systematic excavation was conducted by the German scholars F. Sarre and E. Herzfeld at Samarra on the Tigris . . . ." (Encyclopedia Britannica, loc. cit., p. 265.)

[45]H. H. Schaeder (ed.), Forschung, p. 236.

[46]F. Grobba, Irak (Berlin: 1943), p. 65.

[47]Hans Lührs, Gegenspieler des Obersten Lawrence (Berlin: 1936), p. 221. Lührs is another German archaeologist with a dramatic story of service to his government to tell. As the tension prior to World War I built up, activities of any of the Powers' archaeologists became increasingly suspect to its rivals, often with good reason. Lührs describes the too-casual visits by British officers to the German digs at Ashur, where the personnel, he insists, were innocent of any but scientific interests. (The diversion of large numbers of British personnel over the land route to the Persian Gulf and India from the normal sea route,he drily remarks, could hardly have passed unnoticed.) During the war he assisted as an officer in the German army in the attempt to win the Iraqi Shiites to the jihad proclaimed from Constantinople and led a small expedition which penetrated into Persian territory at Ahwas on several occasions to cut the British petroleum pipeline. It is remarkable, as noted in the foreword to this book (p. 7), that these German adventurers were first given publicity by the British, with C. Sykes' Wassmuss, "the German Lawrence" (London: 1936).

[48]An excellent informal work on German archaeological undertakings in Iraq, although it deals with them somewhat incidentally in a highly readable and varied account of the experiences of one of the participants, is Wilhelm König's Im Verlorenen Paradies. Neun Jahre Irak (Baden bei Wien: 1940).

[49]As an indication of the fame of Mesopotamian archaeological work in Germany, the following may be pertinent: A tourist agent told me during a visit to Bagdad in 1966 that innumerable German tourists take no time whatever for visiting the city but insist on getting under way to the archaeological sites immediately upon arrival.

[50]A. Falkenstein (ed.), Denkschrift zur Lage der Orientalistik (Wiesbaden: 1960), p. 21.

[51]F. Steppat, "Deutsches Orient-Institut in Beirut", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 1 (April 1964), p. 13. The preference for "work-table" study is reportedly still strong.

[52]J. Fück, op. cit., p. 217. Information on German Orientalists in the subsequent four paragraphs is taken from this work unless

otherwise noted. Swiss and Austrian Orientalists, many of whom--like Aloys Sprenger--were closely associated with German Orientalistik are not included.

[53]Saleh, op. cit., pp. 206-07, speaks of the "impressive scholarly work of Sachau": "In his "Journey in Syria and Mesopotamia", published in 1883, Prof. E. Sachau presented valuable information about the land and its people . . . . as well as two detailed maps."

[54]In 1847 in Leipzig there appeared the first issue of the still-extant Zeitschrift der Deutsche Morgenlandgesellschaft. It had been preceded by seven volumes of the Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes and explained its founding as due to "the present upsurge of Oriental studies in Germany."

[55]Steppat, "Orient-Institut", p. 13.

[56]Bernard Vernier, La politique islamique de l'Allemagne (Paris: 1939), p. 26.

[57]1955 edition (the most recent complete edition). Banse had a knack for selecting attention-getting titles--e.g., Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn ("along the route of the Bagdad railway") (1913), Harem, Sklaven, Karawanen (1921), and Wüsten, Palmen, und Basare ("deserts, palms, and bazaars") (1921). These were in the minority, however.

[58]Authors, titles, comments on content, and other data can be found in Saleh, op. cit., pp. 203-22. The rate was about two a decade until the 1880s, when it greatly increased.

[59]K. Hassert, Das Turkische Reich (Tübingen: 1918), pp. 202-03.

[60]Bamm, op. cit., p. 256.

[61]"His entry into Jerusalem was described to me 30 years later by an Arab who had not forgotten the voluminous white cloak worn by Hajji Ghilliun, and firmly believed him to be a Moslem." (Edwyn Hole, Syrian Harvest (London: 1956), p. 46.)

[62]The durability of Hitler's reputation as a leader in the face of Communist denigration (see page 184 below) and the fact that de Gaulle's monolithic leadership style has succeeded in winning new enthusiasm for France even in the Syria which struggled so desperately to rid itself of French hegemony are two cases in point which were often brought up by West German Foreign Ministry and journalist interviewees.

[63]A. Ular & E. Insabato, Der erlöschende Halbmond (Frankfurt: 1909), pp. 161-62.

[64]Earle, op. cit., pp. 40-41. This is in strong contrast to his attitude on Egyptian debts as described by S. N. Fisher: "Threats of action on the part of Bismarck in 1879 led England and France to join in obtaining the Porte's deposition of Ismail." (The Middle East (New York: 1962), p. 288.) Nonetheless, "one German banking firm was involved in the Ottoman bankruptcy in 1881 and was duly represented as a minor interest on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration." (Ibid., p. 333.) Hassert,

op. cit., p. 202, states that the French share in the Turkish debt and in investment in the Ottoman Empire was twice the size of Germany's, which was one quarter and over 1 billion marks, respectively, as of 1914.

[65]The Kaiser expressed his satisfaction with the improvement represented by Prince Hohenlohe's attitude as Chancellor: "He hailed with much joy my Far East [sic] trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem. He was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and considered the plan for the Baghdad Railway from them as a great cultural work worthy of Germany." (Wilhelm II, My Memoirs 1878-1918 (London: n.d.), p. 86.)

[66]Ular & Insabato, op. cit., p. 161.

[67]Jäckh, op. cit., p. 13.

[68]The Third Reich and the Arab East (London: 1966), p. 2. In the heat of war, however, there seems to be a need for personification: Wilhelm "dispersed agents as far East as Kuwait, Persia, Afghanistan devoted to the cause of furthering German imperialism and fomenting trouble in areas under British domination" according to C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, XX, No. 4 (July 1942), p. 663.

[69]Earle, op. cit., pp. 120-23.

[70]As an example of the enthusiasm which reigned in some quarters B. Vernier, op. cit., p. 6, quoted one Friedrich Naumann in Asia (1910): "On all shores of the Mediterranean there are Germans established. Good luck, brothers. Enthusiasm, action! This old sea may still see plenty of wonders!"

[71]Saleh, op. cit., p. 220. Henderson, op. cit., p. 76, cites an authority on the League to the effect that it was not made much of by that group and had no particular importance.

[72]Throughout the period 1894-1918 a Pan-German weekly, the Alldeutsche Blätter "served eloquently as the expansionist mouthpiece" advocating "acquisition of Mesopotamia and Syria", among many other schemes. (Saleh, op. cit., p. 218.)

[73]H. Tillmann, Deutschlands Araberpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: 1965), p. 12.

[74]E. Hole, op. cit., p. 46. The flourishing of German tradespeople in the Ottoman Empire following the elimination of the Armenian merchants in the massacres of the 1890s, which Germany refrained from officially condemning, was pointed out by Ular & Insabato, op. cit., p. 121.

[75]Fisher, op. cit., p. 206, speaks of the "constitutional position of the caliphate which was held after Selim I's conquest of Egypt".

[76]Kirchner, op. cit., p. 589, points out that Abdul Hamid himself welcomed the visits of the German Emperor to support his own weakened position and that Wilhelm greatly overestimated the unity of the Moslem world.

[77]I. D. Levine (ed.), Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar (New York: 1920), p. 57. The Kaiser wrote to the Tsar in English; hence his spelling and style are reproduced in the quotations.

[78]As a corollary thereto, he believed in implicit obedience to the monarch's wishes, as is revealed in his indignation in a letter to Tsar Nicholas (Oct. 20, 1898) that a Russian general had failed to obey Nicholas' commands.

[79]Interview with Mr. Erwin Roth, deputy in charge of West German representation in Amman, Jordan, on Jan. 30, 1967.

[80]Op. cit., pp. 207-08. He speaks of his desire for union of Protestant churches in all Europe. Further: "I assembled all the general superintendents for the consecration of the church at Jerusalem and was also able to greet invited deputations from Sweden, Norway, etc."

[81]Earle, op. cit., p. 135.

[82]General histories of Germany, in both German and English, were found upon random sampling to omit any mention of Wilhelm's Eastern trips (one exception was an indirect mention to the effect that his Reiselustigkeit--"travel-mindedness"--was an embarrassment to Bismarck) Volumes on the Near East seen usually devote only two or three lines to the topic if they are of relatively recent publication, mentioning in addition to the declaration quoted in the text Wilhelm's gesture in donating (1) a spended new sarcophagus, or (2) one or two silver lamps,or (3) a complete rebuilding of Saladin's tomb--occasionally all three, and sometimes none. Only one source claimed that the Sultan presented Wilhelm in turn with one of the Ommeyad desert castles (M'shatta), the facade of which was said to be in the Berlin museum.

[83]Interview, Roth, January 1967, and with Konsul-General (ret.) Hermann Voigt in Bonn on June 9, 1967.

[84]Levine, op. cit., pp. 60-61. [85]Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[86]According to H. Waldmann, "Ideologien und Probleme Israels", Die Neue Gesellschaft, III (July/August 1956), p. 306, Wilhelm met with Theodor Herzl, father of the Zionist movement, on the Rothschild estate near Jaffa while he was in Palestine; Herzl "would have gladly named him honorary patron" of the Palestine settlements.

[87]There is a hint now and then of a desire on the part of Germans to rescue this difficult last Kaiser of theirs from the black judgments which have been passed on him--e.g., Bamm, op. cit., pp. 256-57: "History's verdict on Wilhelm II is ripe for revision. . . . This delightfully picturesque monarch made an extraordinary impression on the Arabs, in any case."

[88]The Anatolian Railway Co. was not exclusively German: "More than one fourth of its first loan was subscribed in Britain, and the British chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration became one of its directors." (Kirk, Short History, p. 90.) "The

control of the Baghdad Railway Company thus remained in Turko-German hands, but French and other interests were too well represented to justify the criticism that the railway was a purely German enterprise secretly cooperating with the German Foreign Office." (Earle, op. cit., p. 93.) In 1898 the Anatolian Railway Co. was also given permission to develop the harbor of the Asian terminal of its line at Haidar Pasha.

[89]Most sources cite this date; Schmidt, op. cit., p. 10, says "December 23, 1899".

[90]Reviews of earlier and contemporary schemes will be found in Longrigg, Iraq (p. 32), Saleh, op. cit. (pp. 258-63), and R. Hüber, Die Baghdadbahn (Berlin: 1943) (pp. 9-12).

[91]"The success of the Germans was not unexpected. They had a strong claim to the concession, for in 1888 and again in 1893, the Sultan had assured the Anatolian Railway Co. that it should have priority in the construction of any railway to Baghdad." On this basis the company "had conducted expensive surveys." (Earle, op. cit., p. 61.) The Ottoman government wanted a Power which was sympathetic to Pan-Islamism, he added, and all the candidates but Germany had large numbers of Moslems within their realms.

[92]Sole financial responsibility had in any case not appealed to French financiers. (Ibid.)

[93]Arnold Wilson in The Persian Gulf (London: 1928), p. 13, makes the usual accusation: "Germany, in pursuance of her Oriental policy . . . spared no pains to obtain a solid footing under the guise of commercial expansion", but admits "in 1892 our Ambassador in Berlin was actually urging Bismarck to interest German shipping and German trade in these regions, but efforts at this period met with scant encouragement." (Ibid., p. 2, footnote 1.)

[94]In 1911 Russia concluded a secret agreement with Germany recognizing the latter's interest in the Baghdad railway in return for recognition of her own interest in North Persia and a line connecting the two areas was to be built. (Kirk, Short History, p. 250.)

[95]Memoirs, pp. 85-86. Rhodes at that time was seeking a right-of-way through German East Africa.

[96]Levine, op. cit., p. 78.

[97]Op. cit., p. 28.

[98]The passenger terminal in Damascus, still commandingly located and impressive with its handsome decor and outsized chandelier, looks worthy of the donors' original hopes for the line. The freight shed behind it has been taken over by a printing business.

[99]It is to be regretted that no biography of Meissner, who is reported as having died in Istanbul in 1940, seems ever to have been written. In the rare instances in which he is commented upon personally, the terms are glowing--Longrigg's "brilliant and dynamic, polished Orientalist [sic] and courtier", for example.

(Iraq, p. 61.) T. E. Lawrence referred to Meissner the engineer as being also an Assyrologist. In such instances H. A. Meissner has most probably been confused with Bruno Meissner (see pages 10 & 13 above).

[100] K. Becker, "Die Hedchasbahn", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 5 (November 1963), p. 193. Earle, op. cit., p. 27, states: "The engineers in charge of the construction were Italians." He also points out that non-Moslems were replaced with Moslems as quickly as the latter could be trained.

[101] Becker, op. cit., p. 194.

[102] "Without question, the Bagdad railway project and its ramifications were significant factors in developing the European climate that led to World War I." (Fisher, op. cit., p. 336.) The undertaking of the Hejaz railway had also alarmed Britain and is credited with having stimulated planning for occupation of Basra in event of war, taking over of a large share of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. by the Admiralty, and assumption of a protectorate over the Bahrein Islands. (Kaster, op. cit., pp. 115-16.) According to the Times History of the War, the mere presence of a European Power other than Britain in the Persian Gulf would have indicated that British strength was declining, not to mention the existence of a base of operations from which India could be attacked. (F. Stuhlmann, Der Kampf um Arabien (Hamburg: 1916), p. 229.)

[103] The Germans, "supported by the good will of the Turks", wished to buy a coastal strip of 20 sq. mi. for the terminus. (Saleh, op. cit., p. 275.)

[104] In 1899 "a German cruiser, the Arcona, visited the Persian Gulf, apparently on a surveying and propaganda mission." The British resident in the Gulf saw to it "that the Sheik of Kuwait was kept away from the Germans." (Ibid., p. 229.)

[105] E. T. S. Dugdale (ed.), German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 (London: 1931), Vol. IV, p. 238. H. H. Schaeder also claimed, in 1935, that one of England's primary concerns was to keep German competition out of the oil areas. (Der Orient und Wir, p. 45.) This aspect is less often mentioned in general accounts than that of access to India, however. R. Hüber accuses Britain of wishing to prevent the railway from serving the Ottoman Empire and bringing prosperity to its Arab regions--a variation on the theme of British exploitation heavily played upon in German World War II propaganda. (Baghdadbahn, p. 24.)

[106] Kirchner, op. cit., p. 593.

[107] An incidental, but revealing, clash of British and German interests occurred at Sir Leonard Woolley's diggings at Carchemish, northeast of Aleppo:

> Trouble had been growing between the German engineers of the Baghdad railway and the British archaeologists. Their interests clashed not only because they were the two great employers of labor, but because the engineers had designs on the site of Carchemish and the archaeologists were doing

all they could to protect it and prevent any of the excavated stone being used for building.

Incidentally, I have been told that Hogarth prevented injury to the great mound by enlisting the support of the Kaiser, who had an amateur interest in archaeology.

These rivalries might have been bridged had there been good will on both sides but the whole attitude of the Germans was so repellant to Lawrence and Woolley that this was impossible.

(D. Garnett (ed.), The Letters of T. E. Lawrence (London: 1964), pp. 125-26.) On p. 128 Lawrence reports the local Syrians' unfavorable comments on the behavior of the Germans and on p. 170 ff. recounts the Germans' difficulties with their Kurdish labor force in detail. ("The Germans offered high wages but had a system of fines and of docking men for food and water which led to continual friction. They maintained their authority with a guard of armed Circassians.")

[108]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 79-80. The agreement also provided for German acquisition of 20% of the Ottoman Steam Navigation Co. and two British representatives on the Bagdad Railway board, among other arrangements. (Saleh, op. cit., p. 285.)

[109]The following documents pertaining to the Bagdad Railway: The Baghdad Railroad Convention, March 5, 1903; Convention (Potsdam) on the Baghdad Railroad and Russian Interests in Persia: Russia and Germany, Aug. 6-19, 1911; Draft Agreement on the Baghdad Railroad: the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank, Feb. 15, 1914; and Anglo-German Draft Convention on the Baghdad Railroad, June 15, 1914, are among those to be found in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. Vol. I. Documentary Record 1535-1914 (Princton: 1956). Notes and correspondence on the negotiations while in progress are provided in revealing abundance in Dugdale, op. cit. Earle, op. cit., p. 84, states that "appended to the Baghdad Railroad Convention was a secret agreement binding the company not to encourage or install foreign settlements or colonies in the vicinity of the Anatolian or Bagdad Railways."

[110]Grobba, op. cit., p. 70.

[111]Earle, op. cit., p. 108. Its service was "not based on German trade" but designed to break into an area under British monopoly. Subsidized by the German government, it was able to enter into a rate war with the British companies which ended in a compromise beneficial to traders with and in Mesopotamia. (Ibid.) This source gives 1908 as the year of the arrival of the first full-time German consul in Bagdad. (Ibid., p. 109.)

[112]Longrigg, Iraq, p. 66. "Influx" is relative. Earle, op. cit., p. 124, states that there were not more than 200 Europeans resident in Mesopotamia before World War I. However, a British account dating from World War I remarked that "there were very few Germans in [Mesopotamia] twenty years ago, but their commercial, engineering, and archaeological enterprises developed with

amazing rapidity and were prosecuted with amazing thoroughness." (Canon J. T. Parfit, Twenty Years in Baghdad and Syria (London: n.d.), p. 20.)

[113]The 1906 and 1913 figures are from Earle, op. cit., p. 109. The 1909-11 percentages are from M. S. Hasan, Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Modern Iraq 1869-1939 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1958), pp. 69 & 154. Items bought and sold by Iraq included "matches, woolens, stationery and papers, loaf sugar, hosiery and haberdashery, leather, lead and tin, silks and velvets, iron and steel, candles, provisions, soap and petrol." (Saleh, op. cit., p. 231.)

[114]Saleh, op. cit., p. 233.

[115]Longrigg, Iraq, p. 62. The Société was under the Belgian flag.

[116]Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London: 1961, p. 13.)

[117]Ibid., p. 65. Article of the Convention of March 5, 1903, reads as follows: "The concessionaires may work any mines which they shall discover withint a zone of 20 km. each side of the middle of the lines . . . but this shall not give them a privilege or monopoly." Earle, op. cit., p. 15, describes the 1904 option as "the privilege of making a thorough survey of the oilfields of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, with the option within one year of entering into a contract with the Ottoman government for their exploitation."

[118]"After two renewals the option was treated by the Turks (though never by the Bank) as having lapsed." (Longrigg, Oil, p. 65)

[119]Ibid. Y. Famchon & M. Leruth, L'Allemagne et le Moyen Orient (Paris: 1957), p. 12, find quite another set of data significant: they cite a firman of Oct. 23, 1913 (published in July 1914) which "conceded to the Turkish Petroleum Co. rights of prospecting for and exploiting the oil deposits of Mesopotamia," participation being 50% National Bank of Turkey (hence, "the Deutsche Bank"), 25% Anglo-Persian Oil, 25% Anatolian Railway, which as "75% German (Berlin)". This agreement was supposed to have been signed on March 19, 1914.

[120]Longrigg, Oil, p. 43. H. Eliseit, Halbmond um Israel (Berlin: 1955), p. 392, points out that von der Goltz had petroleum specialists on his staff during his command of the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia. Even in the face of Germany's most serious defeats in the European theater during World War I, German official policy did not lose sight of its hopes for participation in oil exploitation in Iraq: "On August 9 [1918] representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Imperial Economic Office, the embassy in Constantinople, the Imperial Navy, the War Ministry, and the Ministry for Trade and Industry unanimously declared: The Mesopotamian oil fields (must) be kept in the German sphere of influence at all costs." (F. Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf: 1961), p. 784.) Fischer calls attention in both the text and footnote to the "inner tensions of the German Turkish policy. The tensions resulted from the duality of intentions . . . to create and maintain a militarily strong Turkey as an advance guard in the Mid-

dle East and on the other hand to keep Turkey dependent through . . . penetration with German capital." (Ibid.)

[121]The transfer of the German share to France was ratified at San Remo in April 1920. There was a somewhat ironic footnote to the situation. In the words of I. Kirchner, op. cit., p. 685, "At the end of 1922 England gave its consent to the occupation of the Ruhr by French troops and received in return the assurance of France's withdrawal of political interest in the Mosul area from the French Premier Poincaré."

[122]S. H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate (London: 1958), p. 40.

[123]J. deGroodt-Adent, Geschichte des französichen Einflusses in Syrien (Köslin: 1941), p. 27. Ascribed to "Khairallah, a liberal publicist".

[124]Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., p. 496. Until German goods began to be carried to the Near East largely in German bottoms in the 1890s, figures on German trade in the Fertile Crescent were extremely unreliable. The figures cited date from 1895. (Ibid., p. 481)

[125]Ibid., p. 486.

[126]Ibid., p. 488. A footnote comments on the effectiveness of the approach used at the Berlin school of living Oriental languages.

[127]Earle, op. cit., p. 107. Elsewhere, "in 1914 German commercial influence was already dominant in Haifa, which [as terminus of Meissner's branch line from Deraa] was eventually expected to develop into the Mediterranean terminus of the Hejaz railway." (Henderson, op. cit., p. 81.)

[128]Moutran, op. cit., p. 282 (also Longrigg, Syria, p. 31). On p. 53 Moutron commented: "As is known, the Germans are able to produce certain manufactures at prices defying any hope of competition" but France hoped with the help of the cheap raw materials and labor of Syria "to wrest the Mediterranean market from Germany" and the African and other Asian markets as well.

[129]Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., p. 44. The sequence of names borne by one of the German hotels in Beirut is enlightening: originally the Deutscher Kaiserhof before World War I, it became the Metropole during the war, the Deutscherhof in the twenties and thirties, and the Metropole again after World War II.

[130]Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., pp. 37-38 and Hassert, op. cit., p. 205. Hassert pointed out that there were only 27 German schools with 3,000 pupils, in the entire Ottoman Empire before World War I, as compared with 560 French, 273 American (chiefly in Armenia), 126 British, 69 Italian, and 56 Russian.

[131]Earle, op. cit., p. 132.

[132]Parfit, op. cit., p. 23.

[133]With regard to relations with the French railway system in Syria: it could not have pleased the French that "before the war the Bagdad road, together with the Hejaz Railway, was looked upon as constituting something of a unit often referred to as the Turko-German system." (B. Himadeh (ed.), Economic Organization of Syria, (Beirut: 1936), p. 184.) A plan for peaceful coexistence was made:

> At the end of [May 1913] negotiations began between France and Germany and were terminated by an agreement concluded on February 15, 1914, between the Bagdad Railway Company and the Société Syrienne. Amongst other provisions it defined the areas in which the two would work and stated that each should respect the rights of the other. The Syrian Railway was to join the other at Aleppo.

(Dugdale, op. cit., IV, p. 243, footnote.)

[134]Longrigg, Syria, p. 42.

[135]Kaster, op. cit., p. 113.

[136]The Orientbank was associated with the Nationalbank für Deutschland of Berlin, the source adds. (Henderson, op. cit., p. 86, footnote 37.)

[137]Ibid., pp. 81-82. International mail was handled by the various Powers' post offices in that era.

[138]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 13. It has been pointed out that this almost anachronistically embittered book appeared in 1957--i.e., shortly after the British and French débacle at Suez.

[139]Kirk, Short History, p. 96. They also pointed out that it was "likely to embitter relations with the British". (Ibid.) "It is sufficiently known that from the beginning we have pursued commercial schemes only," the German Foreign Secretary had protested to his Ambassador in London in March 1913. (Dugdale, op. cit., IV, p. 239.)

[140]The term was selected by M. Boveri, Minaret and Pipe-line, trans. L.M. Sieveking (London: 1939), p. 139, as a chapter heading. She offers a lucid description of the transition from purely commercial to politically-directed undertakings.

[141]Stuhlmann, op. cit., p. 1.

[142]Hüber, Baghdadbahn, p. 90.

[143]W. Bretholz, Aufstand der Araber (Munich: 1960), p. 76.

[144]Officials of the German Foreign Ministry concerned with Near Eastern affairs who were interviewed tended to discount both the economic and political significance of the Bagdad railway. They agreed that it is interesting that the Arabs saw little or no colonialism lurking in the background of the project, from all present evidence. (Cf. Lührs, op. cit., p. 28, for a contrary opinion:

> The impressive commercial activity of Germany during the last few decades; the settling of merchants chiefly in Bagdad and also farther south; the setting up of schools; the stress laid on the Hamburg to Bagdad rail connections, with their commercial possibilities--all of this had, in the opinion of the people of the Near East, an emphatically imperialistic character.)

[145]Longrigg, Iraq, p. 61.

[146]Hüber, Baghdadbahn, p. 48.

[147]The British announced German interests in the Société de Transports Fluviaux "forever extinguished" toward the end of 1914. (Longrigg, Iraq, p. 61.)

[148]"In official German war histories this phase of the action is dealt with in a rather step-motherly fashion," in the opinion of Franz von Papen, who was actively involved as a staff officer in the Levant during the principal battles. (Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Munich: 1952), p. 87.)

[149]An official description of his functions stated: "The General is the Chief of the Mission, Member of the War Council, Inspector of Military Schools, and Commander of the First Corps. His command is purely technical. The Straits, the Forts, and the maintenance of order in Constantinople are not in his jurisdiction." To conciliate the British, he resigned command of the First Corps and was given the "less objectionable" appointment of Inspector-General of the Turkish Army. (Saleh, op. cit., p. 288.)

[150]Fisher, op. cit., p. 363. After a brief period of estrangement (minimized or denied by some writers--cf. Saleh, op. cit., pp. 25-52) during the first months of the Young Turk government following the Committee of Union and Progress coup d'état in January 1913, "Turkish-German cooperation was fully resumed." (Longrigg, Iraq, p. 42.)

[151]Op. cit., p. 82.

[152]E. A. Messerschmidt, Review of Persien in der Deutsche Orientpolitik während des ersten Weltkriegs by Ulrich Gehrke, Orient (Hamburg), II, No. 5 (November 1961), p. 222. In Persia, Gehrke claims, German activities were improvised as situations arose and based on inadequate knowledge of the land and its people.

[153]F. Fischer, op. cit., p. 148. Of 896 pages, only six are devoted to "The Islamic World", and within this section Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, and North Africa are the countries or regions singled out for discussion.

[154]Nothing less than "insurrection of the Islamic world from Lahore to Casablanca" was sought. (Ibid., p. 147.)

[155]Sulzberger, op. cit., pp. 663-64. G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1962), p. 39, maintains that calling the jihad had been one of the conditions of the alliance with Turkey. Further, "the German emperor, pursuing his traditional policy of courting Islam, had already (Sept. 9, 1914) issued a proclamation that Moslems fighting in the Entente armies were not to be considered belligerents. . . ."

[156]The Germans were for a time entagled in the Pan-Islamic movement for rejuvenating the Empire but the Young Turks' anti-Arab actions later discredited it: "Apart from the confusion within Turkish ruling circles, there were differences between Turkey and Germany. These differences related to the content of the Central Powers' propaganda in the Middle East and to the methods of car-

rying out the policy. With regard to the content, the German government initially approved the Pan-Islamic propaganda and even actively contributed to it." (Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 53.)

[157] Middle East Journal, XVI (Winter 1962), p. 98.

[158] Fisher, op. cit., p. 362.

[159] A. Hottinger, The Arabs (London: 1963), p. 214. Heed should have been paid to Heinrich von Treitschke's thought of December 1876: "No European knows what is going on in the minds of 8,000,000 Mohammedan subjects of the White Czar, how much the word of the Sheik Islam and the prestige of the caliph is still worth among these masses. . . ." (Germany, France, Russia and Islam (London: 1915), p. 94.)

[160] M. Khadduri, "General Nuri's Flirtations with the Axis Powers," Middle East Journal, XVI (Summer 1962), p. 328.

[161] A German publicist in the late 1930s offered the following reconsideration of the question:

> The hopes which Germany placed in Turkey's assistance militarily were not justified. The "Holy War" which was declared was destined to fail because of its essentially false nature; it was not a question of religion but of power--that of Turkey. The other Moslems had little difficulty in recognizing this fact, and if they responded to the call to arms, it could only be because the time had come for them to throw off foreign domination.

(T. Reichardt, Der Islam vor den Toren (Leipzig: 1939), p. 332.)

German leadership was not necessarily happy with Turkish obduracy regarding Arab autonomy. Franz von Papen, then a young staff officer with the Palestine Expeditionary Corps, tells in his memoirs of the convictions which led him to travel to the Western front in Europe to seek General Ludendorff's aid in changing the Turkish stand. The latter promptly sent off a telegram to Enver with "an urgent appeal for comprehension on the part of the Turkish political leadership and a request that the Arab tribes be granted extensive autonomy." (Op. cit., p. 107.)

[162] According to Earle, op. cit., p. 281, the wartime propaganda efforts were extensive for the day, both within Germany and in the Near East. One organization based in Leipzig, the German Near East Association for Cultural Relations headed by Hugo Grothe, "published and distributed hundreds and thousands of books, pamphlets, and maps regarding Asiatic Turkey; conducted a Near East Institute at which lectures and courses of instruction were given; maintained an information bureau for businessmen interested in commercial and industrial opportunities in the Ottoman Empire; and established German libraries in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Konia, and elsewhere along the line of the Bagdad Railway." Mutual practical advantages were frankly stressed. (Saleh, op. cit., p. 248.)

[163] Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 39.

[164] Lahrs, op. cit., p. 8.

[165] Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 6:

> As allies of the Muslim Empire the Germans could not ap-

peal to the idea of Arab independence; nor could they support the aspiration of Arab leaders for their own separate state. . . . Thus Husein did not break with London even when he learned of the secret treaties for the partition of the Ottoman Empire among the Entente Powers, . . .

[166] Lührs, op. cit., p. 8.

[167] F. Grobba, "Die deutsch-arabische Freundschaft", Orient (Hamburg), I, No. 1 (April 1960), p. 13. (Cf. Liman, op. cit., pp. 303f)

[168] G. Kirk, "The Arab Awakening Reconsidered", Middle East Affairs, XIII, No. 6 (June/July 1962), p. 169.

[169] The preoccupation of the Near Easterner with being on the winning side is credited with the difficulty of determining loyalties for historical purposes. "This occasioned sudden and unexpected changes of front according to the situation and prospects of victory." (Boveri, op. cit., 171.)

[170] Some last-minute maneuvering was done by the German and Ottoman governments with a view to winning the support of the Zionists in Palestine. Germany had intervened at Constantinople earlier during World War I against Ottoman repression of the Zionists but had no clear policy toward or interest in Zionism at that juncture. (The German press was friendly to the movement, however, and the German diplomatic representation in Palestine extended facilities such as courier service to the World Zionist Organization there.) In 1918, after the British breakthrough in Palestine, Germany and Austria finally issued pro-Zionist declarations, theretofore eschewed in order not to trouble relations with Turkey. (Weltmann, op. cit., pp. 254-68.) Weltmann states that there was no German or Turkish equivalent of the Balfour Declaration. However, a reliable West German source offers this version: As Germany and Turkey already saw defeat in the offing, "the two states agreed to make an offer to the Zionist organization in the Central Powers' area by which Turkey undertook to grant the necessary land and privileges to prepare the way for the development of a Jewish political community on Palestinian territory." (F. Böhm, "Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen", Frankfurter Hefte, XX, No. 9 (September 1965), p. 622.) In December 1917 and July 1918, according to G. Lenczowski, "Turkey and Germany tried to win Jewish favor by offering the German Zionists a chartered company in Palestine. It was, however, too late to change the general pro-Ally Zionist orientation." (Middle East, p. 81.)

[171] In his memoirs von Papen recalls his initial reaction to the news, received in the trenches on the Western Front, that he was being reassigned to Mesopotamia: "Where in all the world is that," he asked. Commentators (like Sulzberger, op. cit.) trace to the fact that these two men served together a friendship which led to von Papen's appointment as ambassador to Ankara. However, von Papen's memoirs (Der Wahrheit eine Gasse) reveal neither respect nor sympathy for von Ribbentrip, and he is not mentioned in von Papen's account of his Near Eastern service.

[172]A British history of this campaign auggests that Grobba was a member of von Stotzingen's abortive mission into the Hejaz but Dr. Grobba himself denies this, stating that he was assigned to von Stotzingen only after that mission. (Capt. C. Falls, Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine (London: 1930), Vol. I, p. 229, and interview with Dr. Fritz Grobba, Sept. 22, 1967.)

[173]Longrigg, Syria, p. 47, footnote 1, and O. Liman von Sanders, Cinq Ans de Turquie, trans. Cdt. Mabille (Paris: 1923). These memoirs contain innumerable terse indications of the proud Prussian's indignation at his mission's continually being by-passed by Turkish and German authorities in joint military planning, not least in that for Yilderim.

[174]W.-O. von Hentig, Der Nahe Osten rückt näher (Leipzig: 1940), p. 45.

[175]Liman von Sanders, op. cit., pp. 203-04.

[176]Falls, op. cit., p. 62. He is also remembered as having developed the best rapport with his Oriental comrades-in-arms, although a misjudgment later lost him the confidence of the Turkish commanders.

[177]He had originally been sent with a staff of six German officers to advise Colonel Jemal Bey, commander of the Turkish VIII Corps in Damascus, in the fall of 1914. When Jemal Pasha arrived in November to head the Fourth Army at Damascus, Kress von Kressenstein became his adviser for the surprise attack on the Suez Canal, in which "a contingent of all arms and auxiliary services" from the Central Powers also participated. This contingent was known as "Pasha I" in code, and the Central Powers units in the Yilderim operation as "Pasha II". During the Gaza campaign the units under Kress von Kressenstein were reconstituted as the Eighth Army. (Falls, op. cit., I, p. 202.)

[178]Lührs, op. cit., pp. 29 & 31. As mentioned above, Lührs had been a member of the delegation which had sought to win the Shiite notables of Karbala and Najaf to the idea of the jihad. Although the mission failed, Lührs must have been aware that (according to Boveri, op. cit., p. 170) they "regarded the Germans, if not actually as liberators, at least as a counterpoise to the hated Sunnite Turkish domination." The Turks had some right to their suspicions and caution.

[179]"The barely-completed German wireless station had been left in ruins," comments Longrigg, Iraq, p. 93. He refers to terrorist activity among the populace of British-held areas as "a German-organized series of crimes". (Ibid., p. 95.)

[180]It was because they had gotten wind of the Yilderim plan and wished to draw these forces away from Iraq that the British launched their Palestine offensive at this time, Liman von Sanders claims. (Op. cit., p. 209.)

[181]Longrigg, Syria, p. 47, footnote 3. He had come to behave as a sort of viceroy in the provice, maintains Liman von Sanders. (Op. cit., p. 211.)

[182]Fisher, op. cit., p. 365.

[183]Kirchner, op. cit., pp. 670-71.

[184]A tribute to the German and Austrian troops of the Palestine expeditionary force has also been paid by an Englishman:

> The enemy . . . had lost all order and coherence . . . . Exceptions were the German detachments; and here for the first time, I grew proud of the enemy who had killed my brothers. They were 2,000 miles from home, without hope and without guides, in conditions mad enough to break the bravest nerves. Yet the sections held together in firm rank, shearing through the wrack of Turk and Arab, like armored ships, high-faced and silent, When they attacked they halted, took position, fired to order. There was no haste, no crying, no hesitation. They were glorious.

(T. E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert (Garden City, N.Y.: 1926), p. 310.) No wonder that one still encounters in the Near East fine old gentlemen, grandfathers many times over, who recall with pride their service with the German detachments. (In the Mesopotamian theater the British were less gallant; General Mobberley's Mesopotamian Campaign (London: 1924), Vol. III, p. 197, makes much of panic's having seized the Germans.)

[185]With bitter humor he recalled a request from Enver Pasha for a plan of operations shortly after arrival: "I don't know why the question made me think of a man about to drown being invited by people on the shore to join a swimming contest the following day." (Op. cit., p. 243.) He had had command of the Fifth Army in 1917.

[186]Ibid., pp. 360-61.

[187]Earle, op. cit., p. 39.

[188]E. Candler (2 vols.; Boston: 1919), Vol. II, pp. 278-79.

[189]Earle, op. cit., p. 234.

[190]Secretary of State G. von Jagow on July 16, 1913, and Sept. 3, 1913, respectively, in Dugdale, op. cit., IV, pp. 246-47.

[191]Jäckh, op. cit., pp. 18 & 20.

[192]Schmidt, op. cit., p. 29.

[193]Ibid., pp. 30 & 34. Auhagen expressed a highly favorable opinion of the Syrian peasant.

[194]Himadeh, op. cit., p. 90. "Tractors, harvesters, winnowing and other machinery were imported but soon went out of service as the people who were using them did not understand them and neither trained mechanics nor spare parts were available," it is explained.

[195]Fisher, op. cit., p. 335.

[196]K. M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq (Cambridge, Mass.: 1962), p. 115.

[197]Vernier, op. cit., Introduction.

[198]Dugdale, op. cit., II, p. x.

[199]Huber, Es wetterleuchtet zwischen Nil und Tigris (Berlin: 1940), p. 31.

CHAPTER II

THE FATA MORGANA FRIENDSHIP

> The friendship of the Arabs for Germany is almost instinctive. Every bedouin in the desert is convinced that Germany is a friend of the Arabs. The origins of this attitude lie in the pre-[World War I] period--for example, in the declaration of friendship for the Arabs and for Islam made by Kaiser Wilhelm at the grave of Saladin in Damascus. The German-Turkish brotherhood-in-arms during the Great War is still alive among members of the leading classes in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine today. The main grounds for Arab friendship toward Germany are, however, the recognition that Germany is the only great power which is strong enough to help the Arabs without having any designs on Arab territory. . . . In their struggle to prevent the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine they see Germany as their only real ally.[1]

Thus did Fritz Grobba, German minister to Iraq, seek to make vivid to his chiefs in Berlin the favorable disposition toward Germany which he had encountered in the Fertile Crescent countries between the two World Wars.

The Introduction to this paper presented for consideration the elusive phenomenon which has been called "the well-intended but often puzzlingly irrational friendship of many Arabs" for the Germans.[2] This chapter will offer evidence and opinion tending both to support and to deny its existence and will examine its nature in greater detail.

The converse, the attraction which the Near and Middle East exerts on Germans, is probably no less irrational. At its most superficial this attraction is played upon constantly by the illustrated press in photo series on the Shah and Empress of Iran and a few flamboyant "oil sheikhs". An attraction with a deeper spiritual basis is exerted by the austere but free life of the desert, at least as it is imagined. Further, while the Arab admires the discipline of the German, the German is drawn

by the Arab emphasis on the "human".[3] There is unquestionably here much of the proverbial attraction of opposites. However, cooperation between the representatives of these two seemingly so disparate cultures has often been successful. It seems worthwhile to try to determine whether this has been true to any exceptional extent and, if so, why. (See also Appendix B.)

Without access to effective public opinion sampling, this presentation can consist only of a summary of conclusions reached by a few observers and of published declarations, official and unofficial. And due allowance must be made for rhetoric.[4] Even within these restrictions a relationship of a singular nature emerges. In keeping with the ambiguities which have characterized it, a recent work published in the German Democratic Republic conceded that the Arabs had been well-disposed toward Germany since the days of Wilhelm II, even while accusing the Federal Republic of Germany of reviving for neo-imperialist purposes the "useful fiction of its alleged decades-old indestructible and selfless friendship towards the Arab peoples".[5]

The German View

How do Germans today--primarily West Germans--view the Fertile Crescent nations and Germany's relationship to them? German authorities resident in the Near East who were interviewed on the whole assess the West German public's interest in current developments in these countries as modest and poorly-informed. This opinion is seconded in a 1965 commentary by the editors of Europa Archiv:

> The discussions of the Near East crisis during the past spring in German mass media have shown that Germans have up to this point been insufficiently or not at all aware of the deciding elements in German-Arab relations. The spiritual tensions in the midst of which the Arabs live today and only in light of which their emotional and political reactions are understandable are largely unknown to all but a few scientific, economic, and foreign policy specialists.[6]

As for the traditional German-Arab friendship so frequently evoked by Arab speakers and writers, not only do these experts often ad-

judge the German public unaware of it but in a number of cases have themselves gone to some pains to understand and account for the legend and its persistence.

Even the warmest defenders of the concept find themselves presenting it almost exclusively in terms of Arab reaction to circumstances and events rather than as a shared, reciprocal sentiment. For example, after the customary reference to Charlemagne's exchange of embassies with Harun al-Raschid and to Frederick II's reluctant and bloodless crusade, a West German diplomat summarized the friendship's origins thus in 1960:

> The German-Turkish friendship spread also to the Arab subjects of the Turks. The visit paid by Kaiser Wilhelm II to Sultan Abdul Hamid in Constantinople was interpreted in the entire Islamic world as a sign of friendship for the Islamic peoples . . . . During the first World War an alliance between Germany and Muslim Turkey arose. . . . Disillusioned by the failure to honor promises of independence given them during the war and by the dividing of their lands into British and French mandates instead, the Arabs directed their hopes for help toward Germany, the only Western power which had never had, and moreover did not wish to have, Arabs under its domination, and which had never shown them anything but friendship.[7]

In the same vein, a West German journalist added:

> Direct contacts between Arabs and Germans have been limited to brief episodes which lent themselves to legend-making. . . .
>
> Even when they withdrew from the Palestine front at the end of the war the Germans did not lose face; rather, their military operations made only the best impression.[8]

Finally, the fact that Germany "took an absolutely neutral stand" during the quarter century subsequent to World War I allowed these favorable impressions to become consolidated. As a result, Germany has been "the only important nation which has enjoyed [Arab] sympathy uninterruptedly since the previous century; even the problem of Israel has failed to cause any fundamental change."[9]

Another type of analysis places the traditional German-Arab friendship in perspective as merely part of a much vaster phenomenon:

> The German observer who travels through Asia will note with pleasure the exceptionally high prestige of the German

people. . . .

> But confidence in our economic and technical performance is only one reason for the esteem in which Germany is held in Asia. . . . They do not feel comfortable when they sit alone with the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxons at the table at which the play which will determine their independence, their rise or fall, is to take place; they want a fourth to take his place at the table and join in the dealings--someone who is good at the game without being as involved or as perilously strong as the two others.
>
> The role of this "fourth" has frequently fallen to Germany in the past. . . . There are scarcely any other candidates for the position.[10]

The question of the origins of the "traditional friendship" has apparently preoccupied East Germans as well. "The Arabs give the most curious answers," the representative in Beirut of the GDR's Nachrichten Agentur commented in an interview. The industriousness of the Germans, Rommel (a hero-type beloved of the Arabs)--these "are not answers," he amplified. As for the German friendship for the Arabs, he cited two factors to which he ascribed the attraction felt to the Arabs by Germans in the Near East. First, there is the "hearty and open hospitality toward the Germans", and second, the Arabs' "will to develop economically on their own, to determine their own future, without tutelage."[11]

This is not to say that expressions of friendship have not also come from the German side. But such declarations, particularly those on formal, public occasions, have the air of bemused echoings of similar Arab pronouncements. For example, at the signing of the loan agreement for the Euphrates dam in the Syrian Region of the United Arab Republic in July 1961 "Erhard expressed hope the agreement will strengthen the traditional friendship of the two countries."[12] On another occasion, an eight-man delegation from the West German Bundestag was described by its chief as intended "to study ways to improve the traditionally good relations between the German people and the Arab peoples."[13] And so on.

The hardest-eyed German observers in the Near East deny that any Fertile Crescent government would be influenced by this

"tradition" to take any step contrary to what it felt to be its own best interests. The harshest opinion expressed described it as a lever used by at least one Fertile Crescent government to get more benefit--"the last ounce of profit"--from its associations with West Germany.

Allusions to expediency in German-Arab relations are inevitably associated with reference to the Hitler era:

> Many Germans . . . make the mistake of thinking that they are particularly well liked in the Arab world. It is a fact that Germans are frequently favored, but this is by no means the result of true rapport but purely and simply of political circumstances which cast the Germans in the role of enemy of the English and the French in the past. For this reason many Arabs still think back with great sadness to the days of Adolf Hitler.[14, 15]

There is more than an echo here of thoughts in a passage from a wartime German work. Remarking on the astonishing popularity of the Führer with "the simple man" in Arab countries, where Hitler's picture was to be found in all the bazaars, it continues:

> Such admiration is however in no way the same as what we, in a deeper metaphysical sense, designate as "predisposition to friendship with the Germans". Relations between East and West cannot stem from personal inclinations, particularly not today, but only from considerations of expediency.[16]

In the same realistic mood, Fritz Grobba had rounded off his 1937 report (see page 56 above) with the following terse conclusion: "Even if Arab friendship toward Germany is determined above all by the Arabs' own interest, it is an important factor for Germany, which we can make both political and economic use of."[17]

Is the concept to be dismissed, then, as a fraud? According to Arnold Hottinger, Swiss author of The Arabs, that would be unwise. Among the masses there is a positive feeling toward the Germans even though they "don't quite know why." "When it gets down to that level," he adds, "it is fairly permanent," as is attested by the fact that the disillusionment resulting from German aid to and recognition of Israel has not completely wiped it out.[18]

There is some evidence that the favorable disposition of the Arabs toward Germany had been taken for granted by the average German. The Germans were upset by the recent hostility shown by the Arabs, wrote a Stuttgart journalist in 1959, "for the German-Arab friendship seemed to have become something of an axiom of world politics; but romantic love . . . can also metamorphose into its opposite."[19, 20]

As for any generalized feeling of friendship for the Arab nations within Germany, there is a considerable range of judgment as to whether it has any significant strength as an element of public opinion. Journalists tend to discount it:

> A correspondingly spontaneous feeling of friendship for the Arabs was not to be detected in Germany even before the German-Arab crisis [of 1965]. The Arab world has retreated into the background as far as our awareness of it is concerned in the last few years. . . .
> . . . . . .
> In the Orient, nonetheless, the almost mystic concept of a German-Arab friendship is still a reality.[21]

Opinions expressed by officials ranged from the restrained to the positive:

> The great majority of Germans have no opinion about the Arabs. They are too far away. There is a general friendly attitude, and most know that this dates from the time of Frederick II, but it is not one of the most important questions of interest to all in Germany.[22]
> . . . . . .
> There has always been a strong pro-Arab feeling in Germany which is not artificially created.[23]

In one Orientalist's opinion,

> the "traditional German-Arab friendship" does indeed still play a role in German public life. There are many Germans who feel a marked attraction to the Arabs. On the other hand, the attraction of the Arabs to us Germans is based in part on the illusion that we are still Jew-haters as under National Socialism. The Arabs have still to learn that this is no longer the case. Mutual understanding will only slowly return.[24, 25]

With an acute sense of the irony of the contrast with Germany's accomplishments in Oriental studies, authority after authority confesses that the major source of the German popular

conception of the Middle East and its inhabitants for three generations has probably been the work of adventure-story writer Karl May (1842-1912). Still a best-selling author, he had never visited the exotic lands he wrote about (until perhaps the end of his life). Even Hans Lührs, whose own adventures easily rivalled those of May's creations, found it natural to refer to May in describing an Arab comrade-in-arms: "Hajj Mohammed always recalled vividly to my mind the famous Hajj Halif Omar from Karl May's stories."[26] More recently, Countess Marion Dönhoff, experienced traveler and reporter on international affairs, confessed:

> The thought of flying from Amman to Bagdad seemed sinful to me. Since the days when the Saxon Karl May's From Bagdad to Istanbul gave wings to my imagination Bagdad had been for me a place of mystery and enchantment.[27]

A 1962 article deploring the lack of attention in German universities to the culture of the Kurds concluded the list of reasons:

> Thirdly, there is the German characteristic of correcting already-adopted images of other peoples only with the greatest reluctance. And the average German's image of the Kurds can be traced to Karl May's book "Im wilde Kurdistan" [In wildest Kurdistan].[28]

The tales of the 1001 nights have also played their part in building the popular image of life in the East.[29] In sum,

> the Orient is considered in Germany the cradle of mankind and is, for many, the wonderland of glorious visions: no travelogue fails to conjure up visions of the Arabian fairytal land, whose charms seem to dissolve with modernization.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Interest in the Middle East is nurtured by literary output (novels of the Oriental world based on more or less embellished and garbled reporting and on films), by visiting Oriental princes or missions, and by an adventurous bent nourished by the inexhaustible theme of the white slave and narcotics trade in Arabia.[30]

The susceptibility to clouding of normally sober judgment where things Oriental are concerned is further demonstrated in the accretion of legends regarding the exchange of gifts between Charlemagne and Harun al-Raschid. In the late 19th century von Ranke, pioneer in modern objective history, was already seeking

to combat this romanticization:

> Whatever Harun al-Raschid's gifts may have included, they prove only that the Caliph was disposed toward friendship with the Western emperor. Other external proofs of this friendship appeared neither then nor since.[31, 32]

What do German children today learn in school about the Arabs? World history texts from three West German publishers were examined (Klett, Diesterweg, and Westermann). Those of the first two contained only a modest amount of material on the Near and Middle East--perhaps half a dozen pages; the last, even less. A sober, impartial approach characterizes these schoolbooks. Germany's relations with, or accomplishments in, the area are mentioned only in connection with matters of the greatest weight, and then with extreme brevity.

The treatment of the rapid extension of the realm of Islam in two of the texts shows an interesting similarity:

> The migrations and foundation of empire by the Arabs are in many ways similar to those of the Germans. Well before Mohammed's time the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula had undertaken raiding expeditions beyond their borders. Islam gave these movements a clear goal.[33]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> While the Germanic mass migrations were never under a single leadership or inspired by a powerful idea, Mohammed succeeded in bringing all the Arab tribes together in the belief in the God he proclaimed, not only as a religious but also as a highly active political entity.[34]

One section on the pre-World War I period points out that Wilhelm II had declared friendship for the Muslims, of whom 250 million were under British or Russian rule. It continues:

> Germany sought raw materials sources and profitable fields for capital investment in the Near East. The construction of the Bagdad railway, which was to link Constantinople with the Persian Gulf, was assigned to a German contractor. Germany thus came up against the opposition of both England and Russia. It did, to be sure, win the friendship of the Arab world, which endures to this day.[35]

The mandate period and the struggles for national independence were touched upon only in passing, if mentioned at all.

Among the geography texts, Volume III of Klett Verlag's Länder und Volker series, Afrika--Asien--Australien, devotes

seven of 161 pages to the Fertile Crescent countries, one and a third of these to Israel. Little beyond core facts can be compressed into the tiny allotments of space.[36]

West German educators queried maintained that there was little time in the curricula for the Near East below the university level. Children in terminal programs get their first brief exposure to the topic at about 12 or 13 years and leave school shortly afterward.

The subject of West German education leads naturally to that of education in East Germany, since this is an area in which the German Democratic Republic claims to excel its wealthier sibling. The average person in the GDR, averred my informant, the East German news agency representative in Beirut, is greatly interested in being informed on peoples all over the world. This interest is attested by the preoccupation with the problems of the underdeveloped countries and their industrialization in questions submitted to the readers' pages in East German newspapers, he insisted. However, in the lower schools in East Germany it is difficult to find time to devote to Arab history, partly because it is such a long history. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to convey enough to inspire a "comradeship of peoples" (Völkerfreundschaft).[37]

The most pessimistic summation seen of the resulting lack of knowledge of the Near East on the part of the German public declared:

> For the average Central European the map of Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, along with Iraq, is once more simply a yellow-colored desert area. Nothing more is known than that the desert covers unsuspectedly large oil deposits and that on this account many foreigners are to be found there despite the unaccustomed heat.[38]

On the other hand, impressive sales of a wide-ranging work on current relations of Germany with the Orient have led its author to the hopeful conclusion that "what was originally a predilection for the exotic is steadily developing into a concern for the political."[39]

A final aspect of unofficial German-Arab relations to

be considered is that of relations between Germans in the Near East and the peoples among whom they live and with whom they work. Although some Germans tend to think that they assimilate better--"almost instinctively"--than do many other Westerners (most notably the Americans),[40] long experience in the Near East seems to discourage any generalization of that kind:

> It may be that a certain percentage of German sales personnel, technical people, scientists, politicians, etc., are somewhat more inclined to adapt to the peculiarities of foreign countries than are those of other nations, and it may also be that a number of Germans approach the Near Easterner and the special attraction of the Orient more receptively than do the representatives of other "Western" lands, but this can by no means be said of all Germans nor is it limited to Germans. . . .
>
> One point is important, however: In the portion of the world which is designated the Orient, the German, in contrast to the nationals of other Western lands, is not burdened with the stigma of colonialism. For the individual German this is not an earned privilege but a piece of luck. Further, the very old, traditional friendship between Easterners and Germans, which results in a certain predisposition on the part of the Oriental to work together with the German rather than with other "Westerners", plays a part; admittedly, this also is a point which should be made only with reservations and cannot be applied as a rule to individual cases.[41]

Perhaps the most advantageous characteristic which the Germans bring to their relations with and within the Arab countries is their respect for authority and for historical precedent. This would help to account for the reputably unyielding Germans' "willingness to do things in the Turkish fashion",[42] exceptional among Western nations in the early part of this century and reportedly still a feature of German collaboration in the Orient.[43, 44]

A favorable foundation for present-day German-Arab relations may have been laid as a result of the fact that, with no colonial advantages to attract them unselectively, Germans who came to the Fertile Crescent countries came because they were interested in the Arab area. Nowadays, with relatively fewer commitments abroad than other major Western nations have, Germany can still send out a high quality of personnel.[45] It is sug-

gested also that the spread of a Western-based world civilization had already lessened the cultural differences which had characterized the colonial era by the time the Germans appeared in considerable numbers in the Near East.[46]

West German books for the general public on the Near East which have come out during the fifties and sixties seldom mention German presence or undertakings, government or private, in the countries they survey. Perhaps there is a dread of sounding expansionist. A rare exception was a three-page account of the living conditions encountered by the German technicians who inaugurated the West German work at the Port of Aqaba. Included is the observation that

> our fellow countrymen are on the best of terms with the inhabitants and officials of Aqaba. They are admired for their industry, for their efficiency, and above all for the achievements of civilization which they have brought with them to Aqaba.[47]

For the future of German-Arab relations, the abundance of temperate reflections on the part which Germany can play in helping the developing countries attain a higher standard of living is encouraging. The acknowledgment that "not paternalism but fraternalism, true democratic partnership is desired"[48] by the Near Eastern nations appears repeatedly. "Partnership" is not expected to materialize automatically, however:

> But how can we enter into a foreign world which has seemed to us for the most part a relic of times long past, a symbol of backwardness and incompetence? The new nations themselves want to have done with their pasts as times of colonial domination and subjection: it is time to begin anew.
> . . . . . .
> Here arises the fundamental question: are we ready to accept the developing countries as partners, or are we going to stand fast by the old--one might even say colonial --trade relationship of manufactured goods against food and raw materials?[49]

Even more frequent is the call for patience while awaiting positive results from development aid to the Near East.

> The tensions which have arisen in our time from the collision with the western, technical civilization should teach

> us that any changes which are to be lasting must be integrated into the culture as it has developed there. . . .
>
> The atmosphere of historical tradition which overlies everything teaches us also that the success of man's works cannot be measured in brief generations but only in centuries and millenia.[50]

"Patience, patience, and still more patience," recommends another author for trade and aid dealings throughout Asia. It is almost better to make a few mistakes than to display too much organizational energy, he adds.[51]

Patience with the unstable political situation in the Near East is also in order. Unfortunately, the efforts of scholars of good will who venture into political commentary in order to "contribute to the understanding of the problem of why the erection of modern states in the Islamic Orient is so difficult"[52] attract only a limited audience.

> But it was no different in Germany in the 18th century and in Italy in the 19th century. Decades had to pass before the dreams of unity and freedom of the nationalistic intelligentsia of Germany and Italy could be realized under the pressure of modern national concepts and in response to the might of capitalism beating at penetrating their borders.[53]

It is one of the ironies of German-Arab relations that the Arabs in their own search for unity have never ceased to hold up as a model the role of Prussia in uniting Germany--Germany, which is once again divided. They have longed for an "Arab Prussia" which would weld the Arab nation into a whole. Reported Fritz Grobba to Berlin in 1937:

> Again and again the Arabs compare their present fragmentation of states with the condition of Germany before the foundation of the Second Reich, as also with the present position with the division of the German Volksdeutschtums among different European states. The national unity and constitutional freedom restored to the German people by the Führer seem to the Arabs the example which they should aim at.[54]

Iraq in the late thirties and early forties was portrayed as the "'Prussia of the Arab world' and the new leader of Arab liberation".[55] In 1949 the analogy was still current: "For a long while Arab thinkers have been hoping that an Arab Prussia would

arise and unify us."[56] (See also pages 74 and 76 below.)

The Arab View

West German reserve with regard to the "traditional German-Arab friendship", already well-entrenched, has latterly been deemed further defensible in view of the facility with which the Arab shifts to expressions of enmity when the traditional friend fails to conduct himself in the desired way. "What the 'traditional German-Arab friendship' is really worth to the Arabs, we can readily see when German interests lie in a direction different from that of Arab interests,"[57] a Bonn statesman recently observed.

The verbally violent reaction to West German recognition of Israel in 1965 was, of course, a dramatic instance of such a shift. Still, it is not difficult to see in the not wholly unjustified abuse directed at the erstwhile friend and in the breaking off of diplomatic relations (see Chapter VI below) the depth of the disillusion suffered at the "betrayal".[58, 59]

A factor in the Arab Weltanschauung fundamental in assessing the nature and substance of the professed friendship of the Arabs for the Germans is the Arab capacity--even preference--for ambivalence: "To him to hate what he loves, to refuse what he wants to accept, and to curse what he seeks to praise is a normal procedure."[60, 61] This could have been at the root both of the Arabs' willingness to countenance German aid to Israel until it became a question of tanks and of their rejection of German appeals to "consistency" ("There are enough states in the world which have good relations with both Arab countries and Israel. Why should the same not be possible for the Federal Republic?"[62])

That there is enough ambivalence and contradiction in German-Arab relations to challenge even the Arabs is shown in this summary-picture of the Federal Republic of Germany as presented by the Arab press prior to the crisis of 1965:

> The Federal Republic of Germany is on the one hand part of the West, an ally of the imperialist-colonialist-Zionist powers. . . .

> On the other hand, the Germans are the friends of the Arabs. They have fought together against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism. The Arabs are especially fond of the Germans because they persecuted the Jews, who are also their greatest enemies. They admire the bravery of the German soldier. . . . Arabs, like the Germans, still suffer in the grip of the same oponent: imperialism-colonialism-Zionism. It has subjugated and divided Germany and the Arab lands alike. The Federal Republic's reparations to Israel were made under pressure from Western imperialism, against the true will of the German people, as was the adherence to the imperialist military alliances.
>
> Only a few Arabs are able to distinguish between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Third Reich. Here, too, emotional reality remains stronger. "He who strikes my enemy is my friend." In addition, the extent and the technical-organizational perfection of the persecution of the Jews is beyond the grasp of their imagination.[63]

These are not the only considerations which draw the Arab to the Germans, an Egyptian presuming to speak for all Arabs reassured the West Germans during a period of cordiality in relations:

> If there is any European nation which enjoys the sympathies of the Arabs without reservation or exception, it is the German. . . .
>
> They honor and respect the high ethical standards in accordance with which the latter extend their hands and their aid to their Arab friends, just as the Arabs offered the products of their advanced culture centuries ago to the Germans . . . ; they admire even more the untiring industry and indefatigable application of all their energies which, if it had not been for that wretched Hitler, may have made it possible for Germany to put its impress on all creative aspects of civilization.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In order to understand correctly the picture which the Arabs have of Germany, one must first of all understand that the Arab people think dialectically. The classic and most frequent proverb in the Arab world runs: "Out of bad comes good." . . . Another well-known proverb says: "Religion is (known from) deeds." The fact that the Germans . . . never behaved toward the Arabs in any but a friendly fashion is what has won them the favorable opinion of the Arab world.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> As various as the impressions of the Arabs have . . . of Germany and the Germans may be, one trait is generally admired: the fact that the Germans do not allow themselves to be daunted by defeat. . . .
>
> . . . . . .

Thus a picture of a friendship at once new and ancient, with

> spiritual and material bases, which may temporarily be clouded but which cannot be shaken in its core.[64, 65]

Of several possible instances supporting the thesis of the indestructibility of German-Arab friendship, two will be offered here. The first has to do with the lack of success of British propaganda against the Nazi regime directed to the Arab countries during World War II:

> Even educated Arabs or Iranians could not conceive of the Germans as anything but cultured, efficient, and frequently more courteous than the colonial British. On the other hand, stories of cruelty were not likely to frighten the lower-class audience, which was apt to applaud German strength and their anti-Jewish exploits.[66]

The second instance is of more recent date. While the literature of the Palestine Liberation Organization is much occupied with the question of West German reparations and aid to Israel, the fact that "without the horrors of the Hitler regime, the Palestine problem would never have attained its present dimensions nor would world opinion have supported Zionism so strongly and so uncritically"[67] is obscured or overlooked.[68] An extract from the PLO "Facts and Figures Series", No. 6, United States and West German Aid to Israel, will show that its "Historical Background" section even half-exonerates West Germany for its postwar relations with Israel:

> The foreign policy of West Germany is in effect formulated under the supervision of the U.S. Government. According to Time Magazine "West Germany is the world's second largest trader after the U.S. Yet German political influence is not remotely equal to its economic power. In foreign affairs Bonn is subservient not only to Washington, but often to London and Paris." [June 4, 1965]
>
> The policy of paying "reparations" to Israel on account of Nazi persecution of the Jews is quite illogical in addition to being a thin disguise for pouring economic aid into Israel. The "Nazi regime", which was responsible for the extermination of the Jews, had already accounted for its crimes in the Nuremburg trials. And if the "present" regime in West Germany has nothing to do with Nazism, then on what basis do they hold the people of Germany responsible for crimes committed by a prior regime?[69]

Naziism's neglect of the Arabs was more keenly felt than the enormity of its alleged crimes, but that too was forgiven. "On the whole

it can be said that the Orient policy of the Third Reich under Hitler lacked conviction and adequate material support, but even so it in no way altered the traditional good relations between Germany and the Orient."[70]

A frequently-repeated accusation is that today's Federal Republic of Germany "fails to reciprocate the sentiments of the Arabs." Franz von Caucig encountered it on a trip through the Near East in 1962:

> Throughout the Near East it is explained over and over to every German visitor whether on a public or on a private mission: "To every appearance Bonn and German political circles have not yet discovered, as German economic and commercial sectors did long ago, that such a thing as the Arab area exists." . . .
>
> In all these countries Germans are very well liked. One could provide innumerable illustrations to support this statement.[71]

He concludes with a reference to a refrain heard from officials in every country he visited: "Bonn has not yet learned to appreciate us properly."

Some go further and speak of a German "obligation" to the Islamic world based on "deeds and sacrifices on both sides in the name of Understanding and Friendship between Germany and the Islamic Orient for more than a thousand years!"

> This legacy of excellent German-Oriental, and especially German-Arab and German-Turkish, relations obligates posterity, obligates every present and future German government, to guard and protect this heritage from their forefathers. . . .
>
> . . . . . .
>
> This faith, which it is still disposed to place in the Germans up to the present time, but slowly and surely is beginning to dissolve since the ratification of the German-Israeli reparations agreement, places the Germans under the obligation not to deceive the hopes of the Arabs and of the Islamic world for substantial help and support in the struggle for the security of their existence.[72]

And, lastly, what of the accomplishments of German Orientalists? To consider only the extremes, if their work is known firsthand, which presupposes a knowledge of German, it is "praised to the skies." Otherwise, they are dismissed along

with other European Oriental scholars as "handmaidens of the colonialists".[73] A finer distinction was made by the translator of Sigrid Huncke's Allah's Sun over the Occident, with its enthusiastic presentation of the Arab contribution to Western civilization. European universities and colleges, he maintained, "do not like to discuss past Arab civilization because they have imperialist intentions." Only a few Orientalists have concerned themselves with the Arabs and of those only a small number have believed in the worth of Arab civilization. "Enno Littman, Rudi Paret, Otto Spies, and Wiedmann have been the ones who restored to the Arabs and Arab Nationalism their dignity and have justified Islam and the Moslems," he concluded, conceding that these scholars may have had some influence on German thinking about the Near East.[74]

Indications of opinion regarding Germany in the Fertile Crescent will be presented country by country below.

Lebanese Opinion

In Lebanon among the educated younger generation respect for Germany's practical accomplishments seems to dominate other feelings about Germany. Some of the older generation retain a certain nostalgia for the Hitler era and unabashedly stated their pleasure at the gains of the so-called neo-Nazis in the 1966 German elections.[75] However, since the Lebanese press has not been reticent on the subject of Germany, let the Lebanese speak for themselves. In the words of Al-Nahar (Beirut) in 1958, as translated by The Arab World, a news service,

> Germany is about the only big power which enjoys real, unmitigated popularity with Arab public opinion. This is not because Germany has no past colonial record, but because Nazi antisemitism (and Germanism in general) and the fact that Germany stood against France and Britain, the two imperialist nations in the Arab world, during the second world war created in the heart of every Arab, if not devastating love for Germany, at least considerable admiration and esteem. Add to this that oppressed Arab nations always dreamt of resurgences from her successive defeats and whenever they saw that the energetic, gallant German people leading in the forefront of the nations by virtue of sheer will and

> character. As a matter of fact, the Arabs are still persuaded that West Germany did not sign the compensation agreement with Israel except under American pressure. These peoples--and often the governments--believe, and there is plenty of truth in the belief, that were the Germans at liberty they would have turned this compensation into aid for the Arabs. Arab admiration and esteem for Germans are not confined to sentiments but go beyond that to practical aspects exemplified in the blind confidence in anything that comes from Germany and particularly in that thing that the Arab world needs most--industry.[76]

In 1960 a columnist for pro-U.A.R. Beirut-Massa pronounced the compensations to Israel a "necessary evil" after an investigative visit to Germany and "strongly advocated burying these old hatchets and brisk, fruitful cooperation with Germany on the basis of mutual gains."[77] Among at least three Beirut newspapers deploring the diplomatic break with West Germany, conservative Al-Hayat observed, "West Germany was the only state among the Western big powers which enjoyed moral popularity in the Arab East because its presence here did not have the colonialist or imperialist character."[78, 79] Another opinion was also being offered during these years:

> German "bourgeoise and colonialist ambitions" in the Arab world dated back to the 19th century and under Hitler Germany tried to exploit the Arab hatred of Anglo-French colonialism for the purpose of replacing it by German colonialism. Oil is the main target of German ambitions.[80, 81]

Syrian Opinion

The most striking aspect of Syrian-German relations as of the beginning of 1967 was the fact, despite all the cold-war polemics, that the Syrian-in-the-street truly seemed to make no distinction between East and West Germany. West German diplomatic personnel in Damascus averred that the Syrians as a whole were as friendly to them as before the diplomatic break in 1965; even the press tirades at the time of Jordan's resumption of relations with the Federal Republic were directed almost entirely at Jordan, and no public demonstrations of displeasure with West Germany occurred.[82]

As will be seen in Chapter V, unofficial German relations with Syria resumed shortly after the end of World War II. Welcoming a group of German military advisers toward the end of 1950, Fawzi Silu, then Minister of Defense, is reported to have declared:

> I adore the German people. Germany will find its place as a great power again. The Germans are our only friends. With your help, I hope to make of Syria the Prussia of the Middle East.[83]

Four years later, at the opening of the first International Fair in Damascus, the facilities for which were largely designed and constructed by West German firms, the president of the Fair described the Fair as having been

> from the beginning a symbol of German-Arab friendship and of a productive cooperative relationship, above all because of the genuine sympathy which extends beyond those who have developed ties with Germany through their studies, through commercial relations, or through personal friendships.[84]

A Syrian lawyer who has had many years' experience with German clients emphasized in a March 1967 interview the long gaps in contact between Germany and the Arab countries. Perhaps exaggerating, he insisted that travel restrictions and lack of interest in the Near East had broken connections for a whole generation. Since 1953, however, relations had been successfully re-established, and the Germans "are very good friends with the Arabs now."[85]

Syrian commentary on relations with the two Germanies belongs to the story of the second postwar decade, treated in Chapter VI. Suffice it to point out here that the Syrians have probably been the Arab group most exposed to defamation of West Germany as the sole inheritor of the Nazi legacy, largely as a result of the extension of the Cold War to that area.[86] A conspicuous result has been a duality concerning the "Nazis". On the one hand they may be defended:

> Damascus' Al-Ayyam said the trial is null and void since Eichmann, in committing what he stood accused of, was carrying out orders by his superiors. The paper also wondered if atrocities committed by the Allies during the war were "less brutal than those committed by the Nazis."[87]

And on the other hand, the term "Nazi" has ranked among the most pejorative. Already in 1953 President Shishakli was comparing the crime of the Zionists to that of the Nazis.[88] This combination of terms became common, Al-Baath (Damascus), for example, speaking of "the atrocities inflicted upon the Arabs by Zionist Nazis supported by colonialists and neo-colonialists."[89] (Italics mine.)

Iraqi Opinion

Generalizing from innumerable experiences in Iraq, a West German reporter described a typical initial contact with an Iraqi thus:

> When he learned that the foreigner was from Germany, his facial expression and entire conduct underwent a sudden change, as if he had removed a mask; hearty shaking of hands, "Welcome! Welcome!" And this was the case not only in Iraq.[90]

Iraq's contacts with the West came later than those of the rest of the Fertile Crescent and were less traumatic than those of the Levant states, the Iraqi Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Djabir Omar, explained in an April 1964 article for Orient (Hamburg). Moreover,

> contacts between Iraq and the West as represented by England and Germany were limited to only a few facets of life and were confined to a small circle of official positions, which were, furthermore, held by Turks and not by Arabs. The man in the street was hardly touched by Western influences; only the few Iraqi cadets in the officers' academies in Istanbul had the opportunity to become acquainted, through German officers and instructors in the Turkish army, with the Western style of living and methods of reasoning.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> [The Iraqis] realized immediately that the West had two aspects, one political, the other cultural, and that, in the Iraqi view, the political aspect is divided into two fractions: one consisting of the victors in World War I and the other of the remaining European countries. Germany was for the Arabs a partner in sorrow, in disillusion, and in defeat. They felt from personal contacts that among Germans the gap between the political and the moral was not so wide.[91]

"The few Iraqi cadets" mentioned by Ambassador Omar

were, as it happens, among the most influential men in the country during the thirties (see also the section on Iraq in Chapter III below):

> The German-Turkish camaraderie extends to the Iraqi army, which includes many former Turkish officers. . . . This Germanophile tendency of the Arab military came to the surface most clearly when the brother of the minister Sidki Pasha, General Taha Pasha, wrote the preface to the Arabic edition, translated by the Iraqi Lt. Col. Taha Eddin Nuri, of How Prussia Came to Power, by the Turkish historian Ahmed Refeli.[92]

On the whole, in the opinion of the Beirut correspondent of the Federal Republic's Foreign Trade Information Center, Germany's contacts with Iraq have in turn been more favorable than its contacts with the Levant. It is also possible, he added, that the Iraqis would be more influenced by sentiments of friendship in practical matters than would the Levantines.[93] His judgment echoes that of veteran Middle-East adventurer Werner-Otto von Hentig: "Comparatively speaking, they [the Iraqis] are candid, generous, and less mistrustful than their Arab brothers."[94]

Jordanian Opinion

Of the Fertile Crescent countries, the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was the one with which West Germany in the 1960s enjoyed the most cordial relations. The Hallstein Doctrine had been scrupulously observed by Hussein's government and, aside from a few passionate outbursts upon Erhard's recognition of Israel, relations continued smoothly even during and after the diplomatic break.[95]

The legacy from the German presence in Palestine undoubtedly plays a part in creating this situation. German was the foreign language most studied in the area which was to become Jordan in the first decades of this century. There are Jordanians who maintain that Germany contributed more to the nation than did the British, its longtime mentors. Although ties with, and sympathy for, Germany waned after World War I, the Bedouins of the Jordanian desert know at least that Hitler wanted to fight the British and French, that he had had Jews

persecuted, that German armies stood before Moscow, and, of course, that Rommel had nearly succeeded in penetrating to the Fertile Crescent through Libya (which inspired a new upsurge in the study of German).

The tenets of the National Socialist (Nazi) movement remain beyond the ken of the Bedouin, a fact, commented my informant, which is good for present German-Jordanian relations. There apparently existed no doubt but that a victory by Hitler's forces would have entailed immediate and full national independence for Transjordan.

West German aid to Israel was for the most part regarded as resulting from pressure by Britain and the U.S.A. on the loser of World War II. Jordan's suspension of diplomatic relations with Bonn was explained as an effort to help West Germany to act on its own initiative, free of British and American dictation.[96]

A favorite theme when West German favor is sought is the German-Jordanian partnership in misfortune:

> Arab-German understanding is long-standing. . . . Arabs and Germans have similar tragic factors in their daily life, imposed on them against their free will and choice by alien powers. A divided Jerusalem, a shattered Palestine are equal to a Berlin and a Germany, which link the hearts of Arabs and Germans by a straight, sharp line in living a difficult experience of history and the irony of fate.[97]

Not surprisingly, the new Jordanian ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany declared the latter "a great friend of the Arabs" upon taking up his post on May 22, 1967, following resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[98]

Epilogue

On the whole, the Fertile Crescent area has been a part of the world in which, as Ernst Jäckh discovered in the first decade of this century, a German could be proud to be a German.[99] Unfortunately, the "traditional friendship" has lent itself to distortions and illusions which have proved embarrassing, particularly to West Germany. In the Near East, apart from having to contend with undesirable impressions from the Hitler era,

a major problem has been exaggerated expectations of aid from the Federal Republic. "Because of the Arab world's favorable disposition toward us, West German abilities and possibilities are frequently overestimated," G. A. Sonnenhol, the Ministry of the Interior's director for economic cooperation, has pointed out.[100] False conceptions of Germany entertained by Arab students coming to West German universities have created special difficulties for West German educators. These include the fact that

> often factors which have nothing to do with studies influence the choice: for example, because money can be earned in Germany, Germany is nearby and living is cheap there, no visa is needed, one can "have a good time" there . . . and lastly, Germany is preferred because the home country is friendly with Germany. . . . The dominant opinion in Eastern countries is that one can study here without admission formalities and obtain a doctorate without excessive effort.[101]

Outside the Near and Middle East, the "traditional friendship" has been adduced, out of conviction or sensationalism, as proof that the Drang nach Osten was never really relinquished. As a representative sample of writing reflecting these fears of a second resurgence of German expansionism, a 1954 article from The Nation will serve:

> It is a matter of record that West Germany's President Heuss sent a telegram to the king of Saudi Arabia reminding him of the "traditional German-Arab" friendship, and the latest reports from Bonn indicate that no isolated obstacle will be permitted to interfere with Bonn's grand economic, political, and military designs for the Middle East.[102]

Sir John Bagot Glubb, formerly commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan, offers a view of "traditional friendships" between West and East which may possibly be definitive:

> The Middle East politicians are experts at playing one nation off against another. They will tell one man how much they love him but will complain to him of the conduct of another. Then they go off to the second one with protestations of affection, but complain to him of the first. . . . The vanity and simplicity of Westerners causes them to be constantly deceived by these tactics.[103]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]Confidential report dated Dec. 18, 1937, reproduced in The Middle East Journal, XII, No. 2 (Spring 1958), p. 202.

[2]"Entwicklung und Folgen bundesdeutscher Nahostpolitik", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 3.

[3]The latter observation was offered by a number of Germans who had lived for some time in the Near East. "The Arabs, for their part, are completely trainable as soldiers, provided they are treated strictly but with justice from the beginning of their training," Liman von Sanders had written. (Op. cit., p. 222.) Perhaps the Arabs have sensed in the German character a discipline and justice for which they have felt a need.

[4]Typically, when the Bundesrepublik was established the Arab League sent a message recalling the "thousand-year-old traditional friendship between the two peoples and the great respect and sympathy which the German people enjoy among the Arabs." (Deutsche Presse Agentur, Hintergrund (Background Bulletin), July 15, 1964, p. 12.)

[5]Tillmann, op. cit., pp. 62 & 64. At the same time, it was hoped to appropriate this friendship to the GDR: "I hope by means of this study to strike a blow in the battle against imperialism and militarism on behalf of German-Arab friendship." (Ibid., p. 2.)

[6]D. Weiss, "Zum Verhältnis der Bundesrepublik zu den arabischen Staaten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 21 (Nov. 10, 1965), p. 821.

[7]F. Grobba, "Die deutsch-arabische Freundschaft", Orient (Hamburg), I (January 1960), pp. 12-13.

[8]Deutsche Presse Agentur, Hintergrund, July 15, 1964, p. 9.

[9]Ibid., p. 1.

[10]K. Mehnert, Asien, Moskau, und Wir (11th ed. rev.; Stuttgart: 1961), pp. 384-85.

[11]Interview with Dieter Jäckel, also correspondent for the official newspaper Neues Deutschland, in February 1967. The remark on hospitality appealed to a West German Near East expert as particularly an East German reaction "since they are somewhat on the defensive."

[12]The Arab World, July 7, 1961, p. 7.

[13]Ibid., Sept. 9, 1961, p. 7.

[14]L. Abegg, Neue Herren im Mittelost (Stuttgart: 1954), p. 506.

[15]The foreword to a 1960 translation of Mein Kampf into Arabic asserted: "Adolf Hitler does not belong to the German people alone. He is one of the few great figures who nearly halted and redirected the course of history. . . . " Reviewing this same translation in 1964, Stefan Wild commented:

> The name of Adolf Hitler enjoys a frightening popularity in a large portion of the Arab world. It would be worthwhile to seek out the root reasons why a morally inferior and politically bankrupt being such as Hitler should still enjoy the status of an idol among millions. Such an investigation would throw much light on present currents in Middle East politics.

("'Mein Kampf' in arabischer Übersetzung", Die Welt des Islams, IX, Nos. 1-4 (1964), pp 210 & 207.)

[16] R. Hüber, Es wetterleuchtet, pp. 97-98.

[17] Middle East Journal, XII, No. 2 (Spring 1958), p. 203.

[18] Interview, February 1967. The Arabs first appeared in German in 1960 under the title Die Araber: Werden, Wesen, Wandel und Krise des Arabertums. Dr. Hottinger is also correspondent for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

[19] D. Cycon, "Die Abneigung der Araber gegen den Westen", Aussenpolitik, X , No. 3 (March 1959), p. 167.

[20] Open expressions of German appreciation for Arab esteem are rare and most are attributable to a single source: Reinhard Hüber, business manager for the Orient-Verein in the early forties and prolific author on, primarily, economic relations with the Near and Middle East. For example: "One of the remarkable instances of the contradictions of human history is the fact that Germany, defeated and beaten, has been able to retain its old prestige and finds much genuine friendship in the Middle East." This should not cause Germans to become overconfident, he cautions, since it is traceable not only to technical and economic success but also to decades of work by scholars. ("Nah- und Mittelost zwischen Imperialismus, Freiheit und Kooperation" in Übersee Schriftenreihe, Heft 3 (Hamburg: 1954), p. 55. Also: "We had much to thank our friends in the Near East for during the first postwar years. They gave us some of our self-respect back and helped us to reestablish our foreign trade." (Allahu Akhbar, p. 20.)

[21] H. Vocke, "Das deutsch-arabisches Missverständnis", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March , 1965. Subtitle of the article was "Mutual respect must replace romantic feelings of friendship". "The Soviet Zone regime--the "democratic Germany", as its broadcasters and, lately, Radio Bagdad, call it--is now supposed to assume the role of the good German," Vocke continues.

[22] Interview with Consul-General (ret.) Hermann Voigt in June 1967.

[23] Interview with E. Schmitt, Near East Desk of the West German Foreign Ministry, in June 1967.

[24] Letter from Dr. Rudi Paret, professor at the University of Tübingen, Feb. 20, 1967.

[25] A very limited sampling of West German public opinion was

provided by letters from readers reacting to a pro-Israel article in the weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel (R. Augstein, "Israel soll leben", XXI, No. 25, pp. 5-9). The majority of those published were pro-Arab (Der Spiegel, XXI, No. 28 (July 3, 1967). One, however, declared that the Federal Republic "has let itself be blackmailed by Nasser in a shameful and unworthy fashion for years on end in the name of the 'traditional German-Arab friendship'." This outburst recalls a passage of Chancellor Erhard's speech before the Bundestag in February 1965: "Our deeds have always shown how much we are concerned with preserving a long-standing friendship. Therefore we are entitled to ask, 'What about some proof of Egyptian friendship?'" (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XV, May 15-22, 1965, 20739.)

[26] Op. cit., p. 53.

[27] Welt in Bewegung (Düsseldorf: 1965), p. 280.

[28] S. van Rooy, "Kurdenforschung: eine Voraussetzung Konstructiver Nahostpolitik", Zeitschrift für Politik, IX, No. 2 (1962), p. 153. Such stereotypes do influence research, teaching, and government policy as well as the mass media, he claims.

[29] Cf. Liman von Sanders' reflections on the roots of the failure of the overly-ambitious German-Turkish ventures during World War I: "It would seem that the memories of the tales of the 1001 nights or the mirages of the deserts of Arabia troubled the judgment of our compatriots, ordinarily more perceptive." (Op. cit., p. 376. R. Hüber's many books are full of such references: "Today quite other matters are involved than the fairytale world of 1001 Nights," (Es wetterleuchtet, p. 14.) "Wherever we may look, the old fairytale world of the 'romantic' Orient is irrevocably disappearing." The 36-hour flight between Leipzig and Bagdad is like "those great leaps which captivated the imagination of many of us as children when we read 1001 Nights." (Deutschland und der Wirtschaftl. Aufbau des Vorderen Orients (Stuttgart: 1938), pp. 25 & 36.)

[30] F. Hauenstein, "West Germany and the Middle East", Middle East Affairs, VII, No. 1 (January 1956), p. 12.

[31] Weltgeschichte (Leipzig: 1884), V, p. 204. This same legend is being used to back up recent declarations of a traditional French-Arab friendship.

[32] The works of Georg Jacob (1862-1937) give some insight into lower-echelon German-Arab contacts during the Middle Ages: The Northern and Baltic Trade of the Arabs in the Middle Ages (1887), An Arab Correspondent of the Tenth Century on Fulda, Schleswig, Soest, Paderborn, and other Cities of the Occident (3rd ed., 1896), and Arab Reports from Envoys to German Princely Courts in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries (1927)--to cite the most pertinent titles.

[33] H.-G. Fernis & H. Haverkamp, Grundzüge der Geschichte von der Urzeit bis zur Gegenwart (13th ed.; Frankfurt/Main: 1966), pp. 97-98. "The reason for the rapid victory of the Arabs . . .

lay primarily in their inner unity," they continue. "Their armies were welded together by means of the strictest discipline and unquestioning obedience."

[34]K. Leonhardt & G. Bonwetsch, Von den Anfängen der Menschheit zum hohen Mittelalter (Stuttgart: n.d.) (in use in 1967), p. 171.

[35]Fernis & Haverkamp, op. cit., p. 290.

[36]Extraneous only is the statement in the 1967 edition that "the Federal Republic is placing means for the construction of a dam on the Euphrates at Syria's disposal"; the break in diplomatic relations in 1965 suspended that offer indefinitely (see section on Syria in Chapter VI below). Authors were K. Heck & G. Thiersch.

[37]Interview, Jäckel, February 1967.

[38]K. Schulz, Review of Wessen ist der Orient, by Die neue Gesellschaft, V (November/December 1958), p. 479.

[39]Mehnert, op. cit., p. iii.

[40]Interview, Roth, January 1967. In a letter dated Feb. 10, 1967, he modified his original statement a bit:

> Naturally the adjustment to the Near East way of life is also difficult for the German newcomer, but I have so far never met any who has allowed himself to become irritated to an extreme or who has attempted to reform his hosts rather than adapt, in accordance with the motto "The German way is the right way" ("An deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen") of which we are often accused.

[41]Letter from Consul-General (ret.) Voigt, June 22, 1967.

[42]Fisher, op. cit., p. 336.

[43]At its root may also be the German's expectation, from long conditioning, of being given sets of rules to live by and of keeping to them. Another quality much valued by the Germans is Artigkeit, usually translated "good manners" but strongly connoting conformity. They are also accustomed to confining expression of strong personal feelings to an intimate circle. These qualities and a ceremoniousness of manners closer to the Oriental than is the American, for example (how many American civil servants would say with von Weizsäcker "The Oriental formalities in negotiation were an aesthetic pleasure for me"?), may contribute to smoothness of relations despite the vast differences in other values--the German attitude toward work as opposed to the Oriental, for one.

[44]A book reviewer for Die Welt des Islams made the observation that "there is quite a difference between American and European experts in the Middle East--the secret of success of many continental European specialists in the Middle East may perhaps be traced to their willingness to act as subordinates in the local government hierarchies." (W. Bjorkman, Review of The

Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, H. P. Hall, ed. (Washington, D.C.: 1955) in Die Welt des Islams, V, Nos. 1-2 (1957), p. 132. The latter part of the statement is a quotation from a talk by George Lenczowski.

[45] Interview, Hottinger, February 1967.

[46] In the present era, the fact that European pay scales are closer to those of the Near East than are the American, and that care is often taken to reduce the difference by banking a part of the salaries paid to Germans in the Middle East in home banks, may promote assimilation. (Interview, Hottinger, February 1967.)

[47] H. Jung, Arabien in Ausbruch (Munich: 1958), p. 71. Cf. Longrigg, Oil, p. 50: "Efficiency is not especially valued" in the Middle East.

[48] A. Rüstow, "Freiheit für alle Völker", Zeitschrift für Politik, VI (January 1959), p. 2.

[49] E. Sandhaber, "Der Orient und Wir", Orient (Hamburg), II (January 1961), p. 11.

[50] G. Kurth, "Mensch und Natur", Orient (Hamburg), I (January 1960), p. 16.

[51] E. W. Meyer, "Das Gesicht des Nicht-Kommunistischen Asiens", Die neue Gesellschaft, VII (July/August 1961), p. 268.

[52] F. Steppat, "Der Muslim und die Obrigkeit", Zeitschrift für Politik, II, No. 4 (1965), p. 332.

[53] H. Kohn, Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient (Frankfurt/Main: 1931), p. 357. R. Huber expressed a similar thought in 1940; referring to the rivalry among the Arab states as a hindrance to their future unity, he asks, "Did we not in the course of German history pass through a similar period?" (Es wetterleuchtet, p. 214.)

[54] The Middle East Journal, XII, No. 2, p. 202.

[55] H. B. Sharabi, Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: 1962), p. 159.

[56] Musa al-Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine", The Middle East Journal, III (October 1949), p. 390.

[57] F. Böhm, "Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen", Frankfurter Hefte, XX, No. 9 (September 1965), p. 613. Prof. Böhm headed the West German team in the negotiations over the reparations to Israel. (See also Chapter VI below.)

[58] Interview with Wolfgang Bente, head of the West German representation in Beirut, December 1966. The sincerity of the Arabs' sense of "deception" is not to be discounted, he emphasized.

[59] West German protests that at least 86 other nations had previously recognized the State of Israel with no such sanction being taken was cast aside by the Arab nations as irrelevant. West Germany's situation was unique because of its Hallstein Doctrine against recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

The Arab nations had wholly or at least partly, to the extent of withholding formal recognition from the GDR, respected that Doctrine.

[60] S. Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: 1960), p. 234. Dr. Hamady was Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Relations, University of Miami, at the time the book was written. Her analysis provides many insights into the Arab code of behavior which are helpful in understanding the Arab handling of the crisis. For example (from a study owing much to Hamady), "friendship is . . . highly valued among Arab youths and men but their volatility, pride, and envy lead to the frequent transformation of friendship into enmity, love into hatred." (M. Berger, The Arab World Today (Garden City, N.Y.: 1964), p. 153.)

[61] A. Hottinger sees this quality as the result of the absolutist tradition. Duality is essential in a system which makes no provision for legitimate criticism; the outcome is a kind of schizophrenia. All political moves must be hedged, so that any impulse to act is frequently frustrated. (Interview, February 1967.)

[62] Quotations from speech before Social Democratic Party in Cologne, Feb. 19, 1967. "Arab, German Relations Should not Affect Ties with Israel", The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 20, 1967, p. 2.

[63] D. Weiss, "Zum Verhältnis der BRP zu den arabischen Staaten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 21 (Nov. 10, 1965), pp. 825-26. Dr. Weiss is affiliated with the Institute for Development Policy, Berlin.

[64] M. Youssef, "Lebenskraft und Unrast", Sind die Deutschen wirklich so?, ed. H. Ziock (Herrenalb/Schwarzwald, Germany: 1965), pp. 351-56. He states at one point:

> Admiration for products of German industry goes so far that even if they should ever for any reason lose their traditional good reputation in European markets--unthinkable turn of events--Arab markets would not be affected. German wares stand in first place with the latter whether private or public customers; their faith in the quality of the wares and in the dependability of delivery is unshakable.

[65] At the other end of the scale stands the opinion of a professor of history of Palestinian origin that all talk of a traditional German-Arab friendship is "humbug".

[66] Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 472. The long-term effects of Third Reich propaganda to the Arab world may merit investigation. A rare indication of thought along this line is the following:

> It would be mistaken to believe that the efforts exerted by the Nazi propaganda machine during the war would cease to have any effect after 1945, especially since that propaganda was based primarily on a virulent antisemitism and the systematic denunciation of Western imperialism. In addition, in the eyes of communities permeated with messianic legends, the mystery surrounding Hitler's end was in itself eloquent.

(Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 33.)

[67] C. G. Anthony, "Die Aussenpolitik der U.S.A. im Mittleren

Osten", Zeitschrift für Politik, III, No. 1 (1956), p. 28.

[68]This same phenomenon was remarked upon by the Germans in the thirties: "In his report of January 14th, 1938 . . . German Consul-General Döhle wrote that if the Arab leaders would raise the question of Jewish emigration from Germany, the relation of the Arab population to the Third Reich would undergo a radical change." (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 42, footnote.) Hirszowicz remarks:

> Arab politicians hardly ever raised the question of Jewish emigration from Germany. It was far from typical when the newspaper Al-Jamia al-Islamiyya of January 9th, 1938, . . . wrote: "Many Arabs consider that Germany is a friend of the Arabs. This friendship is perhaps the result of the German hatred of the Jews. Germany's anti-Jewish policy has caused a strong outflow of emigrants to Palestine--German Jews. This is the good that Germany did us." (Ibid.)

[69]A. Abdul-Rahman, trans. L. S. Kadi (Beirut: 1966), p. 37. In Emile Bustani's words: "The Arabs felt that whatever might be said about Hitler, he clearly shared their own views on the subject of international Zionism. This attitude, however, was decidedly short-sighted, . . . " (March Arabesque (London: 1961), p. 47.

[70]Abdel Megid Amin, "Deutsche Orientpolitik heute", Aussenpolitik, V, No. 1 (Jan. 1954), p. 30. An editor's note identifies the author as "an independent Arab publicist who studies Western culture and politics free of any influence [in Cairo] and who is known for his work on behalf of close German-Oriental cooperation."

[71]"Das Ende imperialistischer Konzepte im Nahost", Aussenpolitik, XIII, No. 2 (February 1962), p. 537.

[72]Abdel Megid Amin, op. cit., p. 37. The structure of the piece is revealing, balancing elaborations on the theme of the warm traditional friendship (Frederick II "presents an ideal in all areas of German-Oriental mutual understanding for all time") against tight-lipped indignation at certain manifestations of West German policy.

[73]Interview, Hottinger, February 1967.

[74](Cairo: 1966), pp. xxv & xxvi. Commented Dr. Paret during a symposium on "The World of Islam Today" at Tübingen in 1961:

> We stand to one side, not because the whole matter does not concern us, but because we know that today's descendants and heirs of the once so powerful world of Islam are the ones who must re-examine and recast their spiritual position using their own strength and insight. We can only hope that the present much-overheated nationalism will once again subside and finally withdraw within those limits proper to its true importance.

(Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart (Stuttgart: 1961), p. 21.)

[75]Interview, Bente, December 1966.

[76]May 8, 1958, p. 2. The paper was classified by The Arab World as "right-wing" at that time.

[77]Ibid., June 3, 1960, p. 4.

[78]Ibid., May 14, 1965, p. 3.

[79]These fine sentiments drop into the background when Lebanese and German find themselves opposed in practical matters, it would appear from assorted newspaper items:

> About 270 workers of the National Trading Co., agents of Otis elevators and Carrier air-conditioning units, went on strike Monday. . . . The workers, in a statement later, also denounced what they termed as unjustified and harsh attitude of a German official employed by the company. (The Daily Star (Beirut), March 14, 1967.)
>
> Lebanese Deputy Shafiq Mortada has tabled a question in Parliament urging Lebanese and Arab action in vindication of Lebanese students who were arrested in West Germany on charges of anti-Semitism. (The Arab World, March 11, 1959, p. 1)
>
> [In 1958] the civil war in Lebanon . . . set the Arabs against minorities. . . and also against Handke [German mechanic settled with an Egyptian wife in Tripoli] whose shop and home were suddenly reduced to ruins by former friends and customers. . . . [In 1967] after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war Arab hostility toward the non-Arab Handke showed its face again. . . .There was no place for German and other such monsters on Arab earth. ("Diese Woche", Stern, July 2, 1967.)

[80]The Arab World, July 11, 1961, p. 8. The speaker is identified as a Lebanese Communist by the name of Sawaya.

[81]The only unfavorable statement from an Arab regarding the visit of Wilhelm II (albeit a somewhat cryptic one) seen came also from a Lebanese:

> Hearts did not open themselves to Western civilization full of love. Political errors revived latent feelings which had been building up since the times of the Crusades. It is also to be regretted that certain European leaders made the mistake of ripping scarcely-healed wounds open with their own hands at the foot of altars in Jerusalem and at the grave of Saladin in Damascus.

(M. al-Nakkache, "Die Transformierung der arabische Gesellschaft", Aussenpolitik, XIII, No. 3 (March 1962), p. 166.)

[82]Interview with Dr. Vorndran, cultural attaché of the West German respresentation in Damascus, March 1967.

[83]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

[84]Ibid., p. 39.

[85]Name withheld by request.

[86]Already in 1938 the Syrian Khalid Bakdash, "one of the leading Communist organizers in the Near East" and the first

avowed Communist ever to be elected to a Middle East Parliament, had written (Hitler the Oppressor) that Hitler had declared in Munich that "the Near East is open for German colonization". (B. Vernier, op. cit., p. 91.)

[87] The Arab World, April 12, 1961, p. 5. The Eichmann trial in Tel Aviv was referred to, of course.

[88] N. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: 1957), p. 135.

[89] The Arab World, May 25, 1965, p. 7.

[90] H. Eliseit, Halbmond um Israel (Berlin: 1955), p. 354. He continued, "Now we need not develop any illusions on this account. . . . Had German rather than English officials sat in Bagdad, Amman, Jerusalem, and Cairo, the reception would surely have been a good deal less cordial."

[91] "Irak und der westliche Einfluss", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 1 (April 1964), p. 6.

[92] B. Vernier, op. cit., p. 107.

[93] Interview with Burghart Westerich, Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation, in January 1967.

[94] Der NO rückt näher, p. 48. Iraqi students performed well in German schools, he added.

[95] One story told is that of a Dutch journalist who was refused service at the telegraph office in Amman from which he often sent his reports, at the time West Germany's intention to recognize Israel was announced. When he protested that he was Dutch and not German, he received the reply that he was tall and blonde and that was enough. (Interview, Hottinger, February 1967.)

[96] Information in this paragraph and the three preceding was provided in an interview with Erwin Roth, cultural attaché of the West German representation in Amman, in January 1967.

[97] The Jerusalem Times, Nov. 25, 1964, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), V, Nos. 5/6 (February 1965), p. 183. The fact that the personnel of the Schneller school in Jerusalem abandoned their land and buildings and fled with the streams of Arab refugees in 1948 is said also to have created a strong bond. (Interview, Roth, January 1967)

[98] News broadcast by U.S. Armed Forces Network, Germany, May 22, 1967. For reasons having nothing to do with the June 1967 crisis, according to the Foreign Ministry in Bonn, the ambassador had to return to Jordan before presenting his credentials.

[99] Op. cit., p. 159. Dr. Jäckh ended his career as Consultant in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at Columbia University.

[100] "Der Euphratdamm und die syrische Gesamtplannung", Aussenpolitik, XIV, No. 4 (April 1963), p. 236.

[101] Review of Studenten aus dem Vorderen Orient by R. Mielitz, Orient (Hamburg), IV, No. 6 (1963), p. 266. In 1961, 34% of

the foreign students in Germany were from the Near East. About half were said to fail in their university work. (East Germany claims no failures.) It was suggested by Dr. Steppat in an interview (January 1967) that impression that it is easy to earn a doctorate in Germany may stem from the unmonitored German system of study.

[102] J. Alvarez del Vayo, "Bonn to Bagdad", The Nation, Dec. 4, 1954, p. 476.

[103] A Soldier with the Arabs (New York: 1957), p. 415.

According to competent observers, the Oriental is conscious of no reprehensible duplicity in this behavior (remarkably enough, in view of his sensitivity to "double-dealing" on the part of others). "Only the European, with his ethical criteria, senses something contradictory." (H. Reichard, Westlich von Mohammed (Cologne: 1957), p. 341.)

CHAPTER III

THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939)

Existing accounts of Germany's activities in the Near East between 1918 and the fall of the Third Reich emphasize the wartime period. An attempt will be made in this chapter to fill out some of the neglected areas and provide bases for comparisons between the two postwar eras.

To glance ahead, one clear parallel is discernible in the lapses of about seven years after each World War before active commercial and diplomatic relations were resumed with the Near East. There can also be seen a probing on the part of the Arab nations after both wars for moral and material support from "noncolonialist" Germany, oppressed by the same Powers as was the Arab world.[1] These hopes met with only limited response.

Relative volume and composition of trade, once resumed, tended to follow the same patterns in both postwar periods. Further, as the second post-World War II decade approached, Germany was beginning to reassume the position as constructor and supplier of infrastructure components (e.g., transport, power, and irrigation installations) which she had held in the thirties.[2]

German Contacts with the Near East during the Decade Following World War I

During the 1920s the rate of publication of works of enduring value on the Orient was impressive.[3] The products of this decade ranged from the less-enduring _As a Bedouin to the Devil Worshippers_[4] to the definitive _Handbook of Islamic Literature_.[5] Perhaps an indication of the worth of the Oriental research done in the 1920s is the fact that in its 1955 edition the major German encyclopedia still offers two of them as ref-

erences in a list of only five at the end of its brief entry on the "Orient".[6, 7]

This evidence notwithstanding, it has been asserted that "after the war a marked loss of interest in Oriental matters followed upon the defeat, affecting for a time both intellectuals and the general public."[8]

By articles 155 and 434 of the Versailles Treaty (1919), Germany had renounced all concessions and properties in the Ottoman Empire.[9] With these,

> Germany lost the influence she acquired in the Near East at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. During the Weimar Republic [1919-1933] German political activity in the Arab countries was almost nil. At that time Germany had neither the means nor the will to attack British and French possessions in that area [through the League of Nations, for example].[10]

The French, ever concerned for their position in Syria, saw developments a bit differently:

> German political activity in the East began with Germany's entry into the League of Nations. In 1932 Dr. Ruppel, on the Committee for Mandates, took advantage of that position to undertake a series of contacts with militant nationalists in Damascus.[11]

Trade began to resume in the mid-twenties and, for certain German firms, attained sufficient significance so that in those instances the Great Depression brought a noticeable decline in German exports to the Near East.[12] Also, "some thousands of tourists from America, Great Britain, France, Germany, and elsewhere from the later 1920s onwards" visited the Near East.[13] In 1927 the German firm of Junkers had even launched a Bagdad-Teheran air service but the enterprise shortly failed. In addition to the older Hamburg-Levant services, the German Hansa shipping line was calling regularly at Basra.

After the Iraqi constitution came into force in 1925, Germany, along with France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Greece, established a consulate in Bagdad (January 1, 1927).[14] The representation was raised to that by chargé d'affaires two years later and to legation upon the admission of Iraq to the

League of Nations in 1932. Thus, by 1927 only Transjordan of the Fertile Crescent countries was without a German consulate.[15]

German-Fertile Crescent Trade in the Twenties and Thirties

Although trade had resumed in the mid-twenties[16] for the next decade "owing to British and French political predominance opportunities for other countries in the fields of banking, insurance, foreign investments and trade were rather limited."[17] Moreover, many of the sixty-three ships which had plied between Germany's North Sea ports and the Levant before 1914 had been lost in the war.[18] Even so, "by 1924, six years after the end of the war, Germany had regained a shipping fleet of nearly three million gross tons."[19]

German tonnage passing through the Suez Canal in 1920 represented less than 0.1% of total net tonnage. It rose gradually during the decade following until it represented over 10% in 1928 and 1929, tying with the Netherlands for second place after Britain in share of tonnage. A peak was reached in 1931, when Germany held second place alone, with 11%. She retained this lead until 1935, when the Italian share of tonnage outstripped the German; the latter held fairly steady at 8 to 9% from 1932 to 1938, dropping to 7% in 1939.[20]

Even though German trade representatives had been "driven out" of the mandated territories, trade gradually increased.[21] Tables 1 and 2 below are offered as concise statements of the growth and decline of Fertile Crescent trade with Germany over two decades.

Trade with Transjordan was for the most part insignificant during this period and does not appear separately from that with Palestine in the official statistics. Orient Nachrichten for February 1, 1939, however, refers to both Syria and Transjordan as buyers of German manufactured goods in an article on the Leipzig Fair, at which Iraq was represented with a display.[22]

TABLE 1

IMPORTS INTO FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES FROM GERMANY AS PERCENTAGES OF EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL IMPORTS, 1925-1946

Year	Syria-Lebanon	Iraq		Palestine*
1925[a]	2.1%	3.6%		12.7%
1926	2[b]	n/a		n/a
1927	4.1[b]	n/a		6.5[c]
1928[c]	4.3	4.4	4.1[e]	10.0
1929	4.4[d]	5.1[a]		10.4[a]
1930	n/a	4.3		10.9
1931	6.0	n/a		17.4
1932	4.5 (5.5[a])	3.8[a]		11.3 (10.0[a])
1933	5.0	n/a		11.1
1934	4.9	n/a		12
1935	4.9 (6.6[a])	5.2[a]		12.9
1936	5.0 (6.8[a])	6.5	5.6[e]	14.4
1937	5.2	6.6		16.5
1938	6.5	7.4		14.5
1939	5.7	6.3		11.1
1940	0.5	0.3		1.25
1941	--	--		0.1
1942	--	0.1		0.04
1943	--	--		0.1
1944	--	--		--
1945	0.2	--		--
1946	0.2	--		--

Unless otherwise specified, source is Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 16 (up to 1939) and p. 19 (1939-1946).

n/a = not available -- = negligible or non-existent

[a] R. Hüber, Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben (Heidelberg: 1943)

[b] La Syrie et le Liban sous l'occupation et le Mandat, 1919-1927 (Nancy: n.d.), p. 261.

[c] H. von Richthofen (ed.), Jahrbuch für auswärtige Politik (Berlin: 1929-1931), Vols. I-III.

[d] E. Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics (London: 1938), p. 17.

[e] M. S. Hasan, op. cit., p. 154.

*Figures for Palestine include imports into Transjordan. N.B.: Alternate figures have been given (in parenthese) only if they differed from those of the basic source by 1% or more.

TABLE 2

EXPORTS TO GERMANY FROM FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES AS PERCENTAGES OF EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS, 1925-1946

Year	Syria-Lebanon	Iraq		Palestine*	
1925[a]	1.3%	1.2		2.0%	
1926	1.4[b]	n/a		n/a	
1927	1.4[b]	n/a		5.7[c]	
1928[c]	1.4	2.4	2.5[d]	4.9	
1929[a]	3.0	2.0		7.5	
1930	n/a	2		10.9	
1931	3.0	n/a		19.8	
1932	1.0 (2.0[a])	1.9		11.3	(14.0[a])
1933	0.6	n/a		11.0	
1934	2.0	n/a		17.2	
1935	1.6 (3.2[a])	1.2[e]	3.2[d]	5.9	
1936	1.1	2.9	(1.8[a])	2.9	
1937	1.8	3.3	(1.9[a])	1.5	
1938	5.3	4.9		1.5	
1939	5.3	3.5		0.6	
1940-45	--	--		--	
1946	0.2	--		--	

Unless otherwise specified, source is Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 16 (up to 1939) and p. 19 (1939-46).

n/a = not available -- = negligible or nonexistent

[a] R. Huber, Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben

[b] La Syrie et le Liban sous l'occupation et le Mandat, p. 261.

[c] Jahrbuch für auswärtige Politik, Vols. I-III.

[d] M. S. Hasan, op. cit., p. 69.

[e] Figures for Palestine incluse exports into Transjordan.

N.B.: Alternate figures have been given (in parentheses) only if they differed from those of the basic source by 1% or more.

A table of imports into Germany from the Orient as percentages of total imports for 1929-36 published in 1938 shows no figures for any Fertile Crescent country other than Palestine. (Palestine's percentage rose above 0.1% only in 1934, to 0.3%.) Total imports from the Middle East amounted to the following percentages of total German imports:[23]

1929	1.4%	1932	2.5%	1935	3.8%
1930	1.6	1933	2.5	1936	4.4
1931	2.1	1934	3.3		

Table 3 shows the proportion of total German exports formed by Germany's exports to the Fertile Crescent and the Middle East as a whole.

TABLE 3

EXPORTS FROM GERMANY TO THE ORIENT AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL GERMAN EXPORTS, 1929-1938

Year	Syria-Lebanon	Iraq	Palestine	Total, Near & Middle East
1929	--	--	0.1%	1.4%
1930	--	--	0.1	1.2
1931	--	--	0.1	1.2
1932	--	--	0.1	1.3
1933	--	--	0.2	1.7
1934	0.1%	--	0.4	2.6
1935	0.2	--	0.5	3.5
1936	0.1*	--*	0.4	3.8
1937[a]	0.0	0.0	n/a	6.9
1938[a]	0.05	0.2	n/a	7.5

Unless otherwise specified, source is R. Hüber, Deutschland und der wirtschaftliche Aufbau des Vorderen Orients (Stuttgart: 1938), p. 89.

-- = negligible or nonexistent

[a] Orient-Nachrichten, V, No. 6 (March 16, 1939).

* Values of 5.6 and 6.7 million Reichsmark, respectively, are given by source (a) for these countries in 1937.

For an overview of German-Eastern trade through three eventful decades, Orient-Nachrichten for March 14, 1936, offered the following figures on Germany's participation in the commerce of the Orient (defined here to include Turkey, Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Ceylon, as well as the Fertile Crescent): in 1913 Germany took 4.9% of their exports; in 1926, 3.3%; and in 1935, 9.3%. In 1913 Germany sent them 4.7% of their imports; in 1926, 6%; and in 1935, 8.6%.[24]

As of 1937, exports to the Middle East had risen more rapidly than imports, as well as faster then Germany's total exports (by 7%). In a period of decreasing overall exports, 6.9% of total German exports went to the Orient in 1937, 7.5% in 1938 (see Table 3 above).[25]

By 1937 the volume of German trade with the Near East

had surpassed the pre-World War I peak. The significant gains had not been made in the Fertile Crescent, however. Further, as can be seen from Tables 1-3, even when their trade with Germany loomed large in the balance sheets of individual Near East nations, it formed only a negligible portion of Germany's total trade.[26] Orient (Hamburg) cites the "average share" of Germany in exports from the Near and Middle East during the prewar period as over 14% and its share in imports as nearly 20%. By contrast, "the share of the Near and Middle East within the German foreign trade amounted to an average of only 5 per cent."[27]

In November 1937 regular Lufthansa flights from Berlin to Kabul via Tirana, Athens, Rhodes, Damascus, Bagdad, and Teheran were inaugurated.[28] The Junker Company had also succeeded in establishing service in Iran with connections to Bagdad.

Despite the relative success of German-Arab trade relations in the 1930s, much was left to be desired, according to this 1948 opinion:

> Aside from the giant companies, which--like, first and foremost, the economic section of IG Farben--in any case had access to a far-flung network of agencies for market analysis throughout the world, economic reporting was seriously neglected by Germany. The Third Reich placed more importance on political than on economic analysis and the reports of the Foreign Ministry's commercial attachés . . . were unsystematic.[29, 30]

Germany's gains engendered a good deal of bitterness among the losers in the contest for Arab markets (as was to be the case again in the early fifties)--most notably, France and Great Britain. Accusations of unfair trade practices to attain political ends abounded. The French warned that "Germany plans an economic transformation of the Near East . . . which it intends to absorb into its autarkic system."[31] As for Great Britain, despite German "selling devices" she

> for some time held her own in the Balkans and the Levant; only in 1937 did she begin seriously to feel the effect of undercutting by countries practicing exchange restrictions who were able to trade at prices which bore no relationship to world levels.[32]

In the post-World War II period the accusations continued. The World Today (June 1956) referred to the drive on the part of Germany in the thirties "for commercial and political penetration" of the underdeveloped countries, during which "Germany's strategy ran counter to her trade partners' natural aims of industrial development."[33] Dr. Tillmann of the German Democratic Republic does not neglect the theme that fascism brought with it a "reinvigorated German export offensive directed at the Near East", with weapons being used as the main articles of exchange for strategically vital raw materials, gold, and desperately needed foreign exchange.[34]

Such accusations are countered--by non-German polemicists as well as German--with contentions that what was involved was only a new impetus to an already existing policy and that political goals were added to those of trade only just before World War II. "Germany sought in the Arab countries primarily outlets for her goods," Dr. Hirzsowicz has concluded. He also stressed the restraint urged by the Third Reich government on private enterprise in the latter's drive for Near Eastern trade, of which more will be said below.[35]

German apologists emphasized that the situation was above all a result of the natural development of trade, "providing the Oriental peoples with all sorts of technological aids which they themselves could not produce" in return for agricultural products which Germany and Italy needed and England did not.[36] These trade relations were "nothing more than the expression of friendly relations between equal partners"--and of venerable age. (Elsewhere the same author is inspired to speak of the "idealistic purity" reflected in the exchanges.[37]) Above all, Germany had "no political influence to win or lose in the Orient."[38]

In 1939 Orient-Nachrichten carried an article titled "The German 'Drang nach Osten': Peaceful Economic Aid"[39] and already in 1937 the question had arisen in another of its articles as to the motivation behind Germany's Oriental trade:

> The balances in exchange of goods between Germany and the Orient in the Orient in the last few years show an unusually strong surplus of German imports. This trend to the advantage of Germany could not be avoided in the overall trade situation of Germany in view of Germany's urgent need for raw materials from the aforementioned countries and can in no case be attributed to a drive for autarky.[40]

In the lead article, "Dr. Schacht's Orient Trip", for the December 2, 1936, issue of Orient-Nachrichten it had likewise been stressed that no political goals were tied in with the exportation of products of German industry.

Recent West German views of the trade drive of the thirties do not differ greatly from these prewar assertions. In 1934, when the so-called New Plan for External Economy was launched, holds one author, "the main goal of Germany's foreign trade was to find a place in the new configuration of world commerce, as its needs demanded."[41]

Other Relations between Germany and the Fertile Crescent during the Thirties

In 1934 the Deutsche Orient-Verein was founded in Berlin to provide economic and other research assistance to Germans dealing with the Near East and to Near Easterners dealing with Germany, and to promote friendly relations between the two. Its journal was Orient-Nachrichten, which ceased publication with its eighth volume in 1939.[42]

There was reportedly a notable increase in German university course offerings concerned with "Arab questions" in the mid-thirties.[43] The spate of books during the later thirties and early forties on the Arab countries for the general readership has already been remarked upon.

The Deutsche Akademie in Munich was "well-attended" by students from the Orient, it was asserted in the vague terms common to surveys of developments in Germany touching on the Near East in the thirties: "Many colleges and other technical and trade schools, universities, and clinics have students from

from the East who will later fill influential positions in their own countries."[44] What figures on Fertile Crescent students in Germany were found will be included in sections on individual countries to follow.

Ironically, at a time when interest in the Near East was being rekindled, the government's fiscal policy restricted travel.[45, 46] Nonetheless, German business and technical men, "some of whom have decades of experience in the Orient" were frequently to be encountered in the Near East:

> The Orient no longer takes only simple consumer goods from us but it buys to a great extent capital goods for development of its industry and transportation. German engineers build rail lines, put up bridges, set up power stations, install special machinery of all kinds, create entire factories. . . . [which] requires a far more extensive assistance program of the supplier than simple "customer's service".[47]

Or, to give a Communist-influenced view,

> the German imperialists built up a dangerous fifth column by means of the disproportionately large number of technicians and specialists sent there for that purpose (for example, in Turkey and Iran), who occupied critical positions in the State, industry, and communications.[48]

These allegations were not unjustified. M. Khadduri mentions two instances:

> Colonel Heins, a former member of the German General Staff, came to Bagdad as the consultant of an industrial firm and worked out plans for the defense of Kurdistan by the Iraqi army. . . . A former captain in the German artillery, in the guise of a representative of Rheinmetall-Borsig, arrived in Bagdad to train Iraqi officers in the use of the guns.[49]

This German presence in the Near East was viewed as something less than constructive by the Powers with vested interests there. As early as April 1935, it is alleged, "fifty German agents aged from 25 to 45 were dispatched to North Africa and the Middle East."[50] Misuse of Orientalists for penetration of Near Eastern countries was a frequent charge. Baron von Oppenheim, said to have returned to Syria at the head of an ostensibly archaeological mission of forty members,[51] is among those mentioned, as is Julius Jordan, Inspector of Antiquities for

the Iraqi government[52] and NSDAP (Nazi) Party leader for German nationals in the country.

Another figure from an earlier era in the Fertile Crescent was Franz von Papen, named ambassador to Turkey, a key post from which to observe and coordinate operations in the Arab countries, in 1939. Like von Oppenheim, von Papen was said to have been involved in plans for the jihad during World War I.[53]

By 1934, the year following Hitler's accession to the chancellorship, organization of German nationals in the Near East into Party units was well under way. A Party office was set up in Beirut as early as 1933, but an effective organization was slow in forming; the Beirut group was therefore linked with that in Haifa "for local assistance and guidance".[54] Later Beirut was chosen as a propaganda center. Similar efforts were made in Syria. The resulting Nazi groupings allegedly "developed associations with Muslim 'fraternal organizations' which took orders from them."[55] At least one Party agent was active in Transjordan (at Mafrak, a key point, located on the railway and pipeline and with an RAF base nearby).[56]

As such activities in the Near East expanded,

> in August 1937 three experts of the Berlin Hochschule für Politik went on a motoring trip which took them through Italy, North Africa, across the Western desert into Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Austria. . . . In 1938 the Director of Short Waves Programmes toured the Middle East to collect technical and political data. In March 1939 a high official of the Foreign Country Organization, who had been in charge of the political training of Nazi functionaries from abroad at the courses held in Stuttgart in 1938, flew out to see Middle East top officials of the Party on a trip which took him from Germany to Cairo, Haifa, Beirut, Bagdad, and Teheran.[57]

Because of its effects on the youth movements of the Near East (see section on Iraq below), the trip of Nazi Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach and fifteen coworkers to Damascus, Bagdad, and Teheran in late 1937 was probably more significant than these other visits in terms of German relations with the Fertile Crescent countries.[58]

To the French, with their mandate in Syria and Lebanon,

> these individuals and these activities were a source of concern because of the tension to which they contributed. The glorification of the genius of the Führer and of the virtues of National Socialism found attentive audiences, particularly among the students inclined to consider the creation of Hitler as a model for their own country.[59]

The content of Nazi propaganda directed at the Arab countries is dealt with in Appendix C to this paper. Only the mechanics of its dissemination will be surveyed briefly below.

During the period between the two World Wars,

> nearly every Western power tried to arouse the Arabs in every Arab country not under its domination in order to spite and embarrass its rivals, weaken the position, and extend its own spheres of influence at their expense. In their propaganda against British and French influence in the Arab world, as well as in arousing the Arabs against the British and French policies of empire and kindling the spirit of nationalism among the Arabs, particularly in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were perhaps the most active and the most successful.[60]

The Third Reich's principal propaganda efforts in the Near East fall into half a dozen categories.[61] These included publications and press relations, films and phonograph records, radio broadcasts, visits by dignitaries, overseas Germans' relations with their host communities, and inducements to Near Easterners to travel and study in Germany. Little explicit information on these activities appears in generally-available German sources, whether of that period or in the form of post-war memoirs by major participants; hence, as with propaganda content, accounts at second hand must be relied upon.

Earliest to be developed seem to have been the Near East branches of German news services. The speed and efficiency of the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) in providing releases in Arabic won even the admiration of Third Reich critics.[62] The DNB center for the Near East was set up in Cairo in 1935. It had offices in Beirut and Bagdad, as did the Transozean agency.[63] From 1936 on DNB provided five editions of its dispatches daily to Egyptian newspapers, which had circulation throughout

the Arab world. All news from other sources unfavorable to Germany was immediately refuted. In Bagdad, the German ministry promptly distributed, in Arabic, news received via the German shortwave broadcasts.[64]

In addition, subsidies were paid to Arab newspapers (sometimes in the form of paid advertisements),[65] free subscriptions to German periodicals (in the case of the German army journal Signal and the state radio service's Barid al-Sharq, in Arabic) were generously dispensed, and publications in Arabic from handbills to books were freely distributed. By 1934 the propaganda bureau under Alfred Rosenberg had published sixty works in Arabic and other Near Eastern languages. These included books on military topics, extracts from Mein Kampf, and, above all, pamphlets with titles like Hitler, the Terror.[66]

German films were distributed in Syria and Lebanon also but found their most favorable reception in Iraq. As for phonograph recordings,

> the king of Arab recordings, Dr. G. Baida, has been living in Germany for some thirty years; he is in extremely close touch with the German services. . . . His firm issues recordings of both narration and songs . . . ; a violent "Hymn to the Green Flag" is a call to revolt against the forces of oppression.[67]

The most effective propaganda tool was considered to be radio broadcasting in Arabic from Europe. The Third Reich turned to this rather late, having benefitted from the work of the Italian station at Bari from 1935 on under an agreement that the Mediterranean area should fall within the Italian sphere of influence.[68] The Italian broadcasts are said to have concentrated on inciting the Arab world against the British.[69] In mid-1938, when German propaganda activity in the Near East was noticeably intensified, "the German radio took over from the Italians the broadcasting of anti-British propaganda"[70] since, after the appeasement of Hitler by Chamberlain in Munich, the Nazis were less concerned with appearances in their relations with the British and more concerned with taking advantage of

all subversive possibilities.[71, 72] "Utilizing the services of Arab lecturers in German universities and well-known exiles from Palestine, Iraq, and other British-dominated Arab countries, the Berlin radio produced the most vigorous and widely listened to Arabic programs" throughout the wartime period which followed.[73]

Tours of Near and Middle East capitals were undertaken by highly-placed personages--most notably Goebbels, Schacht, von Hentig, General von Blomberg, and, as mentioned above, von Shirach. One of the few to visit the Fertile Crescent, von Schirach gave the area short shrift in the mid-1967 serialization of his memoirs: he mentions only having met King Ghazi in Bagdad.[74] Of some interest in this connection are the remarks of von Hentig regarding these trips and the men who made them:

> Many of the questions which came across my desk had to do with relations with the Party. Above all, the foreign affairs office of Herr Rosenberg had begun to direct its attention to the Near and Middle East. Its members travelled to that area on the most diverse pretexts. . . . Soon small and large business affairs were being undertaken by them. The larger had to do with weapons deals.[75]

Official Policy

Postwar assessments of Third Reich intentions in the Near East range from "renewed Near East expansion of German imperialism"[76] to the opinion that they were a kind of afterthought with "neither economic interest nor the striving for imperialist expansion".[77] "The Aussenpolitisches Amt of the Nazi Party attempted to maintain contact with the Arab countries," Hirszowicz has concluded, "but the initiative was not supported at that time [1936-37] by the governmental organs."[78]

Whatever the intention attributed to the Third Reich government, accounts of the evolution of its Near East policy follow essentially the lines set forth below.[79] Regardless of pressures during the late thirties from a number of interested groups and personages who proposed an active policy with regard to the Arab lands, those at the center of power in the Third

Reich were not seriously interested in Near Eastern adventures. There were three principal reasons for their reserve.

First of all, they did not yet feel strong enough for the confrontation with Great Britain and France which interference in those nations' spheres of influence would entail. Two commonly-cited examples of the effects of this policy are the Foreign Ministry's discouraging of negotiations as likely to be deleterious to Anglo-German relations when German industry was eagerly seeking armaments sales in Iraq and again when the Dresdner Bank was considering a loan to the Iraqi government in 1937.[80]

The second reason had to do with relations with Mussolini's Italy. In the fall of 1936 the Third Reich "declared its political disinterestedness in the Mediterranean area"[81]--which was left undefined--as a contribution to its new partnership with Italy.[82] The Third Reich's faithful upholding of this agreement (in principle) was not without cynical motivation: on the one hand, allowing Italy the initiative (even in Iraq for a considerable time) meant, according to an official memorandum in July 1937, "the Germans would gain the same political advantages without incurring any risk." Further, the Third Reich did not wish to be associated with Italy in its Mediterranean adventures since "joint action would serve solely the interests of Italy, for it would strengthen its position in the Mediterranean and bring no benefit to Germany."[83] It was evident to the Reich Foreign Ministry that "Italy had no interest in independent Arab states since it wished later to play the leading role there herself."[84]

Various other considerations also abetted the overall policy of restraint. Hirszowicz' statement that "few people in the Auswärtiges Amt [Foreign Ministry] valued highly the possibilities of the Arab national movement" is borne out by published documents such as the Memorandum of Political Division VII, "Brief on the Palestine Question", dated August 7, 1937, which speaks of "the notorious political unreliability of the Arabs".[85] German diplomatic representatives seem, further, to have been convinced of the firmness of the British hold on the loyalty, or at least

the cooperation, of the bulk of Arab politicians in their sphere of influence.

There was also a fear that too much stimulation of Arab nationalism could easily lead to hatred and excess against all foreigners--and that political disturbances could only have unfavorable results for German trade.

Even among enthusiasts for Arab-German cooperation voices were heard warning against false and antiquated conceptions of pan-Arabism and the institution of the jihad in an Arab world fragmented into two major Muslim sects and numerous other religions and religious shadings.[86] "Instead of All-Islam: Concepts of Folk [Volkstumsgedanken] in the Arab Orient" Bertold Spuler titled an article in Orient-Nachrichten in 1939.[87] (In May 1937 it had been written in a German Orientalist publication that "Pan-Arabism is a corollary of the 'Drang nach Osten'." It was a not unreasonable conclusion that "many Germans see in pan-Arabism a fieldpiece directed against the conquerors of 1918."[88]) Remnants of missionary zeal had also to be dealt with. Even ten years after the end of World War II a warning that the Near East would remain predominantly Muslim as felt to be appropriate.[89, 90]

Whatever the sources of their restraint with regard to the Near East, "the Nazis lacked the initiative of their imperial predecessors in Middle East affairs."[91] There was no true Arab policy; affairs in the Near East were viewed almost exclusively in the light of their effect on Germany's relations with other European powers. But, at the same time, it was desired to maintain a basis for cooperation.[92]

Eventually, circumstances compelled a more active German Arab policy:

> Owing to its growing expansion in Europe, the rise of its international importance and the tenser relations among the Great Powers, the Government of the Third Reich had to interest itself in the Near and Middle East. And the Palestine developments directly inclined the German Government to adopt a political position on Arab affairs.[93]

The immediate occasion for this shift was the British announcement of partition plans for Palestine. On June 1, 1937, German

the cooperation, of the bulk of Arab politicians in their sphere of influence.

There was also a fear that too much stimulation of Arab nationalism could easily lead to hatred and excess against all foreigners--and that political disturbances could only have unfavorable results for German trade.

Even among enthusiasts for Arab-German cooperation voices were heard warning against false and antiquated conceptions of pan-Arabism and the institution of the jihad in an Arab world fragmented into two major Muslim sects and numerous other religions and religious shadings.[86] "Instead of All-Islam: Concepts of Folk [Volkstumsgedanken] in the Arab Orient" Bertold Spuler titled an article in Orient-Nachrichten in 1939.[87] (In May 1937 it had been written in a German Orientalist publication that "Pan-Arabism is a corollary of the 'Drang nach Osten'." It was a not unreasonable conclusion that "many Germans see in pan-Arabism a fieldpiece directed against the conquerors of 1918."[88]) Remnants of missionary zeal had also to be dealt with. Even ten years after the end of World War II a warning that the Near East would remain predominantly Muslim as felt to be appropriate.[89, 90]

Whatever the sources of their restraint with regard to the Near East, "the Nazis lacked the initiative of their imperial predecessors in Middle East affairs."[91] There was no true Arab policy; affairs in the Near East were viewed almost exclusively in the light of their effect on Germany's relations with other European powers. But, at the same time, it was desired to maintain a basis for cooperation.[92]

Eventually, circumstances compelled a more active German Arab policy:

> Owing to its growing expansion in Europe, the rise of its international importance and the tenser relations among the Great Powers, the Government of the Third Reich had to interest itself in the Near and Middle East. And the Palestine developments directly inclined the German Government to adopt a political position on Arab affairs.[93]

The immediate occasion for this shift was the British announcement of partition plans for Palestine. On June 1, 1937, German

diplomatic representatives in London, Jerusalem, and Bagdad were notified by top-secret telegram that the formation of a Jewish state would be against the German interest, which lay in strengthening the Arabs as a counterweight to any gain in Jewish strength.[94] A special supplement for the German minister in Bagdad stated: "In this connection the German understanding for Arab nationalist aspirations should be expressed more clearly than before, but without making any definite promises."[95]

From this point on, officially-sponsored activities of the Third Reich having to do with the Near East proliferated. The final outcome would seem to prove that the brief preparation for this new approach was far from adequate; it was hampered further by a more intense concern with other areas as war became imminent.

Arab Reaction to Nazi Blandishments and Accomplishments

The most striking outward evidence of Nazi influence in the Near East between 1935 and 1945 was, to judge from contemporary accounts, the springing up of paramilitary youth organizations on the Nazi and Italian Fascist model. There were Iron Shirts, Green Shirts, Gray Shirts, Blue Shirts.[96] Commonly these were associated with political parties whose "programs had for some time been strongly influenced by ideas out of Hitler's [Mein Kampf]."[97] Arnold Hottinger refers to such parties as the "second generation of Arab parties" which flourished up to World War II, and adds:

> That they were modelled on European Fascism is clear from their ideology and their organization, but one should be careful not to brush those parties aside as "Fascist". . . . The parties of the second generation can only be understood if each one of them is considered as a special phenomenon, each in the social and political context of its country.[98]

It was, Hottinger points out, the parties which grew out of the youth movements in many cases, rather than the reverse.

Similarly, E. E. Abouchdid remarks in Thirty Years in Lebanon and Syria: "Even when the youth movements took a paramilitary form that did not necessarily mean that they were Fascist"[99]

a central tenet of those who resent implications of Nazi influence.[100]

Arab reaction to the Nazi program and, particularly, to its increasing aggressiveness with respect to the Reich's eastern neighbors was not unreservedly favorable.[101] Selections from the Fertile Crescent press of the thirties will serve to illustrate the extremes of opinion which were expressed:

> "The theory launched by Hitler and solemnly sanctioned by the great powers has opened new horizons to all nations who bear the wounds of the old compacts." [Quoted by Le Jour de Beyrouth, October 5, 1938.]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> A paper in Damascus has even gone so far as to compare Hitler to the Prophet Mohammed. [L'Orient (Beirut), March 15, 1938.]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> When German propaganda speaks of the emancipation of the Arab countries, it is only for the purpose of subjecting them more quickly to the domination of the Third Reich. If the Germans confine their persecution today to the Jews, it is simply because of the lack of other opportunities. [Al-Ittihad al-Lebnani, September 1938.][102]

A primary source of irritation was the presence in Mein Kampf of passages such as the one to the effect that Islam encourages mongrelizing. In consequence of complaints from German representatives in the Near East, Hitler proposed that the racial-ladder theory be omitted from the Arabic translation of Mein Kampf then in preparation.[103]

An Arab publicist has chosen to sum up the impact of the Nazis' Führer on the Arab world as follows:

> Hitler made use of his opportunity in the Arab world in such a way that in the Orient he is still regarded as the great Führer--not, however, as the outstanding friend of the Arabs and of the Islamic world in the way the heads of the first and second Reichs, Emperors Frederick II and William II, were. . . . Nonetheless, Hitler won unlimited confidence within the Arab world during the second world war--and not only because of his radio propaganda. And this in spite of his race theories and his inner aversion to the Orient and despite his completely inadequate support of an Iraq beseeching assistance.[104]

Meanwhile, in the late thirties, certain Arab activist groups were eagerly seeking German aid. "Again and again, Arab nationalists turn to us with the request for support through arms

deliveries and they confide in us their secret plans and intentions," Minister to Iraq Grobba reported to his government in 1937.[105] German activities in and relations with the individual states of the Fertile Crescent (and various groupings within them) will be examined below.

Palestine

At the end of the 1920s, 1800 German Christians were living in Palestine. These German citizens had for the most part been evacuated to Egypt during the British occupation of 1917-18 but were permitted to return in 1920 to their former holdings. Though fewer in numbers (1300) and less prosperous than before the war, the members of the Temple Society colonies enjoyed a modest economic upswing during the twenties. The German Lutherans in Palestine, numbering about 400, had communities in the main towns and in Galilee. German Catholic members of religious orders accounted for the remainder of the German residents.

These groups did not attract the favorable political attention of the Reich government (as distinct from the already active NSDAP) until 1937.[106] Meanwhile, the Haavara agreement (see footnote 94) was benefitting Jewish institutions and enterprises in Palestine through the monopoly it gave them on importation of German products--to the detriment of German Christians and of the Arabs.[107]

Although the majority of the German residents had been born and brought up in Palestine, they had their own educational and social institutions and evinced "a strong inclination towards the imperial tradition and [were] deutschnational".[108] As regards day-to-day relations between Temple Society Germans and Arab Palestinians, up to a certain limit Arab children were accepted in their secondary schools and they had always hired Arabs as laborers and domestic servants. Hence,

> although they did not regard the Arabs as equals, close touch with local officials of the Arab population had developed. Non-intervention as an official policy did not preclude private encouragement and expressions of sympathy.[109]

As for the official German stand during the Arab uprisings in British-mandated Palestine from 1936 to 1939, Hirszowicz maintains that the Third Reich had no direct part in them--British and Zionist allegations to the contrary notwithstanding[110]--although it was undoubtedly eager to benefit from British discomfiture. "The Palestine Question," he adds, "was as if made to order for the needs and aims of Nazi propaganda."[111] The situation in the Mandate was, accordingly, a primary topic for German propaganda organs.

Fortunately for German relations with the Arab world, "Arab demands did not go beyond the question of the partition of Palestine" to that of Jewish emigration from Germany.[112] Germans sensitive to the implicit contradiction in Third Reich policy in this area (promoting Jewish emigration but opposing a Jewish State) have found a defense in figures showing that, of the Jews emigrating to Palestine between 1919 and 1937, 42% had come from Poland, 12% from the Soviet Union, and only 10% from Germany and Austria. Moreover, only one third of the Jews leaving Germany in 1933-37 went to Palestine.[113]

Amplification of Germany's role in the Palestine Question, including Third Reich reluctance to take the active, public role against partition for which Arab leaders hoped, belongs to the larger question of the Jewish state. This, as stated in the Preface, is outside the scope of this paper.

Transjordan

In the Orient-Nachrichten of the Orient-Verein, with its commercial news and chronicle of developments in the Near and Middle East, Transjordan was almost never mentioned. The few notices it was vouchsafed usually appeared in connection with Palestinian affairs. A rare entry was one in August 1935 to the effect that a German firm was reported by a Palestinian newspaper as having located asphalt sources near Al-Balk in Transjordan and that negotiations were under way with the government in Amman regarding a concession for their exploitation.[114] Further indica-

tive of both the underdeveloped nature of the Emirate's economy and of Germany's lack of contact with it is the fact that, of the 140 pages of his book The Arab Economy, published in 1943, Reinhard Hüber devoted only a single page to the "Emirat Transjordan".

Syria and Lebanon

During the interwar period, "the German government had no direct interest in Syria and Lebanon except insofar as it had been able during recent years to use Arab discontent as a means of weakening the position of Great Britain and France," according to a competent Arab observer.[115] This assertion stands in instructive contrast to that of the East German historian Tillmann. In Syria-Lebanon, he maintains, the Third Reich pursued the following goals: ensuring economic dominance for the postwar period; insofar as possible, enlisting Syria as a raw materials supplier; development there of a Middle East espionage center; and exploitation of the Arab independence movement as an instrument of German imperialism in its struggle with its rivals.[116]

Germany had reappeared as a competitor for Syrian-Lebanese trade in 1921, selling in that year goods amounting in value to about one tenth of the Mandate's purchases from France. By 1923 Germany was providing 6.3% of Syria-Lebanon's imports, to a value ten times that she had supplied in 1921, and already stood fifth as an import source there. (In 1924 her share dropped to 3.2%. See Table 1 for subsequent percentages.) To attain this sensational re-entry into Fertile Crescent trade

> she had launched a campaign with her renowned tenacity, carried out with her accustomed thoroughness. She flooded this country with catalogs and offers which the drop in value of the mark had rendered enticing, and, in particular, she sent a large number of ships of the Deutsche Levant Linie, which were once more, after five years' absence, regularly plying the route to Syria . . . since the spring of 1921.[117]

Purchases from Syria were less impressive, amounting to only one thirtieth of those by France in 1923 or 0.7% (1924, 0.8%) of Syria's total exports.[118]

France's share of Syrian and Lebanese imports had by 1936 declined to half of what it had been in 1933, while by 1936 Germany was second only behind Great Britain in exports of machinery to Syria[119] (overall, France, Japan, and Britain, in that order, were ahead of Germany as Syrian-Lebanese import sources).[120] Germany stood only eighth as a buyer of Syrian-Lebanese exports.

A payments agreement was entered into by the Third Reich and Syria-Lebanon in 1937. Germany took primarily cotton, wool, and skins and furs and sent, to about three times the value of those imports, iron and iron products, textiles, chemical products, machinery, and electrical and optical apparatus. In the late thirties canning and cement factories were to be built by the Germans, with technicians accompanying the equipment to see to its installation.[121] Efforts were being made to expand this type of activity. During conversations on German-French economic cooperation in early 1939 in Paris,

> the possibility of granting contracts to German industry for French colonial and mandated territories was also mentioned. . . . A Rhine firm had obtained an order to the value of 15 millions Reichsmark for the construction of tanks in the harbor of Damascus [sic], but at the last moment 20 German fitters who were needed were refused permission to enter the Syrian Mandate territory by the French Mandate authorities.[122]

On balance, von Hentig reflected in 1940, the French had seen to it that Germany accomplished little in Syria and Lebanon:

> It is true that we had a great many commercial representatives there. Only an insignificant amount of business could be done, however, since the larger--and above all the government's purchases were naturally made from French firms. Moreover, the most innocent German activity was always regarded with lively suspicion. Thus it was the Syrian Mandate authorities who were the first to undertake to intern German nationals, long before war was declared.[123]

To the French, there were indeed entirely too many Germans solidly entrenched in their mandated territory, as a postwar account recalls:

> As for the Germans, they were numerous [in Syria-Lebanon] before the war. In the business world in particular they had built up for themselves extensive relationships and solid frienships. Some even married local women. Certain

leading Syrian and Lebanese families had chosen German universities for their sons' advanced studies, influenced by these residents.[124]

Acquaintance with the German language was to be extended in Syria in 1937-38 through dispatch of ten teachers who, if a French account is not exaggerated, could not attract sufficient students and had to depend on their stipends to live.[125] It was in Syria that the first translation into Arabic of Mein Kampf appeared (by 'O. A. al-Nasr, a Syrian historian[126]). Like other early Arabic versions, it was incomplete and done from English or French translations.[127]

The political, often paramilitary, youth organizations mentioned on page 106 above were "perhaps the most important development of the early thirties" in Syria and Lebanon, in the opinion of A. H. Hourani. He, too, hastens to point out that "even when the youth movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist," explaining that they met needs having nothing to do with the Nazi or Italian Fascist ideologies.[128] One such organization was the Syrian National Party[129] as founded in 1932 by a Lebanese Christian, Antun Saada, said to have been educated in part in Germany. It adopted a good many of the external trappings of Nazi organizations. Active and growing despite Arab nationalist opposition and repression by the French, who subscribed to "the widespread belief that the party was in too close touch with European Fascism",[130] the party declined after Saada's departure in 1938.[131]

The Arab Club of Damascus, founded in 1937--along with an association of Arabs who had studied in Germany[132]--by a young dentist educated in Germany, Said Imam, was likewise "suspected of too close a contact with Nazi ideas and agents".[133] Not until February 1939, however, was "an Arab club which had been formed with German money, the objective of which was to stir up the population against the French Mandate authorities" protested by the French through diplomatic channels.[134, 135]

Iraq

Fears of German penetration into the Iraqi market expressed by the British in the thirties were not borne out by the Third Reich's policy or by its manufacturers' eventual achievements there. Still, the efforts on the part of German firms to sell to Iraq and the writings of economic publicists like Reinhard Hüber did nothing to allay these fears:

> The half-year figures for 1937, with our imports of RM0.7 million and exports of RM2.98 million give only a partial picture of the significance of the Iraqi market as a whole for Germany.
> . . . . . .
> Statistics show clearly that the possibilities for Germany in the Iraqi market are far from exhausted. . . .[136]
> . . . . . .
> In . . . Bagdad, high-quality, even though expensive, German products such as watches and optical equipment are preferred because one need not fear a premature requirement for repairs.[137]

Indeed, "Germany, with its alert credit-giving marketers and the ubiquitous German-Jewish Haavareh Agency, perceptibly increased its share in chemicals and machinery" in Iraq in the mid-thirties, according to S. H. Longrigg.[138] Meanwhile,

> the rapid growth of the capital . . . attracted German trade representatives. Firms with world-wide connections such as Siemens, Daimler-Benz, Bussing, AEG had their own offices there. The large export firms of Hamburg and Bremen took care of the interests of other German firms. Business seemed to be off to a good start.[139]

German machinery was brought in for a textile factory and German experts were working on plans for a cement plant--with, however, no results.

The facts were much less sensational than painted by either the alarmists or the enthusiasts. A German-Iraqi chamber of commerce had been formed and a trade agreement with most-favored nation clause had been concluded in 1935.[140] Germany was taking wool, cotton, dates, skins (and intestines for sausage casings) and sending copper, iron, and steel wares, machinery, chemical, pharmaceutical, and paper products, optical instruments, textiles--and, last on the list of major exports, beer.[141] Nevertheless, "she was comparatively at the bottom of the list in for-

eign trade with Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq," standing sixth among Iraq's customers, a weak third among its suppliers.[142] To sum up, although German-Iraqi exchange "comprised a wide assortment and many German firms were involved," turnover volume was small.[143]

There was a flurry of interest in selling weapons to Iraq after the Bakr Sidki coup d'état of October 1936. S. H. Longrigg claims that orders were actually placed with Krupp (and with Skoda in Czechoslovakia)[144] but, as has been seen,

> the German authorities checked the zeal of the firms and restrained their Bagdad envoy, Dr. Fritz Grobba. Top officials indicated that only serious economic benefits, such as payment in cash in foreign currency, would induce the German government to export arms to Iraq.[145]

German firms stubbornly continued to seek orders, given the depressed condition of world markets. The smaller arms producers occasionally succeeded.[146]

The final, brief phase of German participation in exploitation of Iraqi oil remains to be recorded.[147] In December 1939 Mosul Oilfields, Ltd.,[148] in association with Mosul Holding Co., which had British, Italian, German, Dutch, French, Swiss, and Iraqi shareholders, was registered "for the purpose of acquiring the share capital of B. O. D., while leaving the latter to operate in the field."[149] (The 12% which was the so-called German share was held by Ferrostaal, associate of Krupp, and by Deutsche Fruehand.[150]) Drilling equipment was ordered from Germany,[151] representing the German share of capital contribution. This--new orders for equipment--was in Hirszowicz' opinion the main purpose of German participation and not control of oil sources, rapid capital gains, or enterprise profits from foreign investments.[152] There were two German directors on the board and a number of German staff members and drillers, who after October 1938 began to leave Iraq, the latter to be replaced by Americans. The German shareholders had by then already withdrawn (1936) because of financing difficulties. Similarly, the Italians found themselves unable to take up an option because of lack of foreign exchange. B. O. D. and Mosul Oilfields eventually became the property of the Iraq Petroleum Company.[153]

In the early thirties, Germany was beginning to attract Iraqi students and to influence education within Iraq. In 1934 Ministerialrat Hermann Südhof had been invited by the Iraqi government to study and make proposals for vocational training in Iraq. An offer was made by the Third Reich to finance and equip a modern technical college in Bagdad; Britain secured its rejection only by making a counter-offer (underwritten by IPC).[154] Germans headed the girls' normal school and the industrial school.[155] The number of students going to Germany for technical schooling had reached only 16 by 1936[156] and was only 13 (of 86 studying abroad) in 1939.[157]

The teaching of German was promoted. In 1938 there were reported to be three German language teachers assigned to Iraq, 300 pupils learning German, and 28 or 30 studying the language in Germany.[158] "But," a French report states with obvious satisfaction, "although the Minister Yassin Pasha replaced French with German as the second language in the higher schools, French and English still are in a better position than German."[159]

"Sedulous" is one of the most benign adjectives used by the British for Nazi propaganda operations in Iraq. There was, according to the author of the British intelligence report reproduced in The Arab War Effort,[160] a network of propaganda cells around the country which offered generous hospitality to Iraqi army officers, among whom "intrigue and subversive projects" were encouraged and subsidized. The British also resented the Third Reich's "courting" of Iraqi education officials. Naji Shawkat, as Director of Education, had been favorably inclined toward the Germans, and

> in 1937 Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, at that time Director-General of Education, visited Germany, where he was accorded an official welcome and was lavishly entertained. On his return Dr. Jamali was prevailed upon by the Germans to send an Iraqi delegation to the Nuremburg rally of 1938. This was headed by . . . Mahmoud Fadhil al-Janabi [head of the Futuwwa youth movement], who was personally introduced to the Führer.[161]

In addition, the dean of the medical faculty was an honored visitor to the Reich in 1937, and "those of the medical profession

. . . who had received their training in Germany were prevailed upon to spread Nazi ideals."[162]

Two of the most notorious instances of Iraqi-Nazi "collaboration" were the above-mentioned expense-paid trip of thirty students from sports associations to the Nazi youth rally in September 1938 and the visit to Bagdad of von Shirach (see page 103 above). The latter was reported at greater length by Fritz Grobba than in von Schirach's memoirs:

> The Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach emphasized the distinction [the fact that the Boy Scouts in Iraq had been founded by the British while the Futuwwa was of Iraqi origin[163]] during his visit to Bagdad in December 1937 to the authorities directly concerned and recommended to them that in the future the military training of the youth be further directed in the patriotic channels already laid out.[164]

According to the above-mentioned intelligence report, a reorganization of the Futuwwa along Nazi lines followed.[165]

German propaganda films were particularly welcomed in Iraq. They were provided free of all but customs charges and represented 70% ad valorem of all films shown in the country.[166]

The dominant manifestation of Third Reich interest in Iraq, however, was the activity of its energetic minister, Fritz Grobba, who headed Germany's diplomatic representation there from February 1932 until the break in relations in 1939. Majid Khadduri refers to his arrival as "a significant event in German-Iraqi relations".[167] Non-German historians of this period drawn on as sources for this paper accord him grudging admiration for his knowledge of the languages and peoples of the area, his charm, his able direction of German efforts at winning Iraqi favor. They vary in the degree of condemnation of his "machinations", blandishment of the Iraqis, alleged duplicity.

Dr. Jordan, "the senior Nazi representative in Iraq" as well as an archaeologist of repute (see pages 100-101 above), who as an Iraqi government official was able "to travel freely and mix with Iraqi officials",[168] was expelled at the insistence of the British ambassador in early 1939. (A branch of the Archaeologisches Institut des deutsches Reiches had, incidentally,

been established in Bagdad in 1938.[169])

What was the effect of German activities in Iraq, on balance? Not all of the favorable disposition of Iraqis toward Germany can be attributed to the Third Reich's conscious efforts to create it, it should first be emphasized. Tracing the history of the army in politics in Iraq, H.B. Sharabi points out that

> the young army officers as well as the younger nationalists who were antagonistic to the 1930 treaty and contemptuous of the ineffectual parliamentary system were . . . deeply impressed by the resurgence of Germany and Italy. During the 1930s the merits of centralized military leadership were openly discussed and contrasted with the weaknesses of parliamentary democracy as it existed in Iraq.[170, 171]

However indirect, German influence is strangely intertwined with the course of political events in Iraq. Bakr Sidki, leader of the successful coup d'état of October 1936, had visited Germany and was married to a German woman; he was believed to have received financial support from the Third Reich.[172] The premier during his brief dictatorship was the similarly Third-Reich-oriented Hikmat Suleiman. Army influence in Iraqi politics persisted even after the fall of General Sidki's government. However, S. H. Longrigg maintains, until the Munich crisis of 1938 the rivalry of Iraqi political leaders had been personal, with recourse to one of the other of the Powers a matter of opportunism; "the event indicated . . . to 'Iraq, in a new light, the menacing cleavages of Europe, and evoked from sections of the public and the Army the admiration for German ruthlessness and successes to which the last few years had disposed them."[173, 174]

The arrival in Bagdad in October 1939 of Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem, was a circumstance which greatly augmented the dealings and rumors of dealings with the Axis Powers in Iraq. This phase of events in Iraq falls into the World War II period, which will be treated in the section following, but since the Mufti's activities will not be treated extensively in that section, a summary of those taking place in Iraq is offered below. Upon arrival he had "organized an Arab committee in whose name he

initiated secret correspondence with Nazi representatives."[175]

> The Mufti also gained for his cause the support of divers Arab nationalist organizations. Some of these were already receiving German funds, which after the beginning of the Palestine campaign reached Iraq through the diplomatic pouches of the Italian Legation. The Mufti concentrated his efforts on establishing controlling influence over large numbers of the police force, the army, teachers, doctors, and lawyers; and he also was able to exert considerable pressure in such affairs of state as the granting of passports. . . . Publications under his control were not interfered with much by the Bagdad press department; and his paper Istiqlal was left unhindered, although it was edited by Osman Qasim, the former editor of the paper Al Liwa in Palestine, a publication subsidized by both German and Italian funds.[176]

The "True World War"

In the spring of 1939 H. H. Schaeder reflected in a speech before the Deutsche Orient-Verein in Berlin that

> the relationship [of the Orient] to Europe will not be determined by sympathy but by expediency--regardless of whether peace is maintained in Europe or whether a new European or world conflict gives the Oriental countries a far more significant and, above all, a far more systematically exploitable opportunity than did the war of 1914.[177]

The following September a new world conflict did indeed begin, and expediency was everywhere the order of the day. Before this paper enters upon that period, Reinhard Huber's review of the previous four decades may provide an enlightening perspective:

> The so-called first world war only prepared the way for today's true world war, as willed by the forces and personages of the [British] Empire. . . who could not do enough to make the Bagdad Railway and the German Drang nach Osten the main theme of their war propaganda.
>
> Our German interest in the Near East was quite different from the form in which it was presented by our opponents. Only a slight change in method (exchange of goods in place of credits) characterized our economic dealings with the Near East after 1918--and an even smaller change in actual practice. . . . Our competitors' firing with gold and silver "bullets" remained unchanged, as did their propaganda against the danger of the German push to the East, which--as most of our trading partners in the Near East have always known--has become a rather worn-out refrain.[178, 179]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]Another parallel may be preferred: "Just as Arab resentment against the British and French led the Arabs in the interwar period to turn toward Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, so their grievance against the role of the Western Powers in the Palestine tragedy led them in the fifties to turn toward Soviet Russia." (Sharabi, op. cit., p. 29.)

[2]Hermann Gross, Nah- und Mittelost als Handelspartner Deutschlands (Hamburg: 1953), p. 15.

[3]Basis: R. Ettinghausen (ed.), Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Books and Periodicals in Western Languages Dealing with the Near and Middle East (Washington, D.C.: 1954).

[4]E. Kleppel, Als Beduine zu den Teufelsanbetern (Dresden: 1925). There is a section on Cairo of a length sadly out of keeping with the title.

[5]G. Pfannmüller, Handbuch der Islam-Literatur (Berlin & Leipzig: 1923).

[6]Der grosse Brockhaus (Wiesbaden). A new edition is now in process of appearing. The two references are to E. Banse's Das Buch vom Morgenland (1926) and R. Hartmann's Die Welt des Islams (1927).

[7]In order to encourage scientific study of the Orient on the spot the Deutsche Morgenland-Gesellschaft in 1928 established a branch in Istanbul. (Steppat, "Orient-Institut", p. 13.)

[8]Vernier, op. cit., p. 27.

[9]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 16, and Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 6.

[10]L. Hirszowicz, "Nazi Germany and the Palestine Partition", Middle Eastern Studies, I (October 1964), p. 40. This assertion is developed in more detail in Third Reich, pp. 15-16.

[11]Vernier, op. cit., p. 89.

[12]Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 40.

[13]Longrigg, Syria, p. 284.

[14]Grobba, Irak, p. 51. Longrigg, Iraq, p. 163, refers to this situation as "implied recognition of the Iraqi state".

[15]The consulate in Beirut functioned for both Syria and Lebanon. There was still a consulate-general in Jerusalem and a consulate in Jaffa. While the German institutions enumerated in Chapter I as existing in Palestine and Lebanon in the early years of the century were still flourishing in the 1920s, none was noted for Iraq in the German Yearbook for Foreign Affairs (Jahrbuch für Auswärtige Politik) for 1931.

The same yearbook revealed in its survey articles the persistence of the German preoccupation with Turkey (e.g., regular flights between Berlin and "Angora" were projected), Persia, and Afghanistan, among the countries of the Near and Middle East. [H. von Richthofen (ed.), Jahrbuch für auswärtige Politik, Vol. III (Berlin: 1931).]

[16]The Versailles treaty had forbidden Germany from setting its own foreign trade policy. "Only in 1925 did Germany, as provided for at Versailles, regain its freedom in trade policy." (H. Bechtel, Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19ten und 20ten Jahrhundert (Munich: 1956), p. 432.)

[17]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 12.

[18]Ibid., p. 14.

[19]G. G. W., "The Revival of West Germany's Ocean Shipping", The World Today, VII, No. 9 (September 1951), p. 393. Eighty per cent of Germany's merchant fleet in 1939 was of Post-World War I construction. (Ibid., p. 393.)

[20]P. Reymond, Histoire de la navigation dans le canal de Suez (Cairo: 1956), pp. 262-63. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 15, cites the German share for 1929 as 16.5% (his 1936 figure is the same as that given by Reymond).

[21]T. Reichardt, op. cit., p. 335.

[22]Vol. V, pp. 41-42.

The figures in Tables 1-3 notwithstanding, Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 16, states that Iraqi-German trade was until 1937 "too insignificant to be recorded in official statistics".

[23]Huber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 89. Calculation of the share of Syria-Lebanon on the basis of figures given on page 88 of this book show its share to be well under 0.1% in the three years recorded (1934-36).

[24]II, No. 10, col. 15.

[25]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 16, maintains that except for the Depression years, Germany had a favorable balance of trade with the Arab countries. However, Huber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 38, shows an export surplus in its trade with the Fertile Crescent countries thoughout 1929-37.

[26]"The position of the German sales representative in the Orient is much stronger than the modest place which those countries occupy in German trade statistics indicates. The effective utilization of this position is the task which now lies before us." ("Deutschlands Orient-Ausfuhr im Steigen", Orient-Nachrichten, II, No. 11 (April 3, 1936), p. 7.)

Then, as thirty years later, "Germans overseas, as pacesetters for German economic activity in the Orient, have a special interest in an accurate assessment of the shape of things in the Near East today. . . above all, by those German circles which are in regular commercial contact with the lands of the

Orient." (C. Erhardt, "Ein Auslandsdeutscher sieht den Orient", Orient-Nachrichten, IV, No. 6 (March 15, 1938), p. 86.)

[27]J. Meier, "Germany's Trade with Near and Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (August/September 1962), p. 162.

[28]Vernier, op. cit., p. 97.

[29]H. Gross, Deutschland und der Weltmarkt (Hamburg: 1948), p. 98. The information-collecting facilities may not have been as inadequate as Gross recalls. There was reportedly a kind of "economic Reuters" in existence in the thirties. (Interview with Horst Raben, commercial attaché of the West German representation in Beirut, December 1967.)

[30]R. Huber cites IG Farben economic reports on Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Syria-Lebanon, "Petroleum in the Orient", and "The Economy of the Orient". (Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben, p. 140.)

[31]Vernier, op. cit., p. 104. E. Monroe pointed out in 1938 that "elsewhere [than in Syria] in the Levant the proportion of French trade has fallen considerably since the war; where France used to be second only to Germany, she is now fifth or sixth on the list." (Mediterranean in Politics (London: 1938), p. 78.)

[32]Monroe, Mediterranean, p. 17.

[33]A.Z., "The Soviet Bloc and Underdeveloped Countries", The World Today, XII, No. 6, p. 227.

[34]Op. cit., p. 17.

[35]Third Reich, pp. 21-22 & 36.

[36]Kirchner, op. cit. (1st ed.), p. 755.

[37]Huber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, pp. 7 & 93.

[38]T. Reichardt, op. cit., p. 336.

[39]V, No. 22/23 (December 1939).

[40]III, No. 7/8 (April 28, 1937), p. 99.

[41]Bechtel, op.cit., p. 436.

[42]It had been preceded during the first year by a weekly bulletin of economic information and was followed from 1940 to 1944 by a monthly magazine titled Der Nahe Osten. (W. Bardt, "Zur Dokumentation des Deutschen Orient-Vereins und des Nah- und Mittelost-Vereins", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 1 (April 1964), p. 10.) Orient-Nachrichten included Abyssinia among the countries on which it reported.

[43]Vernier, op. cit., p. 28.

[44]Huber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 110.

[45]Ibid., p. 109.

[46]As a result, a Syrian lawyer who has represented a German oil firm (Concordia) in Syria during the past decade observed in an interview in March 1967, Germans and Arabs "lost contact." "The 1933-53 generation of Germans was not concerned with the outside world," he remarked further.

R. Hüber offered another reason for limited German travel to the Near and Middle East at that time: Germans tended not to take advantage of the swifter and easier travel facilities "as if we could still not completely grasp that, for example, Palestine, which it took the Crusaders years of hardship and fighting to reach, can today be reached in a few hours via more than eight flights each week." (Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 24.)

[47] Ibid., pp. 109-10.

[48] Tillmann, op. cit., p. 36.

[49] Independent Iraq (London: 1960), pp. 172-73.

[50] Vernier, op. cit., p. 37.

[51] Les Allemands au Levant (juillet 1940-juillet 1941), n.d. (probably of Free French origin), p. 1.

[52] He is also referred to as "head of the Bagdad museum" and as "director of the Iraqi Department of Antiquities".

[53] "Now, years later," wrote C. L. Sulzberger in 1942, "he has an opportunity with large funds and many assistants at his disposal to make good his failures of the last war and perhaps to acquire fame." (Op. cit., p. 664.)

[54] H. D. Schmidt, "The Nazi Party in the Levant", International Affairs, XXVIII, No. 4 (October 1952), p. 468.

[55] Vernier, op. cit., p. 43.

[56] Schmidt, op. cit., p. 468.

[57] Ibid., p. 469.

[58] Revealing of the preoccupation of Nazi authorities with Volksdeutschen in overseas areas rather than with local populations was an article titled "Deutsche Schule im Orient", Orient-Nachrichten, III, No. 6 (April 14, 1937), pp. 83-86; the concern was only with the instruction of German children (which included local languages), with the function of the school as a center for all of German descent, and with its role as a bearer of the culture and spirit of Germany to the host country. There was no mention of German schools for local nationals or attendance of non-German children at existing schools.

[59] A. Laffargue, Le Général Dentz (Paris: n.d.), p. 34.

An East German source suggested that Nazi Party organization efforts among German nationals in Syria and Lebanon made slow progress because of the large number of refugees from Nazi persecution among them. (Interview, Jäckel, February 1967.)

[60] N. A. Faris & H. M. Tawfik, Crescent in Crisis (Lawrence, Kan.: 1955), p. 53.

[61] All of these categories are dealt with at some length in Tillmann, op. cit., pp. 83f. and p. 160.

[62] Vernier, op. cit., p. 77, and Tillmann, op. cit., p. 78. The latter calls the work of the DNB "unusually extensive and subversive."

[63]Grobba, Irak, p. 75.

[64]Vernier, op. cit., p. 77

[65]As a result, according to Tillman, op. cit., p. 78, speeches by Hitler and Goebbels appeared in full in Syrian Arabic-language newspapers. A nationalist magazine of some influence published in Geneva, Chekib Arslan's Nation Arabe, was also financed. (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 130.)

[66]Vernier, op. cit., p. 76. There was a popular name for Hitler current throughout the Near Eastern Arab countries: Abu Ali.

[67]Ibid., p. 80.

[68]Authors who touch on this subject differ as to how formal this "agreement" was in the early stages of the Rome-Berlin collaboration. Elizabeth Wiskeman, in The Rome-Berlin Axis (London: 1949), stresses Hitler's preoccupation with forcing Mussolini's attention away from the Danube basin, and even the Adriatic, toward the "Mediterranean". In discussions with Mussolini in the fall of 1938 which eventually led to the Steel Pact of May 22, 1939, "said Ribbentrop obligingly, the Mediterranean will become an Italian sea." (p. 134.) In March 1939 Ciano "reminded [the German ambassador] that the condition of the Axis was Germany's recognition of the Mediterranean (including Croatia) as Italy's sphere; Berlin promptly sent a docile reply. . . ." (p. 138.) "Hitler, as far as one can judge," she concludes, "for all his big phrases about Italy and the Mediterranean, cared little about the fulfillment of the Duce's aspirations." Sensing this urgently in mid-1940, the Duce "produced larger and more specific demands. . . . They included Italian domination of the Mediterranean and the Italian occupation of Aden, Perim, and Socotra. . . . The Führer agreed in principle with regard to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, but . . . the discussion remained conveniently academic." (pp. 217-18.)

[69]N. Barbour, "Broadcasting to the Arab World. Arab Transmissions from the BBC and other Non-Arab Stations", The Middle East Journal, V, No. 1 (Winter 1951), p. 63.

[70]Kirk, Short History, p. 195. Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 46, gives the date as the "spring of 1939". Cf. Tillmann, op. cit., p. 15.

[71]Hirszowicz, "Partition", pp. 60-61.

[72]Inaugurated in April 1933 at Zeesen, 19 miles southeast of Berlin, the German shortwave service beamed all over the world had already had five years' successful experience (broadcasting in German primarily), with favorable responses from non-German listeners in the Near East as well as elsewhere. (K. von Hofe, "Drei Jahre deutsche Kurzwellensender", Orient-Nachrichten, III, Nos. 12/13 (April 1936) and "Der fröhlichste Sender der Welt", Orient-Nachrichten, V, No. 12 (April 1938). From 1935 on, Vernier claims (op. cit., p. 80), this shortwave service had carried messages of Arab students in Germany to their home countries.

[73]S. Arsenian, "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, II, No. 4 (October 1948), p. 419.

[74]"Ich glaubte an Hitler", Stern, August 20, 1967, p. 54. Von Schirach's visit to Damascus is described by one of Ribbentrop's aides as "entirely unforeseen" and due to bad flying weather. (U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D (Washington, D.C.: 1953), Vol. V, pp. 812-13.

[75]Werner Otto von Hentig was head of Political Division VII (charged with Near and Middle Eastern affairs) at the Foreign Ministry from July 1937 to 1939; these remarks figure among the very few which he includes with regard to this area in his memoirs: Mein Leben, eine Dienstreise (Göttingen: 1962). The quotation is from page 318.

Alfred Rosenberg was head of the Foreign Affairs Office (APA) of the NSDAP from 1933 to 1945 and in charge of its ideological training from 1934 to 1945.

[76]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 11. This is even stronger than the statement in the Encyclopedia of the USSR: "German fascism aimed at restoring Germany's former influence in the Middle East and destroying Britain's influence in the Arab World." (Dashevsky, G., "The Colonies and Colonial Policy", Bol'shaya Souetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed., XXX (1938), cols. 423-83.)

[77]Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 41. In Third Reich, p. 18, he refers to Germany's "lack . . . of genuine interest in economic collaboration with the Arab countries."

[78]Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 52. He follows up with several supporting instances.

[79]An interesting--if overly idealistic--unofficial German statement of policy was offered on behalf of the academic community in 1934 by H. H. Schraeder, then professor of Iranian philology at the University of Berlin:

> An active Oriental policy of the English type is out of the question for Germany; technical and trade possibilities are not at issue here. But what can we accomplish along cultural lines? The answer is simple. We need only continue what we learned from our professors: impartial, forthright concern for the essence of Oriental affairs and their relation to the course of history as we are now experiencing it.

("Der neuere Orient", Der Orient und Wir (Berlin: 1935), p. 53.)

[80]Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 40.

[81]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 54.

[82]See also note 68 above. Kirk, Short History, p. 194, implies that a division into spheres of influences comprising Egypt and the Levant (Italy) and Iraq and Persia (Germany) had already taken place before the outbreak of war. However, Circular of the Foreign Ministry Pol VII 2025g dated August 20, 1940, stated: "This consequently rules out any German claim to political leadership, or the sharing of leadership with Italy in the Arab territories,

which consist of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Iraq." (Italics mine.) (Documents, Series D, Vol. X (Washington, D.C.: 1957), p. 515.)

[83]Both statements quoted in Hirszowicz, "Partition", pp. 59-60.

[84]Foreign Ministry Documents Pol I, Vorderasien, Nr. 71 179, Bd. 1: ab März 1939, quoted in Tillmann, op. cit., p. 181, footnote 264.

[85]"Partition", p. 55, and Documents, Series D, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: 1953), p. 764. See also p. 813 of the latter reference: "German participation in the Arab movement should be permitted only if enough foreign exchange and sufficiently capable personnel are available. . . . Since . . . neither of these prerequisites appear to exist, it seems to me advisable to initiate an investigation . . . . Abetz."

[86]Cf. Hüber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 21.

[87]V, No. 13 (July 1, 1939).

[88]Vernier, op. cit., p. 55. The publication named was that of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde. Informed sources state that this society published only a yearly Orientblatt.

[89]G. Jäschke, Review of Allahu Akbar. Nahost ruft uns by R. Hüber, Die Welt des Islams, IV, Nos. 2-3 (1955), p. 228.

[90]For their part, Arabs were much attracted to pan-Germanic concepts. In the Gall of the Muslim Brotherhood for October 1938 could be read:

> If the German Reich imposes itself as a protector of everyone who has German blood running in his veins, Moslem faith makes it the clear duty of every strong Moslem whose soul has been drenched in the doctrines of the Koran to consider himself the protector of every other Moslem whose soul has also been drenched . . . in Islam. . . . Hereafter, we want the banner of Allah to fly high once more in those regions which were once happy in Islam.

(M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princton, N.J.: 1963), pp. 147-48.)

G. E. Kirk deemed it worthwhile in Contemporary Arab Politics (New York: 1961) to devote the better part of two pages to drawing parallels between pan-Germanism and pan-Arabism (pp. 18-20).

[91]Kirk, The Middle East in the War (London: 1952), p. 20.

[92]Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 42.

[93]Ibid., p. 19.

[94]Documents, Series D, Vol. V, pp. 746-47. According to a strictly confidential circular of the Foreign Ministry dated June 22, 1937, adoption of this policy represented "a revision of the German position". A review of the considerations which had determined the revision followed:

> Heretofore it was the primary goal of Germany's Jewish policy to promote the emigration of Jews from Germany as much as pos-

sible. In order to achieve this goal sacrifices are even being made in foreign-exchange policy. Through the conclusion of a transfer agreement with Palestine (the so-called Haavara Agreement) the Jews emigrating to Palestine are allowed, in order to establish a livelihood, to obtain the release of specific amounts in the form of additional German exports to Palestine. This German attitude, dictated by requirements of domestic policy, virtually promotes the consolidation of Jewry in Palestine and thereby accelerates the development of a Jewish state in Palestine; this might contribute to the view that Germany favors the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In reality, however, it is of greater interest to Germany to keep Jewry dispersed. For when no member of the Jewish race is settled on German soil any longer, the Jewish question will still not be solved for Germany. Rather, the developments of recent years have shown that international Jewry will of necessity always be the ideological and therefore political enemy of National Socialist Germany. . . . Thus there is also considerable German interest in the developments in Palestine. For a Palestine state will not absorb world Jewry, but . . . will provide it with an additional position of power under international law which might have fateful results for German foreign policy.

(Documents, Series D, Vol. V, pp. 751-52.)

[95]Ibid., p. 747. Ten days after the Peel report appeared the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, as head of the Arab Higher Committee, called on the German consul-general (Döhle) to seek support for the Arab cause. ("This was probably the Mufti's first official contact with a Third Reich representative," according to Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 34.) The significance of this visit is minimized by the fact that he called also at other consulates for the same purpose at that time--for example, that of the United States (Lecture by Walid Khalidi, AUB, December 1967).

[96]Vernier, op. cit., p. 70, is the only reference seen which mentions the "Gray Shirts" (Syria's "White Shirts"?). The Green Shirts belonged to Egypt's Misr al-Fatat, the Blue Shirts to the youth group of Egypt's Wafd, and the Iron (Steel) Shirts may have been associated with Shukri al-Kuwatli's National Party in Syria.

[97]S. Wild, op. cit., p. 207.

[98]The Arabs, p. 228.

[99](Beirut: 1948), p. 71.

[100]Nazi influence, real or suspected, and the organizations with which it was associated in the Near East have been toroughly treated in "Fascist Tendencies in Pre-war Arab Politics" by Elsa Marston in The Middle East Forum for May 1959.

[101]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 45-46.

[102]Vernier, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

[103]Ibid., pp. 59-66, and Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 45-46.

[104]Amin, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

[105]The Middle East Journal, XII, No. 2 (Spring 1958), p. 202.

[106]The problem of protection of the German colonists in Palestine in event of formation of a Jewish state was mentioned repeatedly in Foreign Ministry correspondence and reports in 1937 and 1938: e.g., letter from Consul-General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry, July 13, 1937, Subj: Triple Partition of Palestine and its Consequences for the German Colonists; Memorandum by the head of Pol VII, July 29, 1937 ("The possibility of their continued existence would certainly be very much imperiled"); and a Memorandum by an official of Pol VII, Jan. 10, 1937, containing the following:

> As a warning example of the unreliability of the Arabs, it may be mentioned in this connection that despite the moral and probably even material help which the Arab insurrectionists in Palestine have received from the Germans, they feel no obligation toward us and do not shrink from rigorous measures against defenseless German settlers.

(Documents, Series D, Vol. V, pp. 754, 760 & 799.)

[107]Debate over extension or abolition of this agreement was still in process as 1938 ended. Of the agencies concerned, the Foreign Ministry's Special Section for German Internal Affairs and the Foreign Trade Office advocated amendment, at the least, while the Foreign Ministry's Economic Department and the Ministry of the Economy favored continuation. (Documents, Series D, Vol. V, pp. 748 & 798.) According to Tillmann, op. cit., p. 68, the agreement remained in effect unchanged well into 1939.

[108]H. D. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 461. A German view in the mid-twenties ran, in part: "As models of farm management they have stimulated agriculture throughout the country. . . . Everywhere they are well thought of, whether among the peasants, the Jews, or government officials . . . who see in them, belonging to no party, a stable, dependable element in the midst of the unrest of Palestine." (H.-J. Seidel, Palestina (Leipzig: 1926), pp. 81-82.)

[109]H. D. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 467. No Arab pupils at all were permitted in Templar schools under Nazi control. The Lutheran Missions, however, had always had a majority of Arab pupils.

Relations with the Arab middle class were reportedly cordial.

[110]Cf. A. Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East", International Affairs, XXIX (January 1953), p. 39, and Kirk, Short History, p. 175. Indicative of the relationship which existed at on point is the following photo caption from Hüber, Es wetterleuchtet, p. 130: "In the Arab section of beleaguered Palestine the German flag is dependable insurance against attack." Cf. a letter of Jan. 14, 1938, from Consul-General Döhle in Jerusalem: "I have observed that the hitherto decidedly pro-German attitude of the Palestine Arabs has lately begun to waver. This might be traced to the fact that the Arabs in Palestine had counted on active German support in their fight against the Jews and the Mandate Government and were disappointed because such support failed to materialize." (Documents, Series D, Vol. V, p. 780.)

See Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 39-40, for a summary of policy on and active aid to the Palestine rebellion.

[111]Third Reich, p. 27. "But though Hitler's anti-Jewish policy struck at the British in the Middle East only by accident," wrote E. Monroe in Britain's Moment in the Middle East (London: 1963), p. 85, "it struck home because it found out the weakest part."

[112]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 60. Cf. page 70 above.

[113]Non German sources, including ibid., pp. 20-21, confirm these percentages. (Cf. the following statement from the German geography text cited on page 63 above: "The number of immgrants rose especially after the persecution of the Jews in Germany between 1933 and 1945."--p. AS-7.)

[114]I, No. 39, p. 337.

[115]A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: 1954), p. 159.

[116]Op. cit., p. 90. Ironically, with regard to the last point, one of the most influential German visitors, von Hentig, in April 1939 upon his return reported that he adjudged the Syrian Arab nationalists incapable of independent action. (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 54.)

[117]Haut Commissariat de la République française en Syrie et au Liban, La Syrie et le Liban en 1922 (Paris: 1922), p. 179.

[118]La Syrie et le Liban 1919-1927, p. 261. (A contemporary French account of travels in Syria was distinguished by its repeated references to the bad taste of German restoration work on antiquities in the country.)

[119]R. Hüber, source for this information, had predicted in 1935 that German exports to Syria could be increased despite the special difficulties ("The Syrian-Lebanese Mandated Territory", Orient-Nachrichten, I, No. 3 (Dec. 6, 1935), p. 7.) Syrians, when possible, "ordered their machines and instructors from Germany out of pure opposition" to the French, claimed G. Stratil-Sauer, Umbruch im Morgenland (Leipzig: 1935), p. 94. This same book contains one of the few tirades against abuses by French mandate authorities; the British were usually the target.)

[120]Hüber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 96.

[121]Vernier, op. cit., p. 99.

[122]Memorandum by an official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, dated March 3, 1939, in Documents, Series D, Vol. V, p. 812.

[123]Der NO rückt näher, p. 60.

[124]Laffargue, op. cit., p. 33.

[125]Vernier, op. cit., p. 76.

[126]C. Brockelman, Geschichte der arabische Literatur, Vol. S-III (Leiden: 1939), p. 435.

[127]Wild, op. cit., p. 207.

[128]Syria, pp. 196-97.

[129]It was locally known as the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien) and later as the PSP (Parti Socialist Populaire). (Hottinger, The Arabs, p. 230.) Other such groups were the League of National Action and the Nationalist Youth. (Hourani, Syria, pp. 197-98.)

[130]Ibid., p. 197. As Longrigg, Syria, p. 284, puts it, the belief that the activity of the Syrian National Party of Antoun Saadeh was in part German-inspired and German-paid was persistent among French officials. He states elsewhere that PPS activity in gun-running to Palestine is highly probable. (Ibid., p. 225.)

A résumé of PPS history in The Arab World, Jan. 6, 1956, pp. 4-5, contained the following comment: "Founded in Lebanon by an American University graduate, the party has seen a succession of baiters: the French because it was for independence and re-union, the Allies during the war because it had a definite preference for Germany against Russia."

[131]According to the Sûreté Générale, Saada left in 1938 for Germany. (Longrigg, Syria, p. 225.) P. Searle, The Struggle for Syria (London: 1966), pp. 63f., mentions that he visited Germany and Italy in 1938 but was back in South America, where he was born, before World War II began. Searle generally underplays the German connection, pointing out that the French charges that Saada (Sa'ade) had received subsidies from the Third Reich and was engaged in its propaganda broadcasting during the war have never been proved. In a review of Searle's book (Middle Eastern Studies, III, No. 1 (October 1966), p. 102) K. S. Salibi calls "the comments on the PPS, its founder-leader, and its principles . . . perhaps the most valid to date". The only additional comments Searle makes about Saada, however, are that he "returned" to Syria about 1920 as a young man, that he worked on the Damascus paper Al-Ayyam before going to Beirut, and that he was never on the staff of the American University of Beirut, as has been claimed. (Saada apparently offered his services as a tutor in German to AUB students and was seen about the campus a good deal.)

[132]Enclosure 2, The Propaganda Ministry to the Foreign Ministry, dated December 1937, Documents, Series D, Vol. V, p. 778.

[133]Longrigg, Syria, p. 224. Longrigg seems to assume that the Arab Club was a continuation of an organization of the same name founded by Feisal directly after World War II. (Ibid., p. 295.)

[134]Memorandum dated March 3, 1937, Documents, Series D, Vol. V, p. 812. The Foreign Ministry official to whom the complaint was made had no knowledge of the club and was genuinely concerned at a probably pointless provocation of the French.

[135]A last word on Antun Saada: a mature sympathizer--and probably former party member--interviewed in Beirut denied that Saada had beeninfluenced by the Nazis, maintaining that he was an independent thinker of considerable intelligence who had no need of borrowed ideas. The interviewee also pointed out that Saada was not his true family name and claimed to have seen identity documents which proved this.

[136]Hüber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, pp. 87 & 95.

[137]Hüber, Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben, p. 103.

[138]Iraq, p. 256; for textile factory and cement plant, p. 247.

[139]Von Hentig, Der NO rückt näher, p. 51.

[140]Hüber, Wirtschaftliche Aufbau, p. 98.

[141]Ibid., p. 92.

[142]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 16. Between 1932 and 1935 German purchases from Iraq rose from 4% to over 10% of Great Britain's. It was also the third largest purchaser of petroleum after Great Britain and the U.S.A. (Orient-Nachrichten, II, No. 10 (March 14, 1936), p. 7.)

[143]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 19.

[144]Iraq, p. 253.

[145]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 17.

[146]Ibid. For his part, B. Vernier saw in the bids for arms orders a scheme to gain the control this kind of supply relationship, with its ramifications in need for ammunition, spare parts, instructors, mechanics, and the like, implies. (Op. cit., p. 99.)

[147]The Bagdad Railway story can also be brought to a close. The Iraqi government had bought the portion within Iraq from the British in 1936 (before the Bakr Sidki coup d'etat) and undertook to build the missing stretch between Nissibin and Baiji "from the completion of which the British had abstained after the World War for strategic reasons having to do with the security of the Mosul region against the Turks" (Kirchner, op. cit. (1st ed.), p. 765). At the same time, England was trying in vain to persuade the Iraqi government to finance a railway from Bagdad to Haifa. "Instead, the Iraqi government had enough character to continue construction of the old Bagdad railway." (Hüber, Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben, p. 22.) The labor force for this work, incidentally, was primarily Shammar tribesmen; in return, their sheikh received a lifetime pass on the railroad. (An account of the portions constructed by the British will be found in Grobba, Irak, pp. 36 & 95.)

[148]According to Boveri, op. cit., p. 235, Mosul Oilfields had acquired a 75-year concession on the western side of the Tigris.

[149]Longrigg, Oil, p. 71. The British Oil Development Co., more commonly known as B.O.D., had been created in 1928 with 12% German participation and "in 1930 obtained concessions to explore and extract oil in Iraq on territory not already the preserve of the Iraq Petroleum Co." (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 16.)

[150]Ferrostaal was a Netherlands firm "commonly believed to be a German firm". Deutsche Fruehand, AG, had been formed by Otto Wolff, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke, Gutehoffnungshütte, and Vereinigte Stahlwerke. (Boveri, op. cit., p. 235.)

[151]This same equipment was destined to be used again to resume operations in 1945. (Longrigg, Oil, p. 183.)

[152]Third Reich, p. 16.

[153]Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 40, and Longrigg, Oil, pp. 79-81.

[154]Grobba, Irak, p. 22, and W. Björkman, "Das irakische Bildungswesen und seine Probleme bis zum zweiten Weltkrieg", Die Welt des Islams, I, Nos. 1-2 (1951), p. 184. Cf. Khadduri, op. cit., p. 173.

[155]Vernier, op. cit., p. 49.

[156]Björkman, op. cit., p. 187.

[157]Reichardt, op. cit., p. 45.

[158]Tillman, op. cit., p. 85. These figures represent primarily attendance at a year-long course to prepare Iraqi students for study in Germany instituted in 1936 and an evening language school inaugurated (in both instances by the Iraqi government) in 1937. (Grobba, Irak, p. 67.)

[159]Vernier, op. cit., p. 76.

[160]Published by the American Christian Palestine Committee (New York: 1947).

[161]Ibid., p. 31.

[162]Ibid., p. 32.

[163]And "the only government-sponsored paramilitary youth organization in the Arab world." (Sharabi, op. cit., p. 159.)

[164]Irak, pp. 68-69.

[165]The Arab War Effort, p. 31. Vernier, op. cit., p. 72, claims that the reaction of the Iraqi delegates was not entirely favorable, offering quotations in support of his assertion.

[166]Vernier, op. cit., p. 78.

[167]Op. cit., p. 171.

[168]Kirk, Middle East, p. 57. A "so-called commercial traveller" was expelled at the same time. (Khadduri, op. cit., p. 174.)

[169]Grobba, Irak, p. 65.

[170]Sharabi, op. cit., p. 159

[171]There was an Iraqi translation of Mein Kampf available during this period, by an erstwhile government minister (Sabawi). (Tillmann, op. cit., p. 211, footnote 401.)

[172]Kirk, Middle East, p. 59, footnote 3.

[173]Longrigg, Iraq, p. 273.

[174]There had been an attempt to lay instigation of mob reaction in Mosul to King Ghazi's death in 1939 at the door of a German eye specialist in that city and to Axis press and radio provocation.

[175]Khadduri, op. cit., p. 329.

[176]Sulzberger, op. cit., pp. 667-68. He adds: "In this connec-

tion the key man was Taha Pasha al-Hashimi, who had become Iraqi Defense Minister in December 1938 and who before that had been president of the Iraqi Palestine Defense Society which issued the Mufti's propaganda and prepared much of the broadcast material for the Nazi Arab programs. Taha Pasha remained in exceedingly close contact with the German legation and was a close friend of Germany's Number 1 Arab agent, Dr. Amin Ruwaiha." (Ibid., pp. 668-69.)

[177]"Die orientalische Frage einst und heute", Orient-Nachrichten, V, No. 11 (June 1, 1939), p. 166.

[178]Bagdadbahn, p. 100

[179]However purely commercial and innocent of thoughts of territorial conquest Germany's "push to the East" may have been, control of oil sources became a goal during World War II (see Chapter IV). It is argued that the Third Reich's failure in World War II is closely tied to the failure of the original Drang nach Osten: "Some equivalent of a Berlin-to-Bagdad lifeline has become essential for every industrial nation of the modern West--e.g., the calamity which befell the Nazi Luftwaffe in World War II was not unrelated to the failure of the Drang nach Osten." (D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: 1958), p. 355.)

CHAPTER IV

WORLD WAR II IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT

The flow and ebb of official German interest in the Near East during World War II has been traced by competent scholars in hundreds of pages summarizing research on original documents.[1] The brief overview which follows will therefore concern itself primarily with the wartime activities of German nationals and Arab Nazi sympathizers in the Fertile Crescent countries, leaving larger matters of policy and the Palestine Question out of the account insofar as is feasible.

It is during the course of World War II that the cycle nature of German relations with the Fertile Crescent becomes apparent: commercial penetration,[2] development of a secondary theater of war in the Near and Middle East, banishment of German presence consequent on defeat in war, and gradual resumption of intercourse after an early postwar period of quiescence. The wartime situation of 1939-1945, however, presents contrasts as well as parallels with that of 1914-1918.

Among the parallels between the two wartime situations which have been brought out by a variety of commentators could be mentioned the marginal nature of the area in German planning despite Germany's awareness of the advantages accruing to the side controlling it.[3] Also, in both wars Germany had an ally in the Mediterranean area which it overestimated (and "a common enemy but no common plan of operations"[4]); in both, the campaign in the Arab lands was designed as a phase of and coordinated with one directed against Britain[5]; in both Germany sought to threaten the Allies' oil sources via the Caucasus. Similarly, in both wars there were dreams of a jihad, of pan-Islamic or pan-Arabic or just local nationalist uprisings, to drive out the Allies by the sheer force of the masses--and in the second war as in the

first, these hopes proved disproportionate.[6]

The major contrast in Germany's relationship to the Near East during World War II as opposed to that in World War I was its lack of a relatively strong and committed ally in the area such as the Ottoman Empire had represented. By the same token, Germany was in a better position in World War II to seek Arab aid and cooperation, free from its earlier burden of respecting Ottoman dominance in the Fertile Crescent: "just as the British in the last war employed the aspirations of the Sherif of Mecca Hussein, to give weight to the promises of freedom from the Turk, the Germans are now using Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, as their principal spokesman," a waritme analysis pointed out.[7] Still, Italian insistence on predominance in the Levant also proved something of a handicap, as will be seen below.

Moreover, the Arab struggle for independence had reached its final phase; the neutralist view that the war was a conflict among the Powers of little concern to the Arabs flourished alongside pro-German attitudes. The days for a "revolt in the desert" had passed--to adopt the phraseology of numerous postwar commentators. The insistence of even pro-German Arab groups on guarantees of German intentions may be taken as an index of the wariness induced by the Hashimites' experiences with the British and French in World War I and at Versailles.

The story of the Third Reich in the Fertile Crescent during World War II as told by observers from both sides is one of incompletely-worked-out plans, inadequate means, and last-minute improvisation (and improvisation, wrote Rudolph Rahn in his account of the abortive German aid mission to Iraq, "is not a German gift"[8]). In view of the scale of the war, this would not merit remark if it were not for widespread conviction of the thoroughness of Nazi planning and preparation with regard to the Near East as expressed in passages like the following:

> Clearly, then, the Middle East is of essential importance from the military, economic, and communications view-

> points. Clearly, too, the Axis is well aware of this and is making extensive preparations to seize the area.[9]

These "extensive preparations" were late in being undertaken. In November 1939,

> with the war beginning to drag out and their inability to mount an offensive on the Western front immediately after their September victory, the Germans felt compelled to take into consideration the concentration of Allied troops in the Middle East. . . . The General Staff started the necessary operational studies, including the concentration of Near and Middle East specialists.[10]

Although, as will be seen, no clear modus operandi with respect to Arab nationalist movements had been, or perhaps could be, arrived at, their cooperation was basic to the plan of operation evolved for the Near East. At the same time, the German propaganda offensive designed to win the nationalists' cooperation by all accounts far outstripped German readiness or ability to support them in their own aims. What emerges from the evidence presented by researchers who have had access to unpublished official Third Reich documents is a single-minded desire and intention on the part of those setting Third Reich policy--and that means primarily Adolf Hitler--to inspire such groups to create disturbances and threats to Allied supply lines in the Near East, particularly in areas under British hegemony.[11] Thus a portion of the enemy's strength would be drawn away from other fronts and leave Germany freer to pursue the Russian campaign. Once the Soviet Union was brought to its knees--and only then--would serious military attention be diverted to the Near and Middle East.[12]

Both before and after its failure this policy was challenged by competent German observers. If the direct invasion of Russia were actually decided upon, wrote Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry from 1938 to 1943, in early 1941, "as far as the anti-British Arab nationalists go, there remains only the delivery of a few weapons, some money, and good words--the effect of which on the movement should not be overestimated."[13] The German Air Force and Navy sought in vain to win acceptance for Operation Felix,

> a grandly conceived offensive with three branches: through Spain toward Gibraltar and North Africa, through Italy to-

> ward Gibraltar and North Africa, through Italy toward Egypt, through the Balkans and Turkey toward Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. Conditions were favorable, British forces in the Near East relatively weak, advance bases available due to the uprising under Rashid Ali in Bagdad and the control by the Vichy government of the French forces in the Levant. Nevertheless Hitler decided in March 1941 to concentrate efforts first on the Balkan front and then against the Soviet Union.
>
> Many German generals have designated this decision as one of the great missed opportunities of the war.[14]

Again, in the spring of 1941, "with the taking of the Peloponnesus and the Aegean Islands a new world opened itself to the German military leaders, insofar as they were disposed to seek a decision in the war on the Mediterranean and to relinquish the plans for a Russian campaign."[15] The Russian campaign, of course, was not relinquished.

Not only were these two earlier opportunities let slip, but also another in 1942, in the opinion of at least one commentator:

> In the summer of the year following [1942], perhaps a second chance had arisen to wrest the Mediterranean away from the English. An extraordinarily strong effort, even the renouncement of the Caucasus offensive in Russia, would have been required in order to achieve this. Caucasian oil was certainly important, but the oil in Iraq was no less so.[16]

Arrayed against these opinions are others which held that the Third Reich's "opportunities" for mastery of the Near East were vastly overrated. Ernst von Weizsäcker observed in his memoirs:

> I was always of the opinion that all of our schemes for the Near East were beyond our powers. Only our political and military amateurs took these things seriously. In the military and political situation in which we found ourselves in 1942, there was no longer a single country which we could have attracted as an ally whether by persuasion, pressure, or force.[17]

In the end, German efforts in the Fertile Crescent countries passed beyond the stage of subversion in only one instance--that of meager and belated aid in the form of a couple of dozen German-piloted planes and two trainloads of matériel to the pro-Axis government established briefly by coup d'état in Iraq (see section on Iraq below). A concise--and ironic--summary of Ger-

many's activity in the Near East in World War II has been provided by historian Hans Rörig: the defeat of the Third Reich at al-Alamayn at least "spared the Arab countries the material and spiritual destruction of war and the fate of having to build their future on rubble."[18]

Third Reich Relations with Arab Nationalists

The various factors which induced the Third Reich's "restraint" in the Arab East during the war and before were reviewed in Chapter III above (see section on "Official Policy"). In 1940 German political disinterestedness in the Arab area was still being insisted upon by Italy and accepted by Germany.[19] This arrangement with Italy doubly hampered German cooperation with Arab nationalist groups: in addition to the necessity for concealing any dealings from the Italians, the Italian relationship had to be played down or denied to the Arabs because of their experience of Italian imperialism in North Africa and their skepticism regarding Mussolini's self-declared mission as the "Protector of Islam".[20] The need for the cooperation of Vichy France in Syria was, until mid-1941, another damping influence, since it was the hold of France which the nationalists there wanted to throw off.

Over and above these external hindrances, the multiplicity, variety of orientations, and rivalry evinced by the Arab nationalist groups complicated the task of collaboration.[21] Further, while certainty of Axis victory caused many Arab leaders to favor Germany, in the view of others even a victorious Germany seemed in the early stages of the war too far away, and the very real presence of British or French forces left no practicable choice.[22]

On the German side, even though the goal was to use the Arab nationalist movements for the Third Reich's purposes, the effort at cooperation does not seem to have been well organized. Dr. Tillmann of the German Democratic Republic somewhat plaintively sees himself forced to concede that "amidst the abundant documents dealing with the German Near East policy, the

scarcity of significant material on the attitude of the German imperialists with regard to the Arab independence movement is striking."[23] Numerous bureaus had concerned themselves with the question of cooperation with Arab nationalists groups from 1937 on, but no positive policy was arrived at. Every shade of opinion seems to have been put on record, from the conviction that Arab nationalism was deep-rooted and alive and that there could be a "revolt in the desert once again" if only success could be assured[24] to World War I Persian campaigner von Niedermayer's serious doubts that the Fertile Crescent countries could be counted upon to carry out a coordinated operation, especially without military backing for Germany's threats and promises.[25, 26]

As Britain's capitulation began to appear imminent, Arab nationalists considering cooperation with the Third Reich pressed for a clear statement of German support, to include, for example, recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the Arab countries under mandate. Avoidance of such a commitment was still being directed by the Foreign Ministry as late as August 1940.[27] Finally, on October 23, 1940,[28] a statement was issued via the German and Italian radio (in Arabic) which was hailed by German enthusiasts as the answer for which the Arabs had been waiting[29] and as a manifesto for the future of the Arab lands.[30] It was in fact little more than a continuation of the policy of noncommitment, as may be judged from its text:

> Germany, which has always been imbued with the feelings of friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the desire to see them flourish and prosper and attain a place among the peoples of the earth concommitant with their historic and natural importance, has always followed the struggle of the Arab lands for their independence with interest. The Arab lands can continue to count on the fullest sympathy of Germany with their further striving toward this goal. In the issuing of this declaration Germany enjoys the full accord of her ally Italy.[31]

Hajj Amin al-Husaini, ex-mufti of Jerusalem in exile in Bagdad, reportedly found this statement "vague and full of arrière-pensées." On December 12 Ambassador von Papen wired from Ankara that the situation was such that the Arab independence

movement ought to be supported in deed as well as word.[32] At the same juncture, the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) was urging a more energetic policy with regard to the Near East.[33, 34]

The course of developments in each Fertile Crescent country during the first three years of the war will be reviewed below, followed by a summary of Third Reich activities related to the Arab area in the final two years.

September 1939 to Mid-1942

On September 5, 1939, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, England having declared war on September 3. The German minister and his staff left the country the following day. Resident Third Reich citizens were turned over to the British, who deported them to India.[35]

From Transjordan, Amir Abdallah "cabled the full support of his country's resources for Britain"[36] to London immediately upon the outbreak of the war.

In Syria and Lebanon the allegedly pro-Fascist Syrian National Party (PPS) was outlawed and the German-financed Arab Club in Damascus was closed down.[37] Resident German nationals were interned.

The few "Palestinian German" men of military age (about a hundred) who had not already left the Mandate were interned and some deported. None of them is known ever to have returned.[38]

Transjordan. The first seven months of the war were uneventful in Transjordan. German subversive activity was apparently negligible, consisting primarily of clandestine aid in money and weapons to Arab irregulars operating against the British and Jews in Palestine.[39] [The Axis was also providing funds to the ex-mufti of Jerusalem, at this time in Bagdad (see pages 117-18 above), and to the "intricate and extensive political machine which he has left behind him in Palestine, in Syria. . . ."[40] The sabotage which was accordingly carried out by this machine, most notably on the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline and its pumping stations, was not, however,

very effective.[41] These activities continued until the occupation of Syria by British and Free French forces in mid-1941, which deprived the Third Reich of its base of operations in the Levant.

The British in Transjordan experienced their most difficult days of the war during the brief pro-Axis coup in Iraq and Rommel's drive across North Africa in the spring of 1941. It was at this juncture that the German Army's intelligence service expressed its confidence that revolt would break out automatically there upon receipt of weapons (see footnote 33 to this chapter). Sir Alec Kirkbride, British High Commissioner there, has recalled that the events of early 1941 indeed "not only desroyed any lingering hope in our victory, but convinced the Jordanians, including many of the Arab officers of the local forces, that it was high time to get into touch with the new conquerors and to make terms."[42] Further, Germany expected, and the Mufti had promised, "subversive movements" in Palestine and Transjordan in connection with the Iraqi rebellion.[43] In the end, an improvised force gathered by the British in Transjordan--and including Jordanian troops of the Arab Legion, the only Arab troops to fight on the Allied side in World War II[44]--were by circumstance and clever maneuver able to help re-establish British control in Iraq.

Again in 1942, when Rommel's overrunning of Egypt seemed imminent once more, the prevailing opinion was that it would be "only a question of weeks before the German Army would arrive and take over the Near East."[45] Tribal leaders announced that they would not oppose the Axis forces, but Amir Abdallah, "in a state bordering on despair", stood fast.[46] This crisis, too, passed.

Syria-Lebanon. The principal wartime activity of the Third Reich in Syria and Lebanon, the only Fertile Crescent area to which it at any time during the war had free access, was confined to the year between the signing of the armistice between France and Germany in June 1940 and the occupation of the Mandate by British and Free French forces in July 1941. Resumption of German ac-

tivity, which had been suspended by internment of German nationals after outbreak of hostilities, was described thus in a postwar French defense of the Vichy-appointed High Commissioner:

> Interned in September 1939, released at the armistice, these German residents immediately returned to their work and their circles of friends. Once re-established, they never tired of vaunting the successes of the Wehrmacht or of prophesying the collapse of the democracies and the dominance of the Third Reich.
>
> The German News Agency had opened an office, and shortly before the arrival of the High Commissioner, a Mr. Rudolf Roser, for many years head of an export firm in Beirut, returned with a definite assignment, let there be no doubt.[47]

Meanwhile, French repressive measures and distrust of both sides in the war had discouraged political activity among the Syrians and Lebanese. The object of the Italian Armistice Commission (sometimes called the Italian Control Commission) which had arrived after the fall of France "was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers"[48] and it was able, in fact, to exercise little control. A German delegation was eventually attached to the Commission.

From September 1940 on, "a succession of German visitors chosen for their knowledge and contacts in the Levant"[49] supplemented the work of local German residents in establishing a network of connections. (In S. N. Fisher's words: "From the Hotel Metropole in Beirut German agents who flocked into the mandate began to prepare the states for German control."[50]) The more prominent among them toured the area, getting in touch with nationalist leaders and declaring their support for anti-Zionist, pan-Arab, and local nationalist hopes such as the return of Hatay to Syria. Most conspicuous among these was Minister-Plenipotentiary W.-O. von Hentig, veteran of a colorful and courageous but unsuccessful attempt to raise Persia and Afghanistan in revolt against the Entente in World War I. (There is, however, no mention of his month-long visit to Syria and Lebanon in his memoirs.) The visitors also included military groups, which made inspection tours of frontiers and air bases and set up radio facilities.

According to Stephen Longrigg, "coteries of outspoken German sympathizers were formed" among the Syrians and Lebanese.[51] George Kirk details the personalities and their activities in The Middle East and the War but cautions at the same time that much of his information was dreived from a patently inflammatory wartime pamphlet, Les Allemands au Levant (juillet 1940-juillet 1941), of Free French origin.[52]

At the beginning of 1941, unrest broke out in the major cities, partly because of food shortages. The coincidence of the timing led the French to trace its cause to von Hentig's "agitation".[53] At this point, according to the Free French pamphlet mentioned above, there were in Syria and Lebanon some 1500 German agents and collaborators "affiliated with an organization abundantly supplied with funds and facilities".[54]

German activity in Syria-Lebanon was shortly to be dominated by a frenzy of effort to provide assistance to the pro-Axis coup d'état of April 1 in Iraq. A spate of demonstrations in Syria and Lebanon proclaimed solidarity with the Iraqi forces fighting for liberation and union of the Arabs (and against the proposed partition of Palestine). Germany was hailed as the great Power of the future, which would not fail to stand by the Arabs.[55]

While the delicate negotiations which would permit passage of Axis personnel and matériel through Syria and/or Turkey to Iraq were in progress,[56] some of the principal German agents shifted their base of operations from Beirut to Aleppo (beginning of May 1941). A base, Neirab airfield, outside Aleppo was taken over by up to 200 members of the German Luftwaffe. There were landings of small numbers of German planes also at Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, and Tadmor.[57]

In the meantime, special envoy Rudolph Rahn[58] had arrived to hasten arrangements both for the passage of Axis planes--under Iraqi colors, it is claimed--and for making the stores of munitions which had been established there under Armistice Commission control available to the Iraqi uprising. Two trainloads did reach Mosul, but too late. (The matériel allegedly proved to be largely defective, for which circumstance the French later

claimed credit, and of makes unfamiliar to the Iraqis.) By June 6, 1941, all German military personnel had evacuated Syria, but, according to Tillmann, a "colony" of fifty German agents provocateurs remained, among them Rahn.[59] Nevertheless, because of the Third Reich's relations with Vichy France and the newly-launched Russian campaign, they could offer the Arab nationalists little more than sympathy; there was never any question of setting up nationalist governments.[60] Arrangements were foresightedly made for the withdrawal of this German group into Turkey in event of an Allied advance into Syria-Lebanon.[61]

Rahn demanded and received from High Commissioner General Dentz full powers to organize a force of armed Arab irregulars, to be joined by defeated Iraqi troops which had arrived in Aleppo. The force which he and seven Germans from the Foreign Legion succeeded in putting together did retake Rakka on the Euphrates from the British without loss of life[62]--after the signing of the armistice at St. Jean d'Acre on July 14, 1941.[63, 64] (Offers of more than token air support on the part of the Third Reich during the struggle for Syria had been rejected by Vichy France.[65])

German efforts, limited though they were, did not end here, if C. L. Sulzberger's wartime information was correct:

> When the Allies occupied Syria the Germans withdrew, after carefully preparing the ramified network of agents to carry on undercover work. They even distributed arms to some guerrilla groups charged with creating nuisance disturbances. At the last moment before the Syrian armistice Kurdish guerrillas and refugee Iraqi dissident tribesmen were receiving machine guns and Belgian rifles flown into Aleppo from Salonika.[66]

It is commonly stated that the decision for an expedition of British and Free French forces against Vichy-administered Syria and Lebanon--which seemed to the Allies to have virtually been turned over to the Germans despite the Vichy pretense of neutrality--was not inspired but merely hastened by the appearance of German military elements there. Axis use of the area to threaten the Suez Canal had been feared in any case. Not long after the British-Free French occupation of the French Mandate,

assertions that the French wanted nothing more than to retrieve Syria from the "greedy British" began to appear in German propaganda.[67, 68]

Every shade of post-mortem opinion as to the true degree of pro-German feeling in Syria-Lebanon during these events can be encountered. "Some flirted . . . and a few committed themselves deeply" is George Kirk's safe summation.[69] An Arab observer offers another viewpoint:

> During the early period of the war the Communists and the democrats worked unceasingly against the Fascists and Nazis. Many were arrested, tortured and imprisoned under the Vichy regime, but no once did they betray the people into the hands of the Fascists. . . . June . . . the Allies came in instead of the expected and hated Nazis.[70]

Ultimately, in February 1945, sovereign Syrian and Lebanese governments declared war on Germany (and Japan).[71]

Iraq. That the pro-Axis coup d'état in Iraq on April 1, 1941, was truly a surprise to the German High Command is subject to debate. The sustained German propaganda of the two years previous to that date had had a "great though temporary influence" in the Arab world.[72] In the words of Emile Bustani,

> Germany had already deluged Iraq with pro-Nazi propaganda, mainly through the agency of her minister in Bagdad, Dr. Grobba. A certain number of Iraqi Army officers and politicians were convinced that Hitler must emerge victorious from the struggle and the sweeping Nazi triumphs of 1940-41 did nothing to contradict them in this view.[73]

Even Nuri al-Said, whose "unforgiveable crime was not his social blindness but his reliance on the British connection",[74] is reported to have felt out possibilities of collaboration with the pro-Axis group led by the ex-mufti of Jerusalem, on the condition that Iraq's independence be assured.[75]

Through Ambassador von Papen in Turkey the Foreign Ministry assured the Iraqi government that the October 1940 statement of support for the Arab independence movement (see page 138 above) was only the first step in cooperation by the Third Reich with the Arab lands.[76] German efforts to arrange for supply of weapons, ammunition, and other matériel to Iraq did indeed commence late in 1940.[77] It is claimed that not later than January

1941 Rashid Ali al-Gailani, ardent Iraqi nationalist who had served in various cabinet posts including the premiership, was promised such aid if a second front against the British were to be developed in Iraq.[78]

In this light, the assertion by Field Marshal Keitel that just such a development two months later had taken Germany completely by surprise and that therefore help could only be inprovised[79] must be taken as referring to lack of coordination regarding the timing between the two governments--and possibly between the Foreign Ministry and the High Command. One of the foremost historians of modern Iraq

> points out on the basis of evidence available to him that although the Germans had for a long time indulged in political intrigue and propaganda in Iraq, they played no part in the actual planning and execution of the coup. The aid to Rashid Ali came only after the rebellion had started.[80]

The Germans had apparently been prepared to wait a good deal longer for the "overall military and political situation" which in their opinion would make their entry into the area "desirable"[81] than were the Iraqi activists. An uprising <u>without</u> direct German participation was urgently desired, however.

Be that as it may, the most active elements in Iraq were the army, the youth--both subject to Nazi influence, as has been seen--"and the German Legation".[82] After the latter was closed, Axis activity shifted entirely to the legation of Italy, relations with which were not broken off even after Mussolini entered the war on June 11, 1940. The Third Reich intelligence services began to send agents into Iraq in early 1941.[83]

What is perhaps most remarkable is the silence with which the Third Reich's attempts to aid the Rashid Ali government are passed over in German accounts other than the most conscientious histories of the war. For example, a massive 1941 work on the modern Orient painted a picture of armies of sympathizers streaming in from neighboring lands to aid the rebellion but nowhere mentions Germans.[84] A much more compact treatment of Arab nationalism for the general public eighteen years later declared that the coup was condemned to failure because undertaken

with inadequate means--and again there was no mention of German aid.[85] (One postwar West German book does refer to Rashid Ali as a "German agent".[86])

The most balanced view is probably that Rashid Ali was reacting to many pressures besides an in any case mild pro-Nazi-ism[87]: that of the military as personified by the four pro-German colonels who constituted the "Golden Square"; that of the pro-Fascist Iraqi Istiqlal Party--like the colonels, first and foremost nationalists; that of the ex-mufti and his organization; and that of his own misassessment of Germany's readiness and ability to send material support.[88, 89]

The Golden Square made its move on the evening of April 1, 1941, presenting incumbent Premier Taha al-Hashimi with an ultimatum demanding his refusal to make further concessions to Great Britain or to break relations with Italy. He refused to accept, the Regent fled the country, and the coup-established government began its precarious existence. A month elapsed before hostilities with Great Britain commenced, but during that time the new officials experienced considerable difficulty in getting in touch with Third Reich representatives.[90] In any event, after much debate among the major agencies concerned and with Rome, firm promises of munitions and funds were made by Germany, and by Italy as well.[91] From the outset, however, the Germans stipulated that the entire operation should be kept strictly secret since its success was far from assured.[92]

Meanwhile, all active operation of the oilfields ceased; the installations were to be in the control of Iraqi staff until the Germans should arrive to take charge.[93] British and American nationals were interned, primarily at the British embassy and consulate.

On the first day of open conflict between British and Iraqi forces the Iraqi Muslim establishment proclaimed a jihad at the instigation of the ex-mufti.[94]

In spite of the lack of any German-Iraqi contact at staff levels, some assistance appeared by the second week of May in the form of a small advance flight of planes with Axis tech-

nicians, followed by two German fighter squadrons and, toward the end, a few Italian machines.[95] They made their base at Mosul, and experienced great difficulty in keeping even a portion of their number operable.[96] When the commander of the operation, arriving unexpectedly, was shot down over Bagdad,[97] Luftwaffe General Helmut Felmy was assigned to replace him, heading a small military mission. General Felmy accurately predicted that the British would be back in control of the situation before he could reach Iraq (he arrived in Aleppo on June 1, the day after the surrender).

The first two trainloads of armaments sent from Syria also arrived in mid-May, their passage through the Turkish portion of the route having been granted approval without difficulty. The trains brought food supplies back to Syria from Iraq; four more such shipments to Iraq were to have followed. Dr. Grobba had returned to Bagdad on May 11 under the alias of Franz Gehrcke, bringing a large part of the RM 1,000,000 initially allocated to the coup leaders.

All this effort notwithstanding, the Axis Powers made no formal gesture of recognition for the new regime. It was honored, however, with one of the few official German statements of support for Arab aspirations in the form of Weisung (Directive) No. 30, issued only three days after the assault on Crete was launched and in spite of the fact that Hitler is said to have felt it was too late in view of the British landings in Basra.[98] As always, the directive was in general terms: "on such a directive no one could base any action," von Papen commented in his memoirs.[99]

It can perhaps never be determined whether German reluctance and reservations delayed and restricted Axis aid to Iraq until it was all but useless or whether in the circumstances no more could in fact have been done. In any event, on May 30, "the Oriental war ground to a halt before it had really begun."[100] Fritz Grobba in 1943 summed its conclusion up thus: "The Iraqi army battled bravely for a month against the vastly greater forces

of the enemy; on May 30 it found itself forced to give up the fight because of the lack of modern weapons."[101] It is claimed that the size of the British forces had been greatly overestimated by the Iraqi rebels, but, be that as it may, with the appearance of British Indian troops before Bagdad, "the Iraqi forces chose life as against a possible death"[102] and the ex-mufti's group as well as the Golden Square government fled, most of them to Tehran. (Several were captured and executed.) Dr. Grobba headed north via Mosul--against orders, since additional aid was on the way.[103] As in World War I, the possibilities of each side--German and Near Eastern--had been overestimated by its partner.

The Iraqis are said to have been disillusioned by the Third Reich's desertion of Rashid Ali's Putsch,[104] but it can be argued that "they merely used Germany as Germany used them."[105] "The effect of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda was slow to disappear," adds Longrigg.[106] Farther afield, the defeat of the Golden Square probably discouraged other such endeavors elsewhere in the Middle East.

Franz von Papen, as Third Reich ambassador in Ankara directly involved in the attempts to aid Iraq, has quoted Winston Churchill to the effect that Hitler had let an easy victory slip by not directing the forces unleashed on Crete in late May to Iraq. Unlike many German commentators (see pages 135-36 above), von Papen disagrees:

> It would have been only the beginning of an operation with the existence of the British Empire at stake. How could reinforcements through Syria have been ensured without superiority at sea or adequate shipping?[107]

Longrigg sides with Churchill: "If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and the help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed."[108]

In January 1943 the Iraqi government declared war on the Axis Powers, and the Swiss consul assumed responsibility for German affairs. In July of that year, according to Longrigg, three German officers who had parachuted near Mosul to make contact with the Kurds were captured,[109] and the last glimmer of Nazi military enterprise in Iraq was extinguished.

Mid-1942 to Mid-1945

Despite subsequent feverish planning for invasions of the Middle East from the north and east in anticipation of a Nazi victory in Russia, the opportunity for direct German intervention in the Fertile Crescent countries had passed. Turkey's insistence on its neutrality had been a significant factor in the "final bankruptcy" of the Third Reich's Middle East plans, in the opinion of historian Görlitz.[110] No military action had in fact been initiated in the Near and Middle East at any point by the Germans.

By 1943 Arab nationalists in the Near East had on the whole become alienated from the Axis Powers, even actively so.[111] In an attempt to maintain contact with Arab nationalist movements, the Third Reich government, often with considerable difficulty, had assisted a number of their leaders who had fled the Fertile Crescent to come to Europe; the major pro-Axis leaders had all arrived there by November 1941.[112] The two most prominent of these were Hajj Amin al-Husaini, who became head of the Third Reich's Arab Bureau, and Rashid Ali al-Gailani. Fawzi al-Kawukji, Palestinian rebel leader, also spent the balance of the war years in Germany. The story of subsequent German Arab relations during World War II is largely a tale of the jockeying for maximum Axis support between the ex-mufti and the Iraqi. Moreover, they "had committed themselves too heavily to Nazi Germany to be able to alter their standpoints" when other Arab leaders in exile began to fall away from the Axis in 1942-1943.[113]

In 1942 there had occurred an expansion and proliferation of government bureaus on Oriental affairs,[114] with crossing of lines of responsibility and prestige contests (as also between the Foreign Ministry and the military) ever-prevalent. Propaganda, disseminated now primarily by radio, was stepped up. In 1942 and again in 1943 the Arab nationalist leaders pressed for a strong public Axis declaration of support for the Arab struggle for freedom and for Axis recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Fertile Crescent countries. For shifting

and complex reasons it was never considered expedient to comply. Hitler's objection was based primarily on the not unreasonable view that "without real effect on war operations the declaration was for him worthless and even harmful."[115] Further, propaganda could accomplish the Axis aim of sowing dissension in the enemy camp without advancing positive programs and without the aid of such declarations.

Meanwhile, the rudiments of an Arab Legion--called the Deutsch-arabische Lehrabteilung (training detachment) or DAL--were being formed by Sonderstab F in Greece under General Felmy. In May 1942 this group numbered 130 men. It was to go into action in the invasion of Iraq after the taking of the Caucasus and was actually transferred to the Soviet Union (Stalino) late in the summer of 1942.[116] (This project was at the origin of much rivalry between al-Husaini and al-Gailani and between Rome and Berlin.)

The planned invasion of Iraq never passed beyond the penetration of the Caucasus by an advance force:

> During World War II German mountaineers in Hitler's army demonstratively raised the swastika over Mt. Elbrus and directed their gaze from the highest peak of the Caucasus into the promised land of oil. Some took to studying the geology of the Arab area in the hope they might serve in a German protectorate over the oil fields.[117]

After its defeat in Tunisia in the spring of 1943 the Axis was eliminated even as a threat from the Arab area, and "Arab affairs almost ceased to play any role in the Nazi military and political plans."[118] German spies, saboteurs, and propagandists who continued to operate from the embassy and consulates of the Third Reich in Turkey achieved little.[119] As for the Arab Legion project, there was no longer any pretense of organizing Arab units for use in Arab lands. Those created were attached as support units to the Germany army.[120]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, and Tillmann, op. cit., are the major published works of this nature.

[2]This commercial penetration should be kept in perspective as only modest in comparison with the far more successful development of trade and other relations with the nations bordering the Fertile Crescent--Turkey, Iran, and to a lesser extent Egypt.

[3]It has also been maintained that in both wars German strategists saw in the expanses of the Near and Middle East the vast champs de manoeuvre Europe no longer offered. (Vernier, op. cit., p. 111.)

[4]K. Assman, Deutsche Schicksalsjahre (Wiesbaden: 1951), p. 332.

[5]Glubb, op. cit., p. 222.

[6]Also as in World War I, Max von Oppenheim was credited with elaborate plans to culminate in an Arab federation under German auspices. (Tillmann, op. cit., pp. 162-63. "In retrospect," Tillmann had reflected (op. cit., p. 27), "what is remarkable is not that as a result of the unrelenting propaganda of the Germans, a minority of nationalist extremists--such as the Mufti of Jerusalem or Rashid Ali al-Gailani--openly took the side of Germany but that such movements remained isolated phenomena, in view of the vast means applied to the task by Berlin."

[7]Sulzberger, op.cit., p. 666.

[8]Ruheloses Leben (Düsseldorf: 1949), p. 170.

[9]Sulzberger, op. cit., p. 678.

[10]Hirzowicz, Third Reich, p. 70.

[11]"Within limits, the Arabs can be of use to us . . . by carrying out sabotage and instigating uprisings," Ernst Woermann, Under State Secretary directing the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry from April 1938 to April 1943, is quoted as having written--to cite one of innumerable such statements. (Tillmann, op. cit., p. 157.)

[12]Special Directive No. 32 of June 11, 1941, dealing in large part with operations subsequent to the successful conclusion of Operation Barbarossa against the USSR, broadly outlined the campaign to be carried out against British positions on the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal but timing and details were to be decided upon only after the end of Operation Barbarossa. (Tillmann, op. cit., p. 241, and Hirszowicz, op. cit., p. 198-99.)

[13]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 203, and Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 126.

[14]I. Beer, Der Nahe Osten--Schicksalsland zwischen Ost und West (Munich: n.d.) Author Beer identifies himself as "Oberst Dr. I. Beer".

[15] W. Görlitz, Der zweite Weltkrieg 1939-1945 (Stuttgart: 1951), p. 240. A single chapter in two volumes was devoted to "The Middle East".

[16] Assman, op. cit., p. 346.

[17] Erinnerungen (Munich: 1950), p. 335. This constituted the totality of his comment on the Near East in World War II.

[18] Die arabische Welt (Munich: 1955), p. 5.
In this connection, "enemy air action over the British-held Middle East was not considerable, because the Axis tried not to antagonize the local population. The Axis concentrated on bombing Allied shipping and military objectives such as harbors, especially Alexandria, and the Suez Canal." (Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 471.)

[19] Germany in 1940 had already entered the more immediately important Balkan area, where Italy had claimed pre-eminence but had failed to establish herself. Distrust and rivalry are said to have marred the arrangment from the beginning, despite concessions on both sides. After the war the Italian complaint that Germany had not appreciated the importance of the Mediterranean was still being aired. (Kirk, Middle East, p. 91, footnote 5.) Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 71, points out that no concrete war plans had been developed by Germany and Italy in concert until March 18, 1940, after Italy entered the war.

[20] "The Arab leaders, though not unaware of the Italo-German arrangements, did not fully grasp the way in which the Axis powers were proceeding to divide the French and British empires among themselves. . . . They counted on Germany's good will to reduce Italian ambition in the Arab lands." (Khadduri, op. cit., p. 191.)

[21] "To this impulsive, inchoate Arab movement, the world offers no more effective contrast than the mighty German machine ticking over with clockwork precision." (Monroe, Mediterranean, p. 236.)

[22] Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 473, is alone in suggesting that much of the pro-German feeling was rooted in a desire to ingratiate themselves with the brutal Axis powers and forestall vengeance

[23] Op. cit., p. 70.

[24] Von Lojewski, Aufmarsch im Orient (Leipzig: 1941), p. 192.

[25] Tillmann, op. cit., p. 105.

[26] Another line along which policy differed was the choice of Muslim area in which subversion would be most valuable. Those who favored concentrating on the Muslim populations of the Soviet Union were thwarted by the Rosenberg group in the Nazi hierarchy, according to Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 473. (Agitation for Arab independence in North Africa was dropped from the program after the capitulation of France, points out Tillmann, op. cit., p. 134.)

[27] A Circular of the Foreign Ministry dated Aug. 20, 1940, and

signed by Woermann directed that at every opportunity the Arab leaders were to be assured of Germany's sympathy for the independence movement and shared opposition to England was to be stressed, but "avoid entering into any discussion, however, of the question of the future political organization of the Arab region, and if necessary observe a noncommital attitude; on no account are you to say anything to Arab representatives about a désintéressement on the part of Germany." (Documents, Series D, Vol. X, p. 516.)

Tillmann quotes von Weizsäcker to the effect that "as long as we are still at war, we should state to the Arabs only what we are fighting--namely, England, and speak only of the 'liberation of the Arab world' without any more exact specification of future goals." (Op. cit., p. 161.)

[28]Other sources give this date in November. It did not appear in print in the German and Italian press until December, "when the Axis, because of the general situation, grew more interested in taking some steps in the Arab countries." (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 92.)

[29]Cf. von Lojewski, op. cit., p. 184.

[30]P. Schmitz-Kairo, Die arabische Revolution (Leipzig: 1942), p. 136.

[31]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 174, footnote 231. (Cf. translation in Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 91.)

[32]Tillman, op. cit., p. 182. The statement of the Mufti is cited on page 174.

[33]Ibid., p. 181. Tillmann quotes a bulletin of the OKW dated March 25, 1941, "Measures planned by the External Counter-espionage Office in the Near East" which at this late date still projects the building up of a network of agents, sabotage in Palestine, and uprisings: "(a) Palestine and Transjordan. Uprisings will be automatically unleashed . . . upon delivery of weapons, which will be facilitated once Thrace (Salonika) is in German hands. (b) Iraq. Since the weapons deliveries requested by the Iraqi general staff can be carried out by the German side only with great difficulty at this time . . . the Foreign Ministry's view that the problem should be turned over to Japan and the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, will be supported." (Op. cit., p. 205, footnote 379.)

[34]"Eagerness on the one side and lukewarm dilatoriness on the other: this was to remain the constant leitmotiv of German relations with Egypt, Iraq, and the Mufti of Jerusalem . . . before the Italian defeats in North Africa. German reluctance to promise anything of substance to Egypt or Iraq clearly stemmed, in part at any rate, from the deference to Italian wishes in an area where they conceded primacy to Italy.

"But . . . they themselves had doubts about encouraging Arab independence and unity. . . . The present volume contains numerous expressions . . . of German reluctance to make lavish promises in respect of Arab independence and unity. . . . It

may be argued that in all this the Germans were showing excessive and unecessary prudence, that having nothing to lose in the Middle East they could have afforded to publish generous and inflammatory declarations." (E. Kedourie, Review of Documents of German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII: The War Years, June 23, 1941-December 11, 1941 (London: 1966), Middle Eastern Studies, III, No. 2 (January 1967), p. 192.)

[35]Khadduri, op. cit., p. 146. Several sources remark that no data are available on the number of Germans in Iraq in 1939, "but very few remained there after the war broke out." (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 72.) Khadduri comments further:

> Nuri's action in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany aroused criticism in nationalist circles who had hoped that German victory would free Palestine and Syria from British and French control. His action in handing over the German subjects in Iraq to the British authorities was particularly criticized by both moderates and extremists as an unnecessary measure of unfriendliness towards Germany. (Ibid.)

[36]Glubb, op. cit., p. 41.

[37]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 64.

[38]Ibid., p. 72. The German population totaled 2500 by 1939.

An interesting sidelight to the arrests under British authority was the retaliatory arrest by the Gestapo of twelve Egyptian, Iraqi, and Palestinian personages in Germany despite written assurance from the Third Reich government that Arabs in Germany would have full freedom of movement in such an eventuality. Von Hentig, then head of Division Pol VII (Mideast Affairs) at the Foreign Ministry, arranged "at least that they should not be treated as criminals" and protested to von Ribbentrop the unfavorable effect on "our friends throughout the Orient". His extensive comments on this affair in fact constitute the bulk of his observations concerning the Near East and the war, including the period leading up to it. (Mein Leben, pp. 332-33.)

[39]Little concrete information on this aid has come to light. Both Western and Arab investigators discount Zionist reports as exaggerated. (Cf. Tillmann, op. cit., p. 31, footnote 85, and p. 32, footnote 87.)

[40]Sulzberger, op. cit., p. 666.

Contact with a German diplomatic representative was not made by the Mufti after his exile until June 1940, when an envoy of his was received by Ambassador von Papen in Istanbul. Von Papen replied at that time that "the future development of the political situation in the Middle East was primarily a matter of interest to Italy" but suggested that the Mufti's organization might work through Herr Steffen, the representative of Rheinmetall. (Khadduri, op. cit., pp. 178-80.)

[41]Repeatedly quoted in this connection is Italian Foreign Minister Ciano's complaint that the "return on this gift of millions had not been exactly great and had really been confined to occasional destruction of pipelines, which in most cases could be

quickly repaired." (E. Kedourie, op. cit., p. 192.) Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 185.

[42]A Crackle of Thorns (London: 1956), p. 31.

[43]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 152 & 155.

[44]Transjordanian Frontier Force troops which had been included in the expedition "had to be withdrawn, since the soldiers revolted at the H3 station pump of the pipeline." (Ibid., p. 168.) E. Monroe says in Moment, p. 74, that only "one squadron" rebelled.

[45]J. B. Glubb, quoted in Beer, op. cit., p. 62.

[46]Kirkbride, op. cit., p. 31.

[47]Laffargue, op. cit., p. 33.

Mr. Roser is not mentioned in any of the West German sources seen but figures prominently in the pamphlet Les Allemands au Levant, pp. 1-3. Therein it is stated that "a businessman", Herr Roser (no first name given), had taken charge of German affairs in Beirut in the consul's absence, building up a "general staff" which functioned as an armistice commission in its relations with the High Commissioner. He is said to have arrived on Sept. 30, 1940, and to have been among those who transferred their offices to Aleppo at the beginning of May 1941.

Tillmann reports the presence in Beirut of a Lt. Rudolf Roser, assigned to the Armistice Commission on behalf of the Abwehr (army counter-espionage branch) and sent as a Vorkommando (advance guard). (Op. cit., pp. 163, 176-78, 236, 256, & 470.)

Hirszowicz, Third Reich, makes no mention of a Rudolf Roser but rather of an Alfred Roser of the Foreign Ministry who "went to this country on behalf of the Abwehr in the early autumn of 1940." (The arrival date implied in a footnote tallies with that given in the Free French pamphlet.) (P. 112.) Kirk, Middle East, p. 86, identifies Rudolf Roser as former representative of the Voigländer firm in Beirut "with a long experience of the country".

[48]Hourani, Syria, p. 232.

[49]Longrigg, Syria, p. 301.

[50]Middle East, p. 484.

[51]Syria, p. 301.

[52]Pp. 86-87 & 91.

[53]Although he loses no opportunity to condemn Nazi activities in the Near East as imperialist, Dr. Tillmann cannot accept von Hentig's "agitation" as a reason for a "genuine anti-fascist and anti imperialist uprising of the masses". (Op. cit., p. 236, footnote 534.) Von Hentig, he firmly states, had not come to unleash an uprising but to report on the political and military situation in Syria and surrounding regions, the possibility of a British offensive against Syria, and the capacity of the Vichy French troops to hold it off, to advance German economic and cultural influence, and to lay the groundwork for Hitler Germany's plans for the area. (Ibid., p. 182.)

[54]P. 3.

[55]Laffargue, op. cit., p. 55.
Kirk, Middle East, p. 220, notes that the fellahin of the Hauran refused to pay their rents in expectation of the German arrival.

[56]An indication of the negotiations' delicacy is the proposal that Turkey be offered the Aleppo area in compensation for its assistance. Cf. Tillmann, op. cit., p. 202.

[57]High Commissioner General Dentz' telegraphed instructions from Darlan read: "Agreements of a general nature are under way between the French and German governments. It is of the greatest importance for the success of their mission that if the German planes on their way to Iraq land on mandated territory, you provide them with all necessary facilties for resuming their flight [literally: "departing again"]." Laffargue, op. cit., p. 56.

[58]Rahn had been second secretary at the German embassy in France, later was assigned to Tunis. According to Dr. Grobba (interview, September 1967), who was instrumental in his selection, Rahn's "dynamic" character was considered to outweigh as an advantage the disadvantage of his unfamiliarity with the Near East for this assignment. Görlitz, op. cit., p. 247, mentions that Rahn was also to advise Dentz regarding possible British action from Palestine, but when the invasion actually began he was instructed by Berlin to refrain from meddling (Hirszowicz, Third Reich , p. 176).

[59]Op. cit., p. 251.

[60]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 187.

[61]Rahn was also designated the principal agent for provision of arms to the Palestine Arab nationalists but the situation did not lend itself to effective action in this direction. Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 184-85.

[62]Rahn, op. cit., p. 177. Rahn's official report on his mission to Syria is included in Documents, Series D, Vol. XIII. E. Kedourie (op. cit., pp. 193-94) calls it a "vivid, racy, and trenchant account by a most able, energetic, and shrewd man of action" and quotes a few paragraphs:

> After a brief stay in Syria, I found to my astonishment that there was, at all events, no Arab movement there. True nationalist sentiment is unknown to the Syrian tribes, a wild,and for the most part unlovely, mixture of races and religions, spoiled by greed, intrigue, and jealousy, accustomed from olden times to bribes by rival powers. What Beirut wants is opposed by Damascus. What Damscus advocates, is considered treason in Aleppo, Homs, or Hama. . . . At any rate I found nothing in Syria that would have been capable of militant action. At the moment of danger, they all failed, the swaggering leaders of the Arab freedom movement. In undisguised anxiety they asked for our assistance in fleeing abroad, if they had not already preferred "as a precaution" to make contact with the English. . . . After long and labor-

ious efforts, I had to give up working with the old nationalist groups. Finally it proved to be the most effective measure, also with respect to the Bedouins, to threaten them with the severest penalties in the future, for every act of plunder, every attack on neighboring tribes, every interference with the Army of the Levant, and every instance of active support of the English. . . . I was entirely successful. . . . The authority of the German name was almost unlimited. It was possible to get anything from the population--only they did not want to fight.

[63] I. Lipchits, La Politique de la France au Levant (Paris: 1963), p. 119.

[64] "What really occurred and what Mr. Rahn describes in his book like a fairy tale was nothing but the adventure of an amateur," sniffs von Papen. (Op. cit., p. 539.)

[65] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 180.

[66] Sulzberger, op. cit., p. 673.

[67] W. Wegener, Syrien/Irak/Iran (Leipzig: 1943), p. 242.

[68] Görlitz, op. cit., p. 247, describes the Third Reich's goal during this period as being limited to "winning new allies in order to have a beachhead for entry into the Middle East".

[69] Short History, p. 206.

[70] Abouchdid, op. cit., p. 81.

[71] Hourani, Syria, p. 302.

[72] Ibid., p. 237.

[73] Op. cit., p. 48.

[74] Arab Politics, p. 143.

[75] M. Khadduri, "General Nuri's Flirtations with the Axis Powers", The Middle East Journal, XVI, (Summer 1962), p. 330.

[76] Tillmann, op. cit., p. 175. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 89-94, stresses that the statement had been issued under pressure from the ex-mufti's circle primarily.

[77] Ibid., p. 114. Even Japan was called upon for assistance (a step which was still being recommended in March--see footnote 33 above), but with no results.

[78] Tillmann, op. cit., p. 191.

[79] Görlitz, op. cit., p. 247.

[80] G. Lenczowski, "Literature on the Clandestine Activities of the Great Powers in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, VIII (Spring 1954), p. 209.

[81] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 128.

[82] Kirk, Middle East, p. 56.

[83] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 131.

[84] Kirchner, op. cit. (1st ed.), p. 766.

[85]K. Schwan, Der arabische Nationalismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Lower Saxony: 1959), p. 23. He also passes over World War I in the Near East with no mention of German troops with the Turks in the Levant (or in Mesopotamia). (The author is an official of the Lower Saxony Police School and the book forms part of a series for free distribution on general and local political and social questions.)

[86]A. Schoenenberg, Der Nahe Osten rückt näher (Munich: 1957), p. 66.

[87]"He had never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides." (Longrigg, Iraq, p. 297.) Rashid Ali's viewpoint is dealt with in considerable detail in Orient (Hamburg), Nos. 4/5 (September 1965), p. 154.

[88]Sulzberger maintains that it was the ex-mufti who, "acting partially as a representative of Axis desires", made the arrangements for the coup d'état to which Rashid Ali as premier lent his name. (Op. cit., p. 669.) A payment of RM100,000 to the ex-mufti by the Third Reich is on record as of early 1941, over and above the subsidies from Italy. (Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 209, and Tillmann, op. cit., p. 243, footnote 571.

[89]The obituary for al-Gailani which appeared in Orient (Hamburg) for September 1965 (see footnote 87 above) stated that he "had taken his decision in the hope that the Axis Powers would assist him." This appears to be the accepted Western version, although the coup participants stressed that they had acted as a result of encouragement of their cause by the Axis. (Tillmann, op. cit., p. 210, footnote 399.)

[90]One of the stories told is that they had tried to contact Germany by means of the radio which had been provided to the ex-mufti's secretary but he had forgotten how to use it. Finally, the Iraqi minister in Ankara had to get in touch with von Papen. (Khadduri, Iraq, p. 230)

[91]These were accompanied by the advice "to resist Britain with arms when the balance of forces offered a chance of success". (Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 145.)

[92]Ibid., p. 152.

[93]Longrigg, Iraq, p. 292.

[94]Kirk, Middle East, p. 71, footnote 2.

[95]Ibid., p. 72, cites a total of 120 as having been dispatched. Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 247, and Khadduri, Iraq, p. 233, agree that not more than 23 actually reached Iraq. Khadduri adds that 12 Italian planes arrived on May 27 but never got into action.

[96]Khadduri (ibid.) states that only seven were ever in operation at any one time. According to Longrigg, Iraq, p. 294, the Iraqis claimed the credit for the part these planes played in the operations at Faluja and Habbaniyah.

[97]Dr. Grobba states that despite his warning that British pa-

trols would be over Bagdad at the hour (about 9 A.M.) when von Blomberg planned to land, von Blomberg insisted on keeping to his plan. Since he could clearly see upon examining the wreckage that the shots had entered from above, Grobba assumes that the British were responsible and not panicky Iraqi antiaircraft units, as has been charged. (Interview, September 1967.)

[98] Tillmann, op. cit., p. 219. Following is the text of the directive:

The Führer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L(I Op.) F. H. Qu., 23 May 1941
Nr. 44772/41 g. K. Chefs
Directive No. 30 SECRET COMMAND DOCUMENT
Middle East

1. The Arab liberation movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against Great Britain. In this connection, the rising in Iraq has special importance. It strengthens beyond the boundary of Iraq forces hostile to England in the Middle East, disturbs English communications and ties down English troops and shipping space at the expense of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to advance developments in the Middle East by giving assistance to Iraq. Whether and how the English position between the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf--in connection with an offensive against the Suez Canal--shall later be efinitely defeated is to be decided only after Barbarossa.

/s/ Adolf Hitler

(Introduction and close from Lipchits, op. cit., p. 95; text from Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 165-66.)

[99] Op. cit., p. 539.

[100] Görlitz, op. cit., p. 243.

[101] Irak, p. 17.

[102] Von Papen, op. cit., p. 540.

[103] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 171.

[104] Kirk, Middle East, p. 77.

[105] Ibid., p. 78.

[106] Iraq, p. 284.

[107] Op. cit., p. 538.

[108] Iraq, p. 297.

[109] Ibid., p. 303. In this connection, S. van Rooy has written: German history-writing, despite a few outstanding exceptions still lacking in many respects, has still hardly come to grips with the history of the second World War in West Asia, not to mention its German-Kurd aspects. It is certain that there was a plan to send the Nazi army into Turkey and make use of the minorities (above all, the Kurds) living there. The adventuresome attempt to send a German authority on the area to wrest the Kurdish oil fields around Kirkuk from the

British with the help of his Kurdish friends failed, as did the Kurds' attempt to place themselves at the disposal of the Germans against the British and French and later at that of the Allies against Rommel.

(Op. cit., p. 147.) Dr. Grobba recalled having heard of parachuting of a few troops into northern Syria late in the war when queried on the above-mentioned operation but had no knowledge of their mission or their fate. (Interview, September 1967.)

[110] Op. cit., pp. 248 & 251.

[111] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 195. [112] Ibid., p. 210.

[113] Ibid., p. 308.

[114] "Hardly an Orientalist, with his general and special knowledge, is not in the service of the great political and military decision which this war represents for us." (P. Ritterbusch, "Eröffnungssprache", Der Orient in deutscher Forschung, p. 3.)

[115] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 220. [116] Ibid., p. 299.

[117] Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 11.

[118] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 319.

[119] Kirk, Short History, p. 202.

[120] Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 309.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST POSTWAR DECADE (1945-1955)

There is a time-lag in the concepts which nations have of one another which often results in images a generation behind the times; a similar time-lag can be seen in cultural influences and borrowings. This phenomenon is strikingly illustrated by one facet of the political situation in the Fertile Crescent during the first decade following World War II:

> Several national movements, . . . which flourished especially during the fourth and fifth decades of the present century, betrayed Nazi and Fascist influences which still cling to the political thinking of some Arab youth and nationalist leaders, even after the destruction of the leading Nazi and Fascist states in Europe.[1]

These movements and parties never came to power, however, and after the Axis' defeat they played only secondary roles in Fertile Crescent political life.[2]

The aspect of persisting Axis influence in the Arab countries which lent itself to the most sensational treatment in the Western press was the presence of former Nazi officers, whether in a passive role as refugees or in an active one in the service of local governments.[3] "The idea of engaging Germans to train regular and irregular armed forces had taken root in military and extremist circles in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq," according to a somewhat alarmist source.[4]

Expanding on this phase of German influence in Syria, the same source states:

> It seems that it was the dictator Husni al-Zaim who in 1948 had the idea of making up a bodyguard composed principally of former SS personnel. To those who were recruited locally were joined volunteers signed up in the night clubs of the Federal Republic by an organization headed by a German colonel who had converted to Islam, one Hanak Hassine Bey. It is not possible to give the number of personnel recruited

> in this fashion; estimates of 8,000 and even of 12,000 have been made, but even the first seems excessive. Later, in 1951, Damascus hired a veritable mission of military experts which maintained unofficial contact with government and financial circles of West Germany. This mission . . . consisted of a colonel and some thirty officers, among them a famous pilot.[5]

As the end of the first postwar decade approached and the newly-constituted Federal Republic of Germany was able to resume normal trade and diplomatic relations, this "mission" began to disband:

> Of the German military advisers, about whom so much dust has been raised, all except for five had left Syria toward the end of 1952. This may in part have been due to the German policy toward Israel. . . . but also in part to the fact that their presence did not suit the French.[6, 7]

Syria was also among the countries which invited Hjalmar Schacht to serve as a fiscal consultant; he did pay a brief visit to Damascus in December 1952.[8]

To an even greater extent than in Syria, Germany was reported to be taking advantage in Iraq of "durable friendships which Hitler's propaganda had been able to win in the army, government circles, and economic milieux."[9] The director-general of education who had been courted by the Nazis was still prominent in the government, Hassan Salman of Rashid Ali's entourage was Minister of Health, and the counsellor at the West German embassy in Bagdad (Kurt Munzel) had been in charge of broadcasts to the Orient and a member of Fritz Grobba's team.[10, 11]

These old ghosts were soon to be laid as--according to some observers--the USSR began to attract elements in the Fertile Crescent nations seeking allies in their opposition to "Western imperialism":

> Other evidence of this evolution from friendship for the Axis to friendship for the Soviet Union is provided by Ma'aruf Dawalibi's Islamic-Socialist Front in Syria (which describes itself as a Marxist drink in a Socialist cup) and by the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, once the totalitarian, Islamic, and Fascist-favoring support for Rashid Ali--in 1953, however, allied with the Iraqi Communists.[12, 13]

Relations of the new socialist parties in the Fertile

Crescent with West Germany were distant: "Their attitude toward German Social Democracy is not, on the whole, unfriendly but nonetheless reserved and skeptical."[14, 15] Nor was the tendency to military dictatorships to be taken too literally as a flattering imitation. The Arab who subscribes to "militarism" does not interpret it as does the European but "first of all as a soldierly sense of duty and also as political responsibility," a West German political analyst cautioned in 1957.[16] World War II and its protagonists, historian Hans Rörig has asserted, introduced nothing new into Arab political life but merely served to speed up changes already in progress.[17, 18]

Meanwhile, the flood of publications on the Orient which had been a feature of the early forties had yielded place, even after the stringencies of the immediate postwar years had passed, to an extremely modest flow. One reason was perhaps the fact that emigration of both Jewish and non-Jewish scholars during the Nazi period had decimated the ranks of the Orientalists.[19] A survey of West German titles published between 1946 and 1952 on the Orient in the broadest sense reveals, moreover, a preponderance of interest in ancient Asian history.[20]

Commercial relations were among the earliest to be renewed between Germany and the Fertile Crescent. During the first postwar decade many German nationals with knowledge of and experience in the Middle East arrived to launch business ventures.[21] As will be seen below, the upsurge in trade was by the early fifties causing the Foreign Ministry of the newly-established Federal Republic some discomfort lest West Germany be accused of seeking to rush into the vacuum left by the British and French.[22] There were also misgivings concerning the excessive emphasis on material products and technology in the Oriental picture of Germany ("Germany as a Little America").[23]

In the early fifties the West German overseas cultural program gradually began to get under way. In 1953 the Deutsche Welle (German overseas broadcasting) resumed operations. In 1952 the Goethe-Institut, which had originally been founded in 1932 to promote contacts with, and assistance to, Germanists and

teachers of German abroad and develop aids for the instruction of foreigners in the German language, was revived. The range of its activities rapidly broadened. By 1961 over 7000 foreigners from more than 100 countries were studying each year at its eighteen centers in Germany, and over 40,000 at the seventy-four centers abroad. These latter included institutes in Beirut (1954), Damascus (1955), Bagdad (1959), Basra (1960), and Amman (1961).[24] Nearly half of all the language students abroad enrolled by the Goethe-Institut were in North Africa and the Middle East, and more than half of those studying at Institut centers in Germany "hail from Oriental countries."[25]

Ex-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard referred in his book on West Germany and world trade to "the fact that we have been able to set up diplomatic and consular posts [in the Near East] only since 1952"[26] although the Federal Republic had been in existence since 1949.[27] The first West German legation in the Fertile Crescent was opened in Damascus in October 1952; there followed Beirut (May 1953) and Bagdad (September 1953), which handled West German affairs in Jordan through a branch set up in Amman in November 1953. The legation in Damascus was reduced to consulate-general after the union of Syria with Egypt but an embassy was established there when that union was terminated. The Beirut legation had become an embassy in October 1958, as had that in Bagdad, in November 1956. Amman had its own legation from March 1955; this also was raised to embassy level, in October 1959.

The first cloud over Arab-West German cordiality had already appeared as exchange of diplomatic representatives began.[28] Negotiations with the new state of Israel regarding reparations for damages inflicted by the Nazi regime on European Jewry and to cover the major cost of absorbing refugees from the Nazi regime into Israel had begun in April 1952. ["In November 1952 an Arab note was received by the Federal Government asking that immediate steps be taken in accordance with the offer to enter into negotiations with the Arab states; a German economic mission was subsequently sent to the Arab countries."[29]] In March 1953 an agreement to provide compensation valued at $822,000,000 was ratified

by the West German Bundestag. (Israel also undertook to recover $500,000,000 in compensation from East Germany but failed "because the USSR did not press the payment as the United States had in the case of West Germany."[30])

In view of these developments the delay in re-establishing relations on the diplomatic level with the Near East seemed particularly regrettable as 1952 drew to a close:

> During these years [1949-52] Germany could have prepared for the situation in such a way that the present economic-political tension between the government of the Federal Republic and the Arab states need never have come about.[31]

In fact, re-establishment of diplomatic relations occurred concurrently with negotiations with Israel, and the reparations agreement only "temporarily strained the good relations prevailing between the Bonn Republic and the Arab states."[32] Commercial relations suffered even less than did the political.

Trade, 1945-1955

By far the most significant aspect of West German resumption of relations with the Near East in the early fifties was the upsurge in trade with, and aid to, that region. By 1956 a West German economic commentator could write: "West Germany has rediscovered the East. . . . A growing 'go East' drive is noticeably under way in Germany."[33] This development did not fail to inspire allusions to plans "to reconquer and even expand the hold the Third Reich had on foreign markets" and to the "extent of efforts at penetration of [Germany's] two traditional zones of economic influence: South America and the Near East", driven, as ever, by its need to exchange manufactured goods for raw materials and foodstuffs.[34] There were clear echoes of plaints from earlier periods of German economic upsurge in passages like the following:

> The present Drang nach Osten, like the earlier ones, is two-pronged--military and economic. . . . The presence of these German military men has been more conspicuous but no more important than the swarms of German businessmen who have been circulating through Bagdad and Cairo, Damascus and Beirut, since 1950 and even earlier. These salesmen for Ger-

> man goods have been scoring successes in every Arab country except Jordan. . . . More than a year and a half ago U.S. News and World Report said "Germans are running off with trade and influence in the Middle East. . . ." Since then the Germans have further advanced their plans for grabbing markets, advising governments, and seeking oil.[35]

About the time that the issue of reparations to Israel and the Arab threat of a boycott on West German goods had brought the area abruptly back to public attention, rising Near Eastern oil revenues, the Point IV assistance program, and World Bank credits drew West German firms qualified to participate in development projects to the Arab countries. Simultaneously, West German businessmen were feeling the area out as an avenue of expansion of trade ahead of the Soviet bloc. Both types of enterprise had by 1956 encountered financing problems, complicated accounting and payments situations, and political instability, however, which had resulted in "vacillation between expansion and anxiety. . . . In short, Germany's foreign trade with the Middle East did not quite correspond to the marked interest of the German public in the Orient," according to a West German account.[36]

What portion of the trade of the Near East did West Germany actually capture during the first postwar decade? Once resumed in the late forties, trade between West Germany and the Fertile Crescent countries was necessarily on a modest scale until the mid-fifties, when the first stirrings of the fabled West German economic recovery were being felt. According to United Nations figures[37] (which include Indonesia but exclude Turkey), imports of the Middle Eastern countries from West Germany in 1953 constituted 7.1% of their total imports, as compared with 2.6% in 1950. For Arab League states only the amounts were: 1953, 2.2%; 1950, 1.5%.[38] Value of imports by the Arab League countries from West Germany rose to $96 million in 1953 from $29 million in 1950.[39]

Exports to West Germany from Arab League states constituted 3.1% of their total exports in 1953 as against 2.0% in 1950. Between 1953 and 1955 these percentages did not change substantially. Value of Arab League exports to West Germany, however, rose

from $59 million to $110 million—doubling—during that period. Value of both imports and exports, in fact, continued to climb steadily in spite of the fairly constant proportion of total Arab League trade which they represented.[40]

The trend in West German trade with the Arab countries was deemed worthy of reporting by the Mideast Mirror news service in 1954:

> German exports to Iraq last year were almost double those of 1952. . . . The increase to other Arab countries was in no case less than 19% of the previous year.[41]

In view of this impressive spurt, there was justification for the sense of surprise recorded in the conclusions of a 1954 United Nations study:

> The comparison of the recent trade pattern with that of 1929 leads, however, to the significant conclusion that in no major area of the world, as distinct from a few individual countries, has West Germany as yet attained the share of imports that the Weimar Republic held in 1929.[42, 43]

Allowance duly made for changes of borders in both areas, one may also compare the 11.6% of imports of Near and Middle Eastern nations which German wares represented in 1938 with the 4.2% which they represented in 1951. In terms of value, however, trade in 1951 was already double that of the average prewar year. Still, on a per capita basis, expansion of trade had been much slower for Germany than for other industrial countries.[44] Hence,

> as of 1951 Germany had neither fully attained its prewar levels of trade with the Near and Middle East nor, more important, been able to catch up with the expansion of exports of other industrial nations. . . . The rapid revival of German export trade after 1949 therefore represents nothing more than the natural re-entry of Germany into world trade, wherein Germany was still in 1952 far from the stage of development in foreign trade which other lands had reached.[45]

What were the West German-Fertile Crescent trade patterns by country during this first postwar decade? Until 1950 German participation in the area's trade was, as already seen, negligible. Even "traditional German markets" such as Turkey and Iran had been lost to the victors of World War II.

Trade with Syria-Lebanon had revived faintly in 1948,[46] with the three Western zones of Germany taking 0.09% of Syro-

Lebanese exports. Iraq was West Germany's strongest Fertile Crescent partner (though exceeded by Israel in imports from Germany) at mid-century. Syria and Lebanon began to show up more strongly in import statistics than Iraq in 1951-1952. Jordan made its debut in 1951, as an importer only (its 1950 imports from West Germany had been a negligible fraction--one seventh--of 1951's), to a value about one fourth of that of Iraq's or Lebanon's, and a tenth that of Syria's.[47]

At this point, West Germany's Middle Eastern trade amounted to only about a third of that still sustained by Great Britain in the area.

The decision to pay reparations to Israel, made official in March 1953, threatened to interrupt the development of these re-established trade relations. However, the Arab League, after repeated attempts to dissuade West German officials (who argued that strategic goods would not be supplied[48]) and to determine what pressure, if any, had been exerted on them by the former occupying powers,[49] decided on its boycott measures only in the fall of 1954. These measures were, further, limited to the requirement that "goods imported from Germany must, however, be accompanied by a certificate of origin stating that these goods are not of the Israeli compensation quota."[50, 51]

Meanwhile, West Germany had concluded trade agreements with all Middle Eastern countries except Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria--and Israel. The Arab League itself was seeking increased exports from its member states to West Germany. In the end, the value of West German imports from the Middle East more than doubled between 1950 and 1955, and that of West German exports to the Middle East more than tripled.[52]

As for products traded, petroleum, ores, cotton, grains, and fruits were West Germany's main imports, as they had been prewar (with the exception of petroleum).[53] Machine tools, electrical equipment, and vehicles were its main exports. This type of trade can be viewed in two lights: as a "classic exchange" situation or as a colonial relationship of the type to which Near

Eastern countries have become so sensitive. There is no hint of perception of the latter possibility in a 1952 lecture delivered before the Nah- und Mittelost Verein of which the following passage is typical:

> Because of geographical locations and differences in stage of technological development, as well as the differences in socio-cultural structure, there exist extremely favorable complementary possibilities between the lands of the Near and Middle East and Germany.[54]

A contrasting viewpoint was offered in the same year by then Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard: "Nearly all of these countries can offer only limited quantities of exports to Germany, partly because of inadequacy of supplies" as to both quantity and quality, the latter particularly with regard to foodstuffs.[55]

The special case of petroleum, "exploited by international companies and sold by them without contributing, apart from fees or royalties, to the prosperity of the national economies,"[56] has led to differences of approach in setting up a balance sheet for trade between Germany and the Middle East (as will be examined further below, under "Iraq"). Between 1950 and 1955 value of exports to West Germany by oil-producing Middle Eastern states ran about two and one half times that of non-oil-producers' exports. Conversely, the proportion of the value of imports by non-oil-producers from West Germany in relation to that of oil-producers' imports stood at nine times as large in 1950, four times as large in 1955.[57]

Over and above the fact of its rapid revival from 1950 on, West Germany's trade with the Near East in this first post-war decade was characterized by a nearly complete lack of official government assistance. At least until 1952 the resumption of trade relations was the result almost entirely of private West German initiative--with the help of "the long-standing high reputation of German goods and of the German economy in all those countries".[58] Special regional reports by banks (as, Hamburger Kreditbank and Norddeutsche Bank) and the research of various institutes sponsored by business groups or universities facilitated their efforts.[59] The Nah- und Mittelost Verein, among the more important of these, was founded in 1950. Nonetheless, the need for systematic, govern-

ment-backed information-gathering and -distribution (and for other programs such as training of Middle East specialists) was beginning to be urgently felt.[60] Dr. Erhard articulated the need from the policy-making vantage point:

> The Middle and Near East is in the midst of a political and economic revolution which provides great business opportunities, but also risks, for us as they become increasingly independent. Correspondingly, new problems and approaches in trade policy arise. They differ from those posed by doing business in Europe in that more than just exchange and goods are involved. It is rather a question of an economic expansion which has as its consequence the tying up of capital--i.e., import surpluses. Thus we are faced with the task not only of buying but also of investing capital.[61]

This last, he continued, requires a new kind of cooperative relationship between government and industry both at home and in the host country, rendering "Near and Middle East business the greatest challenge facing the makers of German commercial policy".[62, 63]

As of 1956 no formal, coordinated program of technical assistance had yet been developed by the West German government. (To put it more strongly, "in the 1950s aid was given for a variety of purposes and by a variety of means, but astonishingly little thought was devoted to the central objectives that aid could or should be designed to achieve. Aid grew, almost by accident."[64]) Development projects fell to the planning offices of large manufacturers, which had to deal directly with Arab national planning authorities. Further,

> since a major part of the exports to these areas is for development purposes that usually require preliminary financing and therefore are not free from considerable risk, such exports are beyond the capacity of an individual firm and lately enthusiasm for orders of this kind has been declining.[65]

Joint action by several large concerns was one answer found to the problem but "there is . . . a tendency in the Middle East to overestimate the financial resources of such action"[66] (and to overestimate German financial resources in general, admitted Near East enthusiast Reinhard Hüber in August 1954[67]).

Developments in trade and other relations with Germany in the early fifties will be considered in greater detail, country by country, below.[68]

Jordan

Although in 1950 West German-Jordanian trade was still negligible, by 1955 West Germany was the third most important supplier of Jordan to a value of $6,400,000 or 8.5% of Jordan's imports. Vehicles and farm machinery (with spare parts) and textiles predominated. During the same period (1950-1955) West German purchases from Jordan were almost nonexistent, having reached a peak in 1952 at $50,000.[69] As of 1953, no trade or clearing agreement had yet been signed between the two countries.

Fittingly, with the onset of the second postwar decade West Germany's Zublin AG, of Stuttgart, was awarded the contract for enlargement and new construction at the port of Aqaba. This initial step was to be followed by varied and extensive West German activity in Jordan during the second postwar decade.[70]

Lebanon

In 1955, 6.43% of all of Lebanon's imports came from West Germany, a proportion nearly identical with the percentage for Syria-Lebanon in the peak Third Reich-Fertile Crescent trade year of 1938. Its exports to West Germany in 1954 and 1955 represented about 2% of its total exports, still well below the 5.3% which Syria-Lebanon had sent to the Third Reich in 1938. Thus, in 1955 the Federal Republic stood fifth as a supplier and eleventh as a customer in Lebanese trade.[71]

A most-favored-nation commercial agreement with clearing in free currencies--sterling or dollars--which had been signed between the Federal Republic and Lebanon in 1951 marked the beginning of an upsurge in trade between the two: Lebanon's 1955 imports from West Germany ($17.4 million) were quadruple in value those of 1951 ($3.9 million). West German imports from Lebanon, however, hardly changed, rising from $1.1 million to $1.9 million. To offset this imbalance, German investment in agricultural development and transportation was projected in a four-year agreement which went into effect in February 1955.[72] ("Germany is to supply Lebanese agricultural and industrial concerns with technical and financial aid to the tune of 6 million deutschmarks," reported a news agency for the area.[73])

Meanwhile, in 1953, Lebanon and East Germany had also entered into a trade agreement.[74] This was followed, in 1955, by the opening of an office for the encouragement of trade in Beirut.

Syria

Value of West German imports from Syria more than doubled each year between 1950 and 1954, gradually bringing value of German imports of Syrian goods more nearly into balance with Syrian imports of German goods.[75] By 1953 the Federal Republic was the fourth most important supplier of Syria, sending 9.5% of the total of Syrian imports (the U.S.A., the main supplier, provided only 12.3%). In 1955 it was in third place, having displaced France.[76]

It had been attempted to arrive at a clearing agreement with Syria in the fall of 1951, but the agreement was still not ratified by 1955 "since it was not suited to a Syria striving for free exchange".[77] A German-Orient Company for Commerce and Representation was reportedly formed in Damascus in March 1954 to facilitate sales of agricultural machinery, electrical and industrial equipment, and, on commission, to represent foreign firms.[78]

In the summer of 1954 the Damascus press reported the imminent arrival of a West German trade mission seeking conclusion of a commercial agreement between the two countries and offering technical assistance to Syria on its projects in al-Ghab, Latakia harbor--and the Euphrates dam.[79] This last was one of the earliest references to the abortive plans for West German participation in the complex project for the development of eastern Syria. The Syrian press in 1954 also mentioned expectations of an application from a German firm to explore for oil in Syria (a concession was eventually granted in 1956), West German technical assistance on paper production, an order for German gliders and instructors, the visit of a West German tourist agency delegation, and rumors that Bonn had sent a "commercial delegate" to Israel (along with the West German legation's denial).[80] To sum up:

> The establishment of new industries with financial help from West Germany was also under discussion; . . . Most of the development projects, however, were scheduled to be carried out with Soviet assistance.[81]

In March 1954 the East German Commissioner for the Near and Middle East had proposed a trade agreement with Syria to the Syrian ambassador in Cairo.[82] Syria did sign an accord with the German Democratic Republic in November 1955. The latter was to take Syrian cotton, textiles, leather, and oil in return for electrical and medical equipment, heavy machinery, and vehicles.[83,84]

Iraq

Iraqi importation from West Germany recommenced in 1947, in which year it represented 0.2% of total Iraqi imports, and remained negligible until 1952. A trade agreement on the most-favored-nation basis (excluding special status of Arab states) had been signed in October 1951 but did not go into effect until January 1954.[85] By 1954 West Germany had become the third most important supplier of Iraq, providing 7.8% of its imports.[86]

Iraq's special position as an oil producer creates an ambiguous situation in calculation of export deficits or surpluses. It can be argued that

> the considerable deficit (an average of 78.6% from 1950 to 1955) in the trade balance at the expense of Germany ought not to create any illusions since the oil, sold directly by IPC to that country, represents 80 to 85% of the German imports. . . . It therefore does not enter into the trade with Iraq. In fact, if petroleum is excluded, the German deficit more often than not becomes an impressive surplus.[87]

Nonetheless, West German exports to Iraq were lower in value in 1950-1955 than those to either Lebanon or Syria (but represented three to five times the value of the Federal Republic's exports to Jordan). An effort to increase sales of consumers' goods to Iraq, as to other Near Eastern countries,[88] resulted in a rise in their proportion to 12% in 1955 as against 9.6% in 1954, the greater part still consisting of capital goods.[89]

Despite the large number of German sources seen in preparation for this paper, virtually none of the information fol-

lowing on large-scale construction and development projects undertaken by West German firms in Iraq was yielded by West German publications. Even a wide-ranging West German report on "the great diversity of types of technical assistance and advice which have evolved in Europe and Germany"[90] included only a single example from the Fertile Crescent countries (the complete equipping by a West German consortium of the Woollen Textile Co., Ltd., of Bagdad). It was a French source which provided a listing of major West German projects in Iraq between 1953 and 1957: two bridges over the Tigris in Bagdad (Julius Berger AG, Wiesbaden), participation in the Wadi Tharthar dam project and a road from Samarra to Baiji (E. Zublin AG, Stuttgart), equipment of thermoelectric plants at Dibis and Bagdad (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG and Siemens Schukertwerke AG, Berlin), a cement plant (Krupp), and others.[91, 92]

These contracts for development projects in Iraq, seemingly so promising, have left officials of some participating firms pessimistic. The chief engineer for coordination of foreign operations for Julius Berger AG revealed in an interview that his firm has accepted no further contracts from the Iraqi government since the mid-fifties because of its failure to meet payments.[93]

Not surprisingly, in August 1954 the East German government had sought to initiate talks leading to a trade agreement with Iraq. Politely repulsed by the British oriented Iraqi regime at that time, these tentatives were to bear fruit later.[94]

ADDENDA

Page 7, l. 12: Add new footnote designator "17a" at end.

Page 12: Add as new beginning for the first paragraph following the quoted material at the top of the page,

The first German archaeological expedition to Iraq after World War I was that under Dr. Andrae to Uruk-Warka in 1926.[48a]

Page 32, l. 16 from bottom: Add new footnote designator "172a" at end.

Page 38, note 6: Add at end,

A British source designates the Hilfsverein not as a branch of the Alliance Israelite but as a parallel organization "like the Alliance Israelite for the assistance and education of Jews in the backward lands" and a later arrival in Palestine than the Alliance. (Naval Intelligence Division, Palestine and Transjordan (Geographical Handbook Series; London: 1943), p. 140.)

Page 39: Add new note,

[17a]Verney & Dambmann, op. cit., p. 493.

Page 39, note 22: Add a second paragraph,

Jafar Pasha al-Askari, many-time Iraqi Minister of Defense, had received his training in the Turkish army also, and had been sent with a group of young officers to serve from 1910 to 1912 in a regiment at Karlsruhe. He is said to have maintained contact with German friends from that period, which he referred to as the happiest of his life. (F. Grobba, Männer und Mächte im Orient (Göttingen: 1967), pp. 152-53.)

Page 41: Add new note,

[48a]According to Grobba, Männer, p.34, Gertrude Bell had reserved the site for the German archaeologists despite American interest and sent an invitation through Dr. Grobba to Dr. Andrae to return.

Page 48, note 117: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba, Männer, p. 86, suggests that it was "probably lack of capital" which prevented the company from making use of the option, which was to have entitled it to a 40-year concession if oil was found during the first year.

Page 48, note 120, l. 1: Insert after "p. 43",

Quaiyara is 80 km. south of Mosul.

Page 54: Add at end of note 172,

Grobba had been assigned to the consulate-general in Jerusalem as an interpreter-trainee in 1913.

Page 54: Add new note,

172a Pelmy had commanded an aviation unit on the Sinai front and, according to the Mufti of Jerusalem, had enjoyed a good reputation in Palestine. (Grobba, Männer, pp. 234 & 239.)

Page 54, note 174: Add at end,

Grobba, Männer, p. 35, speaks of twice during a visit to Bagdad in 1926 having been taken by cab drivers, unbidden, to pay his respects at von der Goltz' grave.

Page 55, note 183: Add at end,

Ingenuity solved some supply problems: "In Palestine during World War I the German geologist and lieutenant in the reserves Dr. Beyschlag set up a primitive refining unit by means of which he obtained lubricating oil for the Hejaz railway from the bitumen deposits at Makarin, southeast of Lake Tiberias." (Grobba, Männer, p. 85.)

Page 79, note 1: Add at end,

"The bedouins said to me as a German, 'We go together,' in order to show their friendship for the Germans," added Dr. Grobba in an interview (September 1967).

Page 85, note 64: Add at end as a new paragraph,

The viewpoint expressed in 1924 by King Amanullah of Afghanistan may have been shared by the Arabs: he "did not consider Germany defeated [after World War I] since she had for four long years withstood what the Powers opposing her could not have withstood for a single month" and was convinced that Germany would soon be as strong as before. (Grobba, Männer, p. 17.)

Page 89, note 103: Add at end as a new paragraph,

A case in point is this statement made to a British journalist on a visit to Syria in 1968: "Britain was traditionally the friend of the Arab world, they explained, and Syria hoped that 'in time' there would be good relations between the two countries again." (I. Beeson, "Syria Prospers despite Radicalism", The Daily Star (Beirut), April 7, 1968, p. 8.)

Page 91, l. 6 from bottom: Add new footnote designator "13a" at end.

Page 99, middle: Change "These allegations were not unjustified. M. Khadduri mentions two instances:" to "These allegations were not entirely unjustified, even if not all of the instances given are accurate. Majid Khadduri asserts:"

Below the quoted material and before the last paragraph add,

Fritz Grobba, German Minister in Iraq during this period, has taken exception to both of these statements, pointing out that Heins came in the guise of geologist and that the extensive work he carried out on plans for the defense of Kurdistan was undertaken at the behest of General Bakr Sidki. (A Kurd, Bakr Sidki had secret plans for leading Kurdistan to independence, Dr. Grobba purported to know on good authority.[49a]) The Rheinmetall-Borsig man was a regular representative of the firm by the name of Morlock. The firm of Otto Wolff had also sent an employee in response to Bakr Sidki's request that German arms manufacturers send representatives.[49b]

Page 99, last two lines: Delete "two years later" and substitute "at the end of 1929".

Page 108, first paragraph under "Palestine": Add at end,

(A British source gives the total number of non-Jewish German nationals in 1931 as 1934, of whom 1113 were "Templists". Of a total of 174,610 Jews in Palestine in that year, only 1010 were German citizens.[105a])

Page 113, l. 12 from bottom: Add before line beginning "German machinery",

Contracts for supplying of electrical plants for several provincial towns were obtained.[139a]

Page 114, ll. 6-8: Delete "S. H. Longrigg . . . Czechoslovakia)" and substitute:

At least one order was placed with Rheinmetall-Borsig for 18 two-centimeter antiaircraft guns and 18,000 shells to a value of RM 1 million[144]". . . .

Page 114, l. 18: After footnote designator "147" and before "In December 1932" insert,

Eleven German geophysicists from Seismos G.m.b.H of Hanover arrived in Kirkuk in October 1928 for further exploration for petroleum sources on behalf of the Turkish Petroleum Company (which became the Iraq Petroleum Company the following year).[147a]

Page 114, l. 7 from bottom: After "members" add "(including the chief geologist, a Dr. Schmidt)".

Page 115: After the second paragraph insert the following new paragraph,

In the mid-thirties a German city-planning expert, Professor Brix, had been hired by the Iraqi government, and construction of a new museum had been assigned to a German architect, Professor March. Both were continued in the service of the Iraqi government after the Bakr Sidki coup d'état.[159a]

Page 119: Add new note,

[13a]Grobba, Männer, p. 34, writes: "Sir Henry Dobbs asked me at one point [in 1926] why German shipping lines no longer called at the port of Basra. Before the war two German companies--HAPAG and the Hansa-Linie--served Basra. Now only the British India Steam Navigation Co. was serving the port and could set prices as it wished. . . . Subsequently the Deutsche Hansa-Linie of Bremen resumed its service to Basra." A price war ensued to the great benefit of the customers.

Page 119, note 14: Add at end,

Grobba, Männer, p. 34, asserts that the British High Commissioner in Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs, urged him during a visit in 1926 to transmit to the German Foreign Ministry the suggestion that a German consul be assigned to Bagdad in order to help hasten the acceptance of Iraq into the League of Nations.

Page 122: Add new notes,

[49a]Grobba, Männer, p. 158.

[49b]Ibid., p. 157.

Page 123, note 65: Add at end,

Arslan described himself in 1942 as "the oldest Arab friend of Germany" who "for 47 years had proclaimed the identity of interests of Germany and the Islamic world." (Grobba, Männer, p. 270.)

Page 127: Add new note,

[105a] Naval Intelligence Division, Palestine and Transjordan (Geographical Handbook Series; London: 1943), pp. 155 and 174.

Page 130: Add new note,

[139a] Grobba, Männer, p. 157.

Page 130, note 144: Delete "Iraq, p. 253" and substitute

Grobba, Männer, p. 158.

Page 130: Add new note,

[147a] Grobba, Männer, p. 87.

Page 130, note 146: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba, Männer, p. 158, states that under Bakr Sidki, before the first order was placed, "the Iraqi Defense Ministry handed me a list of armaments required to a value of RM 5 million." "Planes and tanks were purchased from Italy." (Ibid., p. 160.) After the fall of the Bakr Sidki government, a second order for antiaircraft matériel was placed with the same German firm but was cancelled upon the outbreak of war. (Ibid., p. 167.) S. H. Longrigg claims that orders were placed with Krupp (Iraq, p. 253). According to Grobba, the dealings with Krupp concerned rails for the Mosul-Baiji section, but the British director of the railway obtained a notably better offer from a British manufacturer (Männer, pp. 167-68).

Page 130, note 148: Add at end as a new paragraph,

An extensive account of the way in which Germany came to participate is to be found in Grobba, Männer, pp. 87ff. To summarize, Iraq had in 1929 refused to countenance further delay by the TPC (IPC) in choosing fields to exploit. "The Iraqi government was supported in its views by the permanent Committee on Mandates in Geneva, in which the German member, Dr. Ruppel, expressed the desire that the exploitation of Iraqi oil be expedited." In 1930, the participation in B.O.D. (British Oil Development Co.) was proposed to the German consul in Bagdad, with orders for at least half of the equipment required by the company to be placed with German firms. IPC was strongly opposed to the whole enterprise. In August 1930 King Feisal I paid an unofficial visit to Germany in order to win the support of the government for the German consortium represented by Thomas Brown, who had become interested in oil exploitation possibilities while engaged on a railway-building project in Persia. The king was assured of the support he sought. "With regard to Mr. Brown, we said, he had undertaken his trip to Bagdad at the behest of the German Foreign Ministry and that behind the German industrial group stood the Deutsche Bank and the Diskonto Gesellschaft,

both of which had extensive experience in the oil business." (When the German and Italian shares were bought up by Mosul Holdings, Ltd., Brown committed suicide, foreseeing the take-over by IPC which would nullify all of his efforts.)

Page 130, note 150: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba, Männer, p. 90, gives the composition as follows: "Otto Wolff of Köln; G.H.H.-Ferrostaal of Essen; Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke of Düsseldorf; and Stahlunion-Export G.m.b.H. of Düsseldorf"--with the Wolff firm as leader. "The members of the German industrial consortium were thus not oil companies but industrial firms which were therefore interested not so much in petroleum as in selling their products."

Page 131, note 158: Add at end,

There was talk of expelling the three teachers at the same time as Dr. Jordan for attempting to exert political influence on their pupils, but they were exonerated and their contracts renewed. Much of the denigration was traceable to the Jewish community in Bagdad. (Grobba, Männer, pp. 180-81.)

Page 131: Add new note,

159a Grobba, Männer, p. 157.

Page 131, note 160: Add at the end as a new paragraph,

An earlier incident probably little to British liking has been reported by Grobba, Männer, p. 83: "The Assyrian Patriarch Eshai Mar Shimun, who had been living under surveillance in Bagadad, was transferred on Aug. 17, 1933, to Cyprus. From there, with a German salesman who was passing through as intermediary, he sent a petition to Adolf Hitler imploring him to bring his influence to bear at the League of Nations so that his oppressed people might have justice." Grobba added that he and a colleague sent recommendations to the Foreign Ministry in favor of resettlement of the Assyrians.

Page 131, note 161: Add at end,

Grobba, Männer, p. 181, recalls from 1939: "Dr. Sami Shawkat further informed me that upon his appointment as the director-general in the Ministry of Education he had been instructed by Nuri al-Said to see that Iraqi youth were trained in the military spirit on the German model." (The Iraqi youth movement Futuwwa included all schoolboys to a total of 63,000 members at that time, he adds.) On the same page, he reports Dr. al-Jemali, "director for training and instruction", as having expressed Iraq's desire to see Germany strong in order to hold French and English oppression of the Arab lands in check. (Shawkat, "a promoter of the pan-Arab ideiology", was Director-General of Education in 1933 and in 1939 and Minister of Education in 1940, according to Khadduri, Iraq, p. 160.)

Page 131, note 167: Add at end,

"Khadduri's assertion (p. 173) that after the fall of the Hikmat Suleiman-Bakr Sidki regime my efforts to win Iraq over to the side of Germany were very limited are not accurate," protests Grobba in Männer, p. 167.

Page 131, note 168: Add at end,

Dr. Grobba referred to Dr. Jordan as the "president of the German-Nazi group in Bagdad". (Interview, September 1967.) He also claimed (Männer, p. 180) that Nuri al-Said shortly granted Jordan permission to return.

Page 131: Add new note (for which the designator "172a" should be inserted after "Hikmat Suleiman" in the middle of page 117),

172a "During the first world war [Hikmat Suleiman] was in Bagdad and in 1916, at the proposal of Field Marshal von der Goltz, was named acting wali. He spent the late years of the war in Berlin and still spoke German to some extent." (Grobba, Männer, p. 149.)

Page 131, note 173: Add at end,

Grobba, Männer, p. 119, on the other hand, insists: "The nationalist movement in Iraq was unquestionably influenced by the National Revolution in Germany. Therefore, both the government and the army were very well disposed toward Germany." Later he adds: "The new [i.e., Bakr Sidki's] government desired to work more closely than had been the case with Germany in scientific and cultural areas. Nearly all of the new ministers, above all the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister Naji al-Asili, the Finance Minister Jafar abu al-Timman, the Minister of Education Yussuf Izzedin Ibrahim, and the Minister of Defense Abd al-Latif Nuri, told me this. Hikmat Suleiman gave me a list of products which the Iraqi government wished to buy and which German firms could supply." (Ibid., p. 157.)

Page 131, note 174: Add at end,

Dr. Grobba maintains that, apart from the Jewish eye doctor of German nationality, whom he personally knew to be strongly anti-Nazi but nonpolitical, there were no German nationals in Mosul at that time--only some individuals who spoke German, probably Swiss. (Interview, September 1967, and Männer, p. 180.)

Page 131, note 175: Add at end,

Grobba, Männer, p. 204, states: "In Bagdad the ex-mufti founded the 'Arab National Party', which worked for entry of Iraq into the war on the side of the Axis. In order to inform the govern-

ments of the Axis of their intentions and at the same time to ensure themselves Axis support in the event of war, Rashid Ali and the ex-mufti decided to send Haddad [the latter's private secretary] to Berlin."

In addition to the extensive accounts of the ex-mufti's activities to be found in Hirszowicz, Third Reich, Carlson, Cairo to Damascus, and Grobba, Männer, there are several books devoted entirely to this topic--e.g.,

S. Wiesenthal, Gross-Mufti--Gross-Agent der Achse (Salzburg, n.d.)

K. Fischer-Weth, Amin al-Huseini, Gross-Mufti von Palästina (Berlin: 1943)

Maurice Pearlman, Mufti of Jerusalem. The Story of Haj Amin el-Husseini (London: 1947).

Pages 131-32, note 176: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba, Männer, p. 205, says of Taha al-Hashimi: "He shared al-Gailani's favorable disposition toward the Axis but sought to avoid an open break with the British before he had a firm commitment of support from the Axis Powers." As for Dr. al-Ruwaiha, he had been director of the Bagdad military hospital and served as physician to the German Legation. Other than these two facts, Grobba mentions only that he had brought a pressing request from Nuri al-Said for an interview in 1938 when the latter was out of office. (The interview never took place since Nuri was shortly called back into the government.) (Ibid., p. 171.)

Page 136: Insert before last paragraph,

In November 1941 Under State Secretary Woermann (head of the Political Division) issued a statement of policy with regard to the Arab area which reveals no sense of opportunities forever lost:

> Our primary goals there are the removal of England from the Near Eastern area and long-term ensurance of German influence over the petroleum resources there. . . .
>
> . . . . . .
>
> As for the new order in the Arab area, the following is probably the most promising basis for our policy: Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon would be grouped into a Greater Arab Federation . . . [which] will enter into a friendship or alliance relationship with Germany and Italy.
>
> . . .
>
> Minor alterations of borders desired, such as of Syria's, will not be prejudiced by any declarations from the Axis.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The aim of the treaty [to be made with the Iraqi government in exile] is the ensurance that everything will be properly prepared for the entry of German troops into Iraqi territory and that the Iraqis entertain closer relations with us, particularly in economic matters.[178]

Page 143, paragraph 2, l. 1: After "Rahn" add ", who after his arrival (at his own request, according to Dr. Grobba) had been given the status of special envoy to General Dentz,[61a]"

Pages 144-45: After the footnote designator "76" delete remainder and all of page 145 and substitute the following,

The British, who had deciphered the Italian legation's code, were aware that resumption of relations with the Third Reich was being considered and in November 1940 threatened extensive economic reprisals.[76a] The Iraqi government, of which Rashid Ali al-Gailani, ardent nationalist, was Prime Minister, rejected the British note and, through the Italian legation, urgently requested armaments and funds from the Axis governments. In reply,

> the Italian minister in Bagdad was instructed by the Italian Foreign Ministry to assure Gailani of the value which the Axis placed on his confidence in it but that the difficulties in the way of military assistance, particularly the problem of a supply route, should be pointed out.[76b] He was to be urged to act with utmost caution. Gailani submitted a plan of defense and an itemization of the assistance desired by Iraq.[76c]

Although the fact is not dwelt upon by Dr. Grobba, other sources maintain that German efforts to arrange for supply of weapons, ammunition, and other matériel to Iraq did indeed commence late in 1940.[77] Dr. Grobba's emphasis is on the February-March 1941 trip of the ex-mufti's private secretary to Berlin, when it was again insisted that only financial assistance to the ex-mufti was practicable at the time.[78] If direct action were to be undertaken, a quick victory for the British was foreseen by the Axis because of the ease with which British troops could be brought into Iraq; the Axis hoped at best to keep the Iraqi sympathy alive against the time when circumstances might become favorable. "In any case, it could be unstintingly emphasized in conversations with the Arabs that . . . the Arabs could be confident in our support within the limits of the possible if they were to undertake to combat England themselves," was, in part, the stand taken by the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, in March 1941.[78a]

In this light, the assertion by Field Marshal Keitel that just such a development during the two months following had

taken Germany completely by surprise and that therefore help could only be improvised[79] must be taken as referring to lack of coordination regarding the timing between the two governments --and possibly between the Foreign Ministry and the High Command. One of the foremost historians of modern Iraq

> points out on the basis of evidence available to him that although the Germans had for a long time indulged in political intrigue and propaganda in Iraq, they played no part in the actual planning and execution of the coup. The aid to Rashid Ali came only after the rebellion had started.[80]

The crucial point is that the Germans had been prepared to wait a good deal longer for the "overall military and political situation" which in their opinion would make their entry into the area "desirable"[81] than were the Iraqi activists. An uprising without direct Axis participation was urgently desired and fomented, however. (It is claimed that Third Reich intelligence services began to send agents into Iraq in early 1941.[82]) All things considered, it is not entirely true that the German Foreign Ministry did not push Iraq into battle as some highly-placed officials have maintained, in the view of former Minister to Iraq Grobba.[83]

What is perhaps most remarkable in the German view of the brief pro-Axis venture in Iraq is the silence with which the Third Reich's attempts to aid the Rashid Ali-Golden Square government are passed over in German accounts other than the most conscientious histories of the war. For example, a massive 1941 work on the modern Orient painted a picture of armies of sympathizers streaming in from neighboring lands to aid the rebellion but nowhere mentions Germans.[84] A much more compact treatment of Arab nationalism for the general public eighteen years later declared that the coup was condemned to failure because undertaken

Page 146, l. 13: After "al-Hashimi" insert,
"--in office since February 3, following Rashid Ali al-Gailani's early 1940 to January 1941 term--"

Page 146, l. 17: After "existence." insert,

The Italian legation reported that the rapid advance of the Axis through the Balkans and on the Libyan front had convinced Iraqis that the decisive phase of the war around the Mediterranean had begun and that "the conviction was widespread that the forces of the Axis would soon appear in the Mesopotamian region from the north or the west."[89a]

Page 146, middle: After footnote designator "90" insert,

As late as May 3 Rashid Ali was still imploring the Axis, through the Italian legation, for a firm commitment in order to know whether to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the British, pointing out that his government had opposed them after the first troop landings at Basra (April 19) on the strength of Axis declarations during April as transmitted by the Italian diplomatic representative, Gabrielli.[90a]

Page 146, l. 4 from bottom: Delete footnote designator "94" and add,

The ex-mufti himself broadcast a call to jihad on the Bagdad radio on May 9.[94]

Page 147, l. 13: Add new footnote designator "97a" after "difficulty."

Page 150, end of paragraph 1: Add,

(Dr. Grobba states that a "declaration of the Third Reich government regarding its recognition of the independence of all Arab lands and the furthering of their unity" was made finally on November 21, 1944, on the occasion of the Congress of Youth in Arab Lands under the chairmanship of the ex-mufti in Berlin.[115a])

Page 152, note 17: Add at end,

According to Grobba, von Weizsäcker was an opponent of Hitler and of expansion of the war to the Arab area (see also note 34 below).

Page 152: Add new note,

[17a]Grobba, Männer, pp. 249-50.

Page 152, note 20: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba, Männer, p. 170, reports Hikmat Suleiman as having said to him on Nov. 21, 1938: "If Germany can use her influence on Italy to give up any designs on Turkish territory [sic], then Germany would be able to exercise influence past the Balkans, over Turkey and throughout the entire Near and Middle East."

Pages 153-54, note 34: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Dr. Grobba appended the following closing remarks in this connection to his book Männer und Mächte im Orient (pp. 317-18):

> During the past war we did not make use of the opportunities offered us by the friendly disposition of the Arabs in the Near East toward us since we did not promise the Arabs independence, which would have been a requirement for their active collaboration. Hitler refused to issue such a declaration allegedly because he did not like to make long-term promises. The true reason was that as advocate of the superiority of the Aryan race he did not wish to acknowlege that the Semitic Arabs could be a significant source of support for us. The Chief of Intelligence, Admiral Canaris, and a friend of his, State Secretary von Weizsäcker, both of whom opposed Hitler, did not wish to see the war spread to the Arab lands and therefore refrained from bringing this opportunity to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff and set strategic planning into motion. Germany's failure to recognize the independence of the Arab lands was brought up before the Iraqi Parliament by Prime Minister Nuri al-Said. . . .
>
> Later, we did not undertake a declaration of the independence of the Arab states out of consideration for the Italian aspirations in the Near East, which Herr von Ribbentrop had specifically acknowledged to Count Ciano. For the same reason the Foreign Ministry refrained from promising independence to the Bey of Tunis. The subsequent independence of the North African countries we did not recognize (chiefly Morocco and Tunisia) because of Hitler's promise to Marshal Pétain that Germany would undertake to defend France's colonial empire.
>
> It was the ex-mufti, Amin al-Husaini, who again and again demanded a declaration as to the independence of the Arab lands in return for military support from the Arabs. He also insisted each time that the German government's declaration on the independence of the Arab lands should be issued through himself so that he alone could claim the credit for being the proclaimer of Arab independence.
>
> When the Italians were hoping to occupy Egypt with the help of Rommel's troops, they decided to establish the ex-mufti in Cairo to counter the Arabs' disinclination towards them. The ex-mufti, who recognized his opportunity, requested of the Italians that they acknowledge him as "the leader of all the Arabs". The Italians had no objections to doing so; however, they requested the German government to co-sign the statement with them. I pointed out to the Foreign Ministry that the ex-mufti was not "the leader of all the Arabs" and that by co-signing the Italian letter we

would incur the opposition of the other Arab leaders. As a result, the Italian letter was signed by us with an alteration to the effect that we recognized the ex-mufti as "one authoritative representative of the Arab freedom movement". . . .

Page 154, note 35: Add at end,

The borders were closed to male German nationals under 40 at 11 A.M. on the day following the declaration of war. (Grobba, Männer, p. 183.)

Page 156: Add new note,

61a Grobba, Männer, p. 244.

Page 157, note 64: Add at end,

Rahn's book, written from memory in prison after the war, does contain many inaccuracies, according to Dr. Grobba. (Interview, September 1967.)

Page 157, note 73: Add at end,

According to Kirk, Middle East, p. 56, the most active elements in Iraq in the thirties were the army, the youth--both subject to Nazi influence, as has been seen--"and the German Legation".

Page 157, note 75: Add at end as a new paragraph,

To the German diplomatic representative in Iraq, Dr. Grobba, Nuri al-Said's favorable disposition toward Germany was not a brief reaction of panic. In December 1938, on a visit to al-Said's office, he reports, "he assured me that he had complete understanding for my having worked so closely with the Hikmat Suleiman government. He hoped that we might now work together in the same friendly fashion." Specifically, Nuri al-Said and his friends perceived in the various declarations of important figures and the press in Germany on behalf of Palestine support for their own policy." In 1940 Nuri al-Said had been moved by Axis progress in Libya to try to establish contacts, but the nationalists through whom he would have worked did not trust his intentions. As for Nuri al-Said's overtures to the ex-mufti and the Italian minister, "I am persuaded that Nuri al-Said acted above all out of concern for Iraq's future . . . and not as the mufti thought, in order to find out what the Axis had promised Rashid Ali and himself. Nuri al-Said had sought on several occasions to establish closer contacts with Germany and the Axis when he was disillusioned with England." (Männer, pp. 172, 175, 190, and 215.)

Page 157: Add new notes,

76a Grobba, Männer, pp. 201-202. After the German legation

was closed, Axis activity had shifted entirely to the legation of Italy, relations with which were not broken off even after Mussolini entered the war on June 11, 1940.

[76b] The Iraqis had suggested a route via Rumania, southern Russia, and Iran. Von Ribbentrop was able to reply only that a Russian route was impracticable at the time. (Ibid., p. 206.)

[76c] Ibid., p. 202.

Page 157, note 77: Change "Ibid." to "Tillmann, op. cit." and add at end,

Japan was willing to supply the needed armaments--if Iraq could work out a practicable transport route. (Grobba, Männer, p. 230.)

It is also claimed that not later than January 1941 Rashid Ali was promised such aid if a second front against the British were to be developed in Iraq. (Tillmann, op. cit., p. 191.) Grobba, however, states that Rashid Ali had complained to the Italian minister on Jan. 20, 1941, that he had not yet received any answer to his request for assistance and that he could not maintain his stand much longer. (Männer, p. 204.)

Page 157, note 78: Delete existing note and substitute,

[78] On March 7, 1941, the secretary was handed von Ribbentrop's reply, to the effect that Iraq was accessible to the Axis only by air and that "an action in the Arab area would not be decisive in terms of bringing England down" at that time, although the Arab area was recognized as being strategically important. (Ibid., p. 207.)

Page 157: Add new note,

[78a] Ibid., pp. 210-211.

Page 158, note 89: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Dr. Grobba stresses that Rashid Ali was "forced" by the Golden Square to become prime minister; in establishing his "Government of National Defense", he was acting as a patriot in the interests of his country and was not in German pay as the British claimed. (Interview, September 1967, and Männer, p. 217.)

Page 158: Add new notes,

[89a] Ibid., p. 218.

[90a] Grobba, Männer, pp. 229-30.

Page 158, note 92: Add at end,

Grobba was given no papers accrediting him to the Rashid Ali-Golden Square government when sent back to Iraq at the beginning

of May; these were to follow if the situation developed favorably. (Grobba, Männer, p. 234.)

Page 157, note 82: Delete and renumber note 83 as note 82. Insert new note,

[83]Grobba, Männer, p. 218.

Page 158, note 94: Add at end "and Khadduri, Iraq, p. 174.

Page 158, note 96: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Grobba has described the Germans' reception: "The entry of the German fliers into the action raised the morale of the government, the army, and the people. When their planes appeared the people gathered in the streets and on the roofs and applauded. Pilots forced down were recognized as 'Alemani' and enthusiastically received and assisted by the Arabs." The few Germans, he added, did more damage at Habbaniyah than the whole Iraqi air force had been able to do. (Männer, pp. 241 & 243.)

Page 159: Add new note,

[97a]"The Italian minister in Bagdad reported on May 4 that Turkey was thought to have consented . . . in order to prevent the closing of the port of Basra to her should the Axis become her neighbor on this side also." (Grobba, Männer, p. 231.)

Page 159, note 103: Add at end,

Grobba explained that the £ 2 million in gold needed by Iraq to back new currency had reached Athens but was detained there because of the worsening of the Iraqi prospects, and that planes sent at his request to assist in the defense of Mosul could not be sent beyond Aleppo because the Iraqi officer who had proposed the defense had disappeared. (Männer, pp. 240 & 247.)

Page 160: Add new note,

[115a]Grobba, Männer, p. 315.

Pages 175-76, note 13: Add at end as a new paragraph,

The shift commenced during World War II, according to Sarkisyanz, op. cit., p. 32: "With the victory at Stalingrad the sympathies throughout the Orient which had previously been directed to the fascist Powers passed to Moscow. The formerly widespread admiration of the Axis Powers was not so much for their ideology as the strength which they brought to bear against France and England. Since the war, Russia has represented such strength."

Page 267, note 101: Add at end as a new paragraph,

An article in Mid-East Commerce, July 1966, pp. 9-10 ("German Loan of 280 Million US$ to Arab and Middle East Countries") reviewing German loans since 1963 makes no mention of any Fertile Crescent country.

Page 269, note 123: Add at end,

The research organization which the Stiftung supports is known as the Deutsches Orient-Institut.

Page 306, note 43: Add at end as a new paragraph,

This line was also set forth at the beginning of 1967 by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt at a press conference in New York. In reply to a question he stated that "if it could [the Federal Republic] would like to contribute to the reduction of tension in the Middle East, but he was cautious in expressing hopes in that direction." ("Top East German Aide Confers with Bouteflika", The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 12, 1967.)

Page C-6 (of Appendix C): Add new footnote designator "21" at end of text.

Page C-7: Add new note,

[21] In an enclosure (No. 2) to Directive No. 30 (see p. 159 above, note 98) "the basis for German propaganda in the Near East was set forth: 'The victory of the Axis brings the lands of the Middle East liberation from the English yoke and with it the right to determine their own destiny. Lovers of freedom will join the front against England.'" (Grobba, Männer, p. 245.) (Grobba also remarked--ibid., p. 219--that the Rashid Ali-Golden Square government had urgently requested intensified broadcasting from the Axis regarding the British breaking of the treaty by landing an excessive number of troops in Basra and regarding the will of the Iraqi government and people to defend their indiependence.)

Page Bib-1 (of Bibliography): Add as first item under "Major Sources",

Grobba, Fritz. Männer und Mächte im Orient. 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit im Orient. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1967.

Page Bib-11, note 1: Add at end as a new paragraph,

Classification into "major" and "minor" sources is based throughout on the extent to which references were useful in the preparation of the present work.

T
950
v.2

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]Faris & Tawfik, op. cit., p. 152.

[2]Cf. Hottinger, op. cit., p. 270.

[3]Activities of Nazi refugees and former Wehrmacht officers in the Near East formed the topic of a book by an American journalist of Armenian descent: J. R. Carlson [pseud.], Cairo to Damascus (New York: 1951). He cites two organizations as designed to assist German nationals stranded by the defeat: an Association for Christian German War Refugees at the St. Charles Borromaeus Hospital, Beirut, and the Deutsches Hilfskommittee für den Nahe Osten--the task of which he alleged to be to locate German ex-officers for Arab armies (pp. 434-35). An organization with a similar mission--recruiting of Third Reich officers for Near Eastern governments--has long been rumored to exist under the name Die Spinne ("the spider") and may have been identical with the Hilfskommittee, if indeed this existed with the function that Carlson attributes to it.

[4]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 33. [5]Ibid., pp. 170-71.

[6]Abegg, op. cit., p. 84. Despite all this help, she adds, the Syrian army still tended to be oriented about personalities in the Eastern fashion and equipment was still ordered primarily from the French (p. 85).

[7]Dr. Voigt stated that there had never been more than four or five Nazi refugees of any note in Syria. Of these most, including the most important (a former counsellor at the Legation), had since left, primarily because of financial difficulties. (Interview, June 1967.)

[8]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 171.

[9]Ibid., p. 178. [10]Ibid.

[11]Allegations of Nazi influence in Transjordan and, after 1948, in the kingdom of Jordan also were not lacking. Under Abdallah, according to G. L. Harris, Jordan (New Haven, Conn.: 1958), "doctors and lawyers who had been trained in Germany often brought back a pro-German point of view which complemented their anti-British bias." Among Abdallah's assassins was one Musa Abdallah al-Husaini who "had even followed Hajj Amin in his flight to Hitler's Germany" but had broken with the ex-mufti and took up studies at Jena and Berlin, marrying a German medical student. (S. G. T., "King Abdullah's Assassins", The World Today, VII, No. 9 (September 1951), pp. 411-19.)

[12]E. Sarkisyanz, "Sowjet Russland im Islamischen Nahen Osten", Zeitschrift für Politik, IV, No. 1 (January 1957), pp. 32-33.

[13]References to this shift are frequent. Cf. "The nationalists then sought from the USSR the support which they had sought from the Axis during the ten years preceding the war." (J. Hey-

worth-Dunne in Orient (Paris), IV, No. 15, p. 72.) "The Soviet Union was now benevolently playing the role of fairy godfather which the extremists of 20 years earlier had hoped Nazi Germany would play (until they were disillusioned by the Germans' desertion of Rashid Ali's Putsch in Iraq . . .)." (Kirk, Arab Politics, p. 17.) "It is often the very people who admired the Third Reich who today swear by Moscow." (F. R. Allemann, "The Permanent Crisis", Encounter, XI, No. 5 (November 1958), p. 11.)

[14]J. Feddersen, "Sozialismus von Persien bis zum Atlantik?", Die neue Gesellschaft, IV, No.4 (September/October 1957), p. 387.

[15]The Arab World, April 22, 1954, reported that the term "fascist" was being used by socialists in Syria for the anti-Communist PPS (see section on Syria in Chapter III).

[16]R. Freyh, "Der Geist der ägyptischen Revolution", Die neue Gesellschaft, II, No. 2 (March/April 1955), p. 150.

[17]Op. cit., p. 5.

[18]German National Socialism was nonetheless the first breath of socialism in the Middle East and made a great impression, contends M. Halpern in The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N.J.: 1963), p. 143.

[19]Paret, Arabistik und Islamkunde (Wiesbaden: 1966), p. 48.

[20]This statement from the foreword to such a history may reveal one reason for their popularity: "Such glances backward to the roots of our existence render us capable of judging the present and the things which assail us more clearly, perhaps even help us find the way to bring them under control." (H. Schmökel, Kulturgeschichte des alten Orient (Stuttgart: 1961), p. xii.)

[21]Interview with Harald Vocke, correspondent for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on Near Eastern affairs, in January 1967.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Mehnert, op. cit., p. 392. These misgivings were not universally shared; Dr. Roth of the Amman embassy particularly discounted them (interview, January 1967).

[24]R. Huber asserted in his postwar Allahu Akbar (1954) that the teaching of German was resumed in Beirut in response to "urgent desire on the Arab side" (p. 121) and that in Lebanon and Syria (as well as Egypt) acquaintance with the German language was on the increase (p. 118).

[25]W. Köpke, "The Goethe-Institut in Oriental Countries", Orient (Hamburg), II, No. 5 (November 1961), p. 209.

[26]Deutschlands Rückkehr zum Weltmarkt (Düsseldorf: 1953), p. 184. Only three and one half of some 300 pages were devoted to the Near East other than Egypt (which was given three pages).

[27]West Germany "was too busy with reconstruction at home and with re-establishing economic contacts with the world's main trading countries," clarifies Fritz Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 11.

Setting up of consulates was first permitted to the Federal Republic by the Petersburg Agreement of November 1949. In that year only Egypt of the Arab nations was represented in Germany, by a consulate in Berlin.

[28]Wrote Cairo publicist A. M. Amin in Aussenpolitik in 1954:

> The new German Orient policy of the postwar period has at its outset placed a heavy burden on the traditionally friendly relations with the Arab East. . . . And this threat to their existence the Arabs had to receive not from the imperialists but from none other than their best friends, the Germans.

(Op. cit., p. 31.)

[29]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 16. It is not clear whether this was a separate mission or identical with the one which he states elsewhere on the same page left for Egypt immediately upon ratification of the agreement "to examine the conditions for the erection of a new dam at Aswan, and to discuss economic cooperation with other Arab countries." W. Z. Laqueur asserts that the Arabs demanded reparations from Germany also: "about a billion dollars over ten years". ("Bonn, Cairo, Jerusalem: the Triple Crisis", Commentary, XXXIX, No. 5 (May 1965), p. 29.) Bonn is said to have offered "to increase correspondingly German supplies to the Arab countries with a view to helping them strengthen their own economic capacity" but the offer was rejected by the Arab spokesman as in no way meeting the Arab case. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Dec. 13-20, 1952, 12621A.)

Subsequent West German aid to Egypt was widely regarded as an effort to counterbalance its reparations to Israel although such intent is officially denied: "Germany at once sent an economic mission to Egypt to restore good relations and, so to speak, make up the reparations." (J. & S. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: 1958), p. 390.)

[30]Fisher, op. cit., p. 593.

[31]H. Gross, Nah- und Mittelost als Handelspartner Deutschlands, (Hamburg: 1953), p. 21.

[32]Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 357, footnote 65.

[33]Hauenstein, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[34]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., pp. 23 & 45.

[35]Alvarez del Vayo, op. cit., p. 476.

[36]Hauenstein, op. cit., pp. 13-17.

[37]Cited in H. Mendershausen, "Impact of Germany's Recovery on World Markets", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVI (1954-1959), No. 2, p. 70.

[38]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 14. Corresponding percentages for the Middle East ("Arab lands, Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Afghanistan, and Pakistan") are: 1953, 6.1%; 1950, 5.3%.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]VI, No. 1 (May 22, 1954), p. 22.

[42]Quoted in Mendershausen, op. cit., p. 72. Note that 1929 was a bit later in relation to the end of World War I than was the year (presumably 1953) being compared with it in relation to the end of World War II.

[43]Similarly, while Germany in 1924, six years after World War I, had rebuilt its nearly decimated merchant fleet to about 3 million gross tons, six years after World War II the Federal Republic had barely 1 million gross tons. (The World Today, VII, No. 9 (September 1951), p. 393.) Shortly after World War II four West German shipping firms which had carried cargo to and from the Near East in the past joined with a Swedish line in a Nah-Ost Gemeinschaft and by 1962 had 52 ships under a central administration. (Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 4 (1964), p. 130.) A Nah-Ost Konferenz of 20 shipping lines was reportedly in existence by 1959.

[44]Gross, Handelspartner, pp. 18-20. [45]Ibid., p. 20.

[46]Note the parallel between the revival of trade with Germany in 1921, three years after the end of World War I, and in 1948, three years after the end of World War II.

[47]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 184.

[48]Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 357.

[49]The Arab states might be said to have preferred to believe Dr. Schacht's declaration in Damascus in December 1952 (as reported by Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 49, quoting the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) that West Germany had acted under pressure, rather than the denials from official sources. Dr. Schacht was allegedly acting as a spokesman for German industrialists.

[50]Syrian News Agency (al-Bina') quoted in The Arab World, Sept. 29, 1954, p. 5. (The agreement forbade re-export from Israel.)

A year earlier the Arab Economic Council was "studying a suggestion made by the Boycott Israel Office to create propaganda offices in Germany and explain Arab operations and views. The truth about the Arab world will be explained to German public opinion so that Germans will know the truth." (Ibid., Dec. 15, 1953, p. 8.)

[51]The Jordanian press (al-Difaa and Falastin) reported in November 1954 that "the West German government has refused to grant a loan of $100 million to Israel and refused German firms permission to grant a loan of $30 million." (Ibid., Nov. 11, 1954, p. 6.

[52]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 14.

An Arab version of the boycott's impact is a bit different: But after the drum roll of the threat of an Arab boycott of German goods in the fall of 1952 brought the Germans to their senses, they hastened to make up for at least a part of past omissions. Trade with the Orient was greatly extended, diplomatic posts in the Orient were finally filled, and a vast number of representatives of German firms suddenly flooded into the lands of the Orient. (Amin, op. cit., p. 35.)

[53]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 54.

In 1950-51 about 25% of German imports from the Near and Mid-

dle East were classifiable as raw materials, 10% as foodstuffs of vegetable origin, and 25% as "luxury items" (tobacco, coffee, tea, etc.) (Gross, Handelspartner, p. 16.)

[54]Ibid., p. 14.

[55]Op. cit., pp. 184-85.

[56]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 55. [57]Ibid., p. 58.

[58]Gross, Handelspartner, pp. 21-22. [59]Ibid., p. 22.

[60]Cf. this passage from a review of Herbert Gross' Neue Märkte --Chancen in Übersee (Düsseldorf: 1953):

> It is regrettable how little concern is shown in Germany today for the long-term problems of the world market. It was not always so; only recall with what attention the German businessman, and also the German State, observed world business matters under the Emperor. Today concern for the tendencies in markets abroad, particularly the "underdeveloped countries", is largely left to the United Nations (in which we Germans have neither a seat nor a vote) and to the overseas organs of the U.S.A. and the colonial powers. This absence of German businessmen and publicists can one day lead to a loss of markets and to our own economy's failing to develop in a way suited to the overall trends in world economic development.

(Aussenpolitik, V, No. 1 (January 1954), pp. 66-67.)

Cf. also H. Eliseit, op. cit., pp. 385-86. This reporter concluded from numerous experiences that the dealings of German private enterprise with potential Near Eastern customers left much to be desired. Commenting on the uselessness of sending correspondence and brochures in German only, he deplores the fact that "such lack of awareness is far more common than one should expect in relations with all the Arab lands." German firms' representatives tended to have inadequate command of English and of local custom, he continues, and failure to take advantage of the services of experienced local exporters had resulted in much needless difficulty." (This picture, which recalls that of the first attempts at developing a Near Eastern trade, may be exaggerated.)

[61]Op. cit., p. 184. [62]Ibid., pp. 184-85.

[63]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 12, states (1956) that "a weekly Wirtschaft-Information aus der arabischen Welt has recently begun to appear in Bonn and the Federal Foreign Trade Information Office has made available a series of surveys. . . . There is . . . a still-undeveloped German economic commission on the Near East. In February 1954 a German-Arab trade company was established to encourage marketing."

[64]J. White, "West German Aid to Developing Countries", International Affairs, XL, No. 1 (January 1965), p. 74.

[65]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 13. [66]Ibid., p. 18.

[67]Quoted in Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 44, footnote 1.

Dr. Hüber, who had been editor of the publications of the Orient-Verein, became business manager of the new Nah- und Mittelost Verein upon its founding in 1950.

[68]The record with regard to the German presence in Palestine remains to be closed. Among the provisions of the reparations agreement with Israel was one to the effect that compensation to the members of the Temple Society and to other German nationals for property seized in Palestine by the Israelis was to be agreed upon and deducted from the amount of the reparations. (Keesing's, VII, Dec. 13-20, 1952, 12621A.)

[69]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., pp. 184-85.

[70]At the same juncture an East German firm reportedly was selected to build a sugar refinery in Jordan. (K. Grunwald & J. O. Ronall, Industrialization in the Middle East (New York: 1960), p. 294.) The project apparently never materialized, however.

[71]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 161.

The Arab World, Dec. 8, 1954, p. 9, reported that participation of West German companies in the exploitation of Lebanon's mineral resources was under discussion. On April 26, 1956, it contained the following item: "Lebanon has exported to West Germany over 100,000 tons of iron ore during the last three years. It is expected that by the end of 1956, the amount of exported ore will reach 140,000. The ore is mined from one district, Marjaba, in north-central Lebanon." (P. 9.) Working of this deposit terminated shortly afterward.

[72]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 162.

[73]Mideast Mirror, VI, No. 1 (May 22, 1954), p. 17.

The sequence of events leading up to this agreement as reported in The Arab World were: a visit by a West German delegation to Beirut in May 1954 to arrange an amendment to the 1951 agreement in order to increase German purchases (which the leader of the delegation acknowledged would be "difficult to achieve") (May 12, 1954, p. 6); a suggestion from the Lebanese that long-term loans and investment be substituted (May 17, 1954, p. 8); a 48-hour visit by Sami Solh to Hamburg (July 20, 1954, p. 2); another West German trade mission (July 29, 1954, p. 8); a public request by Premier Solh to the U.S. Ambassador for aid to Lebanon, failing which application would be made to West Germany, where, he was convinced, "there are German companies quite prepared to finance big construction schemes" as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Sept. 27, 1954, p. 6).

[74]Ibid., Dec. 3, 1953, p. 6.

[75]Hauenstein, op. cit., pp. 18-19. In 1955 a severe imbalance recurred, with West Germany taking Syrian exports to less than half the value of Syrian imports from West Germany.

[76]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., pp. 171-72.

[77]Erhard, op. cit., p. 187.

[78]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 171. "From 1951 on certain German firms--Mannesmann, for example--were accustomed to granting Syria long-term credits." (Ibid., p. 173.)

[79]The Arab World, Aug. 4, 1954, p. 8. The draining of the al-

Ghab marshes was assigned to a Dutch firm and the Latakia harbor development, to Yugoslavia.

[80] Ibid., Feb. 12, p. 7; June 12, p. 22; Nov. 5, p. 20; Nov. 30, p. 5; Dec. 30, p. 5.

[81] Grunwald & Ronall, op. cit., p. 155.

[82] The Arab World, March 17, 1954, p. 7.

[83] Mideast Mirror, VII, No. 28, Dec. 3, 1955, p. 21.

[84] Concurrent with the entry of the German Democratic Republic into Fertile Crescent trade there were rumors in the area of a "Point IV½" program of technical assistance and economic aid offered jointly by the firm of Krupp and the Federal Republic. Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p.50, observed that the program "has the appearance of being a consequence of a reaction in self-defense." The Arab World, April 23, 1956, p. 9, carried denials from both government and Krupp officials:

> Le Commerce du Levant reports from official sources that Prof. Hallstein has stated that there is no such thing as a Krupp program of aid as reported by the Western press. . . . He reportedly stated that when Mr. Berthold Beitz of the Krupp firm called on Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy in Washington, no plan of that nature was submitted.

So far as could be determined from informed German sources interviewed for this paper, the "Krupp program" indeed never existed.

[85] Statistisches Bundesamt, Länderkurzberichte--Irak, 1967, p. 18.

[86] Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 178. In 1938, the percentage was 6.6.

[87] Ibid., p. 179.

[88] "Along with investments, there is a growing demand in the East for all kinds of consumer goods. Since here the individual entrepreneur does not have to deal with the planning authorities, Germans have been urged to encourage such exports." (Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 19.)

[89] Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

[90] H. Gross, Der Handel folgt dem Ingenieur (Düsseldorf: 1955), p. 5 (Foreword). Furthermore, as often occurs, figures for the Near East in this work are not given separately but included in a global figure for "Asia" when statistics are presented.

[91] Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 181. Contract amounts are given.

[92] In Kuwait during the same period "initially all the contracts under the development program were awarded to British firms; at a later date other nationals, among them Germans, entered into competition with the British." (Grunwald & Ronall, op. cit., p. 151.)

[93] Interview with Dipl. Ing. Ober in September 1967.

[94] Mideast Mirror, VI, No. 15 (Aug. 28, 1967), p. 15.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND POSTWAR DECADE (1956-1965)

The end of the first postwar decade and the beginning of the second marked a critical juncture in the foreign relations of the Federal Republic of Germany generally, and in its relations with the Arab states in particular. The need for review and reassessment imposed itself in several aspects of these relations.

September 1955 had seen the first major politically-tainted transaction between the Arab world and the Soviet bloc --the arms deal with "Czechoslovakia".[1] In 1956, shortly after its establishment to finance East Germany's foreign trade, the Deutsche Handelsbank of the German Democratic Republic announced that it would open branches in Cairo, Khartoum, and Damascus.[2] Consulates were soon to follow. The relative comfort of the Federal Republic's position in the Middle East, where it had been accepted on its own terms as the legitimate successor state to the Third Reich, representing the entirety of Germany, was thenceforth slowly to deteriorate.

Nineteen hundred and fifty-six was also the year of the Suez Canal crisis and, as a by-product thereof, of the inception of the Federal Republic's rising fear that the West had lost interest in the reunification of Germany.[3] West Germany was fearful also lest her associations with the offending Powers provoke Asian countries into recognition of the Pankow government. In any event, a popular West German opinion ran, "it did not pay for Germany to risk vital economic interests in Egypt and the entire Arab World for the sake of incompetent French and British policies . . . ."[4] Reappraisal and reconsideration were the order of the day:

> Twelve years after the end of the second world war the time has come for a German policy on Asia. This cannot be derived from any precedent from the history of German foreign policy. Neither the colonial period before the first world war nor the Weimar period, when Asia was still entirely or partly colonial, provides us with guidance--much less the Hitler period. We can, however, learn from Asian policies of other non-Asiatic countries, above all the initial successes and later disappointments of America. The future German foreign policy must begin from the premise that the peoples of Asia, like ourselves, seek freedom, peace, prosperity, and democracy and that, moreover, they are nationalistically, anti-alliance, and, for the most part, socialistically inclined.[5]

The year 1956 was also marked by West Germany's first experiments with a formal program of foreign aid (of which more below). Here, too, began a period of groping for a fresh formulation suited to the new order of technology and of world affairs. To the farthest-sighted, West Germany was standing "at the threshold of a new world economy":

> From the colonial era we are passing into one characterized not only by political independence but also by unsuspected technical energies. Their effects, guided by technical assistance, can scarcely be guessed at today.[6]

Further, it was in 1956 at a conference of West German ambassadors in Istanbul that the first postwar statement of the Federal Republic's policy for the Near and Middle East was made.[7]

For the time being, "the West Germans were the golden boys of the Middle East."[8] Benefiting from an "obscure aura of neutralism", they had "stayed wisely aloof from the passions aroused by the nationalization of the Suez Canal." Also, the Algerian struggle and West Germany's massive investment in Egypt had tempered the ill feelings attendant upon the reparations agreement with Israel.[9] Her situation as the second postwar decade began indeed provoked a certain amount of envy:

> What better broker's man than Germany and what happier contractors to reap the profits of development than the disinterested, unpolitical, down-to-earth, untainted innocents of the Federal Republic?[10]

The dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon and of

British forces to Jordan in 1958 presented West Germany with a problem of policy not unlike that which had been offered by the Suez Canal crisis. Public and official opinion on this occasion seems to have been even more clearly oriented against West Germany's NATO allies than in 1956, if a summary in the New Statesman can be credited:

> West German reactions to the Near East crisis have been both interesting and illuminating. After the landings in Lebanon and Jordan, the majority of the press editorials were bitter and cynical in their criticism of Anglo-American moves, . . . The vehemence with which the developments in Beirut and Amman were attacked indicated more than moral resentment. It showed all too clearly the first of the repercussions on the Federal Republic of a world war, and even more plainly annoyance at the possibility that this country might have to make a decision between political and economic interests. One paper wrote frankly that it was a case of "German solidarity with the West or the Federal Republic's traditional friendship with Arab nations and our far-flung economic interests." German businessmen in Cairo were warning the Chancellor that if the Bonn government sided with the Americans this might mean the loss of valuable contracts for German industry.
>
> American pressure did get the Bonn Foreign Office to make a statement that the Lebanese and Jordanian landings were intended to ease tension in that area. . . . Simultaneously, however, the government's official Bulletin appeared with an article stressing the country's great regard for good relations with the Arab states.[11]

A similar conflict of incompatible pressures was ultimately to result in the severing of diplomatic relations with West Germany by ten Arab states. The political for a time gained ascendancy over the economic in the mid-sixties, and the Federal Republic's status as a member of the Western camp effaced its imputed neutrality, in the Near Eastern perspective. Several eventful years of German-Arab intercourse were to pass before that juncture was reached, however.

A Last Word on Adolf Hitler

The afterglow of Nazi influence had faded perceptibly in the Fertile Crescent by the mid-fifties. It was still strong

enough, even so, to merit brief mention here[12]--not least because of the classic instance of Oriental ambivalence which was developing with regard to Hitler and Nazism. This latter was in great measure the result of increasing exposure to the Soviet-bloc line.

On the one hand, as an instance of Hitler's continued high standing in the Near East as a world figure, there appeared in Beirut in 1960 the first full Arabic translation of Mein Kampf from the original.[13] According to its reviewer in Die Welt des Islams, "the book is . . . in its entire approach a prime example of the persistence of the National-Socialist ideology in the Arab East."[14] The translator's foreword compared Hitler's struggle with the present struggle against Communism and saw a source of assistance to the Arabs in Hitler's views and theories on nationalism, organization of government, and the race problem, the review added.

On the other hand, Nazism was being discredited, largely under Soviet influence, to the point that in the mid-sixties "Nazi Zionists" was a not uncommon term of vituperation in the word war with Israel.[15] The Soviet bloc thesis is that the legend of traditional friendship between the "exploiter class" of Germany and the Arab people, and the myth that Hitler's Germany aided the Arab cause by weakening the French and British imperialists, were both devised by West Germany to camouflage her "renewed neo-colonialist Near East expansion".[16]

The name of Adolf Hitler was also being used pejoratively, another "evidence of alien influence", in the words of Bernard Lewis. For example, "when Qasim called Nasir a Hitlerite, the name was a danger sign of Communist penetration in Baghdad; this was not part of the Arab vocabulary of abuse."[17, 18] Another example is provided by Arab press commentary on the 1964 U.S. presidential campaign:

> "Hitler on the Potomac" was the title of an editorial in Beirut's weekly mass-circulation [pro-U.A.R.] al-Usbu' al-Arabi. . . . "The chain of events which began in Germany in 1932 . . .carries resemblance to the beginning of events which have been taking place in the U.S."[19]

Still another, from al-Thawra (Damascus), pertained to the U.S. move into the Dominican Republic in 1965, which "reminds us of the prewar period when Hitler used to attack any country in Europe without regard to international agreements or possibility of war."[20]

A theme which has become increasingly insistent is the suffering of the Palestinian Arabs for Hitler's crimes:

> Because Hitler and his hangmen massacred the Jews the Arabs, settled on the sacred earth of Palestine for more than 2000 years, have been banished in order to install in their place Jews not all of whom have been persecuted.[21]

As will be seen, the discrediting of the Nazi regime was important to East Germany's winning a place in the Near East.[22] Its contention is that while the Federal Republic claims to be the legitimate representative for all Germany, the West German government is in fact the continuation of the invalidated Nazi regime of the Third Reich. The problem of the "two Germanies" as it affects the Fertile Crescent countries will be examined in a later section.

Orientalistik (Practical and Academic) as the Sixties Began

By 1960 nearly all of the prewar periodicals for German Oriental research had resumed publication.[23] Oriental studies in the Federal Republic were being carried out almost entirely under the auspices of university institutes and departments, most outstandingly at Göttingen, Tübingen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Heidelberg.[24] Libraries, foremost among which are the Bayrische Staatsbibliothek in Munich and the Westdeutsche Bibliothek (formerly the Preussische Staatsbibliothek), founded in 1588 and 1661, respectively, and museums and special collections offered further facilities for research.

In 1959 a Seminar für Orientalische Sprache along the lines of that which had been founded in Berlin in 1887 was set up in Bonn.[25] Its mission is to provide instruction in living Oriental languages for practical use, supplemented by courses on

the economies, cultures, and other aspects of the corresponding areas. Arabic, Turkish, Hindu, Urdu, Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, and Indonesian were being offered in the early sixties, with others to be added as demand arose. A diploma is awarded after six semesters and a successful examination. Students in Arabic may continue their work at the American University in Cairo or at that in Beirut.[26] There is also an interpreters' school attached to the University of Mainz and located at Germersheim. As of the mid-sixties no equivalent of the pre-World War I seminar in Berlin which trained consular personnel and businessmen for work in the Orient with notorious success, emphasizing legal usages and modern history as well as languages, had been developed. The opinion of the group of specialists who surveyed West German Oriental studies facilities in 1959 was that "the provision for living languages and cultures lags far behind that in France, England, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R."[27]

As regards the possibilities for employment after the traditional university training in Orientalistik, these have generally been confined to university faculties. The specialists mentioned above deplored this state of affairs, pointing out that

> Oriental studies, particularly those with emphasis on modern languages and cultures, ought to make possible careers in the foreign service, as cultural or commercial attachés, with press or radio, with publishing houses, or in business.[28]

The two problems of the limited success of the special institute for area and language studies and the limited adaptability of conventional university Orientalistik to the needs of the workaday world are unquestionably related to the crisis through which German universities are now passing.[29] The consequences of the rigidity of the German system in the face of the demands of the modern world are being felt in Near and Middle Eastern studies generally. For example, the principal difficulty faced by the new Deutsche Orient-Stiftung (see section on "Other Contacts" below) is the "lack of scientific experts":

> It is the basic demand of the Institute to regard expert knowledge of economics, sociology, history, education, law, geography, and ethnology--to mention just a few--together

> with Islamic studies and the respective languages as a prerequisite for all research work. This aspect represents, however, a special problem as regards the staff of the Institute, as the German universities do not yet comply with the demands of a double education (e.g., Social Science and Oriental Studies).[30, 31]

To facilitate both historical and current research in Arab, Semitic, and Islamic studies, the Deutsche Morgenlandgesellschaft in 1961 founded its Orient-Institut in Beirut. It continues the publishing work of the Bibliotheca Islamica, is issuing studies on living Middle Eastern dialects,[32] maintains an extensive library for use of all scholars, conducts various special projects such as a German-Arabic dictionary, provides fellowships for young German Orientalists, and maintains contact with the Arab academic community, some of whose members have been recruited for posts at German universities.[33]

In the German Democratic Republic, Berlin's Humboldt University is still the most important for Oriental studies. The Karl Marx University in Leipzig, a city which at one time was a major center for such studies, still has an Orientalisches Institut. There is reportedly no special institution in East Germany for the training of foreign service and trade officials for various areas; rather, candidates for such posts may specialize in languages and history of the Arab area at one of the universities, for example, and then take work in international trade or some other career field.[34]

The complaint is raised today in West Germany that too few experts on the Near and Middle East are in touch with current developments there. One West German observer regretted particularly the lack of understanding of the special problems faced by democratic movements in that area and the special nature of and need for nationalism there. Much of the misunderstanding, he flatly stated, can be traced to certain professors who have not left Germany for years.[35] A recent book by Bertold Spuler echoes the same thought:

> Binder's <u>The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East</u> sometimes seems overly critical, but nonetheless offers a thoroughly worthwhile and informative overall study,

> such as has never once been undertaken by any German university professor; thereby is only too clearly shown what an abyss separates almost the entirety of German Oriental studies from current developments in the very lands with which they are concerned.[36, 37]

Even while confessing that these accusations have some justification, Rudi Paret, Orientalist of Tübingen University, argues that there are unavoidably practical reasons for this state of affairs:

> It is true that many German Orientalists are not au courant of current developments in the Arab World. That stems in part from the fact that specialties within Oriental studies have multiplied impressively of late, and that it is no longer possible for a single specialist to become master of the whole field of study. . . . The modern Orient has become a specialty in itself. . . . I personally have always attempted to keep myself informed on the problems of the Orient today but must make it clear that this is possible only sporadically when one's main concern is the (if one may so put it) "classical Orientalistik". In addition, the travel required for such orientation in current affairs is so costly that an individual can hardly pay for it out of his own pocket. However, interest in current problems is not so limited as it may seem. Here in Tübingen some time ago we had a symposium, the papers from which were published in the booklet The World of Islam and the Present (Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart) in 1961.[38]

Dr. Paret closes this section of his letter with an optimistic note: "The current and oncoming generations of German Orientalists have been highly productive in the most varied specialties of their field and the best can be hoped for the future."[39]

Trade Triumphant

The factors which had characterized German-Arab trade in its two earlier periods of expansion were to be observed again in the 1950s. Once more, dependable quality for moderate prices, effective sales organization, generous facilities for payment (up to three years),[40] and loans at low interest attracted Arab customers.[41] The Arab nations' desire to avoid excessive dependence on "colonialist" Western sources of goods was also

still operating: "German firms can thank this political situation, along with their efficiency, for many a large contract," it was observed in the late fifties.[42]

Foreign comment on German-Arab trade also echoes that of earlier eras:

> While France went out like a lamb, West Germany came in like a lion. If France was irritated and cynical, Germany was buoyant, confident, and aggressive. . . . In the Middle East throughout 1956, you would find German merchants or contractors hard at work, successfully carving themselves a place in the sun. . . .
>
> One cause was simple competence. German consumer goods were the best on the market. The prices were low, the quality was excellent, and the servicing arrangements both courteous and elaborate. . . .
>
> More to the point, perhaps, she seemed to the Arabs to be prospering by the exploitation of Western fears and differences. . . . [and] recognizably different in temperament and intention from the great Western democracies.[43]

Even closer to the prewar cries of "economic absorption" was the Soviet commentary:

> German imperialism, which is based on the economic and political apparatus of the Federal Republic, is at present engaged in active expansion in foreign markets. . . . Revival and extension of colonial ambitions figure prominently in the postwar expansion of West German monopolies. . . . . The [monopolies'] endeavor to keep the poorly-developed lands as raw materials suppliers is associated with the negative attitude of the monopolist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany toward the industrialization of the independent, non-socialist states of Asia and Africa.[44]

Surveys of German-Arab economic relations in the sixties echoed faithfully the conclusions of those of the thirties:[45]

> Although of the Federal Republic's global foreign trade "only" 3.8% is with the Arab League, it must not be overlooked that a large portion of export sales of many individual firms are made in this area and therefore are greatly affected by the development of our economic relations with it.[46]

To such familiar features of German Near East trade have been added new elements. These fall into categories which might be identified as "intensification of earlier trends" and "elements peculiar to the post-World War II era".

Foremost among the intensified trends is West Germany's

"great and increasing reliance on foreign markets".[47] Her situation in this respect had become comparable to that of England: in 1956 imports constituted 13.8% of West Germany's gross national product and exports, 17.9%--as against 18.9% and 17.5%, respectively, of England's.[48]

Trade with developing countries showed so strong an upward trend that they were expected soon to be taking half of West Germany's exports, primarily capital goods.[49] These were likely to be accompanied by increasing "mental" exports--know-how and technical assistance of all kinds.

The growth of exports from West Germany to the Arab countries between 1951 and 1959 was fourfold. Imports by West Germany from the Arab countries more than doubled in the same period. (This period is comparable, in time relation to the ends of the respective world wars, to the period 1924-1932; increases between 1924 and 1932 were less dramatic, however, and reached their peak in 1929.)

The relative share of Germany in the trade of countries like Syria and Iraq, no longer in the mandate or tutelage relationships of the interwar period, increased perceptibly--from 3.7% (1937) to 10% (1960) and from 3.4% (1937) to 8% (1960), respectively. The all-German share in Near and Middle East foreign trade had decreased from an average of 17% (1937) to 10% in 1958, but a slow upward trend set in thereafter.[50]

A debit balance continues to be a feature of German-Near and Middle East trade:

> This debit balance has proportionately almost doubled in comparison with the time before the war. That is to say, from a share of about 10 per cent in the foreign trade turnover between the Near and Middle East and Germany to 18 per cent in 1959. From 1956 (15 per cent) up to at least 1960, the deficit balance continued to show an upward tendency.[51]

The deficit is traceable to West Germany's vast purchases from oil-producers. In 1964 petroleum purchases accounted for 80% of the total value of West Germany's imports from thirteen Arab countries and were half again as large, by value, as

German exports to those same countries (total imports from the thirteen Arab countries having, accordingly, twice the value of German exports to them).[52]

The most striking comparison which can be made between the interwar and post-World War II "share of trade" figures in Tables 4 to 7 below is that between the percentages representing the proportion formed by trade with Germany in total Near and Middle East trade and those showing the Near and Middle East's share in total German trade. Today's two Germanies, even with a far larger value and volume of trade (e.g., $7.1 billion in 1960 against $1.2 billion in 1937)[53] supply and buy a smaller portion of Near and Middle East goods than before World War II. This perhaps disturbing disparity is nowhere pointed out in German discussions of the subject seen. The emphasis is rather on the Near and Middle East's share in total German trade:

> The share of the Near and Middle East in the fictitious "all-German" foreign trade (Federal Republic and Soviet Zone) has considerably surpassed after the war the respective prewar share of the German Reich (5.5%). It amounted to an average of 8.8% in 1960.[54]

For their part, the Arab countries have become fond of vaunting that "the Federal Republic of Germany is more a customer than a supplier of the Arab countries"[55] and that West Germans need the Arab countries more than the Arabs need them. This line of thought is even extended into an argument that the West German aid program was forced into existence by the need to make up the deficit.[56]

Two developments peculiar to the post-World War II era which have had an effect on German-Arab trade relations are the evolution of the "two Germanies" and the creation of the state of Israel. These have troubled German-Arab trade to a lesser extent than diplomatic-political relations, however.

East Germany's gradual entry into Near East trade has been as much through economic need as political motivation, A. Michaelis has reminded those who choose to see only the latter aspect.[57] Still, as can be seen from Tables 4 and 5 below, the

TABLE 4

IMPORTS INTO FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES FROM WEST AND EAST GERMANY AS PERCENTAGES OF EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL IMPORTS, 1956-1965

Year		Lebanon[a]	Syria[b]	Jordan[a]	Iraq[b]	Total, Near & Middle East[b] (14 countries, including Greece)	
1937	(Reich)		5.2%	*	6.6%	19.7%	(12.7)
1956	W	7.0	9.6	8.9	9.2	11.7	(9.2)
	E	--	0.3	0.2	--	0.7	
1957	W	7.0	10.7	8.0	9.7	10.2	
	E	--	0.9	0.4	0.0+	0.9	
1958	W	7.4	11.5	11.0	11.5#	(13.4) 12.7	(9.8)
	E	--	1.2	0.9	0.1	1.2	
1959	W	8.0	13.3	12.1	8.6	13.5	
	E	0.4	1.1	1.9	0.5	1.0	
1960	W	8.4	12.2	10.9	8.9	12.5	(10.1)
	E	0.4	0.9	1.0	0.6	1.0	
1961[a]	W	7.3	11.3	9.2	9.4[c]	n/a	
	E	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.6		
1962	W	6.5	11.3	9.2	11.1	9.9	
	E	0.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.6	
1963[a]	W	9.1	13.2	8.1	9.5[c]	n/a	
	E	0.35	0.5	0.5	0.7		
1964[a]	W	9.5	9.9	8.2	8.5[c]	n/a	
	E	0.4	0.7	2.5	0.9		
1965[a]	W	8.1	11.3	9.0	9.5	n/a	
	E	0.5	0.7	1.5	0.8		

[a] Unless otherwise indicated, calculated from data in the United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

[b] Unless otherwise indicated, percentages for years 1937, 1956-1960, and 1962 taken from J. Meier, op. cit., p. 163, and "Deutschlands Orienthandel", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 4/5 (September 1965), p. 127.

[c] Statistisches Bundesamt, Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 11.

* Trade statistics included with those of Palestine prior to World War II.

\# Figures in parentheses are values given in "Deutschlands Orienthandel", Orient, VI, Nos. 4/5, pp. 126-32, when they differ from those of cited source by 1% or more. The trade statistics used in the calculation for "Total, Near and Middle East" included those for North Africa in this study but not in the one by Meier (see footnote b above).

\+ $100,000 value represented.

n/a = not available -- = nonexistent or negligible.

TABLE 5

EXPORTS TO WEST AND EAST GERMANY FROM FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES AS PERCENTAGES OF EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS, 1956-1965

Year		Lebanon[a]	Syria[b]	Jordan[a]	Iraq[b]	Total, Near & Middle East[b] (14 countries, including Greece)	
1937 (Reich)		1.5%		*	1.2%	14.7%	(10.5)
1956	W	2.6	5.9	0.1	6.7	6.8	
	E	--	0.2	--	--	0.6	
1957	W	3.6	5.4	0.1	6.5	6.4	
	E	--	0.4	--	--	0.8	
1958	W	3.2	2.4	0.2	9.0	6.4	
	E	--	0.9	--	--	0.8	
1959	W	2.0	2.5	0.16	9.4	8.6	
	E	0.4	0.4	--	0.0+	0.7	
1960	W	0.8	3.9	0.2	10.2	8.8	(10.6)
	E	0.9	--	(1.9)# --	0.2	1.4	(0.6)
1961[a]	W	0.5	3.1	0.1	9.1[c]	n/a	
	E	0.3	--	--	--		
1962	W	3.4	6.7	0.1	11.3	9.4	
	E	0.5	0.6	--	0.0+	0.4	
1963[a]	W	4.4	2.5	0.06	9.9[c]	n/a	
	E	1.2	0.8	--	--		
1964[a]	W	3.0	2.3	0.04	8.4[c]	n/a	
	E	0.8	0.5	--	--		
1965[a]	W	2.3	3.1	0.06	7.3	n/a	
	E	1.3	0.4	--	--		

[a] Unless otherwise indicated, calculated from data in the United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

[b] Unless otherwise indicated, percentages for years 1937, 1956-1960, and 1962 taken from J. Meier, op. cit., p. 163, and "Deutschlands Orienthandel", Orient, VI, No. 4/5, p. 127.

[c] Statistisches Bundesamt, Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 11.

* Trade statistics included with those of Palestine prior to World War II.

\+ Value of $300,000 or less represented.

\# Figures in parentheses are values given in "Deutschlands Orienthandel", Orient, VI, No. 4/5, pp. 126-32, when they differ from those of cited source by 1% or more.

n/a = not available

-- = nonexistent or negligible.

TABLE 6a

IMPORTS INTO WEST AND EAST GERMANY FROM THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL WEST AND EAST GERMAN IMPORTS, 1956-1960

Year		Syria	Iraq	Near & Middle East (14 countries, including Greece)
1937 (Reich)		--	0.0%*	4.8%
1956	W	0.2%	0.9	6.3
	E	0.1	--	2.4
1957	W	0.1*	0.5	5.6
	E	0.0	--	2.4
1958	W	0.1#	1.0	6.1
	E	0.1##	--	2.8
1959	W	0.0+	1.0*	6.7
	E	0.0++	0.0	2.5
1960	W	0.1	0.9	6.4
	E	0.1	0.1	2.3

Source: J. Meier, op. cit., pp. 164-65. Lebanon and Jordan were not included because of their limited trade with East Germany.

* Value of $800,000 or less represented.

\# Value of $9,200,000 represented. ## Value of $1,000,000.

\+ Value of $3,700,000 represented. ++ Value of $400,000.

TABLE 6b

WEST GERMAN IMPORTS FROM FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES, 1963-1965

(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

Year	Lebanon	Syria	Jordan	Iraq	FC, U.A.R. Sudan, Arab Penin., N. Africa	Total, W. German Exports
1963	4,920	6,151	44	72,093	552,460	13,094,000
1964	5,258	3,979	64	94,819	768,220	14,613,400
1965	6,008	8,070	196	81,757	880,131	17,472,200

Sources: "Statistiques comparées des échanges commerciaux des pays arabes avec l'Allemagne Fédérale au cours des trois dernières années", Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 12, and United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

TABLE 7a

EXPORTS FROM WEST AND EAST GERMANY TO THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL WEST AND EAST GERMAN EXPORTS, 1956-1960

Year		Syria	Iraq	Near & Middle East (14 countries, including Greece)
1937 (Reich)		0.1%	0.1%	6.2%
1956	W	0.3	0.3	6.8
	E	0.1	--	2.0
1957	W	0.2#	0.3	6.3
	E	0.2##	--	2.8
1958	W	0.3	0.4*	7.0
	E	0.1	0.0*	2.9
1959	W	0.2	0.3	6.7
	E	0.1	0.1	2.9
1960	W	0.2	0.3	6.5
	E	0.1	0.1	2.4

Source: See Table 6a.

Value of $18,700,000 represented.

Value of $3,200,000 represented.

* Value of $700,000 represented.

TABLE 7b

WEST GERMAN EXPORTS TO FERTILE CRESCENT COUNTRIES, 1963-1965

(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

Year	Lebanon	Syria	Jordan	Iraq	FC, U.A.R., Sudan, Arab Penin., N. Africa	Total, W. German Exports
1963	38,342	28,076	10,618	27,826	358,550	14,627,800
1964	41,840	23,028	9,849	30,140	385,735	16,215,000
1965	48,654	23,101	12,799	39,640	411,260	17,892,400

Sources: See Table 6b.

East German share in the trade of the Fertile Crescent has rarely risen above 1%. Its share of overall Communist bloc Middle Eastern trade is also comparatively small, even though "the Middle East has become a good market for goods from the East European countries and their sales there have risen considerably."[58]

Between 1960 and 1965, East Germany stood third from last in the East bloc list (including China) in terms of value of trade with the Middle East, midway between Yugoslavia, with a share of 10%, and Bulgaria, with 3.5%.[59] Hence, the threat to West Germany's place in the Fertile Crescent economically, up to the end of 1965, was not serious.[60]

Nonetheless, trade with Arab nations represented nearly half of the German Democratic Republic's trade with developing countries (45% in 1957 and 40% in 1960).[61] Equipment for entire industrial plants of various kinds was included among East German exports--but lest a purely commercial, profit-seeking motive be assumed, it is explained by the East-bloc publication from which this information was taken that the aim is aid:

> Unlike the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany tries to increase its exports to these lands without a corresponding increase in imports. . . . Such "trade" delays the development of the national economy of the developing countries, makes chronic debtors of them, and eventually exhausts their reserves of currency.
>
> The cooperation of the GDR with the economically poorly developed lands is not limited to trade. Long-term and commercial credits are extended to these countries for the constuction of industrial plants and acquisition of complete installations, machinery, and equipment.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> According to the German press, over 100 extensive industrial installations have been or are being set up [ca. 1961] with the help of the GDR in the UAR, Syria, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Burma, Guinea, and Ghana.[62]

As for the second distinctive element in post-World War II German-Arab relations, West German dealings with Israel have had economic repercussions as well as political. The mild form taken by the boycott threatened by the Arab League after the reparations agreement of 1952 went into effect has been mentioned (page 168). In the ensuing years only three West German firms were blacklisted for doing business in or with Israel.[63] With the cresting of the crisis which ended in the rupture in relations in the spring of 1965, however, upwards of fifty companies, four banks, and several shipping lines were added to the boycott. Even so, six months later the West Germans reported little ap-

parent diminution in their Near East trade.[64] "The preponderance of economic considerations was too great," remarked H. L. Kaster.[65] A year later, the Arabs themselves were making the same observations:

> It is noteworthy that the cooling of political relations has not influenced economic ties. In fact, paradoxically, the opposite has occurred. The traffic in goods with the greater part of the Arab countries has reached a level higher than that of the past.[66]

The trade agreements which had characterized the early phase of resumption of trade with the Near East had outlived their usefulness by the sixties. West German importation and exportation was allowed to develop virtually without restriction except for that which might derive from the Federal Republic's membership in the Common Market.[67]

Investment and Aid

Overshadowed by trade and aid, private West German investment in the Fertile Crescent countries is in any case not impressive. For the record, figures issued by the Ministry of Economy for 1952-1965 are given below:

TABLE 8

ANNUAL AND TOTAL PRIVATE WEST GERMAN INVESTMENT IN THE NATIONS OF THE FERTILE CRESCENT, 1952-1965
(in millions of Deutschemark: DM4 = ca. $1.)

Year	Lebanon	Syria	Jordan	Iraq
1952-55	0.4	--	--	0.9
1956	0.1	1.2	--	0.3
1957	2.5	1.8	--	0.1
1958	0.4	--	--	1.2
1959	1.1	0.1	--	0.2
1960	2.4	--	--	0.3
1961	0.1	--	--	0.1
1962	0.4	6.4	--	0.3
1963	2.8	0.4	--	--
1964	0.7	0.2	--	0.3
1952-65 (total)	6.7	10.3	0.6	3.4

Source: V. Hakim, op. cit., p. 24.[68] -- = nonexistent or negligible.

These amounts should be compared with a total of nearly 8 billion Deutschemark invested by private West German interests throughout the world. Of this total, about two and a half billion are invested in developing countries; just over 150 million, or two per cent of the whole, are invested in Arab countries. Of the latter, just over 50 million went to Algeria and to Libya, just under 20 million to Egypt, and, as can be seen from Table 8, a like amount to the four Arab Fertile Crescent nations.[69, 70] Examples of West German private investment will be included in the sections on individual countries below.

The Federal Republic has adopted a number of measures to encourage private business to invest overseas. They include export guarantees, easy-term credits through the German Development Company (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), the assumption of risks unavoidable in foreign investments, the development-aid tax law, and the conclusion of agreements for the elimination of double taxation. By the end of 1964 credits, investments, and guaranteed export credits had reached a net total of DM 1.8 billion--that is, more than six times the amount of accrued commitments for technical assistance, or about 86% of the accrued capital aid commitments. These were distributed in the Fertile Crescent as follows:[71]

Country	Credits & Investments (net) (in millions of Deutschemark)	Guaranteed Export Credits
Lebanon	7.8	11.1
Syria	3.1	40.3
Jordan	0.5	0.5
Iraq	3.7	139.8
Total, Arab States	154.3	991.0

Central to the insurance against commercial and political risks in both exportation of West German goods and services and execution of projects in developing countries is the Hermes Kreditversicherungs-A.G. (Hamburg), in association with the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand A.G. (Frankfurt). The firm was

formed by a group of banks with government participation and has only administrative functions. Decisions concerning assumption of risks for both exports and projects are taken by an Interministerial Commission for Export Guarantees aided by Hermes representatives in a consulting capacity.[72] Insurance customarily covers only 80% of the total amount involved. In April 1965 it was estimated that insurance in effect for contracts in Arab lands amounted to about DM 2 billion, half of which applied to trade with and construction in the U.A.R.[73] As of 1966 there had been no difficulties over payment in normal commercial transactions with the Fertile Crescent countries.[74]

The German Development Company is charged with encouraging medium-sized German industries to invest in developing countries, by participating and by extending loans with equity features. The government clearly looks to business to build up long-term economic relations. Minister of Economic Cooperation Scheel declared in Bonn on May 14, 1965, as the resolution for the termination of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic by ten Arab states was being put into effect, that

> it would be desirable that private business maintain and even consolidate their contacts with the countries of the Near East. In this way they could make a valuable contribution towards the normalization of relations. I firmly believe that we shall be able to reach this goal in the foreseeable future.[75, 76]

With scarcely ten years of operation behind them in 1965, West German aid programs and policy were still seeking their most effective form as the decade 1956-1965 ended.[77] The overall aid program had originated from three separate activities: consultation and training, contributions to multilateral agencies engaged in development work (not considered by Bonn as aid on its part but as an aspect of international finance), and export financing. Their counterparts in current practice are technical assistance, capital aid, and guaranteeing of export credits (the last having been dealt with in the pages immediately preceding).

In 1953 DM 500,000 was allocated by Bonn to send German

experts abroad. However, genuine foreign aid, in the form of technical assistance, is considered to have begun with the arrival in West Germany of the first officially-sponsored technical trainees from developing countries in 1956. With the aim of "mobilizing the developing countries' own energies"[78] by training local instructors and managers to take over and disseminate new knowledge and practices, training facilities (such as vocational schools) and model installations (such as farms) were offered. Only one of each type was proposed per region; planners, advisers, and experts were the responsibility of the Federal Republic, the land and facilities that of the recipient country. By 1960, when pressure for capital aid had forced official and public attention toward formulation of an aid policy, the federal and state governments of West Germany were spending about DM 30 million per year on technical assistance of all types.[79]

Although the public works financed by the far vaster sums of capital aid in the years since 1960 are the more conspicuous, about 90% of the projects which make up West Germany's aid program still fall into the category of technical assistance.[80] As of 1965, about 7% of the total of DM 940 million committed to technical assistance to that date was assigned to the "Arab countries in Asia". (More than twice that amount was committed to the "Arab countries of Africa".)[81] Allocations to the Crescent were: Jordan, DM 19 million; Syria, DM 18.5 million; Iraq, DM 10.5 million; and Lebanon, DM 6.5 million.[82] Only about a third of the commitments had been disbursed, however.

Between 1956 and 1965 over 5000--or better than half of the total--of the skilled foreign workers who received advanced training in West Germany came from the Near and Middle East. Syria and Jordan were represented in this number by a relatively small percentage, the largest group having come from Egypt.[83] In addition to problems of selection and adjustment similar to those experienced with university-level students (see section on "Other Contacts" below), there has been criticism that "the training has not greatly enchanced the trainees' prospects in their homelands."[84]

(This same difficulty has confronted graduates of German-run vocational schools in the Fertile Crescent.[85]) It is also contended by some West German observers that the foreign student is often disappointed "because we give them skills but no spiritual values to go with them."[86, 87]

The forms other than training of skilled workers which West German technical assistance has taken are too numerous and varied to permit itemization here. Instances will be given in the sections below on the individual countries.

Policy for capital aid has passed through several stages during the brief period in which the Federal Republic has been engaged in it. Seeking to benefit from the lessons of its "unhappy and embarrassing experience of the early years of Rourkela [steel mill project in India]," the West German government attempted to lay down firm principles and criteria, with careful definition of limited objectives, when their aid program was launched: their hope was to stimulate improvements in administration and economic stability.[88] However,

> the attempt has not always been so successful as it might have been largely because of the countervailing reluctance to become involved in the planning, selection, and administration of projects, but there are signs that the Germans are now . . . relaxing their general principles in favor of a more direct and complex involvement in the process of development.[89]

The Federal Republic still tries to concentrate its development assistance on regions whose economic and social structures promise optimum effectiveness of long-term, intensive aid, a West German development official has countered. Further, its "involvement in the process of development" now extends to advance studies to determine the social assistance needed "to help traditional societies to adapt themselves to the new techniques and organization of production."[90]

As a declared principle, aid has been given without political conditions; in practice, the quantity tended to be limited when the political climate was unfavorable.[91] Until 1965, it was also the policy that technical aid should not interfere

with West German economic interests and with business, although such "interference" cannot be entirely avoided.[92, 93]

In accordance with the approach which had been evolved in the early sixties, capital aid was extended for infrastructure projects which do not attract private investors as not yielding direct profits, or which are beyond the capacity of private firms.[94] It is furnished on a loan basis, while technical assistance is as a rule on a grant basis. Capital aid from the Federal Republic is project-tied and is given only when the recipient countries themselves are ready to contribute funds or some other counterpart factor by agreement.[95]

By the end of 1964, DM 8.6 billion had been committed to capital aid, of which DM 410 million, or less than 5%, had been earmarked for the "Arab countries of Asia".[96] Of this, DM 350 million was to go to Syria under the Euphrates Dam agreement (see "Syria and West Germany" below). Fifty million had been assigned to Jordan[97] and 7 million to Lebanon.[98] (The "Arab countries of Africa" received between 550 and 650 million.[99]) A rate of interest of less than 3% on these government-to-government loans, and repayment periods averaging nineteen years, are typical.[100] There had been no significant repayment difficulties with the Fertile Crescent countries as of 1966, but no large loans had been given and most of those smaller loans which had been made, had not yet fallen due.[101]

Directly or indirectly related to capital aid are the contracts received by West German construction firms from the developing countries. It is, in fact, the industry's contention that the general public in such countries is not aware of the sources of capital aid for development projects but that they are cognizant of the nationalities of the firms which carry out the work. Between 1950 and 1966, 1064 contracts to a total value of DM 4.85 billion (German portion only) were awarded to German construction firms by eighty-two countries (sixty-two of them classed as "developing"). Forty-nine per cent of these contracts were with Asian governments, Pakistan, Thailand, and Iraq leading the list.[102]

About 1960, "no doubt spurred on by Communist China's reasonable success in tying economic aid to at least partial recognition of the Peking regime, East Germany increased her effort in the aid field."[103] As for technical assistance, "more than 150 experts from the German Democratic Republic were working in developing countries in 1960, and over 1,000 students, apprentices, and workers were being trained in the schools, workshops, and laboratories of the Republic."[104] East German aid statistics are, unfortunately, customarily merged with those for all East European countries, which "give the Soviet Union considerable assistance in the Middle East and Asia but leave most of the effort in Africa to Russia."[105] The total of East European economic credits and grants to the Middle East as of December 1964 was $392 million, with $34 million going to Iraq and $48 million to Syria.[106]

Assistance programs which are generally of a "very valuable grass-roots type" are also conducted by the churches of Germany.[107] Assisted by a contribution of DM 16 million from Bonn, by a charitable fund-raising movement called Brot für die Welt (Bread for the World), and innumerable other charitable and fund-raising activities, they are to be found in all of the Fertile Crescent countries except Iraq.[108] Two examples, from Syria, will be cited here; others will appear in the sections below on individual countries. An undertaking of major importance to the Kalamun district between Damascus and Homs was the Lutheran Hospital, al-Nabk. Turned over to the Lutheran synod of Syria and Lebanon by the Danish Orient Mission in 1959, the hospital could be only inadequately staffed until the organization Dienste im Übersee (Service Overseas) provided a German chief physician and five German nursing sisters in early 1965. Extensions and improvements were made in the facilities and a nursing school created.[109] Since 1963 the Lutheran World Service had, moreover, maintained polyclinics for the Palestinian refugees in the Damascus area.

The question of development aid has inspired copious dis-

cussion at all levels in West Germany. Opinions in the mid-sixties ranged from the contention that

> we ought to seek out a place at the head of the development aid movement. As an industrial nation unburdened by colonialism we are predestined for such a role.[110]

to second thoughts in this vein: "The question--is it not?--is whether, after all, the giving of credits proves to be more of a curse than a blessing."[111] Why, how, and to whom aid should be given, and in what form, how waste of funds and effort might be prevented, whether the ideological bases of the governments of the needy lands should be considered, whether the German people should delude themselves that the aid given as loans would ever be repaid, whether increased purchases, especially of manufactured products, might not be the sounder way of aiding developing nations--all these have been endlessly debated.[112] Rivalry with the German Democratic Republic entered in: a 1960 article dwelt on the desirablility of devoting at least as much attention as did East Germany to the selection of consular personnel, to scholarships, to aid on the spot, and to supporting of raw materials prices as being of at least as great importance as direct help.[113]

The 1965 termination of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic by ten Arab countries was felt by many West Germans to be a failure of aid policy, particularly in respect to the U.A.R. The attitude adopted by the Bonn government was, however, that aid policy "can be conceived only as a long-term task" and should not be tied to diplomatic and political developments.[114]

A listing of West German governmental and private organizations associated with development aid is provided, with brief explanations of function, in Appendix D.

Other Contacts

Closely allied to technical assistance is the acceptance of foreign students for advanced study in Germany. Their numbers increased by six times between 1944 and 1960: 1954-1955,

1746; 1957-1958, 5811; 1959-1960, 10,315.[115] Nearly half come from the Near and Middle East; the Greek, Iranian, and Egyptian contingents tend to be the largest. In 1964 there were enrolled at West German universities and technical colleges 4283 Arab students, of whom 1200 were Syrians, 795 Iraqis, 631 Jordanians, and 271 Lebanese.[116]

West Germany claims to have the largest number of foreign students in relation to its total population of any Western nation.[117] That its education system, struggling to overcome the triple burden of replacing destroyed facilities and accommodating ever-larger upcoming classes, while at the same time modernizing its educational plant, has been able to cope with this special additional problem is in itself an achievement. Means of reducing the high failure rate (over 50%--twice that of the German students) are being sought. Inadequate preparation is felt to be a major, and remediable, cause:

> It is absolutely inaccurate to maintain that the nationals of one country or another are incapable of holding their own in higher German schools. During a conference of academic personnel concerned with foreign students at the German Student Exchange Bureau in Bonn it was, in fact, reported that at some technical colleges the average grade of the foreign students on the exams is higher than that of the German examinees.[118]

More extensive use of the Goethe-Institut's facilities to improve command of the German language before study in a specialty begins is recommended; improved selection procedures and a more congenial atmosphere among the general population based on greater knowledge of foreign lands and peoples are earnestly to be desired.[119] Shortage of student housing has been a particular problem.

East Germany, if the Neues Deutschland correspondent interviewed is accurately informed, has none of these problems. None of the foreign students in the German Democratic Republic fail at their studies. The Gottfried-Herder-Institut provides them with the necessary level of skill in German by the most modern methods, usually in one year of intensive study. Modern and comfortable student residences, often shared with German students, are provided for all. Rostock is a major center for foreigners

studying in the G.D.R.[120] As with East German aid to the Middle East, the only figures seen on foreign students in East Germany were totals lumping all East European countries together: in all, there were 1310 academic students from the Middle East in East Europe as of December 1963.[121]

Resumption and expansion of the work of the Goethe-Institut was noted in Chapter V. Average numbers of enrollees at its Fertile Crescent branches in 1961 were: Amman, 100; Bagdad, 450; Beirut, 460; and Damascus, 280. (These have become Cultural Institutes, with libraries and special programs.) A branch was later opened in Aleppo, only to be closed again in mid-1965. The very active cultural program for its overseas center, primarily musical groups and soloists, was inaugurated in 1961. According to Institut officials, their primary problem is not promoting interest in German language and culture, but "to wisely direct the rush of language students and their sympathies". The demand is so great that emphasis has had to be placed on the training of native instructors to help carry the load. Most of the centers also offer courses in the local languages (preponderantly Arabic) for German nationals as a contribution to the exchange relationship which they seek to establish.[122]

The Deutsche Welle (German World Service) in the mid-sixties was offering two 85-minute programs a day in Arabic, one among the two dozen languages in which it broadcast in addition to German. It maintains an Arab correspondent in Beirut.

As mentioned in Chapter V, a successor organization to the interwar Deutsche Orient-Verein was founded in 1950. To expand its usefulness, this Nah- und Mittelost Verein in 1960 created the Orient-Stiftung. A "study center for contemporary problems and developments in the Near and Middle East region", it has as its province research on the "modern Orient by means of area studies on an interdisciplinary basis".[123] With the aid of four ministries of the Bonn government, the Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer, and ten other institutes, a Center for Near and Middle East Documentation was set up as an adjunct to the

Orient-Stiftung in 1965 (although it was not opened until May 1966).[124] Numerous other organizations, governmental and semi-governmental, also gathered and disseminated information on the Near East and made "special reports within the framework of German development aid and encouragement of German private investment by means of proposals, verifications, and assistance."[125] These included the Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation and the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft, both in Cologne.

As was pointed out in the Preface, post-World War II publication in German of books for the general public on the Near and Middle East has been circumscribed. Competent observers have, further, pronounced the products "regrettably undistinguished".[126] The cause was sought partly in the lack of interest on the part of the German public, despite the "indefeasible interrelationship between European and Near Eastern political life",[127] and partly in the predominantly journalistic nature of current books.

Magazines published in West Germany for readers of Arabic include the Orient-Post (Barid al-Sharq) of the Bundespresse in Cologne; Fikrun wa Fann of the Übersee-Verlag in Hamburg with the aid of subsidies from the federal government's cultural section; and Scala by the Societäts-Druckerei in Frankfurt am Main for the federal government (this periodical appears in half a dozen other languages as well).[128]

On the East German side, there is a German-Arab Friendship Society which brings out an illustrated magazine in Arabic intended to "counteract the lies and slander spread by Bonn about the German Democratic Republic".[129] The G.D.R., also, maintains cultural institutes in the capitals where it has consulates and sends occasional "cultural exchange" groups such as its massive Dresden Philharmonic Orchestra. Radio-Berlin International broadcasts to the Near and Middle East.[130]

Exchange of visits by delegations is a form of contact much practiced by both Germanies. For example, between 1956 and 1965 some 300 government officials and other leaders took part in the international meetings and seminars of the German Foundation for Developing Countries (Deutsche Stiftung für

Entwicklungsländer), and 140 mayors from Syria and Lebanon, among others, have attended West German conferences on local government.[131] Tours by amateur German athletic teams for competitions and exhibition games in the Near and Middle East are another example.

The Problem of the "Two Germanies" and the Fertile Crescent Countries

Censuring of "Bonn's bumbling in the Middle East",[132] not only on the part of foreigners but also on the part of West Germany's business community, has been widespread since early 1965.[133] It should be appreciated, however, that the Federal Republic has had to conduct its relations with the Arab world under two unrelated but overwhelming pressures--so overwhelming to the Bonn government that it may have been incapable of perceiving that the pressures are not so obvious to outsiders. One is the desire to prevent the division of the "German nation" into two distinct states from becoming permanent. The existence of "two Germanies" has had far-reaching effects on West German foreign relations:

> The basic dilemma of German policy . . . resides in the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is regarded, because of its economic, financial, and military strength, as a suitable and welcome partner in international conflicts by both its allies and by numerous neutral states; on the other hand, as part of a divided land, it considers itself to be limited in its political maneuvering for an indefinite period of time.[134]

The other pressure has been the compulsion to remove the stigma of Nazi anti-Semitism from the German people insofar as this may be possible. It is an ultimate irony that in accepting this burden, as East Germany has not, West Germany has provided support for the Pankow government's contention that the Bonn government is a continuation of the Nazi regime and its claim to be the only legitimate spokesman for the entire German nation therefore invalid.

These pressures have affected German relations with the Fertile Crescent countries since the early fifties, when, as has

been seen, aid to Israel became an issue. The question of recognition of and diplomatic relations with the Pankow government became critical a little later, concurrently with the extension of the Cold War to the Near East.

In contrast to West Germany's alleged lack of a clear policy with regard to the Near and Middle East, its Hallstein Doctrine with respect to recognition of East Germany "has been the cornerstone of West German policy since 1955."[135] According to this Doctrine, as initially enunciated, any country choosing to recognize East Germany as an independent state would automatically forfeit relations with the Federal Republic, including all forms of economic assistance. It is credited by some observers with having hindered recognition of East Germany in a large part of the world--not least, the Near and Middle East. Others judge it to have been "of greater embarrassment than usefulness".[136, 137]

While the Federal Republic had sought since the mid-fifties to prevent international acceptance of the phenomenon of "two Germanies" through the Hallstein Doctrine,

> only with the onset of the sixties did [West] German foreign policy discover a second instrument for promoting its claim to sole representation of the German nation: development aid. . . . Nonetheless, the two tools were not sufficient to keep the Democratic Republic in political quarantine.[138, 139]

One hindrance to the effectiveness of the "two tools" was the fact that "outside the Atlantic World the problem of the two parts of Germany seems remote, and this is the first point that the Bonn government must grasp if its policies in the Third World are to be salvaged."[140] Few Arab politicians, not to mention the masses, had a clear picture of Germany's 1937 boundaries or the process by which the division had occurred.[141] These considerations notwithstanding, the West Germans were firm in their standpoint:

> Naturally we expect from our friends that they respect the primary premise of our policy-making: that reunification is of vital importance to us and that it would be a major step toward the reduction of tension in the world. A reunited Germany could place considerably more resources at the disposal of developing countries than is now the case.[142]

"Given this stand by West Germany, it is incredible that Bonn has failed to understand the Arabs' similar sensitivity regarding Israel"[143]--it must be conceded. Bonn seems to have perceived belatedly that the Hallstein Doctrine provided the Arab countries with a ready means of retaliation in the event that their sensitivity regarding Israel was violated,[144] but it was nonetheless not prepared with a carefully-considered plan of action. The ultimate result of this crossing of purposes and Bonn's unpreparedness was the severing of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic by ten Arab countries. (The chain of events which led thereto will be traced in a later section.)

In the meantime, what were the relations of the German Democratic Republic with the Fertile Crescent countries, aside from those of trade and others already touched on?

"What is surprising," reflected a contributor to The New Leader in early 1965, "is that it took the USSR and Ulbricht so long to capitalize on the opportune link between anti-Zionism and recognition of East Germany."[145] The establishment of branches of the G.D.R.'s Handelsbank in Cairo, Khartoum, and Damascus, and the setting up of a consulate in the last-named city, in the late fifties had been followed in January 1959 by the visit of Minister-President Otto Grotewohl and a twenty-five-man delegation to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.[146] Later in 1959 a consulate-general was opened in Cairo--not without strenuous protests from Bonn. When, in 1962, Iraq decided to exchange consuls with East Germany, the occurrence had become a familiar one, and "the West German Foreign Office expressed its satisfaction on Iraq's assurance that it will not recognize East Germany."[147]

In September 1963 the Egyptian political weekly Rose al Youssef reported that

> East Germany has made several offers to the Arab states, including a pledge never to recognize the state of Israel if they extend recognition to the East German regime. The offers were made during a recent visit to East Germany by League Secretary-General Abdel Khaleq Hassouna.[148]

A year later the vice-president of the German Democratic

Republic, Heinrich Homann, was reported as making a tour of the Arab countries "to acquaint them with his country's point of view with regard to Arab affairs and international matters."[149] Earlier, in July, an East German parliamentary delegation had visited Syria, where it issued statements regarding the East German stand on Israel:

> The delegation confirmed having no political or economic relations with Israel, saying that they considered this country, as Arab countries do, an imperialist base specifically created for brewing trouble and preventing Arabs from achieving unity . . . . [and] repeatedly denied that "any other German state" was a friend of the Arabs apart from East Germany, saying that West Germany really followed an imperialist policy.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Finally, the delegation said cultural and economic relations between their respective countries could be strengthened, suggesting that Syria could support East Germany's views at international organizations and approve acceptance of the latter by these organizations.[150]

Following West Germany's recognition of Israel in May 1965, al-Baath (Damascus) published an East German statement which "condemned the steps the German Federal Republic had taken to recognize the 'bandit' government of Israel. The statement also explained the 'imperialist and aggressive aims' of the West German government in so doing."[151]

After the rupture in diplomatic relations between ten member states of the Arab League and the Federal Republic, these expressions of sympathy were not forgotten. The Assistant Secretary-General of the League spent ten days in talks at high levels in the Democratic Republic in November 1965, returning assured that "the German Democratic Republic fully supports Arab policy and issues, especially the cause of Arab unity and the liberation cause of Palestine, . . ."[152] He was also impressed with the "scope for cooperation between the German Democratic Republic and the Arab countries."[153]

Nonetheless, a year and a half after the diplomatic break none of the ten Arab states had formally recognized the G.D.R. "Their failure to do so," explained an editorial in The Daily

Star (Beirut), "stems from their genuine belief that they cannot accept the partitioning of any country just as they could not condone the division of Palestine into an Arab sector and an Israeli one."[154]

The topic of the "two Germanies" ought not be left behind without a word about the real and the merely apparent similarities between certain aspects of the German and Arab situations, and the rational and irrational intertwining of the influences which have produced, or are thought to have produced, these similarities. The emotional charge which many of the elements involved carry further contributes to the complexity of German-Arab relations.

For example, in November 1958 the pro-U.A.R. newspaper Beirut-Massa declared: "The U.S. and Britain are against German unity the way they are against Arab unity."[155] Upon the occasion of a visit by the Deputy Mayor of Berlin in May 1959, Beirut's pro-U.A.R. al-Kifah commented on Germany's divided condition,

> not only because it is the problem of a nation struggling for liberation, but because that problem in many respects resembles the Arab problem. The German nation's motto today is unity and freedom. It is the same as the motto which is imprinted on the struggle of the Arab nations.[156, 157]

On the other hand, in August 1961 when the wall dividing Berlin went up, there was little hint in the Arab press (at least as reported by The Arab World) of any sense of parallel to the divided status of Jerusalem, later pointed out by the Jordanian press (see section on "Jordan" below).

Even West German success in absorbing refugees and the Arab failure (seen from one point of view) at the same task has led to comparison:

> Both groups--the 8 million German and the half million Arabs . . .--lost their homes as a result of war. . . . In six to eight years the West Germans had resettled the refugees from across the Iron Curtain and had integrated them into the life of the community. West Germany, of course, had considerable resources . . . but the Germans had to do the job on their own.[158]

This "intertwining" of the Arab and German problems is

not entirely due to chance, Franz Böhm, the professor who had served as head of the West German delegation during the reparations negotiations with Israel, has observed. On the negative side, West Germany was the only country which could be drawn into the "Arab net" because of the opportunity for bringing pressure to bear which its own Hallstein Doctrine provided to the Arabs. On the positive side, Germany, whether as Reich or as Republic, was not involved in the founding of the state of Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and was therefore one of the few Western states to be trusted. And, of course, the Third Reich's persecution of the Jews evoked sympathetic echoes in the minds of postwar as well as of prewar anti-Zionists, but

> whether it was really supposed in well-informed circles in the Arab lands that the mass of Germans, including the political leadership, continued to believe in the correctness of Hitler's policy, approved it, and wished only that it might be reapplied at the first opportunity, would be difficult to establish.[159]

The fading of the Arabs' illusion that "support, or at least tolerance and refraining from frustration of their anti-Israel policy,"[160] could be expected from West Germany will be chronicled in the next two sections.

West German Relations with Israel

The melody to which the irregular contacts between the Arabs and the German Democratic Republic formed a counterpoint was, of course, the equally irregular relationship between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. To provide background for the discussion of the diplomatic break of May 1965, the latter is sketched out chronologically below:

1951: (September) Declaration before West German Bundestag of proposed program of reparations to the Jewish people.[161]

1952 (April) to 1953 (March): Negotiations leading up to, and final ratification of, agreement to provide $715 million in goods and services to Israel and $107 million to the Conference on Jewish Material claims over a period of twelve to fourteen years. (The text of the reparations agreement was published on September 14.)[162]

1952: (November) Formal guarantees by West Germany that no strategic goods would be provided to Israel under the reparations agreement. West German government's protests against ultimatum nature of threat of Arab economic boycott.[163, 164]

(For the next few years the official stance was to be based on Chancellor Adenauer's statement that the Germans desired friendship with the Arab states but could not do otherwise than go through with the reparations agreement.[165])

1956: (May) Israeli proposal that a West German agency with consular powers be established in Israel preparatory to development of normal diplomatic relations. West German refusal in consideration of anticipated Arab reaction.[166]

1958: (December) Following visit of Israeli envoy to Bonn, official statement by Bonn expressing surprise that Israel had hoped to purchase arms from West Germany and emphasizing its policy not to supply arms to areas where "acute conflict" existed. Private firms to be forbidden to export arms or military equipment to Israel.[167]

1959: Signing of contract to buy several thousand Uzi submachine guns from Israel following Israeli government's decision to sell munitions to West Germany.[168]

1960: Exchange of visits by ex-President Theodor Heuss, to Tel Aviv, and Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann, to Bonn. (March) Meeting between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in New York; conclusion of secret agreement for delivery of $80 million in arms and military equipment to Israel by West Germany.[169, 170] (April) "Leak" by Israelis of "news" of $500 million loan over ten years arranged between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion to follow termination of reparations deliveries; categorical denial from West German Foreign Ministry.[171]

1962: $1.5 million contributed by West Germany toward atom smasher for Israel.[172] (February) "Series of rules governing cultural, educational, and social relations with Germany" unanimously adopted by Israeli cabinet; accepted by Knesset.[173] (March) First official steps toward implementing agreement to supply military equipment to Israel.[174]

1963: (March) Resolution declaring that German scientists' activities in the U.A.R. were a danger to the security of Israel and its population and demanding that the Federal Republic "put an immediate end to this dangerous activity of its citizens" unanimously adopted by the Knesset. Reply by Bonn that a maximum of eleven individuals was concerned and that no legal means existed for forcing an end to their activities, but that the Federal government "would endeavor to bring about the return of German citizens whose activities abroad might contribute to an increase of political tension."[175] $750,000 contributed by West Germany to Israel's Ullman Institute of Life Sciences. Several West German scientists sent to Israel in connection with above-mentioned grants.[176]

1964: Tanks (200 or fewer) of American manufacture included by West Germany among armaments being supplied to Israel.[177] Israeli officers and noncoms at special weapons training courses in West Germany (e.g., at Munster in November-December).[178] (October-December) Items in West German press regarding arms deliveries to Israel.[179] (November) Proposals from Bonn to exchange trade missions or consulates-general with Israel as a step toward diplomatic ties.[180]

1965: (May) Opening of negotiations leading to establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Israel (May 7). Inauguration of diplomatic relations (May 15).

Net aid from the Federal Republic of Germany to the state of Israel between 1950 and 1966 (public and private, including guaranteed export credits) was reported in 1967 as having amounted to $3,741,400,000.[181]

The Controversy over West German Relations with Israel

The above-summarized contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Israel did not take place without much attendant controversy within West Germany itself, within Israel, within the Arab area, and among all three.

The controversy within Israel will not be traced, except to note that by 1960 opposition to dealings with West Germany had to all intents and purposes disappeared. ("Ben Gurion has had to overcome more opposition in accepting aid than Adenauer had to in granting it," reflected a New Leader article in that year.[182])

The lines of influential opinion within Germany can be seen as drawn, broadly speaking, between government leaders motivated by deep and sincere religious and moral considerations to aid, and seek friendly relations with, Israel on the one hand, and, on the other, powerful business interests which are said to form an "Arab lobby" in Bonn.[183] Without attempting to account for all variations of standpoint within and between these two major orientations of opinion, their main tenets can perhaps best be presented by summarizing the case for each as made by

two prominent proponents.

Favoring regularization of West German-Israeli relations, Franz Böhm (see page 214 above), argued that the inauguration of diplomatic relations with Israel put an end to an "unnatural and dangerous state of affairs".[184] His reasons for considering the previous situation unnatural were many. First of all, Israel had given the Federal Republic no reason to refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with it and failure to do so was in fact an abnormality; such relations were in West Germany's best interests. Her long-run goal of winning the confidence of the majority of the Israeli population as well as of the government had been attained. West Germany's only reason for not entering into proper diplomatic relations was the fear of unfavorable Arab reaction--which after all amounted to sparing West Germany to the detriment of Israel and distorted German relations with the Arabs.

The danger to which Prof. Böhm referred lay first of all in the fact that "the Arab states may well have seen in West Germany's far-reaching, almost indecent, consideration for their passionately anti-Israeli stance support for their contention that a Jewish state had no place in the Near East." Consequently, tensions in the Near East were aggravated. Further, West Germany's Near East policy threatened to take on the character of a chess game with German reunification the goal and interests of nations unable to contribute to it being sacrificed regardless of their claim to the friendship of the free, democratic state whose moral obligation it was to repair the damage done by the Nazi regime to Germany's relations to innumerable states and peoples.

The pro-Arab viewpoint was presented in part in an editorial of the journal of the Nah- und Mittelost Verein in April 1965.[185] None of the theses of Prof. Böhm seem in any way to be contradicted therein[186]; rather, the Society was disturbed by the errors--mainly of timing and handling--in the Federal Republic's Near Eastern policy and the reprisals against private

West German investment and other business interests to which they had given rise. The first error "in a disastrous chain" was the secret armaments-supply agreement of March 1960, to be faulted both for the attempt at secrecy and for the probable violation of West Germany's 1952 pledge (see page 216 above). The second was the violation of the Federal Republic's own principle of not supplying armaments to troubled areas (enforced against Iraq, for example). The third was "that the Federal Republic of Germany took sides in a conflict in which it could at last have been a neutral."[187] The fourth was to present the armaments as a gift rather than to provide them on a purely commercial basis as had France, the U.S.A., and others.[188] The fifth error was the failure to follow up Bendestag president Eugen Gerstenmaier's meeting with Abd al-Nasser in November 1964 by a draft law covering prohibition of arms delivery to areas of tension; instead, the proposal for a trade mission or consulate in Israel was taken up. In the Arab view, the subsequent invitation to East Germany's Ulbricht to visit the U.A.R. was fully justified by the failure to end the armaments deliveries to Israel at the end of 1964. As for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel,

> one would have wished that the German recognition of Israel had not taken place under pressure of political circumstances but at a freely chosen and favorable time. It would then have been more honorable for the Federal Republic of Germany, more meaningful for Israel, and less of a blow to the Arab lands.

The Federal Republic must, in sum, put an end to political blackmail, the editorial concludes. In a later issue, the Society deplored the limited airing given the Arab viewpoint as contrasted with the generous presentation of that of the Israelis in West German mass media.[189]

The Arab view of German relations with Israel as it can be gleaned from press abstracts has consistently held to at least three contentions. First, it has maintained that German reparations and other aid to Israel strengthened the latter's economy and thus "her predatory designs".[190] Second, that the

West Germans had offered reparations to Israel out of a sense of moral obligation came to be accepted by the Arabs--with the reservation that no further direct or indirect help should be extended. Third, if the Arabs' trust in West Germany's good intentions towards themselves were to be disappointed, the Arab states would feel fully justified in recognizing the Federal Republic's rival regime in East Germany. A fourth recurring point is that the Arabs out of generosity and friendship were stretching the limits of patience to give the West German government a chance to correct its errors and omissions. It has been conventional to add the assurance that the good faith of the German people was not being called into question.[191]

Echoes of these contentions are to be found in the Fertile Crescent press throughout the dozen years following the first announcement of the reparations plan. In January 1957 al-Ayyam (Damascus), on the occasion of reports that Chancellor Adenauer planned to visit Israel, recalled that "West Germany has strengthened Israel's economy while Arab states are among West Germany's best industry clients."[192] Later the same year,

> all Syrian papers voiced the expectation that relations between the Arab world and West Germany would be cut if the Bonn Government carried out its reported intention of opening diplomatic relations with Israel. . . . which could only be harmful to the Arabs and thus could only be considered by them as an aggressive act on the part of West Germany. . . . . In her warning Syria declared that any such West German move would result in Syria exchanging diplomatic representation with East Germany.[193]

In 1958, nearly four years before the 1960 secret agreement was implemented, the question of military training in West Germany for the Israelis was already raised:

> Beirut's pro-UAR al Kifah today publishes the full text of a report by the Higher Arab Committee. . . . Training is given secretly in various countries of Europe and the American continent such as West Germany, France, Brazil, and Uruguay. West Germany comes ahead of all these nations, ". . . preparing them to kill Arabs, while at the same time claiming friendship to the Arabs and flooding Arab countries with its goods."[194]

In mid-1959 the Arab League Secrtariat appealed to the member states to demand of the West German ambassadors accredited to them that the obstructions being raised in Bonn to the work of the Arab League Information Bureau there be removed. This obstructionist policy was attributed to the influence enjoyed by Zionists in the West German capital.[195] Also in 1959, in September, the Beirut papers al-Nahar and al-Anwar devoted many columns to attacks on West Germany, alleging, among other things, "that it is through profits reaped in the Arab world that West Germany is paying compensation to Israel."[196]

A year later, after the $500 million-loan rumor (see page 215 above) had been launched, Beirut-Massa (pro-U.A.R.) wrote:

> Should it be true that . . . West Germany has granted Israel a $500 million loan . . . then West Germany has unveiled her face and appeared what she is--a deadly foe of the Arabs. . . . It would be our duty to recognize East Germany without the slightest hesitation.[197]

Al-Anwar (also pro-U.A.R.) remarked on the occasion of West German President Lübke's statement that "West Germany is compelled to give aid to Israel" and that rapprochement between Germany and Israel should not affect her relations with the Arabs,

> How does he expect us, while West Germany is pouring aid into Israel, to strengthen with weapons with which she is attempting to kill us, to believe that this aid should not affect our relations with West Germany?[198]

This Middle East policy of West Germany, observed Jerusalem's Falastin, "rests on two different and contradictory bases; one aims at preserving to the utmost cordial relations with the Arab states . . . the other at eradicating any trace of Nazi rule from the minds of public opinion."[199]

The Arab World news service described a petition of the Arab Palestine Youth organization to the Arab foreign ministers' conference of August 1960 as

> demanding . . . strong pressure upon West Germany and Germany's penalization by means of antagonistic Arab stands on such German issues as Berlin, German reunification, etc. The second step would be a threat of recognition of East Germany and the third step an outright German boycott.[200]

> Since 1960, observed Marcel Colombe in Orient (Paris), the Arab states have gradually evolved a doctrine for application to states according aid and assistance to Israel which strongly resembles the Hallstein Doctrine which the Federal Republic of Germany has tried to make one of the basic principles of its foreign policy.[201]

The Arab League had indeed recommended that its member states review their relations with countries providing military or financial assistance to Israel, but the first clear statement of such a policy occurred in April 1963, when all Arab diplomats accredited to Bonn were "invited to call the attention of the German government to the consequences which further development of its relations with Israel could have."[202]

In 1961 feelings against West Germany were still tempered by the argument that Bonn was under pressure from the World War II Allies (including "constant threat of trial as war criminals" for many West German officials).[203] Damascus' al-Ayyam was not mollified by such considerations: "Don't pressure us with threats," it cautioned the Germans. "West Germany has many political and economic links to the Arabs which are more important to the Germans than to the Arabs."[204] "Adenauer finishes Hitler's work in establishing a Jewish state" it headlined an article the same week, adding that East Germany was the Arabs' true friend.[205]

Even al-Hayat (Beirut), founded by Kamel Mwrowa, who is said to have worked with the Nazi authorities in Germany during the war and was normally well disposed toward West Germany, protested that

> West Germany wants the Arabs to remain quiet and make no move as it pours billions of Deutschemarks to help Israel. . . . It is about time Bonn has realized that Arabs are not wooden cats. It should realize that mutual relations work in two directions.[206]

The next day Beirut-Massa called a statement in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung to the effect that setting up an East German consulate in Damascus would endanger negotiations with West Germany for aid in the Euphrates Dam project as "flagrant interference in our affairs." "What right does this government have to ask

us not to recognize its rival. . . . when it showered Israel with assistance under the pretext of reparations?" the paper asked.[207] About the same time, Iraq's news agency, INA, accused private West German firms of trading with Israel and extending it help.[208, 209]

In September 1961 the possibility that Israel might be admitted into the Common Market led ten Arab heads of mission in Bonn to submit "a joint note to the West German Foreign Ministry warning that Arab states would regard any effort to allow Israel to join the EEC as detrimental to the economic relations between Arab states and West Germany."[210]

Writing in The Middle East Forum for October 1961, Emile Bustani of Lebanon warned against West German loans to Israel above and beyond the reparations already settled upon.[211, 212] Rumors of additional aid to Israel did in fact begin flying again in the spring of 1962. West German denials and the past record "makes us suspicious," wrote Beirut-Massa.[213] West Germany's providing aid to Israel is "far more aggressive than the establishment of [Arab] consular and commercial representation in East Germany," Beirut's weekly al-Saiad commented, in connection with its report that the Arab League had urged member states to take unified action regarding the flow of West German funds and aid to Israel.[214] In September 1962 the leftist al-Bilad in Iraq was describing West German aid to Israel as intended "to enable German business monopolies to inflitrate the Middle East".[215]

The year 1963 and most of 1964 seem to have been marked by a lull in the interest of the Fertile Crescent press in the Federal Republic. There was one notable exception in early 1964:

> Al-Baath, organ of the ruling Baath Party, reported yesterday that the signing of a protocol between West Germany and Israel, according to which West Germany will grant the Israelis the sum of DM 250,000,000 under the reparations agreement, had a bad effect on official circles in the Syrian capital. It was immediately observed that this act is contradictory with the assurances of successive German governments that no more such help will be extended to Israel after 1952. Arab quarters will be protesting officially against this action, the report concludes.[216]

Ludwig Erhard assumed the chancellorship in October, and his wisdom in declining to recognize Israel was commended--with a reminder that the Arabs held West Germany responsible for preventing the collapse of the Israeli economy.[217]

The storm broke in late 1964. In November pro-U.A.R. al-Moharrer (Beirut) quoted the West German press to the effect that the Foreign Ministry would soon establish a diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv and Israel, one in Bonn. Reuter from Bonn said West German officials neither denied nor confirmed the report.[218] (To the argument that this exchange of diplomatic representation was also a moral obligation, the Middle East News Agency had carried an impassioned rebuttal, asking the Germans "whether it is moral to leave a million destitute and helpless Arabs naked in the desert without attention. . . . whether it was moral for Israel to ignore United Nations decisions on the care of Arab refugees issued since 1950."[219])

At this juncture, certain knowledge of the secret armaments deliveries to Israel was in the possession of the Arab governments--at the very least, of the high officials of the U.A.R. Why was the fury of the Egyptian propaganda apparatus not unleashed? Harald Vocke of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung concluded in a March 1965 article that

> the files on the German-Israeli weapons agreement lay ready in their desk drawers, as yet not released to the press. But their feelings and reactions were still governed by the romantic concept of a German-Arab friendship.

Shortly, all of the tensions accumulated in acting at cross-purposes and operating on the basis of unrealistic assessments of the respecitve sides were to flash over.

The Diplomatic Break

Since the early steps leading to the severing of diplomatic relations between ten Arab states and the Federal Republic of Germany directly involved only the U.A.R.--and since most have already been referred to above--these will simply be summarized

in a chronological listing below. Commentary from, and events in, the Fertile Crescent countries will be drawn in from time to time, but speculation regarding pressure applied by the Powers will be eschewed.

1964: (November) Bundestag President Gerstenmaier returns from meeting with Abd al-Nasser urging that West Germany halt arms shipments to any but NATO countries; no action is taken by Bonn government.[220] (November-December) Arab ambassadors in Bonn meet to discuss the addition of tanks to armaments being supplied to Israel as of the summer of 1964.[221]

1965: (January 9-12) Arab heads of government confer; of sixteen resolutions adopted, one concerns West German-Israeli relations (West Germany is to contact the Arab states individually).[222] (January 17) A Syrian correspondent appearing on West German television speaks of the supplying of arms to Israel as an established fact. (January 19) CBS World News reports that West German arms deliveries to Israel have been stepped up and new items, including American-made Patton tanks, added to the original list. (January 20) Detailed articles in The New York Times and other papers follow.[223] (January 24) Brief notice in semi-official al-Ahram (Cairo) announces proposed visit by Minister-President Ulbricht of the German Democratic Republic to the U.A.R.[224] (January 27ff.) East Germany announces officially that Ulbricht will visit the U.A.R. A Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag visiting Cairo is notified that the Federal Republic would be allowed ten days to put an end to arms deliveries to Israel; no action is taken by Bonn government.[225] (January 30) German-Israeli relations form principal topic before conference of heads of Palestine offices in Cairo.[226]

[Al-Kifah (Beirut) calls the invitation to Ulbricht a "master's blow": "This move can make Bonn understand that we are as capable of injuring her interests as she is capable of injuring ours." Al-Anwar (Beirut) declares that the Arab countries reject the Hallstein Doctrine: the Arabs have for a number of years abstained from extending official recognition to East Germany in the hope that Bonn would stop cooperating with Israel but it has showered dollars on the Israelis. "On the other hand, East Germany has done nothing hostile against the Arabs; in fact, her stand towards Israel was one of support and friendship to the Arabs."[227]]

(February 1) West Germany's ambassador to Cairo is called to Bonn; impending visit to U.A.R. by Minister of Economic Cooperation is cancelled.[228] (February 6) U.A.R. threatens recognition of G.D.R. if weapons deliveries to Israel are not ended.[229] (February 12) Bonn announces that no further weapons deliveries will be made to areas of tension and that the Spanish government has been asked to exercise its influence to prevent the Ulbricht visit.[230] (February 15) Israel rejects the West German offer of $60 million aid in lieu of remaining armaments, not to be delivered.[231] (February 24-March 1) Ulbricht visits U.A.R.

(March 1) In communiqué at end of Ulbricht visit, G.D.R. declares full support for Arabs on Palestine, denouncing the "aggressive imperialist schemes which have created Israel".[232] (March 4) U.A.R. announces that it will set up a consulate in East Berlin.[233] (March 7) Chancellor Erhard terminates economic assistance to the U.A.R. and announces his government's intention to arrange for diplomatic relations with Israel.[234] (March 8) Abd al-Nasser threatens recognition of the G.D.R., refusal to repay loans already received, confiscation of West German property, and closing of West German schools in the U.A.R.[235] Iraqi Foreign Minister officially protests proposed recognition of Israel; Iraq recalls its ambassador from Bonn (first to do so).[236] (March 9) Personal representatives of Arab heads of state meet to draw up recommendations.[237]

[Al-Nahar (Beirut) writes: "Bonn must realize that what the Arabs must do about East Germany is the natural and logical retaliation to what Bonn had done vis-à-vis Israel." Pro-U.A.R. Beirut papers call for "violent retaliation". Only al-Hayat advises caution in getting entangled with East Germany. Next day's Lebanese papers are full of Bonn's "arrogance", "deception", "blunders". Al-Baath (Damascus) sees the U.S.A. behind West Germany's decision to recognize Israel. Al-Thawra (Damascus) calls the recognition move "converting Bonn's . . . dealings with Israel from 'secret' to 'public' operations" and "treason as applied to interests of the German people", "a 'crumbling' of West German diplomacy and an obvious sign that Germany was still a 'defeated nation'.[238]]

(March 14-15) Meeting of Arab foreign ministers resolves only the breaking off of diplomatic relations if West Germany establishes relations to Israel, and the issuing of a warning to other nations to cease dealing with Israel. Question of economic rupture is referred to political committee sitting with ministers of economy. Only U.A.R., Syria, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen favor unconditional recognition of G.D.R. (Kuwaiti national assembly votes for recognition).[239] (March 15) Resolution of Arab foreign ministers is published. (March 16-18) Student and other demonstrations against West Germany are reported in Beirut, Tripoli, and Homs. West German embassy in Bagdad is set afire by student demonstrators. Syria announces recall of its ambassador from Bonn.[240] (March 22-April 10) West German envoys are sent to Cairo and Bagdad (Christian Democrat Bundestag member R. Werner) and Amman, Damascus, Riyadh, and Beirut (State Secretaries Carstens and Lahr and industrialist Wilhelm Hartmann) to negotiate with Arab governments and dissuade them from recognition of East Germany.[241] (March 27) Iraq finds against West German construction and other firms which had done business there valued at DM 70 million, which now must be claimed through courts.[242]

[An editorial in al-Thawra (Damascus) says that Bonn had not imagined the consequences of its step--the animosity of the Arabs--nor that East Germany would be able to fill the vac-

uum left behind by its rival. Baathist al-Ahrar (Beirut) claims that efforts are being made to shelve the crisis with Bonn behind the backs of the Arab masses.[243]]

(May 6) Syrian government announces departure of an official delegation for East Germany.[244] (May 12) Federal Republic of Germany becomes 88th nation to recognize the state of Israel and enter into diplomatic relations therewith. Iraq leads Fertile Crescent countries in closing down its embassy in Bonn despite last-minute letter to President Aref from Chancellor Erhard. (Jordan and Syria follow on May 13, and Lebanon on May 14. Representation of West German interests in the Fertile Crescent is assumed by France.)[245]

[According to al-Nahar (Beirut) Lebanese official quarters have assured busnlessmen that trade with West Germany will not be affected by the break. Pro-U.A.R. al-Anwar (Beirut) insists that economic ties will be the next to go. Al-Ahrar (Beirut) calls for recognition of East Germany in addition. A Reuter's dispatch is said to aver that the Erhard-Eshkol note included assurance that military aid to Israel will continue.[246]]

(May 18) Three hundred ulema, representing thirty-five Moslem countries, condemn the West German stand on Palestine and recognition of Israel. Arab League announces preparation of detailed plan for Arab boycott of West Germany. West German interests in Iraq are surveyed for possible nationalization.[247]

(June 16) Arab countries withdraw from Berlin Trade Fair to be held in September.[248]

Therewith the excitement over the crisis subsided. No Arab students or trainees were recalled from the Federal Republic; West German consulates and cultural institutes (with one or two exceptions) continued to function. The "reasonable tone" of the letters exchanged by the German Chancellor and the U.A.R. President also belied the violence of the reactions which had characterized the early stages of the crisis.[249]

The year 1965 ended with the first of many tentatives at reconciliation reportedly initiated by Bonn in subsequent months:

> Cairo's influential weekly Rose al-Youssef in its edition dated yesterday indicated that Cairo has been approached on the resumption of relations with West Germany through mediation by King Hassan of Morocco; the weekly hinted in general terms that Cairo was not turning a deaf ear. It even suggested that Cairo was now in touch with Arab countries on the subject.[250]

This sunny mood was short-lived. New evidence of the

Federal Republic's bad faith was brought to light ten days later:

> Hopes for resumption of Arab-Bonn relations appeared to have received a blow today when Arab radios from Cairo to Bagdad gave prominence to reports that West Germany was to give Israel a new loan of 75 million Deutschemark. Syrian papers headlined "This should be the answer to those who still called for better Arab relations with West Germany."[251]

The End of an Era

Deplorable as the handling of this "first independent encounter of the Federal Republic of Germany with international politics"[252] seemed to West German observers ("Erhard's bungling and Nasser's bluffing have brought us to this pass," remarked one diplomat[253]), there were consolations for West Germany. Not least of these was the quickening awareness that "reconsideration of the [West] German foreign policy was in order."[254] The decision taken to apply the principle of non-delivery of armaments to areas of tension had already "contributed significantly to clarifying her Near East policy."[255] "Normalization" of relations in the Near East was anticipated as a consequence of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. As one commentator put it, "the heretofore rather directionless and floundering German policy toward the Near and Middle East now at least has a kind of base"--as it should have had from the beginning.[256]

It was non-German observers who saw a new flexibility in the Hallstein Doctrine as a major benefit of the crisis. Publicist Wolfgang Wagner in early 1965 had traced the doctrine's evolution from a "delimiting policy" to an "aggressive" one which afforded a means of exerting pressure on the Federal Republic.[257] The Economist, however, went beyond this to detect that "a new suppleness has been adroitly injected into the stiff bones of the Hallstein Doctrine" in view of the fact that "Bonn's dealings with the Arab World are not as radically upset as the decision of the Arab states to dispense with diplomatic courtesies might suggest. . . ."[258] The new Hallstein Doctrine would simply require the Federal government to "review its relations with

the countries concerned" should such an "unfriendly act" as recognition of Ulbricht's regime take place, rather than break off diplomatic relations forthwith.[259]

The brunt of German inquiry seems to have been directed to an understanding of the reasons for the violent Arab reaction to West Germany's supplying arms to Israel. After all, "in view of the fact that millions of Jewish people were murdered by a German dictatorship, it must be a concern of the Germans to try to hinder another threatened massacre of a part of the survivors," argued Chancellor Erhard.[260] One analysis of the Arab viewpoint which emerged maintained that

> The apparent metamorphosis of the Federal Republic, which was to a great extent considered a comrade in arms against Israel, into a secret ally of the archenemy was at first incomprehensible to the Arabs. . . .
>
> After the hectic and emotion-ridden first reactions they seemed gradually to come to the realization that the Federal Republic had indeed repudiated the policies of the Third Reich of its own free will (and not that of the "western imperialists"). . . . Much time will probably have to pass before the Arabs have adjusted to this new state of affairs and have found a new relationship to the Federal Republic.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> This "German breach of faith" forms the most onerous burden on present German-Arab relations. Any reference to weapons supply to and diplomatic relations with Israel on the part of other nations is therefore beside the point.[261]

Others sought to understand how the West Germans could have

> engineered themselves into their present position by requiring the Middle Eastern countries to respect their feelings on non-recognition of East Germany, even though they were blandly pursuing a foreign policy that ignored Israeli-Arab animosities. What is worse, they apparently assumed it was possible to deal with both on equal terms without endangering West Germany's objectives.[262]

In the phraseology of former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun,

> Bonn's attitude reveals "morbid" symptoms in its method of reasoning and in its acts. . . . That this "guilt complex" finally took the form of supplying (secretly) heavy arms shipments to the detriment of the Arabs, who themselves are the victims of the greatest injustice known in history, "exceeds the limits of decency and simple logic."[263]

(Such observations--and Nasserian terms such as "liar", "traitor", "neo-imperialist"--"the Federal Republic of Germany had previously been spared," one West German commentator wryly remarked.[264])

In sum, the Arabs had had confidence in Germany and this confidence was destroyed. Up to that point the Arab friendship for Germany had been rather instinctive; her behavior in supplying offensive weapons to Israel was felt as "high treason directed against the Arabs".[265] This is the answer to the question often to be repeated by Bonn:

> Many nations entertain good relations with the Arab states and with Israel; why should vengeance be sought only against Germany for entering into the same relationship with Israel as these others?[266]

The most trenchant analysis of the illusions in all quarters--West German, Arab, and Western Powers'--which combined to create the West German Middle East policy of the fifties and early sixties was that of Prof. Böhm. The primary source of the dysfunction which characterized that policy, he asserted, was the desire of the Arabs and the "Anglo-Saxon powers" to force Germany into the role of intermediary; in this they were abetted by the Federal Republic's passive acceptance of that role:

> The Arabs have to an astonishing degree succeeded in insinuating the idea into our minds and that of the West that we --that is, the Federal Republic of Germany--as heir to an old tradition of German-Arab friendship, are the only ones suited (in any case, the best-suited)--so to speak, born-- to serve as intermediaries between the Arab World and the Anglo-Saxon powers. Not only our own foreign ministry officials and diplomats but also the governments and foreign policy makers of our allies have found it quite in order that we Germans should make capital of a reputation which possibly--indeed probably--has a foul, bloody, and abominable basis. What scruples existed were appeased with the thought that in this case so important a goal as keeping the Arab states on the side of the West justified the means.
> . . . . . .
> And what service did it do us or the West when we assumed the role of go-between between the Arab world and the West on the basis of a trust of so doubtful an origin? What service did it do the Arab states, for their part, that we pretended to stay aloof from Israel and to take a certain pride in the anti-Semitic era of our past . . . ?[267]

As for another illusion, whoever still believes that West Ger-

many can somehow reconcile Arab and Jew need only think of Tunisia, he added.[268]

Such strong and strongly-felt arguments notwithstanding, there were unregenerates who mourned an as yet unidentifiable loss:

> There may still be negative effects from the fact that the Western state which was regarded as unbiased by the Arab region and could therefore exercise a certain influence has now lost its most important positions. Israel can be satisfied that its wish for a normalization of relations with the Federal Republic has finally been realized.[269]

Others refused to believe that what had been treasured in German-Arab relations could so easily be destroyed: "It is scarcely thinkable that our relations with the Arab states, based as they were on a long tradition of untroubled friendship, cannot survive this unavoidable trial," wrote a contributor to Orient (Hamburg), especially when the Arabs come to realize that the majority of West Germans endorsed the regularization of relations with Israel.[270]

Thus, with relief or regret, was hailed the end of a century-long era of cordial German-Arab intercourse--an era distorted by illusion and misunderstanding for some, one infused with a satisfying emotionalism for others.

Lebanon and East Germany

Relations of the German Democratic Republic with the Lebanese Republic date back to the early fifties but have been confined almost exclusively to trade.[271] An East German trade mission paid a visit in 1953, when an agreement was signed, primarily for exportation of fruit.[272] In 1955 another economic mission arrived, offering "every technical aid in the fields of industry and commerce".[273] The five-year trade agreement signed as a result provided for importation by East Germany of citrus fruits, olive oil, cotton thread, and leather in exchange for diesel engines, lumber, newsprint, and other items.[274] Between 1954 and 1960, value of Lebanese imports from East Germany rose from LL 647,000 to LL 4,543,000 and that of East German exports to Lebanon, from LL 41,000 to LL 2,750,000.[275]

A new agreement signed in 1962 guaranteed that East Germany would "use a minimum of 65% of the proceeds of its exports to Lebanon to purchase Lebanese products."[276] Another, in 1963, required East Germany to take a greatly increased amount of Lebanese tobacco. It was also stipulated that the proceeds of East German sales in Lebanon not allocated to purchase of Lebanese goods were to be used to purchase "products from the Free Zone of Lebanon, or from neighboring countries, bought through Lebanese institutions."[277]

Further agreements followed in 1964 and 1965. Meanwhile, Lebanese businessmen had been attending the Leipzig Fair regularly and East German parliamentary as well as trade delegations made frequent trips to Lebanon.[278]

East Germany has also assisted in the building of two plants for extraction of table salt from sea water, each with an output of one ton per hour.[279] Offers of additional aid and negotiations for Interflug airline connections to Beirut came as the second postwar decade was ending.

Lebanon and West Germany

Relations between the Lebanese Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany have been less exclusively commercial than those with East Germany. Apart from the Orient-Institut and the cultural center mentioned above (pages 188 and 207), there are several German schools the curricula of which are coordinated with the Lebanese academic system.[280] Founded in 1954, the so-called German School at Naameh (south of Beirut) includes a kindergarten and prepares its pupils for the Lebanese baccalaureate. Enrollment is nearly two-thirds Lebanese or other Arab nationalities; eleven of thirty on the teaching staff were Lebanese in 1965-1966. The Johann Ludwig Schneller School at Khirbet Kanafar in the Bika, like its no-longer-extant predecessor and namesake in Jerusalem, combines the function of orphanage with that of educational institution. Founded in 1951, it offers both academic schooling (including preparation for the baccalaureate) and training in

trades. Its support comes primarily from private contributions but also from both Lebanese and West German government sources. In Beirut is the Amilieh Technical School, to which West Germany has contributed equipment and instructor services to a value of about $1 million. By the end of 1965, after four years of existence, it had 300 pupils working under eight German teachers and master workmen.[281] In addition, the Carmel Mission (formerly of Haifa) conducts two schools in Lebanon, one in the refugee camp in Debaya and the other in a village near Saida.[282]

The hospital of the Catholic Sisters of Heilige Karl Borromaeus, locally known as the German Hospital, moved to more adequate buildings outside Beirut in the early sixties. Much esteemed by local residents, it is less generally known than when it was within the city.

Over and above the Amilieh school, a number of other types of projects were inaugurated under the German-Lebanese agreement on technical cooperation signed in 1961.[283] An expert in phytopathology was assigned as consultant to the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture and the Fruits Office for a period of three years and a mobile laboratory placed at his disposal to combat insect damage to commercial fruit crops and to train Lebanese as specialists.[284] Other German experts were sent to advise on the road system and on hydraulic projects, to advise on increasing exports of apples and citrus fruits, and to train telecommunications technicians. A medical training school at Tanail in the Bika was equipped, and aid in the creation of a merchant marine training school was offered.[285] The total value of development assistance tendered by West Germany to Lebanon between 1950 and 1966, from both public and private sources and including guaranteed export credits, came to DM 46.5 million.[286]

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a private foundation with close connections with unions in West Germany, opened an office in Beirut just as the decade under survey ended. It is intended to serve a purely educational function, offering reference and instructional materials many of which have been translated into

Arabic. Its assistance on an advisory basis is available to unions and cooperatives of all political leanings.[287]

A special problem for the two countries has been the failure of Lebanese citizens traveling to West Germany in hope of finding employment to obtain working permits before leaving. (No visas were required for visits.) The numbers involved were large enough to bring the problem before the Lebanese Council of Ministers.[288] More agreeable to contemplate was the increase in numbers of West Germans visiting Lebanon: 14,673, or 2.2% of the total, in 1963, they had more than doubled by 1965, the year in which "the Federal Republic really 'discovered' Lebanon," and continued to increase thereafter.[289]

Despite the persistent and growing disparity between the value of Lebanon's imports from West Germany and that of its exports to her--and despite, also, the sometimes strained relations to which it has led--the total volume of West German-Lebanese trade grew, though less dramatically than between 1951 and 1955.[290] Lebanese imports from West Germany rose from $17 million in 1955 to $48.7 million in 1965, not quite trebling. The growth of exports to West Germany was slightly greater, reaching $6 million in 1965, as against $1.9 million in 1955.[291] Major imports were iron and steel items, machinery, vehicles, electrical products, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and flour.[292] Vegetable oils, textile products, and animal intestines are among West Germany's main purchases from Lebanon. The director of economic studies for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut took comfort in the fact that the bulk of Lebanese imports from West Germany were capital goods or staples but added:

> In any case it would be opportune if West German economic circles would examine the problem of the large and growing trade deficit between the two countries and correct the situation. A solution is not impossible to find.[293]

Passing to the accomplishments of West German industry in Lebanon, these have included the following projects: supply of equipment and installation thereof for a brewery, glass factory, slaughterhouse, and broadcasting station, and of several textile

mills and two steel mills. West German firms have also installed the floodlight system for the Cité Sportive, high-tension overland lines, and water supply and distribution networks, executed several road construction projects, and supplied two generators (of 45,650 kv-a. each) for the al-Awali and Abd al-Al projects.[294] In 1959 the Gerwerkschaft Elwerath Erdölwerke of Hanover took a 50% interest in the Compagnie Libanaise des Pétroles and during 1960 drilled two wells in accordance with the terms of the association; both were dry. Elwerath withdrew in 1961 and sold its share to Lebanese interests.[295]

Lastly, Beirut had been chosen as headquarters by representatives of some sixty West German concerns dealing not only with Lebanon but with an area extending as far east as Afghanistan and as far south as Somalia.[296]

Jordan

Among the Fertile Crescent countries, the Federal Republic of Germany's relations with the Kingdom of Jordan have been the most satisfactory. The Hashemite Kingdom has never made any pronouncements in favor of East Germany, has entertained no East German representation of any kind, and has shown "100% respect" for West Germany's claim to sole and legal right to speak for the entirety of Germany.[297] In view of these circumstances, and in view of Jordan's evident need, a wide-ranging program of technical assistance and capital aid was instituted--the most extensive such program undertaken by West Germany in the Fertile Crescent area.

In March 1958 a West German economic mission visited Jordan for a closer examination of aid possibilities and requested a listing of projects on which the Jordanian government required assistance.[298] An agreement in 1959 covered creation of a vocational school at Irbid, with German instructor personnel, and training of Jordanian workmen and instructors in Germany.[299]

West German experts explored the water resources of Irbid province and made a study for the proposed electrical power grid needed for projected industrialization. Following up a mem-

orandum from the Jordanian Development Board suggesting areas in which technical and financial aid was desired, a West German delegation headed by the Minister of Economy visited Jordan in March 1960.[300] In April a general agreement on technical and economic cooperation in the fields of tourism, railway construction, geological surveys, industrial consultation, medical facilities, equipment of schools, advice on exports, combatting of plant diseases and pests, and electrification was concluded. Credits in the amount of DM 235 million were provided for.[301]

The following year a supplementary accord called for a geological survey of the country and the setting up of a Geological Institute to direct research and train Jordanian specialists. Four West German geologists were assigned to the project.[302] In 1962, in response to the desire of the Jordanian government to intensify the search for mineral resources, four additional geologists were sent.[303] Commercially significant finds announced as a result of their work have included strongly radioactive minerals (in the south), barite and bentonite (east of Bethlehem and in the Jordan Valley, respectively), manganese and iron, and copper (on the east side of the Wadi Araba, near the ancient mines of Solomon).[304] In November 1963 DM 2 million was earmarked for further study of the copper deposits.[305]

By the end of 1965 over 7000 samples from all over Jordan had been submitted to laboratories in Jordan and West Germany for analysis and the first geological map of the entire country had been completed. All laboratory facilities, equipment, and vehicles used by the team were turned over to the newly-founded Jordanian Geological Office, in accordance with the terms of the original agreement.[306]

Similarly, a contract for the planning of a ten-year electrification program within the framework of the technical assistance agreement was let in 1962, to the firm of Lahmeyer.[307] Expert advice on establishment of a blood bank and of a food laboratory, on fisheries, and on irrigation was also provided.[308]

Particularly appreciated by the ordinary Jordanian has been the work of the team of three plant-disease and -pest ex-

perts. Under the supplementary agreement of 1961 West Germany also supplied the necessary equipment and materials.[309] The disease afflicting Jordanian tobacco was eliminated, locusts were brought under control, and the incidence of flies in Amman was reduced.[310] A plant quarantine service and reorganization and extension of the facilities for combatting the recurrence of the locust plagues were also planned. Training of Jordanians as specialists was an integral part of this program.[311]

In addition to the vocational school in Irbid, it was agreed in 1963 to collaborate in the establishment of a similar school in Jerusalem. West Germany was to supply three instructors for a period of three years and all technical equipment.[312] Laboratory equipment for twenty Jordanian schools was also supplied by West Germany.[313] A hotel school and a program for training of hotel personnel in West Germany fell within the framework of the technical assistance agreement as well,[314] as did the construction of a YWCA center and extensions to the Auguste-Viktoria Hospital in Jerusalem.[315]

Independent of the technical assistance agreement but with Bonn providing over half the costs (including housing for the trainees), a second successor to the Schneller orphanage and trade school formerly in Jerusalem was created in Amman: the Theodor Schneller School, commenced in 1959 and inaugurated in November 1965.[316] The Evangelische Jerusalem-Stiftung maintained schools in Bethlehem and the surrounding area exclusively for the Arab population.[317]

Other projects have included supply and installation of stronger transmitting equipment at Amman and Ramallah, and construction and outfitting of a pharmaceuticals plant in al-Salt, a town totally lacking in industrial establishments up to that point.[318] West Germany was only one of several nations called in to assist with the long-contemplated reconstruction of the Hejaz Railway, subject to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia's coming to terms. After a false start, the three nations reached an agreement in 1955 and eventually

> the German consulting engineers Kurt Becker of Munich received the order to act as construction-overseers and local surveyors on June 6, 1961. The first tender of 1962 could not materialize. In the meantime, certain regulations for the future railway and a study for the Ma'an railway station were made; . . .[319]

Studies for a line to connect al-Naqb, south of Ma'an, with Aqaba, ninety very difficult kilometers' distance, were also to be made. Specialists from the West German railways were placed at the disposal of the Jordanian government. In February 1962 the Jordanian Ministry of Communications sought a JD 10 million loan for the construction of this line.[320] Financing remained the stumbling block at the end of the decade.[321]

Into the category of capital aid fall the planning and execution of the modernization, and later the enlarging, of the Port of Aqaba. The initial late-1961 loan of DM 15.3 million, later supplemented by a second, was repayable in twenty years at 3% interest, with the first installment due in three years. Total financial aid for this project has amounted to DM 41 million.[322] The work has been under the direction of Zublin AG of Stuttgart.

As regards private investment, after a visit to West Germany in 1961 the Jordanian director of the Port of Aqaba reported that "several German firms had shown willingness to finance Jordanian projects" and planned to send representatives to study the possibilities.[323] At the end of 1962 the Elwerath company undertook negotiations with the Jordanian government for oil exploration rights. Reconstruction of the chemical plant on the Dead Sea was to be assigned to a West German firm. The M.A.N. company built a power station for an existing phosphate plant, and there were plans for a West German firm to build the Near East's largest chemical fertilizer plant at Aqaba. The Policius company of West Germany participated in the Jordanian cement industry.[324]

The net amount provided by West Germany as development aid to Jordan between 1950 and 1966, both public and private and including guaranteed export credits, was DM 43.3 million.[325]

The extraordinarily large disparity between Jordan's im-

ports from West Germany and West Germany's purchases from Jordan remained a feature of the two countries' trade relations throughout the second postwar decade, as can be seen from Tables 4 through 7 above. Machinery of all types and metal products predictably dominate the list of Jordan's imports but it ranges from foodstuffs through textiles and medicines to toys. (By contrast, "novelty beads" is one of the largest items by value on the list of its exports to Germany.)[326] Overall value of imports from West Germany rose to about $14 million in 1965 from $6.4 million in 1955. Value of exports to Germany had risen sharply from about $50,000 per annum to nearly $200,000 as the decade ended. As in Lebanon, the value of imports from Germany continued to increase after the diplomatic break, but value of exports dropped slightly.[327] German tourists made up the fourth most numerous non-Arab national group visiting Jordan as the decade ended.[328]

A special feature of Jordanian-West German relations has been, as with Lebanon, the problem created by Palestinian refugees and Jordanians who had gone to West Germany without working permits and attempted to find employment. (No visas were required until the diplomatic break.) Since nationals of Common Market countries and associated states must be given priority among foreign job applicants, many Palestinians, in particular, had to be deported.[329] Inflammatory articles appeared in certain sectors of the Arab press, representing the situation as a willful offense on the part of West Germany and "part of an extensive imperialist plan aimed at striking the liberation causes in the Arab homeland, particularly the Palestine cause."[330] In point of fact, about 150 young Palestinian refugees were being sent to West Germany for practical industrial training and experience each year, to remain one or two years. Scholarships had also been granted for vocational education teachers, television technicians, and agriculturists.[331]

Official and private visits at high levels have been so common between the Federal Republic and the Kingdom of Jordan that King Hussein found himself in Germany (at Baden-Baden) when the first rumblings of the diplomatic crisis were heard in November

1964.[332] Not surprisingly, Jordan became the first of the disaffected Arab countries to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, in March 1967 (the Spanish Embassy in Bonn had looked after Jordanian interests there in the interim).

Iraq and East Germany

The Iraqi coup d'état of July 1958 which destroyed the entrenched pro-British government was followed by a flurry of trade and cultural agreements with East Bloc countries, including the German Democratic Republic. An East German trade mission was promptly established in Bagdad. Further, a cultural and technical cooperation agreement was signed by Iraq and the G.D.R. on April 1, 1959, providing for student exchange, professorships in language and cultural subjects, and other forms of cultural exchange[333] Professors from East Germany subsequently joined the staff of Bagdad University.[334]

East German aid and technical assistance to Iraq has apparently not been extensive. An East Bloc source summarized it as follows in 1966:

> With the aid of the German Democratic Republic 14 installations for pressing and packing dates with an output of 15 tons each in two shifts were set up in 1960 in Iraq; in 1962-63 the GDR constructed three mills with a capacity of 50 tons of flour, working day and night shifts. Specialists from the GDR also aided Iraq with putting a textile plant into operation which had been built with the assistance of English engineers.[335]

In August 1959 the two countries reached a barter-type trade arrangement under which dates, barley, hides, cotton, and other Iraqi commodities would be exchanged for East German chemicals, precision instruments, textile mills, and other manufactures.[336] (In 1960 machinery and industrial equipment comprised 40% of the G.D.R.'s exports to Iraq.) During October 1960 the G.D.R. presented an exhibition of the products of its industry in Bagdad under the sponsorship of General Kassim.[337] In June 1962 a one-year supplementary trade agreement required East Germany to buy 20,000 tons of Iraqi dates and

> the two countries also agreed to try to promote exports to East Germany of other Iraqi products such as tobacco, skins, wool, cotton, and millet and to study "carefully" other proposals on trade relations submitted during three weeks of negotiations in Bagdad.[338]

While the proportion of Iraqi imports coming from East Germany did increase fairly steadily through the second postwar decade, it never reached 1%. Iraqi exports to the G.D.R. remained negligible. (See Tables 4 and 5 above.) Similarly, trade with Iraq formed an insignificant part of total East German trade (Tables 6a and 7a).

In May 1962 the intention of Iraq and the G.D.R. to exchange consulates-general was announced. Two weeks laters, two "senior West German officials" arrived in Bagdad for "clarification from the Iraqi government". Rumors flew that Iraqi officialdom had refused to receive them. Shortly the Iraqi government issued a statement that it was free to enter into agreements "with a sovereign state such as the German Democratic Republic" but gave assurances that the exchange of consuls did not constitute recognition of East Germany.[339] The East German consulate-general was opened in Bagdad on June 16, 1962, and enjoyed the status of "technical mission".[340] The Iraqi consulate which was to have been set up in East Berlin "in the near future", as soon as allocation could be made for it in the national budget,[341] had in fact still not materialized long after the diplomatic break with West Germany.

Despite the cooling of relations with the Soviet Bloc toward the end of the second postwar decade, Iraq's contacts with East Germany continued on these bases, with frequent exchange of official visits. By the end of 1965 it had been agreed to extend the services of the East German Interflug airline to Bagdad on its Nicosia-Damascus route.[342]

Iraq and West Germany

The frequent and abrupt political reorientations through which Iraq passed during the second postwar decade notwithstanding, its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany were rarely

troubled. The variety of West German activity there as the decade began was noteworthy. Town planning consultants engaged by the Iraqi Mortgage Bank were scheduled to finish specifications for a new officers' and government officials' suburb of Bagdad by the end of January 1956. Dedication of the Wadi Tharthar barrage, on which British and West German firms had been working since 1952, took place at the beginning of April 1956. In May, it was announced that Iraq's first sugar refinery would be built in Mosul by the West German firm of Salzgitter Industriebau. June brought the welcome news that researchers in West Germany had endorsed the use of Iraqi dates (and date stones) as animal fodder, for which West Germany has an annual import requirement of 1.5 million tons.[343]

Under Kassim (1958-1962) West Germany was the only Western country whose firms were still at work in Iraq--on factories, dams, and roads; all other contractors were from the East Bloc. Altogether, between 1956 and 1962 West German firms had completed projects worth DM 757 million--only DM 90 million less than the total value of those carried out by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (the two major East Bloc nations active there) in the same period.[344]

Meanwhile, negotiations for a cultural agreement, which had reached the stage of a draft by February 1958, were brought to fruition on July 1959 and a branch of the Goethe-Institut established. The Republic of Iraq, in turn, sent a "public relations team" of military officers to West Germany in the spring of 1960 to address interested groups, take part in radio broadcasts, hold press conferences in the major cities, and visit the Hanover Industrial Fair. The following year Iraq participated in the Berlin Film Festival. An agreement on cooperation in radio, television, press, and other information media was initialled in November 1963.[345]

On September 5, 1963, a new round of West German activity in Iraq was launched with the signing of a preliminary agreement for economic and technical cooperation which pledged the West

German government "to assist West German companies and organizations to participate in Iraqi projects to the value of DM 150 million."[346] Contracts were entered into for technical schools and radio and television stations. A West German firm was selected to survey the Qayyara-Mosul road (the only unfinished section of the Bagdad-Mosul highway).[347]

Major technical assistance projects carried out under these agreements were the vocational school at Bagdad, begun in 1960, with director and half a dozen instructors, as well as the equipment, provided by West Germany; an agricultural institute at Abu Ghraib; a radio technicians training center at the Bagdad vocational school; and a forestry training center at Mosul. In addition, various specialists, experts, and consultants have been provided. Fifteen scholarships a year were allocated to Iraqi students beginning with the academic year 1961-1962, ten to go to high school graduates and five to graduates of secondary schools of a technical or vocational nature.[348]

As was true for the decade 1945-1955, much of the information on West German private enterprise in Iraq since 1955 was readily to be found only in non-German sources. Thus one learns:

> In recent years, German firms have been very active in building up the Iraqi irrigation network. They have also helped to set up a synthetic fiber plant as well as textile, cement, and paper plants. Nearly all the major roads and bridges in Iraq have been built since the war by important German concerns.[349]

Tables 4 and 5 above show that West Germany and Iraq have accounted for a fairly constant share of each other's total imports and exports--about 10%--with 1958 (in respect to imports into Iraq), 1960 (exports to Germany), and 1962 (both) as peak years. Between 1955 and 1965 value of Iraqi exports to West Germany had increased by about 50%, whereas the value of Iraqi imports from Germany had nearly doubled and West Germany had risen to second place after Great Britain as a supplier of Iraq.

As a result of the gradual drop in total value of exports to West Germany after 1962, by 1966 the values of the two had

become nearly equal: $62.9 millions' worth sold to West Germany and $58.4 millions' worth bought from her.[350] The trend is undoubtedly accounted for by West Germany's shift to Libya as its main supplier of petroleum (and to others to a lesser extent).[351]

Iraqi official statistics do not show petroleum as one of its exports to West Germany.[352] Consequently, the favorable balance in favor of Iraq shown in trade figures which do class it as an Iraqi export disappears. Since petrdeum accounts for approximately 90% of the value of Iraq's exports, the following type of situation results:

> Iraq has asked West Germany for negotiations aimed at the strengthening of trade relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit. In a note submitted to the West German Embassy in Bagdad, Iraq called for more West German imports of Iraqi goods under the present agreement. The note said that the trade balance between the two countries was always favorable to West Germany, which exported goods worth about 7 million pounds sterling and imported only £ 900,000 of Iraqi goods during the first half of 1961.[353]

Petroleum excluded, Iraq's principal exports to West Germany were "exotic fruits" (dates and figs) and, to a lesser extent, skins. (Barley was second most important in 1955.) Principal imports from Germany were medical and pharmaceutical products; rubber goods; textiles, yarn, etc.; iron and steel; metalware; electrical and non-electric machinery; and vehicles.[354]

With the diplomatic crisis of 1965 the favorable position of West Germany in Iraq was suddenly altered. Orders were withheld and bids were not accepted from West German firms.[355] Die Welt for March 28, 1965, reported:

> In Iraq German firms have as good as lost contracts for a textile factory, construction of television towers, and consultation for a hydraulic power station at Samarra on the Tigris. . . . The Iraqi government even refuses to honor debts of long standing to German firms to a total of about DM 120 million.[356]

On May 20 the press reported that Iraq was cancelling a contract with West Germany to build "a gigantic dam in Karbala".[357]

After mid-1965, however, business relations returned to normal: "Numerous large export orders connected with Iraq's

economic development have, happily, also been placed with German firms since the diplomatic break," it was reported in September 1965.[358] In fact, West German activity in Iraq could be cited as major evidence that "Arab-German economic cooperation has been maintained in recent months at a highly satisfactory level":

> The Iraqi government has placed an order with a major German firm for the construction of a hydro-electric plant, in connection with the Samarra Dam. The cost of the project is estimated at 135 million DM. The plant is expected to be completed in 1969. The same firm had previously been assigned for the installation of the locks on the big Iraqi dam.[359]

As a result, value of Iraqi imports from West Germany rose dramatically in 1966 as compared with 1965: $58.4 million as against $39.6 million. Exports to West Germany (including petroleum), however, dropped from $81.8 million in 1965 to $62.9 million in 1966.[360] Between 1961 and 1965 Iraq also saw a marked increase in tourist traffic--nearly fivefold--with German visitors forming the second or third largest category of Western tourists.[361]

A problem of a special nature which confronted West Germany in its relations with Iraq in the early sixties was that of use of the Euphrates waters in connection with the hydro-electric dam planned by Syria for its portion of the river. Since negotiations were seriously under way for the Federal Republic of Germany to provide a loan to cover the foreign-currency requirements of the project, both countries were much concerned that the question of water rights be worked out promptly by common accord between Syria and Iraq. Bagdad papers reported in September 1961 that the West German government

> has put responsibility on the U.A.R. government to clear up matters relating to the distribution of waters of the Euphrates with other riparian countries. . . . Asked if the West German government has received assurances from the U.A.R. authorities about their responsibility in this matter, the West German official said: "No." But, he added, "the West German Embassy in Bagdad forwarded all articles and views expressed in Iraq on this subject to the West German foreign office in Bonn." The ambassador in Cairo has stressed the point to the U.A.R.[362]

The revelation of the West German arms aid to Israel in November 1964 placed Iraq in a difficult position, given its

dedication to the Palestinian cause. President Aref, in an interview with the business manager of the Nah- und Mittelost Verein on November 9, 1964,

> spoke of the German-Arab friendship in words which were full of admiration for the German economic renaissance after World War II and of sympathy for the desire of the German people for reunification. . . . German firms and German private investment were particularly welcome. . . . All Arab states, including those which . . . like Iraq, have not sought German capital aid, had recognized only the Federal Republic of Germany in the name of German-Arab friendship and expected that the government of the Federal Republic would not complicate the Arabs' Palestine problem by entering into diplomatic relations with Israel. The President declared unequivocally that Iraq would immediately recognize the Soviet Zone as a sovereign state if West Germany were to enter into diplomatic relations with Israel.[363]

In February 1965, Aref declared "the vicious attempts now being made to renew the reparations agreement between Bonn and Israel until 1975. . . . an act of agression against us." The promise to halt arms shipments was not enough: "Germany must stand with us against the Israeli aggression."[364]

As has been seen, Iraq was the first to act on the decision of the Arab foreign ministers assembled in Cairo to sever diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, but apparently not without regrets:

> Aref made a significant reference to relations with West Germany. He declared that Iraq stood with the rest of the Arab states against West Germany's stand on Israel. "But," he continued, "we still hold a great feeling for the German people, the traditional friend of the Arabs." He appealed to the German people to "make" the government reconsider its stand on Israel.[365]

Later in the same month, November 1965, there were denials of an impending visit by a "West German economic delegation", but a delegation did indeed appear in December, made up of members of the West German Bundestag. It was described by al-Manar (Bagdad) as "semi-official" and as having "offered material aid to Iraq as an inducement for resumption of relations."[366] The papers Bagdad News and al-Thawra al-Arabiya for December 12, 1965, recorded the Iraqi government's answer:

The attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the Government

> of the Federal German Republic did not and will not change unless the latter changed its attitude towards the Arab cause and its support to the aggressive Zionist gangs, official quarters emphasized. . . . They also stated that this attitude on the part of Iraq will not be influenced by material aid or trade relations.[367]

Syria and East Germany

The amicable East German-Syrian relations of the second postwar decade began in mid-1956 with the visit to Damascus of an East German delegation seeking to conclude a cultural agreement.[368] Pressure was at the same time being exerted on the Syrian government by divers Syrian parliamentary factions for recognition of the German Democratic Republic.[369] Syria's granting of permission to the G.D.R. to set up a consulate in Damascus in 1956 precipitated a "'mild crisis' between Syria and West Germany" but it was not expected that matters would "reach the stage of severing Syrian-West German relations."[370]

With the merging of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic in February 1958, the East German consulate in Damascus was downgraded to a trade mission--until May 1961, when it became a consulate again, once more with vigorous reaction from Bonn.[371] When the union was dissolved in September 1961, the consular staff continued to function, although the new government never officially confirmed the existence of consular relations between East Germany and Syria.[372] The same arrangement was retained when the Baath regime came into power in March 1963. Only after the break in diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany did the Syrian government re-establish formal consular relations, on the level of consulate-general, with the German Democratic Republic (in the fall of 1965).[373] At the beginning of 1966 the Syrian Arab Republic for its part opened a consulate-general in East Berlin.[374]

During the early 1960s Syrian-East German relations were unobtrusive, attracting notice in the area's press only in rare instances, as when, in September 1964, a Syrian economic delegation stopped in East Berlin on an East-bloc tour.[375] The pic-

ture changed with the West German-Arab crisis of 1965. In June and in November of that year East German experts arrived to advise and assist the Syrian finance ministry in its reorganization "in accordance with socialist development".[376] An air traffic agreement was signed, and in late July the East German trade minister came to Damascus for discussions to lead to technical, economic, and financial agreements.[377] Further exchanges of visits in both directions, additional arrangements for air routes, and offers of technical and financial aid followed relentlessly into 1966.[378]

Value of East German imports into Syria rose above $1.9 million only in 1957 ($3.2 million), and that of Syrian exports to East Germany rose above $1 million only in 1956 ($1.2 million), 1960 ($1.7 million), and 1963 ($1.4 million).[379]

The technical cooperation agreement entered into by the United Arab Republic and East Germany shortly after the former's formation provided for establishment in the Syrian Region of a technical institute, the building of a harbor in Syria, preparation of plans for the airport of Damascus, creation of iron and manganese"industries", establishment of an institute for training in use of precision instruments and one for petroleum research, and preparation of studies for establishment of new industries in Syria.[380] As will be seen, some of these projects later fell to West Germany and others have not yet come to fruition.

Between 1962 and 1964 East Germany assisted in setting up and putting into production a cement plant with 300-tons-per-day capacity; an oxygen plant with a capacity of 71 cubic meters per hour; a textile plant with fifty looms; a shoe factory; and tobacco- and chocolate-processing plants.[381] In March 1965 an offer by East Germany of a mill for round steel bars was passed to a special committee for study.[382] In May the newspaper al-Baath reported that East Germany would undertake to construct a new course for the Euphrates at Deir al-Zor within the framework of a $4 million loan agreement signed earlier.[383] Technical and organizational assistance in the field of agriculture was being discussed at mid-year.[384]

Four economic and trade agreements covering "trade, payments, maritime transport, technical and scientific cooperation" were signed in August 1965 but not approved by the Syrian National Council until the end of the year.[385] An annex called for an East German company to provide Syria with

> construction machinery, machines for the production of sectional prefabricated houses and contractors' plant worth four million dollars. The company will also train Syrians to use the machinery. The agreement is valid until 1970.[386]

Other projects included the building of five flour mills and the procurement of heavy construction machinery.[387] To these ends, long-term credit facilities to the amount of $25 million had been granted by the German Democratic Republic under an agreement signed in October 1965.[388]

Syria and West Germany

As in Iraq, more or less extensive activity on the part of both Germanies proved practicable in Syria through most of the second postwar decade.

By 1960 West Germany was the second most important supplier of Syria, after the U.S.A., moving to first place in 1963 and remaining there through 1965.[389] Annual value of West German imports into Syria was fairly steady around $23 million (with a peak of $28.2 million in 1963). Values of Syrian exports to West Germany were uneven, having reached a peak in 1956 at $12 million and varying between $10 million and $4 million annually thereafter.[390] After the diplomatic break value of trade rose: imports from West Germany for 1966 amounted to $25.3 million as against $23.1 million for 1965; exports to West Germany for 1966, $9 million as against $8.1 million for 1965.[391] Major items of importation from West Germany were synthetic textile products, fertilizers, various chemical and pharmaceutical products, rubber goods, metal products, vehicles, and other machines and electrical products. West Germany took primarily vegetable oils and cotton from Syria.[392]

"Syria could be a model country for development help," observed a West German diplomat assigned to Damascus in 1967, ex-

pressing a regret generations old at Germany's frustration in its efforts to help Syria realize its potentialities.[393] Until the diplomatic break government and private participation by the Federal Republic had been of modest but not negligible extent.

Within the field of technical assistance, organization of the Institute for Technical Education in Aleppo was begun in 1960 with a goal of training 200 to 250 pupils a year in three or four departments. This required a West German contribution of about DM 2 million in equipment and services of instructor personnel, of whome ten or twelve remained in Aleppo even after the severing of diplomatic relations. Selected students were sent to West Germany for further training.[394]

In November 1959, the West German government agreed to assume the bulk of the planning costs for Damascus' new international airport, including the traffic control system. A contract in the amount of DM 1.2 million was let to the engineering firm of Dipl. Ing. Kurt Becker GmbH of Munich effective April 1960; the general plan was officially submitted in November 1960.[395]

Meanwhile, a West German firm had undertaken construction of a cellulose pulp plant and plans for a new harbor at Banyas were being prepared[396] (but West German participation in the project apparently did not go beyond this). A study of economic conditions for new industry in Syria was also said to be under way.[397]

In mid-1962 a technical assistance agreement was reached under which "West Germany will extend assistance to Syria's Animal Husbandry Center at Deir al-Hajar."[398] Six (later about ten) German specialists--veterinarians and agronomists--were to be provided for a period of three years to expand the work of the Center and develop it into a research station for animal husbandry. West Germany was also to outfit a research laboratory for milk, wool, and fodder, supply needed machines and apparatus, and send cattle and sheep for breeding purposes. The bulk of these had arrived by the beginning of 1963 and work began.[399] A former French plantation was taken over to serve as a model farm,

and plans were under way at the end of 1965 to add an existing Syrian village to the complex to bring it up to the standards of the model farm as a demonstration project. One of the center's primary purposes, the training of Syrian specialists, particularly veterinarians, had not met with much success by the end of its third year, however.[400]

A postal, telegraph, and telephone workers' training program had also been sponsored by the Federal Republic since the early sixties in Damascus. Called the Syrian-German Telecommunications Center, this project is located in the main post office (PTT) building.[401]

In August 1963 the Federal Republic of Germany and the Syrian Arab Republic entered into a technical assistance agreement under which the former "undertook to extend technical experts and assistance to Syria in the fields of civil airport construction, maritime shipping vocational training centers, and electrical power networks."[402] The areas in which the Federal Statistical Office reports development aid, apart from those already mentioned, are pest control, forestry, cotton cultivation, and railways. In addition, the trades school Fondation Georges Salem in Aleppo was expanded with West German help.[403]

Those projects which were under way at the time of the diplomatic break were continued but no new ones were initiated. Net West German development assistance, public and private and including guaranteed export credits, to Syria from 1950 to 1966 amounted to DM 63.9 million.[404]

The fortunes of West German private enterprise in Syria have been various.[405] As the second postwar decade began, an affiliate of Deutsche Erdöl AG (DEA), the Société des Pétroles Concordia, was one of only two Western firms with prospecting rights in Syria (granted at the end of 1956).[406] By November 1958 it had brought in its fourth wildcat well. In July 1960 the committee to negotiate with Concordia on exploitation rights met for the first time[407]--whereupon began an ordeal for the firm which by 1966 had not yet seen its end. The source of the trouble,

according to informed sources, was the failure of its contract to specify the company's automatic right to exploit the oil it found. Concordia had, even so, expected in fairness to be accorded exploitation rights and proposed the formation of a joint West German-Arab firm for the purpose.[408] But political considerations intervened. In October 1962 the matter was "frozen" by Syrian authorities. The pro-Communist paper al-Thalia was insisting that Concordia's claims rested on a "verbal agreement with the U.A.R. authorities before the break-up of the union" and were therefore invalid.[409] At the end of the year the company was allowed to ship its equipment out of the country; its concession rights were not, however, formally cancelled.[410]

Although it is true that the government of the Federal Republic did seek to help Concordia to recover at least the amount of its investment from the Syrian government, the widely-made assertion that this had been stipulated as a condition for the granting of a loan for the Euphrates dam project (see below) seems to be based on a rumor with a long history. Certain informed West German sources interviewed attributed its spreading to the oil company itself to strengthen its case and stated that neither the government in Bonn nor its embassy in Damascus had authorized any public statement to that effect. In any case, the two projects --Concordia's concession and the Euphrates dam--were frequently linked throughout the sixties by official hint and unofficial rumor. After the break-up of the union with Egypt Syrian resentment at Bonn's apparent reluctance to transfer the commitment made to the U.A.R. government regarding the loan for the dam to the Syrian secessionist regime had risen to the point that "the Syrian government began dropping hints that the German attitude on the Euphrates project might endanger German oil interests."[411] With a shift in emphasis, in December 1962 the pro-Communist al-Thalia editorially associated "Germany's 'reluctance' to finance the project and oil negotiations with Concordia, the West German firm."[412] From "suggestions that Bonn was bringing pressure to bear on the Syrian government for granting a concession to Con-

cordia"[413] there evolved outright statements to the effect that;

> the West German government gave Concordia strong behind the scenes backing, using the potential big loan to Syria for a High Euphrates Dam as bait to influence a reasonable settlement.[414]

These allegations were still alive in 1968. At ceremonies marking the inception of work on the project with Soviet aid,

> Dr. Zayyen recalled what he described as "West German maneuvers on the dam project. He said that West Germany offered aid on condition that a concession to exploit Syrian oil was given to the West German firm Concordia "to dominate our economic life and thus political freedom."[415]

At the end of 1964 the Syrian government "after years of indecision" officially declared that no production concessions would be granted to foreigners.[416] According to the Petroleum Press Service, Concordia was to be compensated for its outlay in discovering the promising "Suwaidiya" field, but as late as 1967 no compensation had yet been paid.[417]

Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia had underbid all other candidates for the construction of a petroleum refinery near Homs, but West German firms did obtain a contract for part (value under $1 million) of the Latakia oil-port project.[418] In January 1965 a German firm among those bidding on the laying of oil pipelines from the Djezira to the Homs refinery lost out to a British firm (whose payment was to be in Syrian crude).[419]

Toward the end of the second postwar decade the Telefunken company undertook to establish a television receiver assembly plant in Syria, and Siemens entered into a contract for about $3.5 million to install an interurban telephone network. Both of these companies obtained their contracts as a result of bidding and continued their work after the diplomatic break.[420]

No major construction work was performed by West German firms in Syria during the second postwar decade--and yet a consortium from the Federal Republic of Germany very nearly undertook one of the most ambitious projects yet proposed for the Fertile Crescent area: the dam across the Euphrates[421] with associated hydroelectric plant, high-tension network, and irrigation system for up to 600,000 hectares. Frequently compared to

the Aswan High Dam project in Egypt, it is to a lesser extent also comparable to that project in respect of the inter-Arab rivalries and Cold War recriminations which embellished the several phases of the negotiations for financing and execution. Had it materialized under West German auspices, the Euphrates complex in Syria would have been the first major development project planned by the Federal Republic of Germany in its entirety in cooperation with a developing country.[422] The sequence of steps through which the negotiations bearing on the Euphrates dam project passed is outlined in Appendix E.

When in May 1965 diplomatic relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany were severed, the execution of the DM 350 million loan agreement which had been arrived at was "automatically suspended".[423] Negotiations and preliminary work on the Euphrates dam project ceased. West Germany, however, still considered the February 1963 "treaty" as awaiting final disposition, its implementation contingent upon Syria's meeting the conditions specified.[424] About a year after the diplomatic break serious talks between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the former's resumption of the project began.[425]

The Euphrates dam negotiations, regardless of the size and significance of the project, would not merit the extensive attention they have been accorded if they had not, in the opinion of many qualified observers, served as a test case for so many aspects of West Germany's Near Eastern relations--and for both West German and Syrian policy. The handling of every facet of the repeatedly-interrupted negotiations--political, technical, and financial--has been roundly condemned by one side or the other.

Some West German observers saw the central obstacle to speedy arrival at a successful working agreement in the attitude of the Syrians, who were "not happy with the Germans' wanting to know all the details" about their economy and the means which would be found to pay their share of the costs.[426] Further, the German experts had told the Syrians in all frankness that the project as the latter had conceived it would be difficult to re-

alize, and "Arabs don't like to be told that something they want is impossible."[427] The Syrians seemed unconvinced by Bonn's arguments that the Keban dam being built on the Euphrates in Turkey made possible--even necessary--a less extensive project downriver[428] and continued to hope even after the conclusion of the February 1963 agreement for a full billion Deutschemark, as if confident that West Germany's resources were unlimited.[429] Syria (like other developing countries) was also faulted for not appreciating the time-consuming but indispensable requirement for careful advance planning of every aspect of so complex a project.[430]

At the same time, there was a firm belief in German quarters that insistence on realistic investment and avoidance of outsized prestige projects was a special service which the Federal Republic could render to Syria as a friend (and a responsibility it bore to its own taxpayers).[431] Even so, there was understanding on the German side for the economic and political pressures behind the Syrian impatience, not the least of which was that created by the apparent willingness of the Russians to override all petty considerations of financing in favor of rapid completion of the Aswan Dam in Egypt.[432] (In their own defense, the Germans pointed to their relative constancy in the face of repeated changes of regime in Syria as contrasted with the coolness of the Russians to the Euphrates project when under a regime not to their liking.[433])

To one West German commentator, at least, the preponderance of faults and errors lay on the German side in the Euphrates project dealings with Syria. In his view, the delays in the negotiations and the extraordinary stipulations made by the German side were largely unnecessary and only served to anger the Syrians.[434] The "extraordinary stipulations" which had to do with the requirement that Syria guarantee its ability to provide for the expenses in local currency can be traced to the fact that the West German negotiators were themselves under pressure from higher officials to ensure 100% repayment.[435] Added to this was a vagueness in the technical specifications of the February 1963 agreement and a lack of coordination between the form in which the preliminary studies were drawn up and the concept of the project on which the

financing was based.[436]

An earnest concern developed on the part of some West German observers that West German standing and prestige in the Near and Middle East would suffer an irreparable blow if continued misunderstanding in the negotiations should drive the Syrians to seek help elsewhere.[437] When this happened for reasons quite independent of the Euphrates dam project, however, others expressed relief that West Germany had been extricated from a potentially disastrous undertaking.

Syrian reaction to the course of the negotiations was at least as strong and vocal as the German. In September 1962, for example, al-Nasr ("believed to reflect the thinking of Premier Azm") warned that the West German government "had better give Syria the loan" since West German aid to the Arabs was "insignificant" and that to Israel "fabulous". Further, "she now has the chance of taking a positive step toward the Arab people, a step which can prove that officials in Bonn appreciate the necessities stemming from her relations with the Arab world."[438]

One of the earliest of a long chain of accusations that West Germany was "stalling" appeared in the same paper in August 1962 (to be joined in them by pro-Communist al-Thalia in November). The "equivocations" of West Germany were denounced by the Baathist faction favoring help from the Soviet Union at this juncture also. An assurance to the Syrian ambassador in Bonn of West Germany's continuing interest in making the loan was greeted by Syrian papers as the result of "Syria's firm stand", and German businessmen in Syria are said to have been warned of the "seriousness of the consequences of refusing". The Beirut press reported "high Syrian officials as saying that West Germany had fallen under the influence of Nasserism and Zionism" and that Syrian interests may prompt the government to recognize East Germany and break off negotiations with Concordia.[439]

Meanwhile, Damascus' al-Ayyam was attempting to introduce a note of calm into the public discussion. In a full-page article on the projected dam it asked whether the government might not be devoting too much time to it to the exclusion of other vital

projects and whether the state budget might not be overwhelmed by interest payments on the huge loans needed. Furthermore, Syria was at the beginning of a reorganization of its economy and Bonn had a right to seek assurance that this would not detract from its ability to repay the loan and supply its share of the funds.[440]

Protests against any West German "political strings" on the loan offer nonetheless continued to appear in al-Nasr and al-Rai al-Aam (both pro-government). In November 1962 the latter took exception to West Germany's objections to a simultaneous loan from France, only to complain of "internationalization" when Germany suggested that the project be financed by the Common Market.[441] Al-Thalia warned against the "West German imperialists and the other imperialists behind them", and the Muslim Brotherhood's al-Manar joined the chorus accusing West Germany of "stalling" and "reneging" (a charge repeated by al-Thalia the following week).[442]

Meanwhile, the Syrian leftists, led by former Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (retired) Afif Bizri, stepped up their opposition, denouncing German "imperialism" for trying to link the question of financing the dam to exploitation of oil. (The Syrian Minister of Industry denied that there was any connection between the two.)[443] In an interview with the Syrian News Agency in December, Bizri denounced both France and Germany as "part of the imperialist clique embodied in the European Common Market, which is run under American supervision." "We are not beggars," he added.[444] In Beirut, the pro-Communist al-Nida' picked up the cry that Syria ought to accept the old Soviet offer for financing the dam instead of the one from the "heirs of Hitler".[445]

When agreement was finally reached in January 1963, al-Nasr declared that Premier Azm had assured the West German delegation "that Syria did not intend to apply pressure tactics such as the threat of recognizing East Germany if Bonn did not come through with the aid."[446] The agreement was treated as a triumph over Nasserian forces by al-Nasr and the right-wing al-Ayyam.[447] The West German delegation which came to Syria for finalization of the agreement had been impressed

that all parties in Syria, regardless of their leanings,

> stand behind the project and that the dream of converting the Euphrates valley into a second Nile represented a policy of an overriding nature, taking priority if need be over all other economic and development goals.[448]

During the next year or two, polemics over the Euphrates dam project abated, though the progress of the arrangements was followed closely in the Fertile Crescent press. When, at the end of 1964, West Germany expressed its doubts that Syria was able to fulfill its part of the agreement--providing for local currency needs--the old quarrel was renewed:

> The Syrian government charged that Bonn was reneging because the government in December 1964 issued laws nationalizing the oil resources and industry, thus depriving Concordia of the concession for exploiting the oil it had discovered . . . .[449]

President Hafez declared in a speech that his government had perhaps not made its standpoint--refusal of all political conditions --sufficiently clear.[450] Explained a West German journalist,

> the Syrian government is convinced that it can produce the requirements in Syrian currency during the six- to eight-year construction period covered by the German proposal. In Damascus it is insisted upon that the Germans have no business making pronouncements on Syria's internal economic policy.[451]

A year later, the statements which had become so familiar over the preceding five years in the Syrian press were still being made, but with an occasional new note:

> An editorial in al-Thawra said that local expenses of the Euphrates project should be met through savings of the masses in Syria. "Only with determination of the masses can the project materialize," the editorial said.[452]

To one West German observer, a noteworthy aspect of the negotiations was the contrast in the attitude of other Western nations toward the Federal Republic's participation in the project with their attitude in the later stages of the Second Reich's Bagdad Railway project:

> It was not anxiety lest the project should fall to Germany which coursed through the capitals but rather fear that the Federal Republic might, for thoroughly understandable reasons, dissociate itself from this complex undertaking.[453]

Following the diplomatic break, the Goethe-Institut was allowed to continue functioning in Damascus, but its activities were limited to language courses and the operation of a library. The West German government also continued to offer Syrian students ten scholarships for study in the Federal Republic each year.[454] Instruction in German (as well as Russian and Spanish) had been officially added to the curricula of Syrian secondary schools in 1956, and additional preparation in the language for university-level and professional work was offered by the Damascus Goethe-Institut branch.[455]

A fine summation of the contradictory and ironic aspects of the severing of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Syrian Arab Republic is provided by an Arab World review of Syrian official declarations during that fateful mid-May 1965:

> The Syrian official statement, . . . [which] appeared to be the strongest and longest Arab statement in denouncing Bonn, suggested, however, that Syria will maintain its cultural and trade ties with West Germany. The statement said that Syria will maintain some of its present Embassy staff in Bonn to handle the affairs of Syrian students in West Germany, and to look after Syrian trade relations there.[456] . . .
>
> While the "Bonn rulers" say their action stems from their desire to wipe out Nazi crimes against the Jews, "they are encouraging the new type of Naziism which has arisen in Palestine" . . . [and] went out of their way "in serving Zionist and imperialist interests" when they timed the recognition on the eve of the anniversary of the rise of the Israeli state and the eve of the anniversary of the Arab flight in [sic] Palestine.[457, 458]

. . . . . .

Restoration of mutual confidence had reached the point by late March 1967 that the Secretary-General of the Arab League was directed by the League Council to undertake discussions in Bonn with the aim of resumption of relations.[459] This development was interrupted by the crisis of May and June and the renewed estrangement which followed.

The alleged alignment of the Federal Republic of Germany on the side of the "imperialist aggressors" seems not to have been

made an issue until at least a week after the end of the "June war". The pre-June decision of the Kiesinger government to permit sale of 20,000 gas masks to Israel (despite protests from some members of the cabinet that it would violate the prohibition against provision of armaments to areas of tension) was commented on by the Fertile Crescent press but does not recur in press extracts until after the Soviet chief delegate to the United Nations declared before the Security Council in mid-June that "behind the Israeli extremists it is easy to see not only the shadow of the Pentagon but the tireless militarists from the banks of the Rhine" and pointed to the "sale of anti-gas weapons" to Israel as evidence.[460] The following day Iraq "decided to apply a boycott against American, British, and West German goods and films," and in Syria the remaining Goethe-Institut branch was closed.[461]

Thereafter, the idea of the "tripartite aggression" was developed rapidly. Bagdad Radio on June 22 referred to "the countries of aggression"--"the U.S., Britain, and West Germany, all of which are accused of following a biased policy in favor of Israel."[462] A statement by the Syrian Minister of Information read over the Damascus radio the last week in June began:

> 1. The recent events exposed Zionism as an expression of militarist and fascist existence in the Arab world.
> 2. The events showed that U.S., British, and West German collusion with Israel is clear.

and "strongly attacked West Germany and said that it was, like Israel, 'a tool in the hands of the imperialists'."[463]

Late in July al-Baath, the organ of the ruling Baath Party, declared that "America allied itself with Britain, Israel, and West Germany only to deal a blow to the Arab Socialist movement and the aspirations of the masses for more independence and national sovereignty."[464] Two weeks later its theme was: "Our Arab people is not confronting Israel but rather international imperialism."[465]

West German-Arab reconciliation in the larger Fertile Crescent countries, at least, would clearly have to await more auspicious circumstances.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]Kirk, Arab Politics, p. 38.

[2]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 53.

[3]J. J. Malone, "Germany and the Suez Crisis", The Middle East Journal, XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1966), p. 27.

[4]Ibid., p. 26. Earlier on the same page he remarks that "the German tactics at Lancaster House showed clearly that, in a conflict between political and economic interests, the economic would predominate."

[5]Mehnert, op. cit., p. 395.

[6]Gross, Handel, p. 234.

[7]Interview, Reinartz, February 1967.

[8]Morris, op. cit., p. 132. (Source for sentence following also.)

[9]H. Müller-Friedmann, "Der Nahe Osten und der Westen", Aussenpolitik, X, No. 1 (January 1959), p. 43.

[10]Morris, op. cit., p. 132

[11]"News from our own correspondents--Bonn: Germany and the Arabs", New Statesman, LVI, No. 1431 (Aug. 16, 1958), p. 183.

[12]In 1966-68 Germans in the Near East in non-business capacities and with extensive opportunity for contact with the local populations consistently reported encountering an uncritical view of Fascism and admiration of Hitler for his military successes; the Nazi means of achieving "success" were not questioned. (Interviews.) Kirk (Short History, p. 306) attributes much of the attraction which Nazi Germany had for Arab Nationalists to its "crude dynamism".

[13]A. Hitler, Kifahi tarjamat, trans. Louis al-Hajj (Beirut: 1960).

[14]Wild, op. cit.; the translation contains much paraphrasing but this is expertly done, Wild comments.

[15]Cf. an editorial in al-Baath (Damascus): "The Nazi-Zionist threat is not limited to Palestine only . . . ." (The Arab World, July 26, 1967, p. 6.) Also: a cartoon in Sawt al-Uruba showing "West Germany as a Nazi soldier saluting an Israeli in uniform supposed to be a new Hitler." (Ibid., May 13, 1965, p. 3.)

[16]Tillmann, op. cit., p. 5. Cf. Hirszowicz, Third Reich, pp. 313-15:

> The German Federal Republic has entered the ranks of imperialist rivalry for influence in the Arab East. It is difficult to estimate fully the role of recent history in the present and future expansion of the Bonn Republic. . . . . .

> A contemptuous attitude to the Arabs, aversion to their character and political behavior, disbelief in their state-forming capacity and their loyalty as allies were expressed by many statements of German leaders and offials. . . . Whatever the promises made to the Arabs--and there were not many even of them--the Germans never for a moment doubted that the Arabs would remain dependent and dominated by European masters after the Nazi total victory.

He notes on these same pages that Wilhelm Melchers, wartime director of the Near and Middle East section of the Foreign Ministry (Pol VII) served the Federal Republic as ambassador to Amman and Bagdad when diplomatic relations were re-established.

[17] B. Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: 1964), p. 67.

[18] Another example of the adaptation of this new "vocabulary of abuse" to Arab cold-war purposes is provided by the following item from The Arab World, Oct. 30, 1961, p. 1: "L'Orient today publishes a 'preview' by its Damascus correspondent, George Chatila, of the 'Black Book' the new right-wing Syrian regime proposes to publish on the 'horrid' police-state methods employed in Syria during the time of the union with Egypt. The methods, Chatila says, were taught to the Egyptians by the large number of Nazi specialists they hired in Germany."

[19] Ibid., July 30, 1964, p. 8.

[20] Ibid., May 20, 1965, p. 6.

[21] From joint statement dated June 5, 1967, drawn up by the Arab ambassadors accredited to Belgium, quoted in E. A. Messerschmidt, "Palestine Refugees an Arab Propaganda Weapon?", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 4 (August 1967), p. 113, footnote 2.

[22] Cf. an editorial in Rose al-Youssef (Cairo) in mid-1967: "We cannot ignore the dangers threatening Democratic Germany (East Germany) as a result of the militant and fascist spirit of Federal Germany." (The Arab World, July 19, 1967, p. 8.)

[23] These include: Zeitschrift der Deutsche Morgenlandgesellschaft, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung (Deutsche Akademie, Berlin), Welt des Orients, Orient-Literatur Zeitung (Leipzig), Mitteilungen der Deutsche Orientgesellschaft, Islam, Die Welt des Islams, Oriens Christianus, Nachrichten des Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Asiens, the numerous publications of the various Academies, monograph series (such as the Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes of the DMG), and foreign journals in German such as the Archiv für Orientforschung (Graz) and the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.

[24] All West German universities except Saarbrücken and Kiel offered one or several areas of Oriental studies. The fields into which Orientalistik is conventionally divided in Germany are: Egyptology, Antiquity (Altorientalistik), Semitic studies, Islamic studies, Iran-Indology, Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian studies, and African languages and cultures. (Falkenstein, op. cit.). Arab studies do not appear as a major, independent sec-

tor. A slim volume appeared at the end of 1966 reviewing recent work of West German Arabists primarily, however--R. Paret's Arabistik und Islamkunde an deutschen Universitäten.

[25]It is administratively attached to the University of Bonn, as had been the case in Berlin. The highly theoretical nature of the regular university work makes such a supplementary "practical" institution imperative. "At German universities," a foreign Orientalist interviewed summed up the German system (in which he had worked), "the students work alone and learn in spite of the professors."

[26]"The results to date have not been outstanding," commented Fritz Steppat, Director of the Orient-Institut in Beirut. (Interview, January 1967.) The Falkenstein report pointed out that there is in Germany no equivalent for Paris' École des Langages Orientales Vivantes and École Pratique des Hautes Études or London's School of Oriental and African Studies for modern Near East and North African languages and dialects. (P. 43.)

[27]Falkenstein, op. cit., p. 45. The bulk of the information in the three paragraphs preceding is taken from this publication (pp. 14-15, 17-18, 23, 43, and 45).

In the early sixties the Hammar-Purgstall Society in Vienna organized its new Oriental Academy to try to fill the gap. Students from other German-speaking countries are, of course, sought. (Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 5 (1962), pp. 205-206.)

[28]Ibid., p. 42. Placement of Orientalist-students in Goethe-Institut teaching positions in pertinent areas is recommended by the report as a way of promoting and supporting Oriental studies.

[29]Cf. Time, Dec. 22, 1967, pp. 33-34.

[30]"Deutsche Orient-Stiftung Jahresbericht 1966", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 3, June 1967, p. 77.

[31]Viewing the problem from the students' viewpoint, Dr. Paret has suggested that the demands in language qualifications for specialists in the Islamic area be lessened to permit more thorough preparation as well as work in areas hitherto neglected by German Islamic studies. Sharing of professors by neighboring universities would also make broader offerings by all universities possible. (Arabistik, pp. 74-75.)

[32]Study of dialects is an aspect of current Arab studies in which Germany is strong. (Ibid., p. 74.)

[33]Steppat, "Orient-Institut", pp. 13-14.

[34]Interview, Jaeckel, February 1967.

[35]E. W. Meyer, "Das Gesicht Nicht-Kommunistischen Asiens", Die neue Gesellschaft, VIII (July/August 1961), pp. 267-68.

[36]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 4/5 (September 1965), p. 176.

[37]Van Rooy, op. cit., p. 152, remarks that, in implied contrast to the situation in the Federal Republic, in the U.S.S.R. as in the former colonial powers (England and France) Oriental

studies and Oriental policy are clearly coordinated."

[38]Letter, Feb. 20, 1967.

[39]Arnold Hottinger offered quite another opinion, which may represent a reaction against his own Germanic background. In his view, the Golden Age of German Oriental studies has passed; nothing new has been done lately. Today's Orientalists' weakness is the failure to change; they are plodding along in the old paths (Mainly philological), and since most of the work has been done in this line, they are getting more and more "Byzantine". (Interview, February 1967.)

A more generous view, expressed by Nicola Ziadeh, is that the exhausting wars of this century have left German scholars without the means to continue the outstanding work of the last century but that they are now beginning to reattain their former level of work. (Interview , Dr. Ziadeh, Professor of History, American University of Beirut, March 1967.)

[40]Especially welcome in view of the general lack of medium-term credit facilities in the Near East.

[41]Cf. pages 26 and 113 above; also Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 184; Malone, op. cit., p. 26 ("Once again emphasis was laid upon Germany's advantage as a 'non-colonial' power . . . willing to invest in the Arab lands with goods sold on low interest, long term loans."); and Mendershausen, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

There was an echo of pre-World War I practice in the proposal by Franz Blücher of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation as reported by Le Commerce du Levant in May 1955: "Blücher said his country wished to create German 'service stations' in the Middle East to service local businesses with German goods and skills." (The Arab World, May 18, 1955, p. 8.) Cf. page 26 above.

[42]Mehnert, op. cit., p. 386.

[43]Morris, op. cit., pp. 129-31.

[44]S. E. Filschtinski in Problemy vostokovedenja, No. 2 (1960), quoted in "Deutsche Entwicklungshilfe in sowjetischer Sicht", Orient (Hamburg), II, No. 1 (March 1961), pp. 15-16. An oil concession in Syria (see section on Syria and West Germany below) was given as a prime example of an attempt to create a "raw materials satellite" of a Near Eastern country.

A further thesis presented, according to the reviewer, was that West Germany and the U.S.A. were intent upon moving into the place in the Near East which France and England had had to surrender after the Suez fiasco. (Ibid., p. 17.) Cf. Malone, op. cit., p. 26: "For some there was the confident expectation that Anglo-French miseries were Germany's advantage. . . ."

[45]Cf. beginning of second paragraph from bottom, page 91 above, and pages 95 to 96.

[46]R. von Keiser, "Deutsch-arabische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 4/5 (September 1965), pp. 133-34.

[47]Malone, op. cit., p. 25.

[48]H. Gross, Deutschlands Zukunft auf dem Weltmarkt (Düsseldorf: 1959), pp. 114-15. Imports consisted 30% of food, 27% of raw materials, 25% of manufactured goods, 18% of partly-finished goods; exports consisted to in excess of 80% of manufactured goods.

[49]Ibid., p. 96. They were taking 30% of West Germany's exports in 1957, 20% before World War II. World-wide they took 35.2% of all exports in 1957, as against 27 to 29% in the interwar period. (Ibid., p. 84.) This book, incidentally, does not discuss the Near and/or Middle East separately but only as a part of Asia, following a practice common in German world trade and development aid literature. Cf. E. Majonica, Deutsche Aussenpolitik (Stuttgart: 1965); particularly in his chapter on "Germany and the Third World" the failure to make any special mention of the Near East was notable.

[50]J. Meier, "Germany's Trade with Near and Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (August/September 1962), p. 162. "In this global analysis the share of the SBZ [East Germany] of little more than 1% on an average is of but minor consequence," he adds.

[51]Ibid.

[52]"It's an Ill Wind", The Economist, CCXV, No. 6352 (May 22-28, 1965), p. 894.

[53]Meier, op. cit., p. 162. [54]Ibid., p. 165.

[55]Heading of an article in Le Commerce du Levant (November 1966), p. 12. The article does admit that this is true only for the oil producers and for overall German-Arab trade when oil is included.

Another, titled "German-Arab Relations", asserts that "the Arab states do not need the Federal Republic as an exporter of manufactures as much they need it as an importer of Arab raw materials," which presents the same set of facts in quite another light. (R. O. Tabbaki, "Les Relations germano-arabes", ibid., p. 7.)

[56]West German official sources deny that there is any connection. (Interview with Horst Raben, commercial attaché with the West German representation in Beirut, December 1967.) However, The Economist stated in 1965 that "for some projects, the Germans are now recovering all their costs. There even seems to be a very recent tendency among officials to look more genially on aid to meet balance of payments difficulties." ("Samuel Smiles", CCXV, No. 6357, June 26, 1965, p. 1513.)

[57]"Middle East Economy in 1957", Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, No. 1 (January 1958), p. 2.

[58]Report of Sino-British Trade Council quoted in "Chinese Exports to M.E. Double in Four Years", The Daily Star (Beirut), Dec. 14, 1967, p. 2.

[59]Ibid.

[60]As for the larger area, "Near and Middle Eastern markets are hotly contested even among 'Germans'." (Meier, op. cit., p. 165.)

[61]"Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungsländer", Vierteljahresberichte (Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), No. 8/9 (September 1962), p. 83. "Among them, the UAR constitutes the principal partner of the GDR," the article added.

The information presented in the above-cited article was taken from the journal of the Soviet Institute for World Economy and International Relations (Mirovaya ekonomika i mezdunarodnye otnoseniya, No. 7 (July 1962), p. 114ff.).

[62]Ibid., pp. 83-84.

[63]In some instances blacklisting has been withdrawn when proof could be produced that there was no collaboration with Israel; particularly when the firms were not large and well known an adjustment could be arranged. (Interview, Westerich, January 1967.) German subsidiaries of blacklisted U.S. firms have been able to get off the blacklist by convincing the Boycott Office that their policy was determined independently. (Cf. Business Week, July 2, 1966, p. 28.)

[64]Von Keiser, op. cit., p. 132.

[65]"Wandel in Nahost", Die politische Meinung, X (October 1965), p. 78.

[66]V. Hakim, "Les Investissements privés allemands dans les pays arabes", Le Commerce du Levant (November 1966), p. 24.

[67]Interview, Raben, December 1967.

[68]Discrepancies between the total given and the sum of the investment in individual years may be accounted for by disinvestment, and by investment during 1965, but this is nowhere clearly stated in the source. (The totals for 1952-65 cited were obtained from "Nah- und Mittelost Verein e.v., Jahresbericht 1965", Orient (Hamburg), VII, No. 3 (1966), p. 83, but they are in close correspondence with those cited for mid-year 1965 in the source for the remainder of the table.)

[69]Hakim, op. cit., p. 24

[70]The relative meagerness of West Germany's capital resources is a limiting factor on investment abroad which is frequently mentioned. (Cf. Mendershausen, op. cit., pp. 80-81.)

H. J. P. Arnold, in Aid for Development (London: 1966), p. 136, remarks on the low level of German private investment in the developing countries "despite the efforts of Bonn". "The fear that established French and English investors have great advantages in these countries and doubts about the profitability generally of investments there are reasons quoted for the disappointing performance," he adds.

[71]D. Weiss, "Characteristics of Economic Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Countries of the Near and

Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 4/5 (September 1965), p. 152.

[72]Interview, Raben, December 1967.

[73]Editorial, Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 4.

[74]Interview with E. Schmitt, Near East desk, Auswärtiges Amt, in June 1967.

[75]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 152.

[76]"'Partnership with Asia and Africa' is the name of a newly-founded society in West Germany . . . to encourage German firms to invest in developing countries." (The Arab World, June 24, 1966, p. 8.)

[77]Aid to the Middle East as a whole in 1954-57 from all foreign sources was "negligible" and "unsystematic". Per capita Syria was receiving $3.10, Lebanon $14.60, Jordan $36.30 (including UNRWA funds)--and Israel $94.60. (Iraq had $1.90.) (J. Lundberg, "Technical and Economic Aid to the Middle East", Current History, XXXVIII, No. 225 (May 1960), p. 286.)

[78]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 149.

[79]J. White, "West German Aid to Developing Countries", International Affairs, XXXXI, No. 1 (January 1965), p. 76.

[80]"Germany's Aid to 95 Countries", The Bulletin (Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government), XIV, No. 34 (Sept. 13, 1966), p. 1.

[81]Weiss, "Cooperation", pp. 149-50.

[82]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 7.

[83]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 150.

[84]Arnold, op. cit., p. 137.

[85]A. M. Gilleo, "Basic Concepts of German Vocational Schools in Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 4 (August 1967), p. 116.

[86]G. Wülker, In Asien und Afrika (Stuttgart: 1962), p. 119. The author headed the Studienstelle für Entwicklungsländer ("Study Group for Developing Countries").

[87]German firms operating abroad also contribute to the dissemination of skills. In order to train as many local personnel as possible to take over the jobs required on their projects, an excess of German skilled personnel may be brought in initially and gradually replaced as the newly-trained local nationals become competent. (Interview, Ober, September 1967.)

[88]White, op. cit., p. 78. The Rourkela project started as a purely commercial operation conducted by a consortium of forty loosely-allied German firms.

A traumatic experience in attempting to apply the new principles was provided by the negotiations for the Euphrates Dam project, which is reviewed under "Syria and West Germany" below.

[89]Ibid., p. 79.

[90]Weiss, "Cooperation", pp. 149 & 151-52. Dr. Dieter Weiss was associated with both the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and the German Institute for Development Policy.

Cf. Walker, op. cit., Author's Foreword: "Attempts to raise the economic level in the developing countries will not succeed as long as the social situation is not improved. Development help is effective only when it takes into account the human beings it is intended to serve."

[91]It is frequently and frankly acknowledged that early aid efforts were designed to win supporters for German reunification in the United Nations.

[92]Both statements in this paragraph derive from the interview with First Secretary Raben in Beirut, December 1967. He added: "Recently, there has been some thought that technical aid should seek to better relations."

[93]I. M. D. Little & J. M. Clifford, International Aid (London: 1965), p. 44, have commented on the "commercial nature of German aid": "In particular, no proper aid administration has been established overseas, so that although the government now believes that it should help to stimulate requests, it has no means of doing so. Requests continue to be stimulated largely by representatives of business interests."

[94]Between 1950 and 1963, 13% of the public aid extended by West Germany and 19% of the private had gone to 23 countries of Asia. (Majonica, op. cit., p. 272.)

[95]Cf. I. Hoffman, "Zur deutsche Agrarhilfe in Nah und Mittelost", Orient (Hamburg), IV, No. 4 (1963), p. 158.

[96]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 150. During 1950-64 West Germany also supplied almost 8% of the OECD funds. (Arnold, op. cit., p. 98.)

[97]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 7.

[98]Keesing's, May 15-22, 1965, 20737. This amount to Lebanon is not mentioned in the previous reference.

[99]Sources differ as to the amounts. Der Spiegel, XXI, No. 44 (Oct. 23, 1967), p. 108, gives the following breakdown for West German development aid between 1960 and 1965: India, 19.9%; Israel, 18.2%; Pakistan, 7.2%; Turkey, 6.7%; Brazil, 4.6%; Liberia, 4.1%; Greece, 2.9%; Chile, 1.9%; Indonesia, 1.8%; Egypt, 1.7%; 84 other countries, 31%.

[100]"Samuel Smiles", The Economist, CCXV, No. 6357 (June 26, 1965), p. 1513. Early loans were on a commercial basis at 6 to 7%.

[101]Interview, Schmitt, June 1967.

[102]This paragraph is based on Bauen im Ausland (Hauptverband der deutsche Bauindustrie, e.v.: n.d.) The brochure is abundantly illustrated but the only photograph from the Fertile Crescent was that of the barrage at Dibbis in Iraq; construction of ports and roads in the Fertile Crescent area was mentioned in passing.

[103]Arnold, op. cit., pp. 166-67.

[104]Vierteljahresberichte, No. 8/9 (September 1962), p. 85.

[105]Arnold, op. cit., pp. 165-66.

[106]Ibid., p. 248. As with West German technical assistance program, only about one third of the aid extended had been drawn.

[107]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 152.

[108]German relief organizations minister to all elements of the population of Israel. (Interview with Pastor Weckerling of the Lutheran Community in Beirut, January 1968.)

[109]The German personnel were forced to leave in June 1967 and are not expected to return; financial support for the hospital continues, however. (Interview, Weckerling, January 1968.)

Both East and West German Lutheran churches contribute to the relief of the refugees in Syria.

[110]R. F. Pauls, "Aussenpolitik und Entwicklungshilfe", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 6 (June 1965), p. 381.

There were expressions of enthusiasm for German aid on the Arab side also: "German technical and economic aid to the Arab countries dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, . . . at a time when 'development aid' was completely unknown. . . . The technical abilities and gift for organization of the Germans were never forgotten." ("L'Assistance economique apportée par l'Allemagne aux pays arabes", Le Commerce du Levant (November 1966), p. 25.)

[111]"Credits--Aid or Burden for the Developing Countries?", Wirtschaftsdienst (English edition), No. 3 (March 1963), p. 11.

[112]H. Thierback, "Zur Problematik der Entwicklungshilfe", Zeitschrift für Politik, IX, No. 3 (1962), pp. 212-23, gave vent (not unconstructively) to the author's exasperation at the many frustrations and unreasonable practices and conditions encountered in realizing foreign aid projects.

[113]E. Bohr, "Deutsche Politik in Afrika", Die neue Gesellschaft, VII, No. 3 (May/June 1960), pp. 163-66.

[114]Minister for Economic Cooperation Scheel, quoted by Weiss.

[115]H. Scheibe, "Das Problem der menschlichen Kontakte", Orient (Hamburg), I, No. 1 (1960), pp. 13-14.

[116]"Of some 230 organized Kurdish students in Europe by far the largest part (about 135) live in German-speaking area but of these only 30 in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone." (Van Rooy, op. cit., p. 153.

Figures are from The Economist, CCXV, No. 6352 (May 22-28, 1965), p. 894.

[117]Majonica, op. cit., p. 304.

[118]Scheibe, op. cit., p. 13.

[119]Abstracted from ibid. One facet of the selection problem

is the reportedly widespread impression in the Middle East that it is "easy to get a doctorate in Germany". While not aware of this attitude, Dr. Steppat (interview, January 1967) suggested that the method of study in Germany--i.e., largely unsupervised --may have something to do with it, as may the occasional leniency of some professors with foreign students.

[120]Interview, Jäckel, February 1967. Likening the Herder-Institut to the Goethe-Institut is anathema to the East Germans, the latter being considered a tool of imperialism. (Interview, Steppat, January 1967.)

[121]Arnold, op. cit., p. 176. Generous stipends are said to be one of the attractions, even to students already enrolled in West Germany or Austria. (Van Rooy, op. cit., p. 150.)

[122]Goethe-Institut--Jahresbericht 1961/62 (Munich: 1962) and Köpke, op. cit., pp. 209-11. The cultural program proved to attract more resident Europeans than local nationals and consequently began to be de-emphasized in the late sixties.

[123]"Deutsche Orient-Stiftung--Jahresbericht 1966", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 3 (June 1967), p. 77.

[124]"Nah- und Mittelost Verein e.V.--Jahresbericht 1965", Orient (Hamburg), VII, No. 3 (1966), p. 84. Cf. E. Diedering, "Die Sammlung wirtschaftliche Daten in Ägypten und Syrien", ibid., III, No. 1 (1962), p. 22.

[125]Orient (Hamburg), VII, No. 3 (1966), p. 84.

[126]Letter from H. J. Andel, editor of Nahost Bulletin, to Dr. Grobba dated July 21, 1967. When queried as to the probable causes for the failure, already remarked upon earlier in this paper, of West German authors of books on the Near East to mention German projects and activities there, Dr. Grobba replied that the public's interest in German activities in the Near East is not very great.

[127]A. Schimmel, Review of Blick in den Vorderen Orient, by K. Schwan, Zeitschrift für Politik, VIII, No. 2 (1961), p. 91.

[128]Industrial films in Arabic are also available on loan from the German Industrial Film Center in Cologne.

[129]DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964. President of the society at the time of the report was Werner Hartke, also president of the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften in East Berlin.

[130]Since May 1961 four broadcasts a day in Kurdish have been scheduled. (Van Rooy, op. cit., p. 150.) This is a language in which the West German Deutsche Welle does not broadcast, according to its monthly bulletin for Nov. 26-Dec. 23, 1967.

[131]Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 150.

[132]K. Ames, "West Germany in the Middle East", The New Leader, XLVIII, No. 5 (March 1, 1965), p. 8.

[133]Unfavorable criticism is not confined to the business com-

munity. A retired diplomat attributes much of the trouble to the fact that the high functionaries in the Federal Republic's Foreign Ministry have had little knowledge of the Near and Middle East. This situation, in turn, can be traced to the fact that assignments in that area (apart from Istanbul) have not been considered to carry much prestige and have therefore rarely attracted the ambitious. (Interview, Grobba, September 1967.)

[134] W. Wagner, "Der Rückschlag der Bonner Politik in den arabischen Staaten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 10 (May 25, 1965), p. 369.

[135] Ames, op. cit., p. 9.

[136] Arnold, op. cit., p. 137.

[137] The Economist, March 6, 1965, p. 978, protests that it fails to take into account the need for Afro-Asian countries, particularly those just emerging as independent nations, to be non-aligned--a need more immediately apparent to them than is Germany's for reunification.

[138] W. Wagner, "Überprufung des deutschen politischen Instrumentariums. Die Hallstein-Doktrin nach Ulbrichts Besuch in Ägypten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 5 (March 10, 1965), p. 160.

[139] The Hallstein Doctrine "seems to limit, rather than to determine in any precise way, the distribution of German aid," observed Little & Clifford, op. cit., p. 44.

[140] "Two Germanies, Three Worlds", The Economist, CCXIV, No. 6341 (March 6, 1965), p. 978.

[141] DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964.

[142] Von Keiser, op. cit., p. 134. Mehnert, op. cit., p. 386, claims that educated "Asians" have indeed been persuaded that reunification of Germany is of vital importance--by Russian and Chinese propaganda. It is also believed that a reunited Germany would be a satellite of neither side in the Cold War, he adds.

[143] Ames, op. cit., p. 9.

[144] When the Foreign Ministry in Bonn opposed Israeli-sought relations in the mid-fifties, "privately it was explained that the tense situation would only be aggravated by a hasty decision." The Hallstein Doctrine was already felt as a real handicap which "made it possible for almost any Asian or African country to get grants or gifts from Bonn simply by indicating that it might recognize Pankow." (W. Z. Laqueur, "Bonn, Cairo, Jerusalem: the Triple Crisis", Commentary, XXXIX, No. 5 (May 1965), p. 30.)

[145] Ames, op. cit., p. 10.

[146] Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 173, and The Arab World, Jan. 9, 1959, p. 9.

The Arab World, May 2, 1960, p. 9, carried the following item: "Secret messages from the Leipzig central communist agency for the Middle East were said by L'Orient of Beirut and others to have been discovered in the [15] toothpaste tubes a Jordanian

. . . was carrying in a suitcase when he arrived at the Beirut International Airport aboard an Air India aircraft from Zurich."

[147] Ibid., July 31, 1962, p. 1. By 1965 East Germany was represented officially or unoffcially in nearly fifty countries.

[148] Ibid., Sept. 4, 1963, p. 9.

[149] Ibid., Oct. 2, 1964, p. 6.

[150] Ibid., July 9, 1964, p. 5. (Interview was by al-Baath.)

[151] Ibid., May 18, 1965, p. 6.

[152] The Egyptian Gazette, Nov. 20, 1965, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), VII, No. 1 (February 1966), p. 15.

[153] Ibid. Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 368, remarked in May 1965 that East German aid could only partially replace West German aid lost by Egypt but mentioned none of the other nine.

[154] "What Price Bonn?", The Daily Star, Nov. 19, 1966.

[155] The Arab World, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 2.

[156] Ibid., May 4, 1959, p. 4.

[157] A-Thawra (Bagdad) declared in mid-1960 that "the Communists consider the presence of American forces in West Germany as an imperialist aggression but they fail to see the Soviet occupation of East Germany. Soviet occupation in East Germany is for them a splendid act of solidarity with the German people, on the oft-repeated pretense that the German people voluntarily chose the friendship of the other Socialist Republics." (The Arab World, June 2, 1960, p. 7.)

[158] T. Prittie, Israel (London: 1967), p. 122. Cf. this passage from P. Coulmas, Zwischen Nil und Tigris (Hamburg: 1958), p. 184: The Palestine refugees "do not resemble the Germans driven out of the East, who had taken axe and saw in hand to build something up almost before they were settled. The majority of the Arab refugees instead folded their hands in their laps and waited. Allah akhbar." (This and one other brief reference constitue the only allusions to Germany in the entire book.)

It is doubtful that there is much awareness in the Arab world of West Germany's refugee problem and the manner in which it was handled; massive American aid and the demands of the regenerated industrial state for manpower rendered the German case quite different from that of the Palestine refugees, it can be argued.

[159] "Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen", Frankfurter Hefte, XX, No. 9 (September 1965), pp. 611-12.

[160] Ibid., p. 613.

[161] Ibid., p. 601.

[162] Keesing's, VIII, Dec. 13-20, 1952, 12621A.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Without specifying dates of either inauguration or termination, the Statistisches Bundesamt's Länderkurzberichte--Israel (Mainz: 1967), p. 28, lists the following as "Important Pro-

jects under German Development Aid":
Until 1965, primarily reparations
Erection of housing projects
Financial assistance to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel, Ltd.
Extension of the telephone and telegraph systems.

[165] Keesing's, VIII, Dec. 13-20, 1952, 12621A.

[166] Frankfurter Hefte, XX, No. 9 (September 1965), p. 601.

[167] Keesing's, XI, Jan. 25-Feb. 1, 1958, 15990A.

[168] Ibid., XIII, Dec. 23-30, 1961, 18507A.
Al-Akhbar (Cairo) in December 1964 asserted that the Israeli-made guns were then resold by West Germany to Portugal. (The Arab World, Dec. 29, 1964, p. 8.) Rose al Youssef (Cairo) stated that they were sent to Africa as part of the West German aid. (Ibid., Jan. 20, 1965, p. 8.)

[169] In subsequent statements to the press Adenauer expressed "deep satisfaction . . . in contributing to rehabilitation in Israel and promising mutual cooperation with and support for Israel in the future." (A. Sherman, "Reparations and Restitution", The New Leader, XLIII, No. 25 (June 20, 1960), pp. 15-16.)

[170] "Despite the many well-authorized press reports in the past two or three years, the existence of the 1960 agreement had neither been confirmed nor denied by the West German and Israeli governments, both of which maintained official silence. The agreement had never been set out in any formal document." (Keesing's, XV, May 15-22, 1965, 20737.)

[171] Sherman, op. cit., p. 16.

[172] Prittie, op. cit., p. 204.

[173] Keesing's, XIII, Feb. 3-10, 1962, 18582C.

[174] Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 5.

[175] Keesing's, XIV, Sept. 14-21, 1963, 19635A.

[176] Prittie, op. cit., p. 204.

[177] Ames, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Some accounts state that this was done at the request of the U.S.A.; others, that West Germany asked U.S. permission. A former chief of the Near and Middle East section of the Foreign Ministry at Bonn stated in an interview that U.S. pressure had indeed been exerted to obtain West Germany's assistance in transferring the tanks to Israel, but only for this portion of the armaments. (Interview, Voigt, June 1967.) The arms deliveries as a whole constituted a gift, but a U.S. State Department spokesman referred to sale of the tanks. (Keesing's, May 15-22, 1965, 20737.)
Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 3, pointed out that the "offensive weapons" nature of tanks made their inclusion particularly significant to the Arabs.

[178] The Economist, Feb. 6, 1965, p. 527. Rose al-Youssef (Cairo) claimed that 5000 Israeli soldiers altogether had received train-

ing "at camps attached to American bases, with the knowledge and approval of Germany." (The Arab World, Jan. 20, 1965, p. 8.)

[179] Ames, op. cit., p. 11.

[180] The Arab World, Dec. 16, 1964, p. 4.

Prittie, op. cit., p. 203, asserts that the decision to establish diplomatic relations and Israel's agreement thereto had been announced in March 1965 in anticipation of the closing of the only regular avenue of contact between the two nations--the Israeli reparations office in Cologne--in May 1965. Chancellor Erhard was quoted by The Daily Star (Beirut), Dec. 15, 1964, as having explained the move by the fact that West Germany could not "in one jump" establish diplomatic relations with Israel since "West German Near East policy must take into consideration the whole situation." It was further explained that the tank deal had been kept secret to prevent a new arms race.

[181] Landerkurzberichte--Israel, p. 28. See also note 164 above.

[182] Ames, op. cit., p. 16.

[183] Prittie, op. cit., p. 202. Some other sectors of opinion identified by political observers are indicated in the following:

"The average German wants no more reparations, no more 'blood-guilt' aid to Israel." (Attributed to "a German diplomat in Cairo" by P. Dorn, "Germany on the Nile", The New Leader, XLVIII, No. 18 (Sept. 13, 1965), p. 3.) W. Z. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 31, identifies German diplomatic and political commentators who are "convinced that relations between Bonn and Cairo are more important than Germany's ties with Jerusalem" as having been "associated in the past with Hitler and Goebbels". Sherman, op. cit., p. 16 (among others) points out that "some sections of the Christian Democratic party would certainly prefer to pay more heed to Arab views." Orientalists and businessmen alike working in the Fertile Crescent countries repeatedly deplored in interviews Bonn's apparent unawareness or indifference to the repercussions of its Israel policy on West Germany's standing and interests in these countries.

[184] Op. cit., p. 601. This and the following paragraph are based on pp. 601-602.

[185] [E. A. Messerschmidt], "Entwicklung und Folgen bundesdeutscher Nahostpolitik", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), pp. 3-7.

[186] "No one in Germany dares to attack Israel," remarked Dr. Grobba. Those in high office are afraid for their positions should they speak out against Israel, he added. (Interview, September 1967.)

[187] New Statesman, Aug. 16, 1958, p. 183, speaks of "the neutralism which is not far below the surface whenever Arab-Israeli issues crop up" in Germany.

[188] The supplementing of the arms with training in West Germany compounded these errors, others would add. Cf. Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 359: "In Germany and abroad this setback has

often been ascribed exclusively to errors in German policy, even though opinions as to when and where these errors were made differed. Nonetheless . . . [it] must first of all be seen in association with the Near East conflict, between the millstones of which other nations have already been caught."

189 E. A. Messerschmidt, "Palestine Refugees--an Arab Propaganda Weapon?", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 4 (August 1967), p. 113.

190 Keesing's, VIII, Dec. 13-20, 1952, 12621A.

Rose al-Youssef (Cairo) claimed that official reports to the West German parliament revealed that 80% of Israel's economic, military, and commercial potential was due to German reparations. (The Arab World, Jan. 20, 1965, p. 8.)

191 From The Arab World, March 15, 1965, p. 2:

> The [Arab] Foreign Ministers' statement said declarations made by the government of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on March 7 "contained open hostility to the Arabs, fell in line with the imperialist, Zionist machinations in the Middle East, and sought to interfere with Arab responsibility for maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East." The statement at the same time appealed to the German people to appreciate the circumstances which prompted the Arab resolution, and declared that the friendship which the Arab peoples have for the German people will remain.

From ibid., April 15, 1966, p. 7: "Paying reparations to Israel, according to [al-Thawra (Damascus)], is extremely humiliating to the Germans as a whole. It reflects that the people of Germany are all responsible for the atrocities of the Nazis and therefore the people of Israel, of a heterogeneous nationality, have the right to make claims on the people of Germany." Al-Thawra also commented, in response to Foreign Minister Schroeder's stand on ties with the Arabs, that there was "no enmity between the Arab and German peoples." (Ibid., Nov. 16, 1966, p. 6.)

192 Ibid., Jan. 3, 1957, p. 6. The conservative paper Beirut asked: "If this policy [recognition of Israel] is a national German policy, why does not East Germany also aid Israel?" (Ibid., Sept. 5, 1957, p. 1.)

193 Ibid., July 23, 1957, p. 4, and Sept. 24, 1957, p. 6.

194 Ibid., Nov. 17, 1958, p. 3.

195 Ibid., June 29, 1959, p. 9.

196 Ibid., Sept. 2, 1959, pp. 4 & 8.

197 Ibid., April 13, 1960, p. 3.

198 Ibid.

199 In the latter, the paper (which is no longer published) added, "Zionism is performing a dirty role." (Ibid., June 24, 1960, p. 7.)

200 Ibid., Aug. 23, 1960, p. 3.

201 "Remarques sur la crise germano-arabe", Orient (Paris), Nos. 32/33, 4th qtr. 1964/1st qtr. 1965, p. 7.

[202]Ibid. The principle was not, however, firmly enunciated until the first Arab summit conference in Cairo in January 1964, he adds.

[203]The Arab World, May 2 & 4, 1961, p. 6.

[204]Ibid., May 18, 1961, p. 5. [205]Ibid.

[206]Ibid., May 21, 1961, p. 8.

[207]Ibid., May 15, 1961, p. 9.

[208]Ibid., May 16, 1961, p. 3, and June 7, 1961, p. 8.

[209]During the Eichmann trial in Israel in April 1961, Arab papers were liberal with accusations that West Germany had sold out to the Zionists. (See ibid., April 11, 1961, pp. 4-5.)

[210]Ibid., Sept. 27, 1961, p. 9.

[211]"European-Arab Relations", The Middle East Forum, XXXVII, No. 8, p. 40. The latter are understood to be justifiable, he said.

[212]A Soviet charge that the West German ambassadors to Iraq and Lebanon (among others) were Nazis liable to trial for war crimes appeared in Rose al-Youssef in December 1961. (The Arab World, Dec. 27, 1961, p. 8.)

[213]Ibid., April 5, 1962, p. 5.

[214]Ibid., July 6, 1962, p. 8.

[215]Ibid., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 9. A few days earlier West Germany had protested the invitation of East Germany to participate in a Lebanese film festival; the Lebanese government replied that it was strictly a commercial affair. (Ibid., Sept. 3, 1962, p. 3.)

[216]Ibid., March 30, 1964, p. 5. Even the U.A.R.'s Middle East News Agency was content to warn Bonn that it was being exploited by Israel. (Ibid., Aug. 16, 1963, p. 8.)

[217]Ibid., Dec. 5, 1963, pp. 7-8.

[218]Ibid., Nov. 4, 1964, p. 4.

[219]The occasion for this rebuttal was a report that the West German Workers' Union had "invited Bonn to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on the basis that this was also a moral obligation." (Ibid., March 12, 1964, p. 8.)

[220]D. Schorr, "Reporting the Deal", The New Leader, XLVIII, No. 5 (March 1, 1965), p. 11.

[221]Keesing's, XV (May 15-22, 1965), 20737. [222]Ibid.

[223]Schorr, op. cit., p. 11. In June 1964 Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol had appealed to the President of the U.S.A. for tanks, at a time when Arab pressures on the U.S. were very strong. The Erhard government reluctantly agreed to be its stand-in. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

[224]Editorial, Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 3.

Colombe, op. cit., p. 8, gives the date as Jan. 14.

[225]Editorial, Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 3.

[226]W. Khalidi & Y. Ibish (eds.), Chronology of Arab Politics, III, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1965), p. 45.

[227]The Arab World, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 3.

[228]Colombe, op. cit., p. 8.

[229]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 3.

[230]Keesing's, XV, May 15-22, 1965, 20737.

"The much-discussed influence of Spain on the Arab world due to historical tradition is largely wishful thinking on the part of Madrid," commented Messerschidt in deploring what he considered the disgrace of the second greatest trade and military power of Europe's imploring help in this affair. (Orient, VI, No. 1, p. 3.)

[231]Keesing's, XV, May 15-22, 1965, 20737.

[232]The Arab World, March 2, 1965, p. 3.

[233]Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 366. Most of the aid committed had already been given or was "in the pipeline", he added.

[234]Colombe, op. cit., p. 9. The latter step was taken without prior consultation with his cabinet.

[235]Ibid.

[236]The Arab World, March 9, 1965, p. 2. President Aref of Iraq echoed Abd al-Nasser's accusations of "neo-imperialism" on the part of West Germany in a speech. (Ibid., March 10, 1965, p. 3.) He is also reported as having called her recent policy "a stab in the back to the entire Arab world". (Chronology of Arab Politics, III, No. 1, p. 50.)

[237]Egyptian Gazette, March 15, 1965.

[238]The Arab World, March 9, p. 4A; March 10, p. 3; and May 14, p. 8 (all 1965). The editor commented: "A joint Arab measure against Bonn may well be the first real test to Arab solidarity reached following the first Arab summit meeting. The risk involved may be big: failure by Arab states to come out with a unanimous resolution on Bonn may well shake this Arab solidarity." (Ibid., March 9, 1965, p. 2.)

[239]Ibid., March 10, 1965, p. 3. Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla is credited with the toning-down of the final resolution, having warned that voting on East Germany's recognition would split Arab ranks. (Ibid., March 16, 1965, pp. 2-3.) Nonetheless, the occasion was hailed as the "beginning of the falling apart of the Arab League" by C. von Imhoff, "Die Arab-Liga nach der Nahostkrise", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 7, p. 468.

[240]The Arab World, March 17, 1965, p. 4. "Neither in Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon, however, were there any cases of violence against German nationals." (Keesing's, May 15-22, 1965, 20741.)

[241]The Arab World, March 23, 1965, p. 3, and Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 367. The burden of the envoys' message was probably similar to that of Dr. Werner on an earlier trip to Cairo: that recognition would mean an end to "special relations" with Israel and that "recognition of East Germany would mean an end to present Arab-German relations--with unforeseeable consequences." (The Arab World, April 2, 1965, p. 8.) Wagner, ibid., p. 368, saw the envoys' efforts as "not without success" since some Arab states hesitated to take a step which might be seen as an orientation toward the Eastern bloc and which also might "drive the Federal Republic into the arms of the Israelis."

[242]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 4.

[243]The Arab World, March 24, p. 5, and March 29, 1965, p. 9.

[244]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 4. The occasion was the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the defeat of the Hitler regime.

[245]The Economist, May 22, 1965, p. 893; The Arab World, May 13, 1965, p. 3; and interview, Raben, December 1967.

[246]The Arab World, May 13, 1965, pp. 3-4.

[247]Ibid., May 18, p. 13, and May 19, 1965, pp. 7 & 8.

[248]Ibid., June 17, 1965, p. 11.

[249]The Economist, May 22, 1965, p. 893. Erhard is said to have given assurance that no guarantees of Israel's borders or arms aid were entailed in his country's establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

[250]The Arab World, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 3. West Germany's argument is said to have run as follows: "1) Germany had suspended arms shipments to Israel; 2) it has rejected Israel's request for military cooperation and for exchange of military information; 3) it refused Israel's request for cancellation of the decision which had been issued by the West German Finance Minister postponing payment of reparations to the Jews until 1967. Rose al Youssef said that the West German government asked King Hassan to tell the Arab states in general and the U.A.R. in particular the following: 1) West Germany now takes an impartial stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict; 2) Bonn officially desires to resume diplomatic relations with the 10 Arab states as soon as possible; 3) continuation of the break with the Arab states 'harms the cause of German unity'." (Ibid.)

[251]Ibid., p. 1. The announcement (by Rose al-Youssef) in September that $63 million compensation had been paid to Israel in place of undelivered arms, that a $250 million loan had been made, and that 5000 Israelis were to be trained in West German factories had been accompanied by no such repercussions, apparently. (Ibid., Sept. 30, 1965, p. 8.)

[252]Wagner, "Ruckschlag", p. 369.

[253]Ames, op. cit., p. 8.

[254]Wagner, "Überprüfung", p. 157.

[255]Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 4/5 (September 1965).

[256]F. Baade, "Neugestaltung unserer Politik in Nah- und Mittelost", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 4 (April 1965), p. 243.

[257]Wagner, "Überprüfung", p. 163. Those who are inclined to the German Democratic Republic are slipping into the Communist camp anyway, he remarked (pp. 164-65).

[258]"It's an Ill Wind", The Economist, CCXV, No. 6352 (May 22-28, 1965), p. 893.

[259]Ibid., p. 894. Actually this represents a return to the original (September 1955) enunciation of the doctrine by Adenauer; the version stating that the "Federal Republic would break off diplomatic relations with any such country" was not set forth until December of that year. (Keesing's, XV, May 15-22, 1965, 20737.)

[260]Speech by Chancellor Erhard before the Bundestag, Feb. 17, 1965, cited in "Entwicklung und Folgen bundesdeutscher Nahostpolitik", Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 6, footnote 2.

[261]Weiss, "Verhältnis", p. 826.

[262]Ames, op. cit., p. 10.

"In Bagdad at the end of 1964 they were wondering how there could be a single German who could not see the clear connection," wrote E. A. Messerschmidt in "Deutsche Widervereinigung und Nahostpolitik", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 5/6 (February 1965), p. 164.

[263]The Arab World, May 14, 1965, p. 8.

[264]Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 367.

[265]Interview, Grobba, September 1967.

[266]Speech by Erhard, Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 6.

[267]Op. cit., pp. 612-13. He continued:

> And what of our illusion that our charisma could hinder the Arab states from going over to the Soviet side: . . . Those who subscribed to this illusion overlooked the fact that the Arab states have a fundamental interest in maintaining a certain degree of independence from both blocs.

[268]Ibid., p. 614.

[269]Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 368.

From the Arab side came a reply to thoughts along this line:

> In the main, hopes for an early resumption will depend on the nature and extent of cooperation between Tel Aviv and Bonn. The chances will be greater if Bonn convinces the Arabs that these will not exceed the mere formality of keeping a representative in Israel.

("What Price Bonn" (editorial), The Daily Star (Beirut), Nov. 19, 1966.)

[270]Von Keiser, op. cit., p. 132.

[271]Contacts of other natures included attendance by Lebanese Communists at conferences in East Germany, such as that on neo-colonialism at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig in 1961. (The Arab World, July 11, 1961, p. 8.)

[272]Mideast Mirror, Nov. 28, 1953, p. 8.

[273]Ibid., Oct. 1, p. 21, and Oct. 22, 1955, p. 16.

[274]Ibid., Nov. 19, 1955, p. 23. Woolens of the Lebanese National Wool Co. were also taken. (The Arab World, May 10, 1961, p. 7.)

[275]Ibid. Figures of LL 3.5 million and LL 2 million are given for 1960 by the Arab Economic Report, October 1962, p. 59.

[276]Ibid. This was reduced to 60% the following year.

[277]Ibid., February 1964, p. 62.

[278]The Arab World, June 25, 1964, p. 1; Sept. 17, 1964, p. 11; and Nov. 4, 1965, p. 12.

[279]Vierteljahresberichte, No. 27 (March 1967), p. 90.

[280]A German Institute of Biblical Archaeology also has facilities in Lebanon and conducts a yearly seminar for Biblical scholars from all German-speaking countries; three or four from East Germany usually attend. (Interview, Steppat, February 1967.)

[281]A. Kecati, "La Présence allemande au Liban", Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, pp. 10-11. Also: Gilleo, op. cit., pp. 116-18.

[282]Interview, Weckerling, January 1968.

[283]Al-Hayat (Beirut), Dec. 13, 1961, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 1 (1962), p. 31. The Soviet Union had protested the inclusion of West Berlin in the agreement as "support by Lebanon of West Germany's aggressive policy against the GDR"; the protest was rejected by the Lebanese government as a "political gesture". (The Daily Star (Beirut), Dec. 14, 1961, quoted in loc. cit.)

[284]Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 159, and Kecati, op. cit., p. 11.

[285]Länderkurzberichte--Libanon (Mainz: 1967), p. 20. Not mentioned in that source but by The Arab World, Feb. 28, 1961, p. 3, were experts to assist the government in the reorganization of its "economic and financial office, particularly in relation to tax laws and regulations".

The Lebanese press reported in April 1961 that a proposal that Hjalmar Schacht come to Lebanon to help establish a Central Bank had come to nothing. (Ibid., April 25, 1961, p. 5.)

The merchant marine training school project was reportedly

abandoned by the West Germans when the Lebanese made it clear that the school was to serve for military training as well. (Interview, Bente, December 1966.)

[286] Länderkurzberichte--Libanon (Mainz: 1967), p. 20.

The Arab World, Jan 9, 1963, p. 4, carried the following commentary: "The Communist al-Nida' this morning charged that West Germany inherited the U.S. Point IV in Lebanon through the technical aid agreement signed between West Germany and Lebanon recently. The paper said West Germany intends to use the agreement as a cover for espionage activities here."

[287] Interview with Heinz Matthiesen, representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Beirut, January 1968.

Later it was hoped to establish contacts in other Arab countries; during the initial period a monthly magazine in Arabic, al-Ihlam, is the foundation's only regular avenue of contact with the union movement in the Fertile Crescent outside of Lebanon.

[288] The Arab World, Jan. 26, p. 9, and June 21, 1961, p. 5.

[289] Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 29. Inexpensive "mass" tours for limited budgets such as those organized by the Neckermann firm were responsible for this increase, in large part.

[290] In 1956 there was talk of abrogation of the existing trade pact with West Germany since "Germany did not respect her obligations under the agreements." (The Arab World, Dec. 7, 1956, p. 3.) Trade agreements were finally abaondoned in any case, both countries favoring ultra-liberal trade policies. (Interview, Raben, December 1967.)

In 1965 the deficit in trade with West Germany represented 10% of Lebanon's overall trade deficit. (Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 5.)

[291] The sources are those for Tables 4 and 5 above. The value of trade rose after the diplomatic break: Lebanon imported goods from West Germany to the amount of $51.4 million and exported to a value of $8.1 million in 1966. (Länderkurzberichte--Libanon, p. 13.)

[292] The variety is much greater than this selection suggests. There were 250 classifications with a value over LL 100,000 each. (Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 5.)

[293] "La Part de la RFA dans le commerce extérieur libanais", ibid., p. 5. The type of solution he had in mind was not long in coming. In the fall of 1966 a consortium of West German banks was said to be offering DM 500 million to Lebanon to finance development. (The Arab World, Sept 23, 1966, p. 11.)

[294] Letter from First Secretary (Commercial) Horst Raben of the Office for West German Interests of the French Embassy in Beirut dated Jan. 25, 1968.

[295] Petroleum Press Service, May 1960, p. 190; April 1961, p. 153; and March 1963, p. 115. A geophysical survey had first been carried out by the German company Prakla; a 14% interest

had been held by the Lebanese government. (See also The Arab World, July 13, 1959, p. 7, and The Oil & Gas Journal, LVII, No. 53 (Dec. 23, 1959), p. 123.)

[296]Letter, Raben, January 1968. Several hundred local businessmen have also been appointed as agents or representatives of German firms but the exact number is not known.

[297]Interviews, Roth, January 1967, and Schmitt, June 1967.

[298]The Arab World, March 19, 1958, p. 9.

[299]DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964.

[300]E. Diedering, "Die deutsch-arabische Entwicklungshilfe", Orient (Hamburg), I, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 10-11.

[301]Interview, Roth, January 1967. "Combatting plant diseases and pests and geological studies were included in the list, for example, since outstanding German work in these fields has long been known in Jordan." (Letter, Roth, Feb. 10, 1967.)

[302]Al-Difa', April 11, 1961, and June 26, 1961, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), II, Nos. 3/4 (1961), p. 178.

German geologists had made studies of the Great Rift beginning in the early 1800s.

[303]Al-Difa', May 29, 1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (1962), p. 176.

[304]Arab Economic Report, October 1965, p. 47, and H.-A. Reinartz, "In Jordanien hat die Zukunft begonnen", Wirtschaftsdienst, XLIII, No. 3 (March 1963), p. 128.

[305]DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964.

[306]Bulletin, Service des Intérêts Allemands, Ambassade de France, Amman, dated Nov. 11, 1966.

[307]Al-Difa', June 27, 1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (1962), p. 176, and Arab Economic Report, October 1962, p. 53. West Germany was to bear about 60% of the cost of the planning and advice on generation and distribution of electric power to meet present and future requirements for both domestic and industrial uses.

[308]Länderkurzberichte--Jordanien (Mainz:1967), p. 22.

[309]Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 159.

[310]Interview, Roth, January 1967.

[311]Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 159.

[312]Arab Economic Report, February 1964, p. 33. DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964, speaks also of a trade school to be set up in Ramallah in 1962. This may have been supplanted by the Jerusalem school.

[313]Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (1962), p. 176.

[314]Interview, Roth, January 1967.

[315]Länderkurzberichte--Jordanien (Mainz: 1967), p. 22.

[316]Gilleo, op. cit., p. 118.

[317]Interview, Weckerling, January 1968.

[318]Reinartz, op. cit., p. 128. A state-owned company with capital of about $400,000 was formed to run the plant.

[319]Becker, op. cit., p. 195.

[320]The Arab World, Feb. 16, 1962, p. 1. (The German studies for the line had fallen under the technical assistance program.)

[321]About DM 50 million had been allocated for the connecting railway in 1967 although the agreement covering capital aid had not yet been signed as of January 1968. ("West Germany's Economy Minister Visits Amman", The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 18, 1968, and letter, Raben, January 1968.)

[322]The Arab World, Dec. 27, 1961, p. 9, and letter, Raben, January 1968. DPA Hintergrund gave the amount of the second loan as DM 15 million; the amount stated by an Amman embassy official as DM 7.5 million. The contract for the first was signed in August 1961. (Al-Difa', Aug. 9, 1961, quoted in Orient (Hamburg).)

[323]The Arab World, Aug. 15, 1961, p. 9.

[324]Reinartz, op. cit., p. 126, and Hakim, op. cit., p. 24.

[325]Länderkurzberichte--Jordanien (Mainz: 1967), p. 22.
Proposals for worthwhile projects have never ceased to stream into his office from Jordan, Dipl.-Ing. Ober (of Julius Berger AG) commented, but "the money is never there. . . . They do not understand about financing." There must be much more development aid, he concluded. (Interview, September 1967.)

[326]Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 15.

[327]Länderkurzberichte--Jordanien (Mainz: 1967), p. 14.

[328]Ibid., p. 16. West Germans were nearly as numerous as the French, who were in third place.

[329]Interview, Bente, December 1966.
In any case the Foreign Ministry has little influence on labor policy, commented journalist H. Vocke (interview, January 1967).

[330]The Arab World, Sept. 21, 1966, p. 11.

[331]Interview, Bente, December 1966, and letter, Raben, January 1968. The industrial training plan was working out well, commented Counsellor Bente, head of the West German representation in Beirut.

[332]The Arab World, Nov. 30, 1964, p. 8.

[333]Keesing's, XI, Sept. 27-Oct. 4, 1958, 16770.

[334]Interview, Jäckel, February 1967.

[335]Bjulleten inostrannoj kommerčeskoj informacii (BIKI), Bei-

lage 11/1966, pp. 67-72, translated in Vierteljahresberichte, No. 27 (March 1967), p. 87.

[336]The Arab World, Aug. 19, 1959, p. 9.

[337]Orient (Hamburg), I. No. 2 (1960), p. 80.

[338]The Arab World, June 26, 1962, p. 8.

[339]Iraq Times, May 25, 1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 3 (1962), p. 123; The Arab World, June 12, p. 4, and July 31, 1962, p. 1; and DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964.

[340]Interview, Schmitt, June 1967. According to diverse accounts, the East German "head of mission" enjoys all of the perquisites of the diplomatic representative of a recognized government except for showing his nation's flag.

[341]The Arab World, June 22, 1962, p. 8. Iraq's interests in East Germany were handled by its embassy in Prague.

[342]The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 9, 1966, p. 2.

[343]The Arab World, Jan. 4, p. 9; Apr. 4, p. 6; May 16, p. 8; and June 12, 1956, p. 9. The barrage was designed to divert flood waters, provide hydroelectric power, and make possible an extensive irrigation program.

[344]DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964.

In June 1958 King Faysal II and Crown Prince Abd al-Illah had accepted an invitation to visit the Federal Republic of Germany the following September. (The Arab World, June 18, 1958, p. 9.) West Germans whose business called them to to Bagdad shortly after July 14, 1958, reported that they were nonetheless cordially received.

[345]Ibid., Feb. 5, 1958, p. 9; July 9, 1959, p. 7; May 27, 1960, p. 7; May 5, 1961, p. 9; and Nov. 11, 1963, p. 1.

[346]Ibid., Sept. 6, 1963, p. 3.

[347]Arab Economic Report, February 1964, p. 20.

[348]Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 18; Gilleo, op. cit., pp. 114-16; and The Arab World, Jan. 10, 1961, p. 8.

[349]"German Firms Still Active in Arab World", The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 10, 1966.

In an unexpected turn of events perhaps indicative of the future, a U.A.R. firm (Othman Ahmed Othman) underbid both Czech and German firms for a feeder canal project off the Kirkuk canal as the decade ended. (International Commerce, April 4, 1966, p. 39.)

[350]Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 12.

[351]West German demand for petroleum had been expected to triple between 1960 and 1970. (Cf. Paret (ed.), Welt des Islam, p. 157.) According to Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 26, it rose from 13 million tons in 1955 to 77 million in 1965, a sixfold in-

crease. West Germany attended Arab Petroleum Congresses with a respectable number of delegates--27 to Britain's 37 in 1963. (The Arab World, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 9.)

[352]Of over $630 million paid out by West Germany for Arab oil in 1964, only about $200 million accrued to the Arab governments as revenues paid in to them by the concessionary companies. (V. Sarkis, "Un Style nouveau dans les accords pétroliers germano-arabes", Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 26.)

[353]The Arab World, Dec. 27, 1961, p. 9. According to figures in the UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, for example, half-year value of West German exports to Iraq was just under £ 7 million, as in the Iraqi note, but half-year value of Iraqi exports to West Germany was just over £ 10 million--excellent confirmation of the estimate of 90% for the share of petroleum in the value of Iraqi exports.

[354]Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 12.

[355]Interview, Raben, December 1967.

[356]"Deutsche Industrie erleidet Verluste in Nahost", Die Welt, No. 74, p. 4. E. A. Messerschmidt, business manager of the Nah- und Mittelost Verein, gave a figure of about DM 70 million. (Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (1965), p. 4.)

[357]In the words of President Aref:

> We had an agreement with the West German government for the construction of a water dam, the Karbala dam, which is to be even bigger and more gigantic than the Aswan High Dam but Bonn's hostile stand towards the Arabs has prompted us to cancel the agreement and seek other states to replace her--those states will probably be from the East bloc.

(The Arab World, May 20, 1965, p. 1.)

[358]Von Keiser, op. cit., p. 133.

[359]"German Firms Still Active in Arab World", The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 10, 1966.

[360]Länderkurzberichte--Irak (Mainz: 1967), p. 12.

[361]Arab Report and Record, Feb. 1, 1966, p. 13. The bulk of the traffic is non-European and non-American.

[362]The Arab World, Sept. 7, 1961, p. 7.

[363]E. A. Messerschmidt, "Deutsche Wiedervereinigung und Nahost Politik", Orient (Hamburg), V, No. 5/6 (February 1965), p. 163.

[364]The Arab World, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 2. Feeling was running so high that reports of German arms aid to Iraqi Kurdish rebels had to be denied by the West German Foreign Ministry. (Ibid., March 31, 1965, p. 4.)

[365]Ibid., Nov. 19, 1965, p. 4.

[366]Ibid., Nov. 30, p. 11, and Dec. 20, 1965, p. 3.

[367]Quoted in Orient (Hamburg), VII, No. 1 (February 1966), p. 19.

[368]The Arab World, July 9, 1956, p. 9. Specialists in education and geology from East Germany also visited Syria. (Ibid., July 11, p. 5, and Oct. 10, 1956, p. 5.)

[369]Ibid., July 11, 1956, p. 5.

[370]Al-Shaab, quoted in The Arab World, Oct. 17, 1956, p. 8. "Especially that Syria can always argue with West Germany regarding the latter's stand with Israel," the translation of the statement in al-Shaab concluded.

In January 1958 Arab students in East Germany were said by al-Rai al-Aam (Damascus) to have besought the Egyptian and Syrian heads of state to sever relations with West Germany and recognize East Germany, which "had stood on the side of Syria, Egypt, and Algeria in their struggles." (The Arab World, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 7.)

[371]DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964. East Germany had a consulate-general at the seat of the U.A.R. government, Cairo.

[372]Letter from Leg. Rat I Kl. Gerhard Pfeiffer dated Feb. 9, 1968. To avoid difficulties the protocol office of the Syrian Foreign Ministry refrained from publishing a consular list during the next few years, Dr. Pfeiffer explains.

[373]Ibid. "This was done after considerable efforts and also some pressure from East Germany in the months before," the letter adds.

[374]"Deeply impressed by the conditions prevailing in East Berlin and East Germany, the first two Syrian vice-consuls actively assisted some Germans to cross the border lines in order to reach freedom in West Berlin. When the whole affair came out, the two Syrian officials crossed into West Berlin, asking the German authorities for political asylum, which was granted to them." (Ibid.)

[375]In 1962 "three Damascus newspapers . . . devoted considerable space to an article and photos on the ninth anniversary of the workers' rebellion in East Berlin." (The Arab World, June 19, 1962, p. 6.) The 1964 item was from ibid., Sept. 3, 1964, p. 3.

[376]Ibid., June 16, 1965, p. 7.

[377]Ibid., July 21, 1965, p. 7.

[378]Ibid., Feb. 20, p. 7, and Feb. 23, 1966, p. 7; The Daily Star (Beirut), Nov. 7, 1966.

[379]Sources are those for Tables 4 and 5 above.

[380]The Arab World, July 29, 1958, p. 6.

[381]Vierteljahresberichte, No. 27 (March 1967), p. 88.

[382]The Arab World, March 23, 1965, p. 5. A loan of $5 million was mentioned.

[383]Ibid., May 25, 1965, p. 7. Under the terms of the accord the G.D.R. was "to provide Syria with technicians, experts, and planners to assist in the projects of various ministries". (Ibid., May 25, 1965, p. 7.)

[384]Ibid., July 28, 1965, p. 7.

[385]Ibid., Dec. 31, 1965, p. 6.

[386]Ibid., Aug. 4, 1965, p. 10.

[387]Ibid., May 18, 1965, p. 7.

[388]Ibid., Sept. 28, 1965, p. 6.

A protocol to implement the 1966 agreement entailing an LS 100 million loan was signed in February 1967, according to The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 12, 1967, p. 2. It "contained two lists, one defining industrial plant to be provided by East Germany for Syria's second five-year development plan. Plant includes cranes, harbor installations, drills and electical equipment. The second list itemises goods which Syria may export to East Germany in repayment. It includes raw materials and cotton."

[389]Arab Economic Report, October 1962, p. 77.

[390]Länderkurzberichte--Syrien (Mainz: 1967), p. 14, and sources for Tables 4 and 5. It was perhaps because of this imbalance of imports against exports that "West Germany . . . promised to provide Syria up to 40% of a $40 million stand-by credit through the International Monetary Fund. . . . The spokesman said the credit would help to ease balance of payments difficulties which have arisen since Syria's independence from the UAR." (The Arab World, March 9, 1962, p. 5.)

[391]Länderkurzberichte--Syrien, p. 14. "Commercial relations continued normally during the diplomatic break." (Interview, Schmitt, June 1967.)

[392]Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 15. Only about 40% of this trade was with private firms. (Interview, Westerich, January 1967.)

[393]Interview, Vorndran, March 1967. Cf. letter, Pfeiffer, Feb. 9, 1968: "Syria is a potentially rich country. The natural and human resources could be much better used for the benefit of the nation."

[394]"Germany and the UAR" (Supplement), The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, VI, No. 7 (July-August 1960), p. XXIV, and The Arab World, Feb. 14, 1962, p. 8. The agreement had been signed in 1959.

[395]"The New International Civil Aerodrome of Damascus", Orient (Hamburg), II, No. 4 (September 1961), p. 158. Construction was well on its way to completion by mid-1961, according to the article.

[396]Egyptian Economic and Political Review, VI, No. 7, p. XXIV; Grunwald & Ronall, op. cit., p. 155; and The Arab World, May 21, 1958, p. 7.

[397]Egyptian Economic and Political Review, VI, No. 7, p. XXIV.

[398]The Arab World, June 27, 1962, p. 8.

[399]Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 162.

[400]Interview, Vorndran, March 1967. As is customary in West Germany's technical assistance projects, the recipient country provided land, buildings, and housing and other necessary facilities for the personnel. (The Arab World, June 27, 1962, p. 8.)

[401]Interview, Vorndran, March 1967, and letter, Pfeiffer, Feb. 9, 1968.

[402]Orient (Hamburg), IV, No. 4 (1963), p. 174. The establishment of a geological and hydrological service for the Syrian government was cited by Weiss, "Cooperation", p. 150, as a typical postwar West German technical assistance project but it does not appear in the listing of development aid in Länderkurzberichte--Syrien.

[403]Länderkurzberichte--Syrien (Mainz: 1967), p. 21. [404]Ibid.

[405]The early years of the decade were rife with reports of West German loan offers. In May 1956 "an important West German banking group" was said to have offered $72 million repayable in ten years at 3½ to 5%--for purchase of West German capital goods. (Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 173.) In November 1957 a group of West German businessmen were reported as being in Damascus to propose financing of development projects with the support of the West German Government. (The Arab World, Nov. 14, 1957, p. 3.) The item adds that U.S. influence was suspected but right-wing al-Jarida (Beirut) discounted the idea since Israel was trying to block West German economic expansion and Syria could benefit from "objective cooperation".) In July 1959 the "West German Popular Housing Reconstruction Corporation" was in the news as having suggested a DM 20 million loan on easy terms, to be used in purchase of housing materials from the Federal Republic. (Ibid., July 7, 1959, p. 7.) In September 1959 the Deutsche Bank was reported as having agreed to open a credit account for the Syrian Central Bank in the amount of DM 5 million "at good conditions". (Ibid., Sept. 17, 1959, p. 5.)

No confirmation of the existence or the acceptance of any of these offers was seen in any German source.

[406]The Oil and Gas Journal, LVI, No. 45 (Nov. 10, 1958), p. 106. Concordia's concession covered 5800 square miles within the triangle formed by the Euphrates and the Syrian border and was to last eight years. (Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 174.) When the U.A.R. was formed this firm was permitted to continue its exploration and drilling program without interruption, although the other firm (American) was ordered to relinquish its concession and equipment. (The Oil and Gas Journal, LVI, No. 45, p. 106.) Its area was that abandoned in 1950 or 1951 by Syrian Petroleum, Ltd.

[407]The Arab World, July 6, 1960, p. 9.

[408]Interview, Westerich, January 1967, and The Arab World, March 22, 1960, p. 9. A German-U.S.-Italian combine offered in 1962 to develop the Syrian fields and build a pipeline to the

coast, giving Syria 16 2/3% royalties and a 55-45 division of profits, but the offer was rejected. (DEA was the German member.) ("Syria Now Ready to Talk Oil Development", The Oil and Gas Journal, LXII, No. 11 (March 11, 1964), p. 85.)

[409]The Arab World, Oct. 24, 1962, p. 9.

[410]Ibid., Dec. 18, 1962, p. 6.

[411]Interview, Vorndran, March 1967; interview, Vocke, January 1967; and The Arab World, April 27, 1966, p. 11.

A correspondent for L'Orient (Beirut) claimed that Bonn was proposing unacceptable conditions which included "a 'live and let live' policy on Israel, stop dealing with East Germany even economically, turn over to Concordia all Syrian oil resources, not just the Swedieh area." (Ibid., Oct. 15, 1962, p. 7.)

[412]Ibid., Dec. 4, 1962, p. 6.

[413]Ibid., Dec. 23, 1964, p. 6.

[414]"Syria Refuses Oil Rights to Foreigners", The Oil and Gas Journal, LXIII, No. 1 (Jan. 4, 1965), p. 76. This echoed charges in the Syrian press: West Germany "is trying to make the loan dependent on whether or not the Syrian government would give the German oil group of Concordia-DEA the concession for exploiting the oil which Concordia had discovered in the north of Syria." (The Arab World, June 23, 1964, p. 1.)

In May 1964 the Syrian humor weekly al-Modhik al-Mobki had sympathized with Concordia in its having to explain its case all over again to each of the many new governments in Syria. (Ibid., May 27, 1964, p. 6.)

[415]"Israeli Expansion Leads to Destruction--Zayyen", The Daily Star, March 7, 1968, p. 2.

[416]The Oil and Gas Journal, LXIII, No. 1, p. 76. Three months later nine foreign fuel and oil distribution companies in the country were nationalized. (The Arab World, March 9, 1965, p. 4.)

[417]"The State Takes All in Syria", Petroleum Press Service, XXXII, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 134-35.

A postscript to the Concordia affair: "The Syrian special oil committee has decided to reject an offer submitted by four companies jointly to develop oil deposits in the Djezira district. . . . [It] is noted that an offer submitted in the past by the German firm, Concordia, one of the four companies in question, was alone more favorable than the offer by the four." (The Arab World, July 2, 1966, p. 9.) Concordia was thereupon authorized to submit an offer for the development of the deposits it had discovered. (Ibid.)

"Suwaidiya", "Sweidiya", and other variants apparently influenced by the spelling of al-Suweida in the Jebel Druze appear in all accounts of Concordia's work; it seems, however, that "Soueidik" (French transliteration) near Karatchok is meant since the field is identified as lying about 19 km. south of that mountain.

[418]Famchon & Leruth, op. cit., p. 173. The group included Krupp.

[419]The Arab World, Jan. 20, p. 5, and July 27, 1965, p. 9. The British firm subsequently lost the contract.

[420]Interview, Westerich, January 1967. The implications of future orders in such a project should not be overlooked; "once you choose a system you are bound by it." (Letter, Pfeiffer, Feb. 9, 1968.)

[421]Original plans, dating from before World War II, were for Youssef Pasha; later the site was shifted northward to Tabqa.

[422]G. A. Sonnenhol, "Der Euphratdamm und die syrische Gesamtplannung", Aussenpolitik, XIV, No. 4 (April 1963), p. 233.

Particularly during the first year following Syria's secession from its union with Egypt, Syria was harrassed by Egyptian mass media predicting the failure of its hopes for a nonpolitical loan and of the project in general. (Cf. G. von Heubbenet, "Syrien nach der Trennung von Nasser", Aussenpolitik, XIII, No. 2 (1962), p. 199.)

[423]The Arab World, April 27, 1966, p. 12.

Matters had not reached the stage of bidding by the consortium, pointed out Dipl.-Ing. Ober. The financial condtions set by the Russians were much more strict than those of the Germans, he added. (Interview, September 1967.)

[424]Interview, Schmitt, June 1967.

[425]"All is set for the biggest economic development project in Syria's modern history--the construction of a giant Soviet-financed dam to harness the Euphrates River," reported The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 26, 1968 ("Syria Will Soon Launch Work at Euphrates Dam"). "An earlier agreement to finance the dam was signed with West Germany in 1963 by a right-wing Syrian regime. But the current leftist government tore up that agreement after it took power in 1966," the article stated in a later paragraph.

[426]Interview, Schmitt, June 1967. He added that when the difficulties became apparent to the Syrians they threw the blame on the Germans as not wanting to carry out the project.

[427]The West German journalist who made this remark also pointed out that the Russians and French had not told the Syrians the full truth about their dream project.

[428]Because of the control on flood peaks and overall flow which it would exert.

[429]Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 231. Even this amount would not cover the full irrigation scheme, which would cost much more than the dam. (F. Baade, "Turkische und syrische Dammbauten am Euphrat", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 2 (February 1965), p. 110.)

[430]Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 229.

The Federal Republic also saw the proposed resettlement of one million peasants in this area as one of the major sources of difficulty and insisted on preparatory studies by the Syrian government. (BD, Feb. 13, 1965, in Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1, p. 25.)

[431]Baade, "Dammbauten", p. 113, and Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 229.

[432]H. Vocke, "Über den Euphrat-Staudamm muss bald entschieden werden", Frankfurter Allgemeine, Feb. 1, 1965, p. 22.

[433]Thierback, op. cit., p. 214. There was some hesitancy, of course, as after the installation of the Baath regime in 1963.

[434]Interview, Vocke, January 1967.

[435]The Kreditanstalt is said to have proposed a formula at one point to the effect that if the Syrian economy should prove not to be strong enough to carry the burden of the project, the West German government should declare the work suspended and all loans and credits already given should be paid back. This was to be a first trial of a principle it had hoped to apply extensively in the future; the aggravating effect which such action would have on any crisis--not to mention the implications of a foreign nation's passing such a judgment--seem not to have been considered. (Ibid.)

[436]To support his charge that no political agreement or treaty ever concluded had been made in such a superficial and dangerous way as that on the Euphrates dam project, Vocke cited first the vagueness of the terms under which the loan was to be granted in the agreement signed in February 1963. Secondly, the technical aspects were poorly set forth: the final height of the dam (it could not be much above that for the "first stage" at the location chosen or the flooded area would extend into Turkey), the final extent of the irrigation system, and the destination of the high-tension lines (the wording was "to the place needed", with no distance given) were left unspecified.

He also pronounced the phrase "first stage" highly misleading --and probably intentionally so as a device to reconcile the recommendations of the early studies and the inflated Syrian goals for the project, on the one hand, with the more conservative intentions of the West German loan. All of the preliminary studies--those of the Soviet technicians and of Professor Press and, later, of Professor Tinbergen--declared the project economically practicable but failed to point out at what "stage" it became so. This point was surely crucial to the Kreditanstalt in deciding what funds it could and should make available. It is true that the right to decide on the final form of the project was left to the Syrians, who were also to have the responsibility for getting the financial assistance for the "later stages", but the final form ought to have been known in order to make provision for it in the initial construction--and in the budgeting. (Vocke, interview, January 1967, and "Staudamm".)

[437]F. von Caucig, "Euphrat-Damm gegen Assuan-Damm", Aussenpolitik, XII, No. 8 (August 1961), p. 543.

[438]The Arab World, Sept. 28, 1962, p. 7.

[439]Ibid., Aug. 17, p. 5; Oct. 8, p. 8; Oct. 15, p. 3; Oct. 17, p. 4; Oct. 19, p. 5; and Nov. 9, 1962, p. 6.

[440]Ibid., Sept. 19, p. 9, and Oct. 31, 1962, p. 8. In the latter article the economic analyst for al-Ayyam also upbraided the Syrian delegation for going to Bonn unprepared to answer eco-

nomic questions and the Syrian press for giving an "incomplete picture" of West Germany's position.

[441]The Arab World, Nov. 30, p. 6; Dec. 4, p. 6; Dec. 7, p. 6; and Dec. 28, 1962, p. 6.

[442]Ibid., Dec. 12, p. 6; Dec. 19, p. 7; and Dec. 27, 1962, p. 9. Aid Minister Scheel's conversations with World Bank officials in the fall of 1962 had not pleased the Syrians, who were apprehensive lest the Bank should decide that the dam did not deserve priority and was beyond the Syrians' means. (Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 231, and Le Commerce du Levant, Oct. 31, 1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 5 (1962), p. 284.)

[443]The Arab World, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 9.

[444]Ibid., Dec. 6, 1962, p. 6.

[445]Ibid., Dec. 5, 1962, p. 4.

[446]Ibid., Jan. 15, 1963, p. 5. This,however, remained a very real fear in some West German quarters, to judge from Baade, "Dammbauten", p. 106.

[447]The Arab World, June 17, 1963, p. 9.

[448]Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 232.

[449]The Arab World, April 27, 1966, p. 12.

[450]Vocke, "Staudamm".

[451]Ibid.

[452]The Arab World, Nov. 24, 1966, p. 6.

[453]Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 231.

[454]The Syrian government proposed the candidates but West Germany reserved the right of final choice among them on the basis of "quality". (Interview, Vorndran, March 1967.)

[455]The Arab World, Aug. 28, 1956, p. 5, and brochure of the Goethe-Institut, Damascus, for term beginning Oct. 1, 1966.

[456]Pakistan was to look after other Syrian interests.

[457]The Arab World, May 14, 1965, pp. 2-3. Palestine Day is observed on May 15.

[458]As a matter of incidental interest, Michel Aflaq, ideological founder of the Baath Party, chose West Germany for his five months' "exile" in 1964 when he perceived that the military were taking over his party. (Ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 11.) It has been noted that his collaborator, Akram Hourani, "began his political career in Antun Saada's PPS, organized on fascist lines." (R. Kapferer, "Die Baath-Partei und die arabische Einheit", Aussenpolitik, XIV, No. 5 (1963), p. 342.)

[459]"Hassouna ira bientôt à Bonn", L'Orient, March 21, 1967.

[460]The Arab World, June 14, 1967, p. 5.

[461]Ibid., June 15, p.3.

[462]Ibid., June 23, p. 10.

[463]Ibid., June 26, pp. 9-10.

[464]Ibid., July 21, p. 6.

[465]Ibid., Aug. 8, 1967, p. 6.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The diverse problems, of both recent and ancient vintage, which have characterized the postwar era in German-Arab relations range from the incompatibility of forces forging national policy to the day-to-day conflict of cultural values in mutual undertakings. Some of these problems merit a moment's reflection in closing. (Reference will be to West Germany only.)

The Special Problem of Technical Assistance

One of the more serious sources of friction in German-Arab collaboration has been, on the one hand, the aversion to practical work on the part of many young Arabs with training in technical specialties--training which, if given in German or German-run institutions, represents considerable expense to the German as well as the Arab government. The frequent failure of Arab socio-economic systems, on the other hand, to make use of this training once acquired has further contributed to the friction.

The first of these sources of friction has its roots in the traditional Oriental depreciation of manual labor and the tendency to reserve educational opportunity to the upper classes. It has been the experience of representatives of the installation and operating side of German industry with years of work in the Arab countries that one can hope to adapt a secondary-school graduate to the kind of practical work demanded by economic development, but with the holder of a higher degree it would be very difficult--and it is impossible to collaborate with the degree-holder who has studied abroad.[1] Further,

> how many German universities and colleges could tell a tale about this type of foreign student!
>
> The hard struggle for life has produced an elite among the laboring masses which would be outstandingly well adapted to the development work in their own lands.

These individuals should be sought out and trained.[2] However, this is not done, the author of the above passage continues. The insistence of the educated on managerial jobs "in which they will not have to get their hands dirty" results in a "vastly overinflated bureaucratic apparatus" with consequent unnecessary expense and mismanagement.[3]

There is also the problem that economic and social systems in the Arab world are seldom ready to accept the type of skilled worker produced by German training, whether it has taken place in German-run vocational schools in the Fertile Crescent countries or in the Praktikant program in West Germany.[4]

These phenomena are far from peripheral in German-Arab relations since there is a tendency on both sides to favor technical assistance and training as the form which West German aid should take. In its negative aspect, this tendency has its origin in West German wariness of overextending the country's resources on "super-projects", which, in addition, are not always the type of aid most needed. Positively, West Germany is said to have an advantage in that it still has adequate well-qualified personnel to send out on technical assistance assignments, whereas other industrial nations' technical manpower resources are overtaxed.[5] There is a general, if not unanimous, opinion on both sides also that the Germans are especially gifted for instructional and advisory work.[6] This idea is of venerable age; the version of it which follows is dated 1918:

> With capital alone it cannot be done; our Ottoman ally needs examples and teachers for its spiritual and economic renaissance. A no less important, many-sided and challenging field of activity thus lies open before the Central Powers since all of the bases for rehabilitation are still to be laid through awakening of the slumbering resources of the land and modernization of the outmoded economic customs of the population. . . . First, however, European specialists and experts, who have already been appointed or are being selected, must develop native abilities and guide them in the right channels and smooth the way for the native population until it is able to take over the work of renewal independently. Then the Turks themselves must continue the work, in order to dispel that distrust which Easterners harbor against Westerners and their intentions.[7]

Again in the thirties, Germany was proposing itself as a "disinterested tutor", stressing that there was nothing humiliating in the Arabs' pre-industrial situation but that rather there was everything to hope from it. Their position was comparable to Germany's at the outset of its industrialization a hundred years before, the argument ran.[8]

In more recent years, the same thoughts have appeared on innumerable occasions in slightly different phrasing:

> Economic enlightenment is spreading along with or even in advance of the export of commodities. This export of economic education--in the form of technical consultation and planning, or of the dispatch of such experts as engineers, architects, and physicians--is today of the highest importance for underdeveloped countries, so concerned about their sovereignty.[9, 10]

Respect for local customs--if not always for values--is one of the traits which has made German tutelage acceptable, as was suggested in Chapter II above. "The fundamental differences in usage and viewpoint which become evident with every contact in daily life make cooperation especially difficult and require exact knowledge of the Orient and of its inhabitants," observed the author of the above-quoted passage from the year 1918.[11] More often than not, to judge from the Germans' persistently favorable reception, this advice was followed and continues to be today. Both diplomatic and industry spokesmen interviewed feel that West German industry's selection of personnel for adaptability and its advance preparation of selectees for local conditions on overseas projects is as thorough and as successful as that of any Western nation (and better than that of most). Further, care is taken not to try to impose a completely German system of work at the project sites.[12] Hence, the problem of conflict of cultural values is fully recognized on the German side. How far its remaining aspects are amenable to rational solution remains an open question.

Contradictions and near-impasses of another nature have faced the makers of West German foreign policy for the Near East, and the way to their elimination has not yet been found.

Vying Viewpoints and the Search for a Viable Policy

The strong position of the Federal Republic of Germany as a trading partner and technical adviser in the Near East as contrasted with its weak position politically is less than astonishing to seasoned observers of postwar Germany, which they call "an economic giant but a political pygmy".[13] West German commentators have not failed to point to West Germany's continued strong trade position in the Near East as the most likely starting point for its political salvation there:

> A normalization of German-Arab relations on the basis of common economic interests seems to offer, relatively speaking, the best prospects for success. The possibility for realistic judgment of one's partners is most rapidly attained through increased economic contact.[14]

Such sanguine prognostications fail, however, to take into account the Arab ambivalence in matters economic. Throughout Arab history, historian Hans Rörig reminded his German readers in 1955, the unpredictable impulse to sacrifice material advantages for ideals has vied with the drive toward accumulation of riches. "It would therefore be a mistake to explain too many events in Arab lands in a purely economic light," he cautioned.[15] A not-unusual West German--in fact, Western--reaction to this phenomenon is that expressed by a highly-placed diplomat in Syria in the mid-sixties: he was "astonished and even shocked at the Arabs' negligence of the importance of economic factors," citing the cutting off of the flow of Iraqi oil through the Syrian section of the IPC pipeline as an example.[16]

Nevertheless, economic interests were not neglected by the Arabs when the boycott in retaliation for the reparations to Israel was strictly limited. Later, in May 1965, a boycott to accompany the severing of diplomatic relations was voted down,[17] and the absence of formal ties proved to be no hindrance to doing business with West Germany.[18]

The disparity in viewpoint toward the Near East between West German government and business circles must strike the Arabs as similarly indicative of ambivalence. Present-day entre-

preneurs have given some evidence of nostalgia for the days of the Second Reich, when, in their opinion, diplomatic policy was determined in large part by the economic situation (see footnote 60, Chapter V). "The German Empire was an industrial state and its needs were therefore imperious"[19]--and this is more true today than ever, this viewpoint runs. A nation whose life depends on trade cannot afford political luxuries, it further implies.[20] Nonetheless, Chancellor Adenauer, in announcing the 1952 reparations agreement, declared as a matter of national policy that "some things are above good business."[21] The resulting Arab view, as articulated by a normally pro-German Arab journalist, was that the Federal Republic of Germany "in her friendship with us adopted the role of salesman who is very conservative in taking positive activity beneficial to the Arab world."[22]

Another remarkable feature of postwar German-Arab relations was the Federal Republic's seeming blindness to the inevitability of violent Arab reaction to the secret supplying of arms--above all, of tanks--to Israel. The question of the wisdom of gambling that the "deal" could be kept secret, and of the extent of planning, if any, for the situation which could be expected to arise if it could not, will be left aside.[23] The central question for German-Arab relations is whether Bonn in reality failed to take into account Arab sensitivities.

"The way has been nearly impossible to find," a former chief of the Near and Middle East section of the West German Foreign Ministry summed up his country's dilemma. Israel never seemed satisfied and was always asking for more aid. At the same time, Arab nations were seeking aid in various forms. With the development of the German Democratic Republic as a political and economic entity of more than negligible consequence on the international scene the problem of good relations with the Arabs "has become very acute and more difficult from year to year." Then, "one day unfortunately Israel asked for weapons."[24]

Furthermore, Bonn felt the pressure of other problems

in the Middle East just as acutely as that of the Arab-Israeli enmity:

> Everything else in the way of problems which exists in this [Arab] area is of secondary importance . . .--apart from the question of preventing a war between Israel and Egypt. But this task is, as we will see, simple of accomplishment in comparison with the gigantic one of rendering India, Pakistan, and Turkey economically viable.[25]

It is not impossible that harrassed Bonn officials had expected that the Arab nations would see and understand the insoluble dilemma of its situation[26]--without themselves perceiving that they had presented the Arab world with a similar dilemma. There was also a feeling that no satisfactory basis of cooperation could be found until the "Palestine conflict" had been resolved--a conflict in which the Germans considered that they had no part.[27] If a book on German Postwar Foreign Policy by the head of the political division of the West German Foreign Ministry, published in 1960, can be taken as an indication, there was little preoccupation with the Near East in foreign policy making circles.[28] In addition, there may have been "a bit of duplicity" toward the Arabs at the top level in Bonn in the failure to make its policy clear.[29]

Accusations of the want of a clear Middle East policy on the part of Bonn were not lacking during the first fifteen years of the Federal Republic's existence. Until about 1960, it is charged, Bonn had simply followed in the wake of the "disastrous" U.S. policy in the Middle East.[30] The need not only for a clarification of West German relations with the Near East but also for the development of a true Near East policy may have first been acutely felt during the national debate on the employment in Egypt of German rocket experts (protested by Israel in March 1963).[31] The embarrassment which followed upon the revelation of West German delivery of tanks to Israel led to the questioning of Bonn's competence in foreign policy overall:

> If a moral is to be drawn from the crisis, it would be that the Federal Republic of Germany, in spite of the strength it has attained, is not ready to stand up for itself in international conflicts. The greater part of

> the German public is in any case inclined toward a cautious, almost anxious, reserve. . . . [But] simple withdrawal from international politics would not be a suitable response to the disappointments which the Federal Republic of Germany has experienced during these weeks.[32, 33]

That the diplomatic rupture of 1965 marked in many respects the end of an era in German-Arab relations was brought out in Chapter VI. It was expected in West Germany that the irrefutable evidence with which the Arabs had been presented that the Federal Republic was at last fully integrated into Europe would cancel out the preference reputedly accorded to her because of Germany's "non-colonial" past.[34]

The deterioration in good will toward West Germany which has resulted from the failure of her behavior to conform to Arab hopes has been abetted by Communist and Communist-inspired propaganda in the Near East. Insofar as it seeks to denigrate the Federal Republic as the heir of Nazi Germany, it has, however, done little to erode--and may even enhance--the basic esteem in which West Germans are held in the Fertile Crescent area.[35]

The diplomatic crisis of 1965 marked the expiration of a number of Western as well as Arab misconceptions and instances of self-delusion. It also brought to light the fact that the end of the "old era" of German-Arab relations had in some respects occurred much earlier. Still, the superficiality of postwar West German interest in the Near East which the crisis revealed, for example, may be no more marked than that of previous generations--simply less conspicuously masked by romantic fascination. Ironically, the nation that had in two wars counted on benefiting from pan-Islam and/or pan-Arabism when these supposedly monolithic forces should rise to smite their enemies proved in peace to be the enemy against which the Arab states made one of their greatest shows of solidarity (ten of thirteen members of the Arab League having united in severing relations).

There was an end also to the West German hope that aid could be given at the same time non-politicially and as an inducement to non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic.[36]

Among the Federal Republic's Western allies, most notably the United States of America, the legend of West Germany's unlimited usefulness as a go-between in extending aid unacceptable to the Arab nations from "imperialists", or in rendering assistance to Israel theoretically less objectionable to the Arabs, was laid to rest.[37] However reluctantly or willingly assumed by the Federal Republic, its role as political intermediary between the West and the Arab world was automatically forfeited with the termination of diplomatic relations.

Within West Germany there had been some sincere belief that the Federal Republic might by even-handed dealing with both sides (the Arab and the Israeli) contribute to the lessening of tensions in the Near East. During a visit to Beirut in 1960, Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano had in fact stated, in justification of West Germany's desire for friendship with both Israel and the Arabs, that "one day this attitude of ours may contribute toward reducing tension in the Arab world."[38, 39]

The chances of West Germany's serving as an intermediary between Israel and the Arab world, of which some dreamed, were variously considered enhanced or destroyed. The organ of the Nah- und Mittelost Verein spoke of the Bonn government's "noblest task, to work toward an Arab-Israeli agreement", an opportunity which that government itself destroyed in precipitating the diplomatic break.[40] Others saw the recognition of Israel as a constructive act directed against no one, "particularly not against the people of the Arab lands, to whom the German people know themselves to be bound in friendship"; rather,

> the Federal Republic has made it possible to create for itself an entirely new image in the Near East and at the same time, provided it shows a certain tactical deftness, also created the opportunity of filling a role as intermediary between the Arabs and Israel.[41]

Officials of the West German Foreign Ministry interviewed in June 1967 disavowed any intentions on the part of the Bonn government to seek such a role. West Germany is under no obligation to help find a settlement, pointed out one of these officials, but she will support any endeavors toward peaceful

coexistence in the Near East. (If it is asked to be of help in mediating between the parties, it will refuse, he added.)[42] Another insisted that neither side could be expected to accept West Germany as a mediator and that such a role was in any case not the proper one for Germany.[43]

Bonn continued to insist that its aid to Israel (a new promise of $40 million was reported in 1966) was "in no way directed against the Arab World".[44, 45] Such statements of wishful noninvolvement are not infrequent on the part of West German publicists and officials[46] and pose again the question whether the disregard for the Arab stand in the "Palestine conflict" is willful or unwitting. To the Arabs the very existence of Israel is damaging, directed against their well-being, and aid to Israel, it follows, must be aggressive, as Syrian foreign affairs commission president Amin al-Hafez stated in May 1966:

> The new agreement now being negotiated [with Israel] shows that West Germany is pursuing a policy imperialist and Zionist in character, that it is carrying out a plan designed to retard the development of the Arab world, and that it no longer cares for the friendship of the Arabs.[47]

To turn briefly to another feature of postwar German-Arab relations, the West German proclivity to interpretation of events in the Near East in terms of the Cold War has long been deplored by the occasional political commentator. Already in 1953 a writer in German on Near Eastern affairs active since the thirties had produced a book warning against exaggeration of this tendency.[48] Nearly ten years later it was still being pointed out that

> today there is an inclination in [West] Germany to regard developments in the Near East almost exclusively from the standpoint of an anti-Communist.[49]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> We would do better to emphasize that--as is the fact--we would seek to cooperate with these lands even if there were not a single Communist on the face of the earth. Otherwise people in the Oriental countries will sink to their knees and thank God that He sent the Communists since otherwise no help would be forthcoming.[50]

That the tendency persists in the late sixties can be seen from the treatment of the 1967 June War in the West German weekly Der

Spiegel:

> The divisions at the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan River, and the Gaza Strip, armed to the teeth, artillery at the ready, had become the forward troops in the conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union, auxiliaries on a second front between the two super-Powers--on a battlefield chosen by Moscow.[51]

Search for the fair and workable Near East policy which would best serve the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany had only begun as the second postwar decade ended. Elements which will enter into it can perhaps be perceived in subsequent developments.

The Kiesinger government (which was installed in late 1966) considered until June 1967 that its policy had been one of neutrality. However, a split in the coalition cabinet over the sale of gas masks to Israel at that juncture led to renewed cries for clarification of policy toward the Near East.[52]

Serious tensions were in fact to be detected as developing in Bonn with regard to West Germany's "special relationship to Israel" more than a year before. Some members of the government gave evidence of believing "that West Germany has paid its moral debt to world Jewry."[53] Any long-time resident in the Federal Republic is likely to become aware that a largely inarticulate segment of the generation which fought World War II has little enthusiasm for the government's continued policy of atonement toward Israel and the remaining Jews in Germany. As an American journalist based in Bonn assessed the situation:

> The German press, and most young Germans, vigorously support Bonn's pro-Israel stance, though the government may have run out ahead of general German sentiment.[54]

This does not automatically imply a pro-Arab view, however, particularly since Abd al-Nasser, with his threats of nonrepayment of West German loans, and Egypt have for so long dominated the Arab scene for West German government and public alike. But as a first step toward a reorientation of its Near East stance the Kiesinger government rejected former Chancellor Erhard's contention that since the Arab states had severed re-

lations, they should make the move to restore them, and began actively sounding out the ten Arab governemtns concerned on the prospects of reconciliation.

A more relaxed and judicious approach to Near Eastern affairs had, for that matter, been widely advocated during and after the crisis of 1965:

> In place of the overexcited attitude which has been maintained to date, we must strive to attain an attitude of the greatest composure. . . . All important decisions must be made after long and earnest, confidential discussion with friendly governments.[55]

Bismarck's handling of the Balkan quarrels of his day was held up as an example to be followed--and the Near East was designated "the Balkans of our century".[56] Another model on which to base the Federal Republic's policy was also suggested:

> The French Near East policy can be held up as an example here: in spite of the burdens of colonial domination, the Suez conflict, and the war in Algeria, and in spite of the fact that France is the principal supplier of arms to Israel, it succeeded at least in establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Arab lands. The Federal Republic of Germany ought also to be able to attain at least this much in the foreseeable future with the help of calm resolve.[57, 58]

The evidence at the West German Foreign Ministry in June 1967 was that this attitude had been adopted: "Both the Arabs and the Germans can live without the other"[59] was the leitmotiv. As for the Hallstein Doctrine, "we must make an effort to rid ourselves of this shackle, but naturally not as the result of any threat or extortion."[60]

The West German press stood ready to translate the new attitude into readily graspable terms. To cite one example:

> The GDR-recognition hysteria of earlier governments of the Federal Republic permitted [Abd al-Nasser] to block West German diplomatic relations with Israel and at the same time demand money.
>
> That is now all past. Foreign Minister Brandt has even put it in writing to the Arabs: Bonn's relations with Israel are one thing, with the Arabs another. Plainly stated: we are no longer going to let the Arabs tell us what form our relations with Israel should take.

> This doesn't suit Abd al-Nasser at all. Therefore he has turned to his final weapon: full diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. There is only one reply: go right ahead . . .
>
> Bonn should react in a relaxed way and accept the inevitable. Our government can no longer be blackmailed.[61]

The problems of the Near East--industrialization, agricultural development, Arab unity, a satisfactory end to the Palestine question--are all admittedly difficult, the West German thesis runs, but they are not hopeless. West Germany has successfully faced up to and survived too many problems of a similar nature to dismiss them lightly or to despair of solutions. But West Germany is only a European Power, not a world Power, it feels increasingly constrained to remind those who look to it for help:

> The confidence in us and in our strength is so great that, as a German, one often asks oneself, disturbed, whether too much is not being asked of us, whether we with our limited means and manpower will be able to live up to these expectations.[62]

Despite the setback of West Germany's having been classed with the "imperialists" supporting the Israeli aggression after the June 1967 war, there are signs which augur well for future fruitful collaboration between the Federal Republic and the Arab East. Even eternally intransigeant Syria has hesitated to recognize the German Democratic Republic <u>de jure</u>. Above all, the Arab League response to the West German offer of resumption of relations in late 1967 was not discouraging:

> In no circumstances would Arabs accept a German offer of economic and financial aid as a price for the resumption of diplomatic relations . . . Relations must be based on good-will and reciprocal respect. . . . In spite of what has taken place, I am optimistic about future Arab-German relations.[63, 64]

FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

[1]Interview, Westerich, January 1967.

[2]H. Thierback, "Zur Probleme der Entwicklungshilfe", Zeitschrift für Politik, II, No. 4 (1965), p. 215.

[3]Ibid., p. 217. Higher pay for skilled work may correct this.

[4]Cf. A. Gilleo, "Basic Concepts of German Vocational Schools in the Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 4 (August 1967), p. 118.

[5]Gross, Handelspartner, p. 45, and interview, Hottinger, February 1967.

[6]Cf. von Hentig, Mein Leben, p. 441: "It is difficult to repress the teacher hidden in every German."

[7]Hassert, op. cit., p. 202.

[8]Vernier, op. cit., p. 104.

[9]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 19.

[10]The passage from which the quotation is taken concludes with the statement that "Germany is trying to secure a place in this export in order to build her trade on a wider foundation." Pretensions to selflessness are not the current style: "Our obligation is in the deepest sense moral. . . . But we most certainly should acknowledge that we are guided by selfish aims as well. We will seem more trustworthy to the Asiatics if we do." (E. W. Meyer, "Das Gesicht des Nicht-Kommunistischen Asiens", Die neue Gesellschaft, VIII, No. 4 (1961), p. 267.

[11]Hassert, Op. cit., p. 202.

[12]Interview, Roth, January 1967, and interview, Ober, September 1967.

[13]M. Rutherford, "Sizing up the Neo-Nazism Threat", The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 21, 1968.

[14]D. Weiss, "Zum Verhältnis der BRP zu den arabischen Staaten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 21, Nov. 10, 1965, p. 827.

[15]Op. cit., foreword.

[16]Interview, Leg. Rat. I. Kl. Dr. Gerhard Pfeiffer, June 1967. Arabophiles find it repeatedly necessary to remind the Western public that "the Arab world first and foremost, and above any material loss, feels that its sense of justice and its honor have been violated." (H. Henle, Der neue Nahe Osten (Hamburg: 1966), quoted in Orient (Hamburg), VIII, No. 3 (June 1967), p. 105.) "The fact is that economic forces do not always make an impression on the Arabs." (H. Waldmann, Die neue Gesellschaft, III, No. 4, p. 311.)

[17]M. Colombe, "Remarques sur la crise germano-arabe", Orient (Paris), Nos. 32/33, 4th Quarter 1964/1st Quarter 1965, p. 10, and W. Wagner, "Der Rückschlag der Bonner Politik in den arabischen Staaten", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 10 (May 25, 1965), p. 367.

[18]Dipl. Ing. Ober (interview, September 1967) hazarded the opinion that the Arabs would give contracts to West German firms even if a state of war existed with the NATO countries.

[19]Earle, op. cit., p. 45.

[20]The businessman's viewpoint is that the weapons deliveries to Israel did more harm to West Germany's standing among fifty million Arabs than it raised it among two and a half million Israelis but that there is no assurance that Bonn has seen its error. (Interview, Ober, September 1967.)

[21]A. Sherman, "Reparations and Restitution", The New Leader, XLIII, No. 25 (June 20, 1960), p. 16.

[22]K. Mrowa in Al-Hayat, quoted in The Arab World, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 4.

[23]"Adenauer . . . evidently assumed that any pressures which might develop, should the assistance become public knowledge, could be dealt with in the same way as he handled the talk of a boycott--by calling the bluff of Nasser and his allies." (Ames, op. cit., p. 8.) His gamble might even be considered justified in light of statements like the following from Arab League Assistant Secretary Sayed Nofal in late 1966: "The Arab countries had unwillingly been forced to sever relations with Bonn in the face of the challenge of the former Chancellor." (The Arab World, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 5.)

[24]Interview, Voigt, June 1967. Dr. Voigt, born in Palestine, was Konsul-General in Jerusalem before World War II and as head of the Middle East section of the Foreign Ministry until 1962 had managed to avoid, during the reparations negotiations and subsequent boycott threat, "the hopeless type of muddle which occurred later". His successor (1962-66) had no Middle East experience other than in Cairo and concentrated on Israel and Egypt. (Interview, Vocke, January 1967.)

[25]F. Baade, "Neugestaltung unserer Politik in Nah- und Mittelost", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 4 (April 1965), p. 247.

[26]"Our deeds have always shown how much we are concerned with preserving a long-standing friendship. Therefore we are entitled to to ask, 'What about some proof of Egyptian friendship?'," Chancellor Erhard declared in his speech to the Bundestag on Feb. 17, 1965. (Keesing's, May 15-22, 1965, 20739.)

[27]Cf. H. L. Kaster, "Russlands Einbruch in den Mittleren Osten", Aussenpolitik, VII, No. 1 (January 1956), p. 38.

[28]W. G. Grewe, Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegzeit (Stuttgart: 1960). Israel has three index entries but only deals with Near East policy; the Lebanon and Suez crises are mentioned once each in passing; and the Aswan Dam and Abd al-Nasser appear only

incidentally. (The book is a collection of lectures.)

[29]Interview, Hottinger, February 1967.

[30]Interview, Vocke, January 1967.

[31]C. von Imhoff, "Aufmarsch im östlichen Mittelmeer", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 5 (May 1965), p. 327.

[32]Wagner, "Rückschlag", p. 369.

[33]"Pusillanimous as the German performance was in the early stages of the affair, much of the responsibility lies with the Western allies, particularly the U.S. and Britain." (Laqueur, op. cit., p. 33.)

[34]Cf. Mehnert, op. cit., pp. 393-94.

[35]The Beirut representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (see "Lebanon and West Germany", Chapter VI) reports daily proof of this although the milieu in which he works--unions and cooperatives--is probably thoroughly exposed to the propaganda. (Interview, Matthiesen, January 1968.)

[36]There was much dissatisfaction with this concept in any case. "The erection of a large installation in a developing country is today a political act," be the project public or private, wrote Ministerialdirektor G. A. Sonnenhol of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation (op. cit., p. 235) in 1963.

[37]"The Federal Republic has often been chosen as intermediary by other Western lands, especially the U.S.A., in contacts with the Near Eastern countries lately." (H. Müller-Feldmann, "Der Nahe Osten und der Westen", Aussenpolitik, X, No. 1 (1959), p. 43.)

In some instances the role was welcomed. Cf. "As acknowledged members of the Occidental-Western world we should make an effort to help remove the resentment which still exists between the Arab and Western worlds . . . and thereby assist the two worlds to find a new partner-like relationship." (Schwan, op. cit., p. 51.)

[38]The Arab World, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 4.

[39]It is open to question whether this corresponds to the "strictly neutral" attitude which A. M. Amin cited as indispensable to West Germany's acceptance by the Arabs as an intermediary between the Orient and the West. (Op. cit., p. 34.)

[40]Editorial, Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (April 1965), p. 4.

[41]C. von Imhoff, "Die Araber-Liga nach der Nahostkrise", Aussenpolitik, XVI, No. 7 (July 1965), p. 467.

[42]Interview with Dr. E. Schmitt of the Near East desk of the West German Foreign Ministry in June 1967.

[43]Interview, Pfeiffer, June 1967. He suggested France as a more likely candidate.

[44]Editorial, The Daily Star (Beirut), May 13, 1966.

[45]This premise was surely as dubious to the Arabs as was their

counter-demand to West Germany: aid and reparations to the Palestinians as the indirect victims of Naziism, to an amount equal to that granted to Israel. ("Bonn Makes New Offer in Bid to Resume Ties", The Daily Star (Beirut), March 25, 1967, p. 2.) However, this principle would seem to have been partially accepted by Bonn in view of its doubling the Federal Republic's contribution to UNRWA for the Palestinian refugees in 1966.

[46]Cf. von Imhoff, "Aufmarsch", p. 328, and Chancellor Erhard's statement that "secondary considerations" should not hinder resumption of Germany's traditional Arab ties. ("Bonn Looks toward Arab World", Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1966.)

[47]"A Propos de la visite d'Adenauer en Israel", L'Orient (Beirut), May 6, 1966.

[48]F. W. Fernau, Flackernder Halbmond (Zürich: 1953). He had produced Nazi-Party-lining books prewar, has apparently emigrated to Switzerland.

[49]Van Rooy, op. cit., p. 152.

[50]Meyer, op. cit., p. 267.

[51]"Heisser Sommer", Der Spiegel, XI, No. 23 (May 29, 1967), p. 120.

[52]News broadcast, U.S. Armed Forces Network, Europe, June 1, 1967.

[53]"Skirting What Matters", The Economist, March 19, 1966, p. 120.

[54]Letter from H. B. Ellis, correspondent for Christian Science Monitor in Bonn, Jan. 9, 1968.

The sympathy for Israel current in Germany is in large part based on its position as a small nation threatened by many and larger neighbors. (Interview, Schmitt, June 1967.) Much of the low-key friction now discernible within the Federal Republic is probably attributable to the phenomenon of Jewish returnees, attracted by the special benefits accorded them by West German legislation.

[55]Baade, "Neugestaltung", p. 243.

[56]A. Weinstein, Das neue Mekka am Nil (Wiesbaden: n.d.), author's preface. Date of publication was probably 1959.

[57]D. Weiss, "Verhältnis", p. 827. Considerable admiration for the success of France's cultural approach to winning the lasting attachment of the peoples who rebelled against its rule was also expressed.

[58]As a result of mutual oppostion to the United States, France in 1968 was playing the role with respect to the Arab world which Germany used to play when the common enemy was Britain, a British Broadcasting Corp. commentator observed in a BBC World Service program in February 1968.

[59]Interview, Schmitt, June 1967.

[60]Baade, "Neugestaltung", p. 250.

[61]"Nasser", Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, No. 103, May 4, 1967, p. 1. The paper calls itself "independent and above parties".

[62]Mehnert, op. cit., p. 387.

[63]"Arab-Bonn Official Talks Are Denied", The Daily Star (Beirut), Nov. 28, 1967, p. 2. The statements quoted are from a speech at the University of Freiburg by the director of the Arab League office in Bonn, Hamdy Azzam.

[64]"Arab-German relations"--but there are still two "Germanies", and East Germany has made significant inroads into two of the Fertile Crescent countries during the diplomatic break with West Germany. This problem can be expected to become acute once more when West German-Arab relations are resumed. And what of German reunification? A West German journalist queried on his forecast for developments in German Arab relations if Germany should be once again united replied that that eventuality was so remote as to render speculation pointless. (Interview, Vocke, January 1967.)

APPENDIX A

TERMINOLOGY FOR NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

German terminology for the Near and Middle East is perhaps even more confused than that in English. To begin with the limited area dealt with in this paper, the Fertile Crescent, this term exists in literal translation in German (Fruchtbarer Halbmond). However, its use is less frequent than in English, often designating the political union of Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon championed by Nuri al-Said.

The term Arabien (Arabia) has been used to designate all lands inhabited by Arabs, not just the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, arabischer Raum (Arab area) was used by the German foreign ministry during early World War II, at least, to include the peninsula, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Iraq. "Later definitions of the Arab area as the term was used in German excluded the peninsula and Egypt."[1]

The most inclusive usage of the term Nah- und Mittelostländer (Near and Middle East countries) encountered in research for this paper embraced Indonesia, Malaya, Ceylon, Indochina, Burma, Pakistan, India, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Jordan, Aden, the Sudan, Iraq, Bahrein, Kuwait, Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan, Thailand, Egypt, and Iran.[2] The definition of the Near and Middle East standardized by the Nah- und Mittelost Verein for its own purposes includes fourteen countries from Morocco to Pakistan.

The term Orient is perhaps the most frequently encountered as referring to the Near and Middle East. It has been in use in German since the Middle Ages to indicate the area of Islamic dominance, but it is now coming to include the Far East due to British and American influence.[3] A West German economic journalist has offered the following explanation of the term Orient:

> More recently the lands of southeast Europe have been termed the Near East and distinguished from the Middle East, though there is hardly any clear-cut and fully recognized division between the two areas. The designation "Orient" is still used in German for the region, with the Arab countries as its core.[4]

Lastly, the Arab area is frequently included in the term Asien (Asia), general discussions of that area making no special mention of its western portion as a rule. Less frequently, the term Südwestasien (southwest Asia) is resorted to.

The terms Vorderen Orient and, less frequently, Levante, are also in current use, with the meanings of their English equivalents (Near East and Levant).

---

[1]Tillman, op. cit., p. 166, footnote 192.

[2]Hermann Gross, Handelspartner, pp. 30-31.

[3]"Orient", Der grosse Brockhaus (encyclopedia), 1955. This entry consists of only about three inches of text. Cross-references are made to the Ancient Orient, Panarab Movement, Pan-Islamic Movement, and Arab League, and to no other topics.

[4]Hauenstein, op. cit., p. 11.

APPENDIX B

GERMAN COMMENTARY ON THE ARABS

What is the German view of the Arab people? A few glimpses will be given below. The selections are not from works which set themselves the task of explaining or analyzing Arab behavior but rather isolated comments encountered in accounts of travels, political developments, German work in the Near East, and the like. The majority were clearly not calculated to be flattering to the Arabs but seem to seek a reasonable explanation for a Weltanschauung which borders on the incomprehensible to the German observer. Such attempts to analyze or judge are encountered in reportorial accounts far less often than might be expected.

The selections are presented in random order.

> The distinctive mentality of the people, which is highly emotional and exhibits its own logic, is characteristic, as is distrust, the outcome of rich historical experience. (DPA Hintergrund, July 15, 1964, p. 1.)

> In the Orient, just as was the case thousands of years ago, it is not what is known but what is felt which dominates. (Ular & Insabato, op. cit. (1909), p. 342.)

> The advancement of Islamic culture was dependent on princes and others in power. . . . The result was that the population remained more or less on the same level economically, socially, and spiritually as their predecessors 3,000 years before. (Ibid.)

> When we speak of those countries we are likely to use the general term "the Arabs". We must be clear in our own minds, however, that these very Arabs make up a society which is hardly less differentiated as to history, culture, origins, economic condition, and even religion than is our own in Europe. (E. M. Gorrissen, "Europäer und Araber in Schicksalsgemeinschaft", Aussenpolitik, VIII, No. 4 (April 1957), p. 257.)

> [The Arab's hatred of Israel] resembles the small, visible part of a huge iceberg which represents his hatred and mistrust of the West. . . . The Dynamik which he rejects and fears. (D. Cycon, op. cit. (1959), p. 167.)

Consciously or unconsciously the advantages which [Western] civilization brought to the Near East are overlooked: the breakdown of hierarchic organizations which had outlived their usefulness, the freeing of the human spirit from the chains of irrational authority, the concept of the dignity and responsibility of human existence, government and law. (H. L. Kaster, "Russlands Einbruch in den Mittleren Osten", Aussenpolitik, VII, No. 1 (January 1956), p. 36.)

The assertion which can frequently be heard from both Muslims and Europeans these days that the present success of the modern Occident is merely the result of the processes set in motion by the original Islamic "impetus" cannot be supported. (J. Krämer, "Islamische und abendlandische Kultur: Unterschiede und Wechselwirkungen", Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart, ed. Rudi Paret (Stuttgart: 1961), p. 79.)

Strange as it may sound, for the sake of reduction of tension in the Middle East it is better if the Arabs do not confess to military defeats but, as often happens, present them as victories. Recognition of the significance of national and personal honor is perhaps the most important key to the psychology and successful dealing with the peoples of the Orient as a whole. (A. J. Fischer, "Politik und Prestige im Orient", Aussenpolitik, XIV, No. 12 (December 1963), p. 853.)

When the smallest possible amount of work has yielded just enough to live on, work ceases. . . . Nonetheless, among many the knowledge that other people live better leads often to the question as to how that might have come about. (K. Caesar, "Problematische Agrarreform im Irak", Aussenpolitik, X, No. 8 (August 1959), p. 540.)

Manpower [for new industries] naturally constitutes a special problem. By and large, this consists of men who come direct from peasants' huts, who neither read nor write, who are not accustomed to regular working hours, and who are undernourished. To convert these into industrial workers. . . . has been accomplished by means of carefully planned training. (R. Stucken, "Die wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsprobleme arabischer Länder", Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart (1961), p. 145.)

Understanding Arab politics is like trying to appreciate Arab music. (R. Hüber, Es wetterleuchtet (1940), p. 11.)

. . .a typically Arab answer. Why always try to plan everything ahead? Why complicate matters by considering everything in advance in a negative light and thus de-

tract from every joy and every success? When the time comes, some sort of arrangement will suggest itself. (Dönhoff, op. cit. (1965), p. 280)

. . . the inconstant Arabs. (Lührs, op. cit. (1936), p.31.)

[In Amman] an indescribable din fills the air. . . . It is as if these ancient peoples had no nerves. Gradually the Frank also forgets that he has nerves. (Bamm, op. cit., p. 310. 1st ed. 1955.) (A favorite topic of travel commentators is the hectic "taxi" ride from Aleppo to Damascus with radio blaring the entire distance.)

Whoever has lived in the Orient knows that even in the simplest conversation it is assumed that one's partner does not say what he does to convey information literally but for some well-concealed purpose. (G. Stratil-Sauer, Umbruch im Morgenland (Leipzig: 1935), p. 79.)

To call things by their right names, the attitudes of the Arab states and Arab statesmen toward the West are essentially determined by feelings. (K. Schwan, Der arabische Nationalismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (1959), p. 42.)

The minor things seem to matter more than the big ones in Arab sentiment for the Germans. (Interview, Schmitt, June 1967. He cited the fact that many Arabs had spoken of the Kaiser's visit to him and that it to all evidence had carried more weight than any treaty in Near Eastern opinion.)

For the European to assign their proper worth to, understand, and analyze political movements in the Arab world, this explosion-prone area of tension between Asia and Europe, is for many reasons difficult--even impossible. (J. Feddersen, "Sozialismus von Persien bis zum Atlantik?", Die neue Gesellschaft, IV, No. 4 (September/October 1957), p. 384.)

Here propaganda has definitively taken the place of a program of action. (H. Coubier, "Levante--soweit ich feststellen konnte", Merkur, XVIII, No. 5 (May 1964), p. 416.)

The Arab is a dreamer who easily loses contact with earth. . . . He will not accept or recognize that his capacities may be below the desired level. (Interview, Voigt, June 1967.) (In reply to a comment by another Foreign Ministry official that the Arabs fail to learn from experience, Dr. Voigt retorted: "What people learns from experience?")

(Although Reinhard Huber's writings on the Near East do not as a rule fall into the category described in the introductory paragraph above, his last major publication--Allahu Akbar--is recommended for an abundance of pithy observations on the way of life in the Arab world.)

APPENDIX C

CONTENT OF NAZI PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT ARAB COUNTRIES

Only second-hand indications of the content of the printed and broadcast propaganda prepared by the Nazi regime for the Arab world are generally available. For the record these will be presented below, largely in direct quotation. Non-German commentary will be presented first.

Among British observers, S. H. Longrigg contents himself with a remark in passing on "the crude propaganda of the German wireless"[1] and offers as an example the claim that Hitler was a Moslem. Nevill Barbour's 1951 review of "Broadcasting to the Arab World" devoted a brief section to Nazi broadcasts, stating in part:

> The broadcasts had no cultural content but concentrated upon news and news talks which from the beginning were highly tendentious and became inflammatory and abusive with the outbreak of war. There were interspersed with them commercial recordings . . . . Berlin Radio was bound by no scruples and cared nothing for factual accuracy.
> . . . . . .
> And Berlin Radio . . . used every device to inflame Arab resentment against the British for favoring Zionism, to exploit every conceivable suspicion regarding British actions, and tosneer at Arabs who publicly declared their support of the British connection. The Berlin Radio announcer, for instance, used regularly to refer to the Amir Abdullah as "Rabbi Abdullah".[2]

Disappointment with the 1937 Peel Commission proposals (for the partition of Palestine)[3] "gave Nazi Germany great possibilities. It was enough now to adopt a clear position against partition and to unleash a propaganda campaign."[4, 5]

Among American commentary on Nazi propaganda to the Arab world C. L. Sulzberger's wartime article "German Preparations in the Middle East" deals with the subject relatively extensively. In World War II, he points out, the Germans

> are on the outside looking in, and they can elaborate on any mistakes in British administration instead of apologizing for errors in the Ottoman administration. The German sets himself up as a savior to the Moslem world. Every ounce of gold distributed and every word pronounced by the German agents is establishing that Hitler, a descendant of the Prophet, the enemy of the Jews and British, the Protector of

> Islam, is devoting his energies to the establishment of a free Arab Federation. His own "Free Arabia" radio station in occupied Athens says so.
> . . . . . .
> Broadly speaking, the Axis broadcasts and propaganda leaflets continually promise that the "day of liberation" from Britain is coming soon and that Islam must rise up to aid the German liberators when the Wehrmacht strikes . . . . The Moslems are told that they are being starved by the British; that Britain and America have promised to give the best Arab land to the Jews; and that the United Nations are preparing Jewish domination of the Middle East in the event of their victory . . . . The Berlin radio says to them: "Continue the fight against the English and know that you will soon be freed from the Anglo-Jewish yoke."[6]

In George Lenczowski's summation: "Skillful Axis propaganda . . . harped on the theme of liberation from British control, and it had many willing listeners."[7]

Greater detail is provided by Seth Arsenian's "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East":[8]

> The major line of propaganda emanating from Berlin and two other subsidiary stations located in the Balkans was as follows: the interest of the Allies in the Middle East was motivated entirely by the "greedy imperialism" which was bound to "rob the Arab of his wealth and enslave him forever". The Allies were "scheming partners" representing no real strength when compared with that of Germany; Allied leaders and authorities . . . were "untrustworthy, perfidious and decadent individuals". The Allies were represented in these broadcasts as "Jewish controlled" and were often referred to as "United Jewish Nations".
>
> Separate treatment was accorded each of the four major Allies. The British were represented as "deceitful enemies" of Arab independence and aspirations. All the wartime difficulties in the Middle East, including high prices in Iraq, malaria in Egypt, starvation in Hadramaut, and disturbances in Palestine were equally attributed to British rule.
>
> The Arabs were assured over and over again that the power of Great Britain was a thing of the past; . . . The Arabs should, therefore, rise up and strike this "deceitful enemy" while it was in plenty of trouble and was tottering on its feet.

The U.S. was associated with Zionism and Britain's nefarious plans, especially for Arab oil. As for the Soviet Union, "the Communist idealogy . . . was represented by Germany as Jewish and opposed to everything for which the Moslem religion stood."

> Berlin broadcasts attempted consistently to arouse and strengthen Arab nationalistic attitudes and to appeal to Moslem religious feeling. They extolled Arab culture and exhorted the Arabs to use force to secure their independence.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> A further major theme of German propaganda to the Arabs, distinct from direct attacks upon the Allies, was anti-Semitism. This campaign of hate was relentlessly pursued by Berlin in many different forms. The Arabs were told that the Jews would make a Jewish state of Palestine and force the Arabs out of that country; that Jews, as tools of British imperialism, would colonize and exploit the Arabs in the entire Middle East. The Jew was pictured in the vilest terms, and as the particular foe of Islam: "The Jew since the time of Mohammed has never been a friend of the Moslem, the Jew is the enemy, and it pleases Allah to kill him." On this score also Germany was the "great friend of the Arab, for had she not cleared Germany of Jews? Let the record speak!"[9]

Arsenian ends his section on Nazi Germany with an instructive case history "of propaganda activities of all kinds and their effect in Turkey." Weighing the effectiveness of Axis as against Allied broadcasting, he concludes:

> There is reason to believe that Axis broadcasts . . . were the more popular. The highly colored, emotional programs, making the most of the common tastes and beliefs of the masses, providing music and entertainment, had greater appeal and were listened to more frequently in coffee houses and other assembly places than were Allied offerings . . . . It may be surmised that Axis propaganda had a hand in the Palestine revolts of 1936-39, and the Iraqi 'incident' of 1941."[10]

"German propaganda is ingenious and consistent . . . . It seeks to adjust itself to the special psychologies of various Oriental milieux," a prewar French review of Third Reich policy toward Islamic countries observed.[11] For example,

> The Germans, having undergone regeneration through Nazism, insist with delicacy on the analogy between their recent reawakening and the awakening in the East, since similarity predisposes to sympathy. . . .
>
> Like the Germans, the Arabs are victims of the imperialist "dictates" [Diktat] of 1918, in disregard of the right of peoples to determine their own fate . . . . The map of Asia Minor [sic] drawn up by the Allies is, like that of the old Mitteleuropa, an artificial political creation as indefensible as arrogation of the right to keep adults in a state of tutelage. This community of misfortune is in itself a source of consolation. . . .

> Germany, having thrown off the imposed conditions which were oppressing here, is demonstrating an effective and modern method of attaining liberation.[12]

As war began, vilification of France as one of the Allies was the order of the day. But even after the fall of France and the cooperation of the Vichy government had deflected the Third Reich's vilification program to de Gaulle and the Free French, Nazi propaganda was a thorn to the French authorities in Syria. Von Hentig, on the occastion of his visit there at the beginning of 1941,

> speaks of the Reich freed from its chains, because of its racial theories the only nation capable of understanding and approving an Arab uprising on behalf of independence and unity and of supporting it with its invincible armed forces.
>
> The tour of this agitator is to last a month; his departure coincided with the first disturbances. The rumor that 30,000 French families had left France and were going to seek refuge in Syria had been spread.[13]

In Iraq in the same period (1940-41), "the prevailing opinion . . . was that England had no chance of survival, while Axis propaganda gave lavish assurances of a brighter and more prosperous life if Germany won the war . . . ."[14]

In the war's later stages the aim of the German propaganda was "to sow dissension in the enemy camp without advancing positive programs":

> In the propaganda in the Arabic language the Germans limited themselves to attacks on the anti-Fascist coalition, incitement against the Jews ("Kill Jews wherever you find them, for the love of God, history, and religion."), adulation of Hitler, Germany and Japan for their friendship to the Arabs, calling for an uprising in Palestine, etc.[15]

There is a concept which is emphasized in official Third Reich memoranda on dealing with the Arabs which does not appear in the above-cited summaries. That is Germany's innocence of territorial and/or political ambitions in the Arab area.[16] Whether this was not a prominent theme or did not attract the interest of the investigators cannot be determined from the sources seen.

The themes of the Third Reich's propaganda can also be deduced from the tenor of the myriad books on the Near East addressed

to the German public in the late thirties and early forties. In fact, the incidence of the words Aufbruch ("uprising"), Aufmarsch ("deployment"; usually translated "on the march"), and Revolution in the titles is in itself an indication. Even what was essentially a travel account of passage through Syria and Iraq en route to Iran harbored the following statements:

> The Arabs take an enthusiastic interest in the struggle between the Axis and England. The spark of the Holy War will not be extinguished, it will leap to Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. The whole Arab world is on the point of rising up and will sooner or later fight for its rights.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> [The Iraqi Boy Scouts] love their Fatherland and want nothing more earnestly than finally to be free, free of British fetters.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt are bound by friendship to Germany and want nothing more ardently than their independence and freedom.[17]

On the other hand, some of these works were devoted in entirety to the anti-imperialist thesis, as was Iwan Kirchner's Sperrfeuer im Nahost, which concluded:

> Whoever has spent any length of time in the nomads' tents and the oases of the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts and in the villages and small towns of the Arab peasants and shopkeepers on the slopes of the Lebanon, in the Hauran, on Hebron, or in the valleys of the Euphrates or Jordan rivers could not fail to notice that inside the steel net of the British overlordship hate was welling up and now and then, like a warning, flashed through the meshes.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The Arab could not know that his oppressor had long since lost the capacity to fight . . . . It was only when the thunder of battle heralded a new era and England's soldiers fled at Dunkirk, headlong through Greece, and finally in North Africa to Egypt that he realized that a new day had come for him also--a day when he could break out of the confinement of centuries and enter upon a new order in which life and the destiny of nations would no longer be determined by an island in a far ocean but by [his own] accomplishments and work.[18]

German publishers' wartime blurbs for some of these books are also revealing. For example, Werner von Lojewski's Aufmarsch im Orient was offered with: "The history of Arab Nationalism and England's betrayal of the Arab World are shown with especial clarity." For Paul Schmitz-Kairo's Die arabische Revolution: "The author details the British intrigues during and after the World War against the leaders of the Arab people."[19]

British exploitation ("robbing") of Arab resources--mainly petroleum and cotton--was also a favorite theme, especially in tracts on trade and economics. Reinhard Hüber, whose specialty this last field was, ventured farther from it than usual in his Arabische Erbe--arabische Zukunft (Berlin: 1943) with commentary like the following:

> [The Arabs] have the same enemies as the Germans: the English and their allies and the Jews. The Arab struggle for freedom is also a part of our own struggle.[20]

---

[1] Irac, 1900-1950, p. 272.

[2] [3] Middle East Journal, V, No. 1 (Winter 1951), pp. 63 & 65.

"In May 1937, for instance, on the occasion of the celebration of the birth of Mohammed, German and Italian flags were displayed as well as portraits of Hitler and Mussolini, although in 1935 the Arabs demonstrated in many localities against the Italian agression in Abyssinia." (Hirszowicz, "Partition", p. 46.)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Cf. P. Lisovsky, "Intrigues of the Fascist Aggressors in the Arab East", Mirovoye Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika, No. 3 (1938), pp. 76-84: "An estimate of the future policy of the Berlin-Rome Axis towards the Arab countries . . . .German propaganda is directed against the British and French administrators. Among the British administrators there are persons with reactionary tendencies who are well disposed to Fascism."

[6] Foreign Affairs, XX, No. 4 (July 1942), pp. 666 & 674-75. As an instance of the extremes which were resorted to, he cites a claim that Hitler had been born with a green belt as a sign of his "sharifhood".

[7] The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 471.

[8] The author worked with the U.S. Office of War Information during World War II.

[9] Middle East Journal, II, No. 4 (October 1948), pp. 420-21.

[10] Ibid.; pp. 425-27.

[11] Vernier, op. cit., p. 75.

[12] Ibid., pp. 52-53. Cf. Tillmann, op. cit., p. 15: "The annexation of Austria, as well as of the Sudeten territory, was presented in the Fascist German Near East propaganda not without success as a reuniting of all Germans in one grand empire which was achieved against

the will of the English and French governments."

[13]Laffargue, op. cit., p. 46. Von Hentig is also credited by the French with having originated a popular slogan of this era in Arabic: "Bissama Allah, wa alard Hitler" (In heaven Allah, and on earth Hitler) [French transliteration]. His alleged limited command of the language renders this allegation a bit dubious. (The pamphlet Les Allemands au Levant, p. 5, translated the refrain "There is no longer but one God--Hitler"!)

[14]Khadduri, Independent Iraq, p. 333.

[15]Hirszowicz, Third Reich, p. 311.

[16]Cf. Tillmann, op. cit., p. 104, footnote 70 (quoting Niedermayer) and p. 202 (Woermann).

[17]W. Wegener, Syrien/Irak/Iran (Leipzig: 1943), pp. 30, 297 & 304.

[18](Munich: 1941), pp. 690 & 770.

[19]Taken from the advertisements in the back of Wegener, op. cit.

[20]P. 18.

APPENDIX D

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY CHARGED WITH AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Governmental

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KW) (Bank for Reconstruction)

Was initially directed to finance projects for the increasing of German exports. More than half of its operations are now represented by bilateral capital aid.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (German Association for Economic Cooperation. Also known as the "German Development Company".)

Supplies funds to be invested in small and medium-sized projects in developing countries.

Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) (German Development Service)

Recruits young people with various technical competences.

Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer (German Foundation for Developing Countries)

Brings experts from developing countries together with their German counterparts to exchange points of view. This institute has organized more than 300 seminars with a total of more than 5000 participants.

Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German Institute for Development Policy)

Gives courses of one year's duration on problems of development aid for a carefully-chosen and limited number of experts who will later be assigned to key posts.

Deutsche Förderungsgesellschaft für Entwicklungsländer (GAWI) ("Company for the Advancement of developing countries")

Bundesamt für Gewerbliche Wirtschaft (BAW) (Federal Office for Industry)

Selects German experts to be sent abroad under the technical assistance program.

Private

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) (German Academic Exchange Service)

Invites foreign students to Germany and provides scholar-

ships for German students abroad. It also aids students from developing countries selected by German embassies.

Karl-Duisberg Gesellschaft (KDG)

Supervises the training of foreign workmen in Germany.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

(See section "Lebanon and West Germany" in Chapter VI.)

Sources: Le Commerce du Levant, November 1966, p. 25, and Majonica, op. cit., pp. 268-70.

APPENDIX E

CHRONOLOGY OF EUPHRATES DAM NEGOTIATIONS

Serious consideration of the scheme for a dam across the Euphrates River in Syria dates from the 1930s.[1] Effectual steps toward its realization were not destined to be taken until the 1950s, however,[2] most notably with the signature by the Syrian and Soviet Union governments of an economic and technical cooperation agreement in 1957. Among many other undertakings, this included a promise of Soviet help in the planning of the Euphrates project, and also in its construction if studies should prove its prospects favorable.[3] The Soviet Union is generally reported to have withdrawn its offer to finance and build the dam following the merger of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic with an official explanation that the project was not technically feasible. A West German diplomat closely connected with the West German negotiations on the project denies that the Soviet Union withdrew.[4] At any event, in November 1959 the newly-formed U.A.R. signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the stage was set for the West German-U.A.R. and West German-Syrian negotiations which are chronicled below.

1961: (June) Euphrates dam is included in talks between Bonn mission and officials in Cairo. Long-term, low-interest loans totalling DM 600 million for projects in both Egypt and Syria are agreed upon, up to DM 500 million of which is reserved to cover all foreign currency needs of the Euphrates project.[5] (July 4) An agreement--the so-called "Boghdadi Accord"--is signed.[6] (August) West German experts are scheduled to arrive in Damascus to begin work on the project.[7] (September) A military coup in Syria ends the union with Egypt. (October-December) The West German Ministry of Economy studies the transferability of the commitment on the project.[8] A three-man West German delegation discusses the project with the Syrian government in Damascus.[9] West Germany's demand for conversion of the agreement into a Syrian-West German accord renders it a target for vehement attacks by the secessionist government's information media.[10] Soviet studies for the project are turned over to Bonn agencies; two German commissions of experts under Professor Press are dispatched to Syria.[11] The governor of the Central Bank of Syria talks with the German Minister of Economy in Bonn.[12]

1962: (Spring) The "Press Commission" submits its report: the dam should be constructed at Tabqa and provide for irrigation of 600,000 hectares as recommended by the Soviet study; it should also include a large power station.[13] Diplomatic pressure brought to bear by Syria culminates in decision by Chancellor Adenauer that West Germany will honor its loan offer and Syrian government is so notified.[14] (July) The Syrian Council of Ministers forms a delegation for talks with West German officials in September, at request of West Germany.[15] (August) The West German Embassy in Damascus issues a statement that West Germany is ready in principle to assist with the Euphrates dam project.[16] (September-October) New negotiations between Syria and West Germany begin in Bonn. Both Syria and Egypt claim full amount of original loan. Bonn maintains that DM 500 million was specified for Syria and will go to Syria.[17] Iraqi delegation arrives in Damascus to discuss waters distribution.[18] West German Aid Minister Scheel contacts officials of World Bank regarding possible participation in the project. Syrian delegation returns from Bonn in high dudgeon.[19] The Syrian ambassador in Bonn is assured of the Federal Republic's continuing interest in making the loan; the Syrians request an official document to that effect.[20] (November) New Syrian committee to study financing announces that Syria can carry its share of the financing "provided a sound economic policy is followed".[21] A supplementary loan possibility (equal to DM 150 million) is discussed.[22] (December) Agreements with Turkey and Iraq are sought by Syria, reportedly at Bonn's insistence.[23]

1963: (January) Minister for Foreign Aid Walter Scheel and a delegation having visited Damascus "in order to demonstrate on the spot West Germany's unchanged resolve to aid Syria in its economic development and to finance a project within the means of both sides," it is officially announced in a joint communiqué that "the German government will cover the cost in foreign exchange" of the execution (no amount specified) and that "the Syrian government for its part has undertaken to assume responsibility for the financing in local currency" of the remaining two thirds. Financing from other sources might be sought as needed.[24] (February) An agreement is signed in Bonn between the two governments; DM 350 million is to be made available for the "first stage"[25] at 3.25% interest (negotiated down from 3.5%, according to the Syrian delegation[26]) for a period of 20 years, repayment to begin at the end of the sixth year of utilization of the dam; engineering consulting firms engaged by the Syrian government must approve the entire project; the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (which is to provide the West German funds) must review the project but will have no deciding voice; and security must be provided for the full cost.[27] The Syrian government claims LS 80 million annually can easily be raised since it represents only 15% of the current annual budget.[28] (March) A new regime dominated by the Baath Party takes power in Damascus; it endorses the agreement signed in February.[29] (April-December) Contacts are exchanged between the Kreditanstalt and Syrian officials; West German government releases first DM 20 million of loan for further planning. A Swedish firm is engaged for planning and consultation on the barrage;

the West German firm of Lahmeyer receives the contract for planning the electrical installations; and the Dutch firm Nedeco undertakes that for the irrigation system. The World Bank is to make an economic study in connection with the project.[30]

1964: (January) A Syrian delegation[31] goes to Bonn for the final stage of talks, reported successful upon the delegation's return, with hopes expressed of beginning construction "in the next few months".[32] (February) Technical and economic talks are continued in Damascus (height of dam, additional financing for foreign exchange needs still to be worked out). Completion date of 1971 is mentioned.[33] (May) Technical discussions continue. (June) Charges that Germany is insisting on guarantees for the loan "beyond the ability of the Syrian government" (see section on "Syria and West Germany" in Chapter VI for review of Syrian press commentary). (August) Representatives of the special consortium of 17 West German firms led by Hochtief and Krupp and of West German banking institutions attend "cordial and satisfactory" meetings in Damascus; discussions on additional credits continue.[34] Repeated assurances are given by West German officials that their government intends to stand by its commitment to contribute to the financing of the project.[35] (October 7) An agreement is signed by the consortium (in association with the Dresdner Bank) and the Syrian Euphrates Dam Authority stipulating that the former is to submit two offers within the following four months: one for the construction of the dam proper and the other for the hydroelectric plant, on the basis of plans drawn up by the Euphrates Dam Authority. The consortium is to make the necessary arrangements with German banking institutions to cover the expenses in foreign exchange beyond those covered by the government loan, which arrangements the Syrian government may or may not accept. One year is to be allowed for signing of the two contracts, subject to negotiation. In event of failure of the two parties to reach agreement, recourse is to be had to international expert opinion.[36] Report of the Kreditanstalt is submitted to the Euphrates Dam Authority confirming that Syria will be able to provide the funds needed in local currency.[37] (November) A team of experts from consortium members arrives to study local conditions for construction of the components of the project.[38]

1965: (January) "Yet another crisis between Damascus and Bonn on the question of the Euphrates Dam" is announced by the Syrian press, with renewed objections to "strings".[39] (February 7) A group of representatives of the consortium submits "an official report on the Dam drawn up by the Kreditanstalt. This delegation is charged with proposing to the Syrian government the opening of negotiations at a date to be set later."[40] (The final offers of the consortium on the barrage and hydroelectric station were due in February.) (March) Premier Hafez accuses West Germany of stalling and warns that "Syria will forget about Germany if the latter did not pay the loan within six weeks."[41] In an interview with a West German reporter Hafez denies Bonn's alleged charge that Syria had not arranged to cover expenses in

local currency, stating that they had been provided for in the second five-year plan.[42] Later, Hafez delivers a speech making no mention of West Germany's announced intention of recognizing Israel, stating merely that Syria examines its policy toward foreign states "in the light of the Palestine question".[43] W. Hartmann of Hochtief AG talks with Syrian Foreign Minister and Dam Authority director in Damascus, reportedly proposing on behalf of the consortium immediate commencement of building on the first stage, "brushing aside all the restrictions and reservations hitherto made by previous German negotiators." This proposal was rejected and the Syrians requested that the consortium build the whole project, not just the first stage.[44] (April) W. Hartmann returns to Damascus, reportedly offering a loan of DM 500 million, "which was equally refused".[45] (May) Syria terminates diplomatic relations with West Germany and the execution of the loan agreement is suspended.

---

[1] H. Vocke, "Über den Euphrat-Staudamm muss bald entschieden werden", Frankfurter Allgemeine, Feb. 1, 1965, p. 22.

[2] In the early fifties the World Bank had made a study of the project conditional upon an accord with other nations with rights to the Euphrates waters. (Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 231.)

[3] The Arab World, April 27, 1966, p. 11.

[4] See review of project in reference cited in note 3 above. An "official apology" is also claimed to have been made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry at a later date. (Ibid., June 30, 1961, p. 6.) The correction was offered in a letter from Leg. Rat. I Kl. Gerhard Pfeiffer dated Feb. 9, 1968.

[5] The Arab World, June 28, 1961, p. 6, and Vocke, "Staudamm".

[6] Named for Egyptian vice-president who led the U.A.R. negotiating team.

[7] The Arab World, Aug. 11, 1961, p. 9.

[8] Ibid., Oct. 26, 1961, p. 5.

[9] Ibid., Oct. 25, 1961, p. 5.

[10] Ibid., June 23, 1964, p. 1.

[11] Vocke, "Staudamm".

[12] The Arab World, Dec. 14, 1961, p. 8.

[13] Vocke, "Staudamm".

[14] Ibid. and Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 231.

[15] The Arab World, July 13, 1962, p. 6.

[16] Ibid., Aug. 17, 1962, p. 9.

[17] Ibid., Sept. 7, 1962, p. 8; Le Commerce du Levant, Oct. 17,

1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 5 (1962), p. 234.

[18]The Arab World, Sept. 26, 1962, p. 6.

[19]Le Commerce du Levant, Oct. 31, 1962, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 5 (1962), p. 284.

[20]The Arab World, Oct. 18, 1962, p. 8, and Oct. 30, 1962, p. 6.

[21]Ibid., Nov. 15, 1962, p. 9.

[22]Ibid., Nov. 27, 1962, p. 4.

[23]Ibid., Dec. 6, 1962, p. 6.

[24]Sonnenhol, op. cit., p. 232.

[25]This was to consist of a barrage 300 meters above sea level in height (i.e., about 60 meters above ground level) which could later be increased, a hydroelectric plant with an initial output of 200,000 kw. with a high-tension network, and a system of irrigation canals to serve 200,000 hectares. (Vocke, "Staudamm".)

[26]The Arab World, Feb. 12, 1963, p. 6.

[27]Vocke, "Staudamm". West Germany thus renounced control over the final form of the project, overall planning having been agreed to be the responsibility of Syrian authorities. The West German loan was to be used only for products and services of firms with headquarters in West Germany.

[28]The Arab World, Feb. 15, 1963, p. 6.

[29]Ibid., April 27, 1963, p. 11. [30]Ibid.

[31]Composed of Minister of Economy, Minister of Public Works, Director of Euphrates Dam Authority, Governor of Central Bank, and a number of engineers.

[32]The Arab World, Jan. 9, 1964, p. 5, and Jan. 22, 1964, p. 6.

[33]Ibid., Feb. 4, 1964, p. 6.

[34]Ibid., June 23, 1964, p. 1.

[35]Ibid., Sept. 4, 1964, p. 6.

[36]Arab Economic Report, October 1965, p. 157.

[37]Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes (BD), Feb. 13, 1965, quoted in Orient (Hamburg), VI, No. 1 (1965), p. 25.

[38]The Arab World, Nov. 24, 1964, p. 3.

[39]Ibid., Jan 14, 1965, p. 4A.

[40]BD, Feb. 13, 1965.

[41]The Arab World, March 9, 1965, advanced copy. Cf. Chronology of diplomatic break, pages 224-26 above.

[42]"The proposition made by the Syrian government to devote 5% of its annual receipts (about LS 30 million) for the project was unacceptable to the German side, which insisted on earmarking a specific budget for the purpose." (The Arab World, May 5, 1965, p. 10.)

[43]*The Arab World*, March 9, 1965, advanced copy.
[44]*Ibid.*, May 5, 1965, p. 10. [45]*Ibid.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY[1]

Books

Books in the German Language

Major Sources

Huber, Reinhard. Allahu Akbar--Nahost ruft uns! Hamburg: Übersee Verlag, 1954.

_____. Arabische Erbe--arabische Zukunft. Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1943.

_____. Arabisches Wirtschaftsleben. Vol. IV of Arabische Welt. Edited by H. H. Schaeder. Heidelberg: Kurt Vowuschel Verlag, 1943.

_____. Die Baghdadbahn. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1943.

_____. Deutschland und der wirtschaftliche Aufbau des Vorderen Orients. Stuttgart: Friedrich Enke Verlag, 1938.

_____. Es wetterleuchtet zwischen Nil und Tigris. Berlin: Drei Säulen Verlag, 1940.

Tillmann, Heinz. Deutschlands Araberpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1965.

Minor Sources

Abegg, Lily. Neue Herren im Mittelost. Arabische Politik Heute. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954.

Assmann, Kurt. Deutsche Schicksalsjahre. 2nd ed. Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus, 1951.

Bamm, Peter. Frühe Stätten der Christenheit. 13th ed. Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1963.

Bauer, Leonhard. Volksleben im Lande der Bibel. Leipzig: Kommissionsverlag von H. Wallmann, 1903.

Bechtel, Heinrich. Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im neunzehnten und zwangzigsten Jahrhundert. Munich: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1956.

Beer, Col. I. Der Nahe Osten. Schicksalsland zwischen Ost und West. Munich: Verlag Europäische Wehrkunde, n.d.

Bonne, Alfred. Palästina--Land und Wirtschaft. Leipzig: Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Buchhandlung, 1932.

Bretholz, Wolfgang. Aufstand der Araber. Munich: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1960.

Dönhoff, Marion, Gräfin. Welt in Bewegung. Berichte aus Vier Erdteilen. Düsseldorf: Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, 1965.

Eliseit, Horst. Halbmond um Israel. Das neue Gesicht Arabiens. Berlin: Safari Verlag, 1955.

Erhard, Ludwig. Deutschlands Rückkehr zum Weltmarkt. Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1953.

Falkenstein, Adam (ed.). Denkschrift zur Lage der Orientalistik. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1960.

Fernis, H.-G., and Haverkamp, Heinrich. Grundzüge der Geschichte von der Urzeit bis zur Gegenwart. 13th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 1966.

Fischer, Fritz. Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegspolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-18. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961.

Fück, Johann. Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des zwangzigsten Jahrhunderts. Leipzig: Otto Harrasowitz, 1955.

Görlitz, Walter. Der zweite Weltkrieg 1939-1945. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Steingruben Verlag, 1951.

Grewe, W. G. Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegzeit. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960.

Grobba, Fritz. Irak. 2nd ed. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1943.

Gross, Herbert. Deutschlands Zukunft auf dem Weltmarkt. Düsseldorf: Time, Inc., 1959.

_____. Der Handel folgt dem Ingenieur. Der industrielle Rat im Übersee. Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1955.

Gross, Hermann. Deutschland und der Weltmarkt. Hamburg: Hammerich und Lesser, 1948.

_____. Nah- und Mittelost als Handelspartner Deutschlands. Hamburg: Übersee Verlag, 1953.

Hassert, Kurt. Das türkische Reich. Politisch, geographisch und wirtschaftlich. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1918.

von Hentig, W. O. Mein Leben, eine Diestreise. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962.

_____. Der Nahe Osten rückt näher. Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1940.

Jäckh, Ernst. Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg. 2nd ed. Munich: Martin Mörike Verlag, 1913.

Jung, Hermann. Arabien im Aufbruch. Eine Reise in die neue Zeit. Munich: Verlag F. Bruckmann, 1958.

Kaster, H. L. Kleine Geschichte des Orients. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Heinrich Scheffler, 1955.

Kirchner, I. E. Der Nahe Osten. Der Kampf um Vorderasien und Ägypten vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. 2nd ed. Munich: R. M. Rohrer Verlag, 1943. (First published under the title Sperrfeuer im Nahen Osten, 1941.)

Kohn, Hans. Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient. Frankfurt am Main: Societäts Verlag, 1931.

Leonhardt, Karl, and Bonwetsch, Gerhard. Grundriss der Geschichte für die Oberstufe der Höheren Schulen. Edition B. Vol. I. Von den Anfängen der Menschheit bis zum hohen Mittelalter. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, n.d.

von Lojewski, W. Aufmarsch im Orient. Leipzig: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 1941.

Lührs, Hans. Gegenspieler des Obersten Lawrence. Berlin: Vorhut-Verlag Otto Schlegel, 1936.

Majonica, Ernst. Deutsche Aussenpolitik. Probleme und Entscheidungen. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965.

Mehnert, Klaus. Asien, Moskau und Wir. 11th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961.

von Oppenheim, Max Freiherr. Vom Mittelmeer zum Persichen Golf, durch den Hauran, die syrische Wüste und Mesopotamien. Berlin: Renner, 1899.

von Papen, Franz. Der Wahrheit eine Gasse. Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1952.

Paret, Rudi. Arabistik und Islamkunde an Deutschen Universitäten. Deutsche Orientalistik seit Theodor Nöldeke. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1966.

_____(ed.). Die Welt des Islams und die Gegenwart. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961.

Rahn, Rudolph. Ruheloses Leben. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen. Düsseldorf: Diedrichs Verlag, 1949.

Reichardt, Thomas. Der Islam vor den Toren. Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1939.

von Richthofen, H. Freiherr. Jahrbuch für auswärtiges Politik. Vols. I-III. Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1929-1931.

Rörig, Hans. Die arabische Welt. ("Dalp-Taschenbücher" No. 313) Munich: Leo Lehnen Verlag, 1955.

Schaeder, H. H. (ed.). Der Orient in deutscher Forschung. Vorträge der Berliner Orientalistentagung, Herbst 1942. Leipzig: Otto Harrasowitz, 1944.

Schmidt, Hermann. Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Türkei. Berlin: (no publisher given), 1913.

Schmitz-Kairo, Paul. Die arabische Revolution. Leipzig: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 1942.

Schwan, Kurt. Der arabische Nationalismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Niedersächsischen Landezentrale für Heimatdienst, 1959.

Seidel, H.-J. Der britische Mandatsstaat Palestina im Rahmen der Weltwirtschaft. Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1926.

Statistisches Bundesamt. Länderkurzberichte: Irak, Jordanien, Libanon, Syrien. ("Allgemeine Statistik des Auslandes") Mainz: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1967.

Stuhlmann, Franz. Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Türkei und England. Hamburg: Verlag von Georg Westermann, 1916.

Ular, Alexander, and Insabato, Enrico. Der erlöschende Halbmond. Türkische Enthüllungen. Frankfurt am Main: Rütten, 1909.

Wegener, Walther. Syrien/Irak/Iran. Leipzig: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 1943.

von Weizsäcker, Ernst Freiherr. Erinnerungen. Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1950.

Ziock, Hermann (ed.). Sind die Deutschen wirklich so? Meinungen aus Europa, Asien, Afrika, und Amerika. ("Deutsch-ausländische Beziehungen" No. 7) Herrenalb/Schwarzwald: Horst Erdmann Verlag, 1965.

Books Not in the German Language by German Authors

Boveri, Margret. Minaret and Pipeline. Yesterday and Today in the Middle East. Traslated by L. M. Sieveking. London: The Oxford University Press, 1939.

Liman von Sanders, O. V. K. Cinq ans de Turquie. Translated by Commandant Mabille. Paris: Payot, 1923.

Wilhelm II. My Memoirs 1878-1918. London: Cassell, 1922.

Books in Languages Other than German by Non-German Authors

Major Sources

Famchon, Yves, and Leruth, Maurice. L'Allemagne et le Moyen Orient. Paris: Editions des Relations internationales, 1957.

Hirszowicz, Lukasz. The Third Reich and the Arab East. Translated from the Polish. ("Studies in Political History" edited by Michael Hurst) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966. (First published in Warsaw, 1963.)

Kirk, G. E. A Short History of the Middle East. 6th ed. rev. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.

Vernier, Bernard. La politique islamique de l'Allemagne. Paris: P. Hartmann, 1939.

Minor Sources

Abouchdid, E. E. Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria (1917-1947). Beirut: Sader, 1948.

Les Allemands au Levant (juillet 1940-juillet 1941). (No publication data. Probably identical with Les Allemands en Syrie sous le gouvernement de Vichy. Brochure No. 201. London: Publications de a France Combattante, 1942.)

American Christian Palestine Committee. The Arab War Effort: A Documented Account. New York: The committee, 1947.

Arnold, H. S. P. Aid for Development. A Political and Economic Study. London: The Bodley Head, Ltd., 1966.

Birdwood, Lord. Nuri as-Said; a Study in Leadership. London: Cassell, 1959.

Bustani, Emile. March Arabesque. London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1961.

Candler, Edmund. The Long Road to Bagdad. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1919.

Carlson, J. R. [pseud.], Cairo to Damascus. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Dugdale, E. T. S. (ed. and trans.) German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914. 4 vols. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1931.

Earle, E. M. Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. A Study in Imperialism. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966. (First published in 1923.)

Falls, C. B., and MacMunn, Sir G. F. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. 2 vols. London: (no publisher given), 1928-1930.

Faris, N. A., and Tawfik, H. M. Crescent in Crisis. An Interpretive Study of the Modern Arab World. Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1955.

Fisher, S. N. The Middle East. A History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Frye, R. N. (ed.). The Near East and the Great Powers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Glubb, Sir J. B. A Soldier with the Arabs. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957.

Grunwald, Kurt, and Ronall, J. O. Industrialization in the Middle East. New York: Council for Middle East Affairs, 1960.

Hamady, Sania. Temperament and Character of the Arabs. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960.

Hasan, M. S. "Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Modern Iraq, 1869-1939." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1958.

Henderson, W. O. Studies in German Colonial History. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1962.

Himadeh, S. B. (ed.). Economic Organization of Syria. ("American University of Beirut Social Sciences Series" No. 10) Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1936.

Hole, Edwyn. Syrian Harvest. London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1956.

Hottinger, Arnold. The Arabs. Their History, Culture, and Place in the Modern World. London: Thames & Hudson, 1963. (First published in Zürich, 1960.)

Hourani, A. H. Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay. London: The Oxford University Press, 1954.

Hurewitz, J. C. (ed.). Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record. 2 vols. New York: D. van Nostrand & Co., 1956.

Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq, 1932-1938. A Study in Iraqi Politics. 2nd ed. London: The Oxford University Press, 1960.

Kirk, G. E. Contemporary Arab Politics. A Concise History. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.

_____. The Middle East in the War. ("Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946" edited by Arnold Toynbee) London: The Oxford University Press, 1952.

Kirkbride, Sir. A. S. A Crackle of Thorns. Experiences in the Middle East. London: John Murray, 1956.

Laffargue, André. Le Général Dentz (Paris 1940-Syrie 1941). Paris: Les Îles d'or, n.d.

Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. 3rd ed. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Levine, I. D. (ed.). Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar. New York: F. A. Stokes Co., 1920.

Lewin, Evans. The German Road to the East. An Account of the Drang nach Osten and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East. London: William Heinemann, 1916.

Lipchits, Issac. La Politique de la France au Levant. Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1963.

Longrigg, S. H. Iraq 1900-1950. A Political, Social, and Economic History. London: The Oxford University Press, 1956.

_____. Oil in the Middle East. Its Discovery and Development. London: The Oxford University Press, 1961.

_____. Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate. London: The Oxford University Press, 1958.

_____ and Stoakes, Frank. Iraq. London: Benn, 1958.

Magoffin, R. V. D., and Davis, E. C. Magic Spades. The Romance of Archaeology. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929.

Monroe, Elizabeth. The Mediterranean in Politics. London: The Oxford University Press, 1938.

Morris, James. Islam Inflamed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957.

Parfit, J. T. Mesopotamia, the Key to the Future. London: (no publisher given), 1917.

_____. Twenty Years in Baghdad and Syria, Showing Germany's Bid for the Mastery of the East. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., n.d.

Prittie, Terence. Israel. Miracle in the Desert. London: Pall Mall Press, 1967.

Saleh, Zaki. Mesopotamia (Iraq). 1600-1914. A Study in British Foreign Affairs. Bagdad: Al-Ma'aref Press, 1957.

Sharabi, H. B. Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand & Co., Inc., 1962.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistical Office. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York: United Nations, 1959-1967.

United States Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

Verney, Noël, and Dambmann, George. Les Puissances étrangères dans le Levant en Syrie et en Palestine. Paris: Libairie Guillaumin et Cie., 1900.

Ziadeh, Nicola. Syria and Lebanon. London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1957.

Articles and Periodicals[2]

Major Article Sources

Ames, Kenneth. "West Germany in the Middle East", The New Leader, XLVIII, No. 5 (March 1, 1965), 8-11.

Amin, Abdel Megid. "Deutsche Orientpolitik Heute", Aussenpolitik, V, No. 1 (January 1954), 27-36.

Arsenian, Seth. "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, II, No. 4 (October 1948), 417-29.

Böhm, Franz. "Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen", Frankfurter Hefte, XX, No. 9 (September 1965), 601-25.

Deutsche Presse Agentur. Hintergrund, July 15, 1964. (Mimeographed.)

Document. "German Ideas on Iraq, 1937-1938" (Report submitted

by Fritz Grobba, German Minister to Iraq in December 1937 to the German Foreign Office.) The Middle East Journal, XII, No. 2 (Spring 1958), 202-204.

Hauenstein, Fritz. "West Germany and the Middle East", Middle East Affairs, VII, No. 1 (January 1956), 11-19.

Hirszowicz, Lukasz. "Nazi Germany and the Palestine Partition", Middle Eastern Studies, I (October 1964), 40-65.

Meier, Jens. "Germany's Trade with Near and Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), III, No. 4 (August/September 1962), 162-66.

Schmidt, H. D. "The Nazi Party in Palestine and the Levant, 1932-39", International Affairs, XXVIII, No. 4 (October 1952), 400-69.

Sulzberger, C. L. "German Preparations in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, XX, No. 4 (July 1942), 663-78.

Weiss, Dieter. "Characteristics of Economic Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Countries of the Near and Middle East", Orient (Hamburg), VI, Nos. 4 & 5 (September 1965), 149-52.

_____. "Zum Verhältnis der BRP zu den arabischen Staaten. Überlegungen zu den Möglichkeiten einer Wiedervereinigung", Europa Archiv, XX, No. 21 (November 10, 1965), 821-28.

White, John. "West German Aid to the Developing Countries", International Affairs, XXXXI, No. 1 (January 1965), 74-89.

Wild, Stefan. "Mein Kampf in arabischer Übersetzung", Die Welt des Islams, IX, Nos. 1-4 (1964), 207-11.

Periodicals from which Minor Article Sources Were Drawn

German

Aussenpolitik. Zeitschrift für internationale Fragen. (1951-1967)

Europa Archiv.

Frankfurter Hefte. Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken.

Die neue Gesellschaft.

Orient. (Nah- und Mittelost-Verein/Deutsches Orient-Institut) (1960-1967)

Orient-Nachrichten. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Orient-Vereins. (1934-1939)

Die politische Meinung.

Der Spiegel.

Stern. Das deutsche Magazin.

Vierteljahresberichte. (Forshungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

Die Welt des Islams.

Zeitschrift fur Politik. (1958-1966)

Non-German

Arab Economic Report. (General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab Countries) (1962-1965)

The Arab World. A Daily Digest of Arab Opinion, Political and Business News. (1954-1967)

Chronology of Arab Politics.

Le Commerce du Levant.

The Daily Star (Beirut).

The Economist.

International Affairs.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives.

Middle East Affairs.

The Middle East Forum.

The Middle East Journal.

Middle Eastern Studies.

Mideast Mirror. Weekly Review of Middle East News. (1949-1955)

The New Leader.

Petroleum Press Service.

Other Sources

Interviews

Cultural and/or commercial attachés of Offices of (West) German Interests of the Embassies of France in Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, and Damascus. (April 1966-December 1967)

Journalists from both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic based in Beirut. (December 1966-March 1967)

Personnel of German-run vocational schools in Iraq and Lebanon and other West German nationals employed on German-directed projects or church work in the Fertile Crescent. (April 1966-March 1968)

Directors of the Orient-Institut and the Friedrich-Ebert-Institut branch in Beirut. (January 1967; January 1968)

Officials of the Near and Middle East section of the Foreign Ministry in Bonn. (June 9, 1967)

Dr. Arnold Hottinger (February 16, 1967) in Beirut; Dr. Fritz Grobba (September 22, 1967) in Bad Godsberg; and Dipl. Ing. Ober of Julius Berger AG (September 4, 1967) in Wiesbaden.

A scattering of citizens of the Fertile Crescent countries who have had close contact with Germans. (October 1965-January 1968)

Letters

Prof. Rudi Paret, University of Tubingen; Mr. H. B. Ellis, Christian Science Monitor, Bonn; and amplifying letters from two or three interviewees.

Lectures as noted in the footnotes.

---

[1]Sources drawn upon and credited in single instances (or for only incidental comment in more than one instance) are not included in this listing.

[2]Periodicals drawn upon for only one article are not included. SPECIAL NOTES: Spellings of proper names have been standardized insofar as possible on the basis of usage in S. N. Fisher's The Middle East. All translation from sources in the French and German languages was performed by the author of this paper.

Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.